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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Gary Lloyd Larsen for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Public Administration and Policy presented May 2,2008.

Title: Emerging Governance at the Edge of Constrained Federalism:
Public Administrators at the Frontier of Democracy

President Reagan and each succeeding President exerted significant effort to
scale back the size and scope of federal executive branch agencies, a pressure that can
be characterized as constrainedfederalism. This phenomenon is described by Kettl
(2000) as the theory of New Public Management. I observe and theorize that a new
form of governance is emerging as an unintended consequence of constrained
federalism's attempt to replace governance with management in the name of
efficiency.
This new form of governance arises when federal public administrators and
citizens work together in partnerships to mitigate the immediate and more subtle
adverse effects of constrained federalism. These partnerships have potential to remedy
New Public Management's reported shrinkage of democracy (R. C. Box, Marshall,
Reed, & Reed, 2001), and its flawed belief that management reform will solve
fundamentally political problems. This hypothesized new form casts public
administrators in an active role of constitutive governance by harnessing the power of

2
special interests to public purposes, thereby giving citizens opportunities to
reinvigorate democracy through civic engagement.
My research (a) investigates the nature and occurrence of this new form of
governance in the domain of federal natural resource management, (b) determines its
potential to reinvigorate democracy, (c) assesses its potential to reform fundamentally
political problems, and (d) establishes standards for its practice. I posit two new
theories to synthesize the findings of my research. The theory of New Public
Governance describes the newly emerging form of citizen engagement in governance
that arises from federal administrators' response to pressures of constrained
federalism. Federal Principal-Agent Theory prescribes how administrators must
operate within the space created by New Public Governance to redeem their
fundamental duties as public officials in our Constitutional federal republic.
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Preface
This dissertation has enabled my research to reflect over the span of more than
three decades of experience as a public administrator and to document some important
lessons learned. First, proper framing of an issue may be the most important step to its
successful resolution. Second, administrative work is ultimately the work of
governance. By that I mean public administrators play a key role in creating a
successful working relationship between democracy and capitalism, between
government and the profit and nonprofit sectors, and between citizens and their
government. How well these relationships will turn out in the long run is anybody's
guess and, in our democracy, everybody's responsibility. But career public
administrators play a special role. To more adequately perform this role in the future,
David Farmer (1995) has argued, in his study on bureaucracy, modernity, and postmodernity, that administrators need better preparation in a variety of disciplines that
will provide them with more self-critical perspectives to understand and improve their
work.
[There is a] need for expansion in character and scope of public
administration's disciplinary concerns. It implies that public administration
research and discourse can have more long-term and fundamental benefits by
strengthening the link between practical concerns and philosophical
perspectives, (p. ix)

The broader theme he articulates is the raison d'etre of my own public
administration practice and pedagogy. I am continually surprised by the power of both

Preface

xvii

systems theory and plain old managerial horse sense. My colleagues in the study and
practice of public administration stay a constant inspiration—I am inspired by their
passion, dedication, hard work, and commitment to public service as a noble cause. As
my understanding of public administration grows, I become more aware of importance
of the human factor. Lifting the managerial veil of goals, objectives, resources, and
processes to expose the human motivations, values, and beliefs behind people's
actions is an amazingly informative exercise. I am also drawn to the underlying
corollary of social institutions. With this brief preface, I hope the reader finds interest
and utility in theframesI create to bring life and texture to my examination of citizen
partnerships in American federalism.
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Emerging Governance at the Edge of Constrained Federalism:
Public Administrators at the Frontier of Democracy

President Reagan and each succeeding President have exerted significant effort
to scale back the size and scope of federal executive branch agencies, a pressure I
characterize as constrainedfederalism. I choose this descriptor to reflect the lived
experience of public administrators operating in a strongly constrained environment of
federal agency management that wasfirstinitiated by President Reagan and continues
to this day. President Reagan (1981) declared famously in his first inaugural address
that: "In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government
is the problem" (para. 9). President Reagan (1987) issued Executive Order 12612
entitled "Federalism" which articulated "fundamental federalism principles," the first
of which is "Federalism is rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best
assured by limiting the size and scope of the national government" (sec. 2.(a)). The
Order, echoing Thomas Jefferson and theframersof the constitution, required that all
Executive departments and agencies shall adhere, to the extent permitted by
law, to the following criteria when formulating and implementing policies that
have federalism implications: (a) There should be strict adherence to
constitutional principles. Executive departments and agencies should closely
examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any Federal
action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States, and should
carefully assess the necessity for such action. To the extent practicable, the
States should be consulted before any such action is implemented. (Sec. 3)
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In addition, the order empowered the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
the extent permitted by law, "to ensure that the policies of the Executive departments
and agencies are consistent with the principles, criteria, and requirements stated i n . . .
this Order" (Sec. 7). Many present-day federal administrators would likely argue that
even though this order has been rescinded, OMB has not relinquished its charge.
The term constrainedfederalism can be construed to refer to (a) national
government agencies, (b) the relations of the national government to the state
governments, or (c) both. President Reagan's Executive Order posited the scaling back
of federal agencies as a necessary condition for expanding state powers. For the
purposes of this research however, I am only investigating the constriction of national
government agencies (henceforth referred to as federal agencies). The associated
expansion of state powers, however important, is excludedfromthe scope of study.
Constrainedfederalism,in the sense I use it, is exactly described by Kettl (2000) as the
theory of New Public Management (NPM1). I observe and theorize that a new form of
governance is emerging as an unintended consequence of constrained federalism
which attempts to replace governance with management in the name of efficiency.
This new form emerges, I believe,fromcitizen partnerships with federal agencies.

1

1 use only three acronyms in this dissertation: NPM when referring to Kettl's theory
of New Public Management, which I use as a highly specified ideal type in describing
America's current experiment with constrained federalism; NPG for New Public Governance;
and OMB for Office of Management and Budget.
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This new form of governance has the potential to remedy the observed defects
of NPM reported by Box, Marshall, Reed, and Reed (2001) and others to shrink
democracy and remedy its flawed belief that management reform will solve
fundamentally political problems. This hypothesized new form casts public
administrators in an active role of constitutive governance by harnessing the power of
special interests to public purposes, thereby giving citizens opportunity to reinvigorate
democracy through civic engagement. My research (a) investigates the nature and
occurrence of this new form of governance in the domain of federal natural resource
management, (b) determines its potential to reinvigorate democracy, (c) assesses its
potential to reform fundamentally political problems, and (d) establishes standards for
its practice. I posit two new theories to synthesize the findings of my research. The
theory of New Public Governance (NPG) describes the newly emerging form of
citizen engagement in governance that arisesfromfederal administrators' response to
pressures of constrained federalism. Federal Principal-Agent Theory prescribes
fundamental duties of federal public administrators in our Constitutional federal
republic.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Democracy, according to Lakoff (1996), is comprised of two projects in selfgovernance. Thefirstproject is undertaken by citizens operating directly on and in
their own environment through personal choices they make in relationships, markets,
associations, careers, and the remaining dimensions of their lives. The second project
is undertaken by citizens operating indirectly on and in their environment in matters
that affect ail citizens through elected political representatives who are accountable to
them. The resulting American system of governance arising from its constitutional
origins* divided into three branches, subject to rule of law, and constrained by multiple
layers of checks and balances, is run by its public administrators. The purpose of this
dissertation is to explore one corner of democracy—that corner created by
collaborations between citizens and the public administrators who run their
government. I lay out below a context andframeworkfor exploring these
collaborations.
America has experimented with trying to harness federal executive branch
agencies under a constrained notion of federalism for more than two decades. The
experiment has resulted in beneficial as well as adverse effects. Presidential initiatives
from every administration since President Johnson have taken aim at executive branch
agencies to reduce the expense and increase efficiency of government. While this may
have arguably increased efficiency, it has also resulted in reduced agency efficacy and
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narrower, more instrumental2, governance. In addition, citizens have been adversely
effected by reduced goods and servicesfromgovernment, as well as by a shrinkage of
democracy as reported by Box, Marshall, Reed and Reed (2001). The pressure of
constrained federalism is well-described by Kettl (2000), which he argues is embodied
in the theory of New Public Management.
This current experiment with constrainedfederalismis but a manifestation of
the deeper American engram of distrusting government while yet demanding from it a
full suite of goods, services, arid functions. McKay (2000) notes that "Americans have
historically mistrusted big government. Low taxes and limited public spending have
been populist rallying cries since the beginning of the republic" (p. 1). He goes on to
observe that the great paradox is that the "fundamental dilemma of attempting to
reconcile raised public expectations with a deep suspicion of what government can
and should do is, therefore, likely to remain the identifying feature of the American
system for many years to come" (p. 391).
D. F. Morgan, Shinn, and Green (2008b) recognize the challenge of resolving
the inherent parallel dilemma between the instrumental and constitutive roles that
public administrators necessarily play in our democratic system of governance. They
2

Instrumental is used here in the sense examined closely by Cook (1996) of a narrow
conception of public administration where an administrator's only job is to carry out the
orders of elected officials. This is distinguishedfroma constitutive role where administrators
shape public policy and are thus players in the political community.
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point out the difference between the currently espoused theory of public
administration under constrained federalism, and the theory in action of the mixed
instrumental and constitutive roles public administrators are actually compelled to
play. Both of my theories of new public governance and principal/agent theoryfor
federal public administration aim at transforming the dilemma into a working theory
of public administration. In the case of new public governance, I do so by adding an
element of liberal democracy to constrained federalism, thus tempering one of its most
serious adverse unintended consequences. In the case of the principal/agent theory of
federal public administration, I do so by defining the terrain in which New Public
Governance must operate—within the Constitutional institutions of governance.
KettPs theory of New Public Management provides a solid framework to
describe the intent, ideology, operation, and results of developed countries' efforts to
rein in their bureaucracies. While his theory is well-accepted, no such well-accepted
exists to describe American federalism in its current incarnation—the broader context
of governance in which constrained federalism is set. Developing such a theory is
beyond the scope of my research, but I do need a working model of current American
federalism to provide a starting point. Stewart (1982) presents 326 metaphors and
models of federalism to illustrate the complexity of federal forms, suggesting that
"there are as many or more 'theories' of inter-governmental relations as there are
commentators on the subject" (p. 5). Rosenthal and Hoefler (1989) report five schools
of divergent approaches to federal theory: (a) dual federalism, (b) cooperative
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federalism, (c) pragmatic federalism, (d) non-centralized federalism, and (e) nationcentered federalism—to which they add two more: (f) distributive justice, and (g)
public choice theory. More recently, Volden (2005) embraces the inherent complexity
and offers a mathematically complex "game theoretic model of intergovernmental
political competition between state and national policy makers in American
federalism" (p.327). He describes four "stylized facts" of American federalism that he
suggests are accepted as conventional wisdom:

1. Manyftmctionsof governmentfluctuateover time between states and
federal government because of lack of Constitutional specification,
2. The most efficient level in delivering goods and services takes the lead
role in the marketplace of competition for government function,
3. Joint delivery of services is chosen based on credit claiming and blame
avoidance rather than efficiency for many major policy areas, and
4. States have variable responses to changes in federal spending priorities.
And finally, Pickerill and Clayton, (2004) affirm the dynamic nature of American
federalism by describing the contention sparked by the Rehnquist Court's 1992 revival
of federalism. The foregoing discussion suggests that no well-accepted description of
current American federalism is likely to materialize in the near future. My research
and theories contribute one piece to developing a working theory of American
federalism around the instrumental and constitutive roles played by administrators.
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While there is no general theory of American federalism, the literature from
many disciplines is rich with ideas, research, and theories about its different aspects.
From this literature, I create a set of concepts toframea model of American
federalism The model serves as a starting point for my research. It is designed to shed
light on various research constructs related to the emergence of citizen engagement in
their own governance including: (a) reduced public service as a result of constrained
federalism, (b) citizen partnerships in coproduction as a response, (c) administrators'
constitutive role in forming partnerships, (d) administrators' instrumental role in
mediating partnerships, (e) benefits of constrained federalism, (d) defects of
constrained federalism, (e) elements of governance embracing liberal democracy, and
(f) factors that influence the emergence of citizen engagement. It is also important, for
the purposes of this research, to capturefromwhence flows the dominant environment
of constraint faced by federal public administrators in the conduct of their business.
Constraints on administration are deeply imbedded in American federalism They
include constraints due to finely divided authority, multiple checks and balances
between and within branches of government, and the aforementioned initiatives of the
modern Presidency. Perhaps Fossum and Roth (1981) capture the heart of it in their
article entitled 'The American Dream." They remind us that:
The Constitution recognizes that Americans are not innately tolerant, that
they are rather a coalition of minorities, each trying to escape the others'
bigotry. Thus, if that document is famous for anything, its emphasis on
"checks and balances" may top the list. (p. 9)
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Hypotheses and Related Propositions
My research investigates the thesis that America's current experiment in
constrained federalism is resulting in the unintended consequence of a new emergent
form governance that is more democratic than its predecessor. The pressure to scale
back size and scope of federal executive branch agencies under a constrained notion of
federalism—the principles of New Public Management—has persisted for a quartercentury, datingfromthe widely acknowledged failure of President Johnson's War on
Poverty. It has had demonstrable beneficial as well as adverse effects. Scaling the
federal bureaucracy back has reduced costs and decreased rate of growth of
bureaucracy in government and has arguably increased its efficiency. However, it has
also resulted in reduced agency efficacy and more narrowly construed instrumental
governance. In addition, it has reduced theflowof goods and servicesfromthe federal
government as well as caused the reported (R. C. Box et at, 2001) shrinkage of
democracy. The following four hypothesesframethis possibility.
Hypotheses
I suggest that a new form of governance emergesfromthe constitutive actions
taken by federal public administrators. The particular constitutive action being
investigated is public administrators'formationof citizen partnerships to help with
their struggle to meet increasing demand for public services with decreased resources.
More specifically, my research investigates the claim that formation of citizen
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partnerships by public administrators results in (a) new organizational forms that
emergefromthe pressures induced by attempts to shrink size and scope of the federal
government, (b) that these new forms evolve to citizen engagement in governance, (c)
that this new form of governance retains the benefits of constrained federalism but
provides a remedy for its defects, and (d) that there is a set of factors that foster and
inhibit the hypothesized emergence of citizen engagement in their own governance.
The hypotheses and associated reasoning are outlined below.
Hy. I. New forms of citizen engagement arise as a response to constrained
federalism.
Hy. II. Emergent forms include elements of liberal democratic citizen
engagement—citizens engaging in their own governance.
Hy. III. Emergent forms retain benefits of constrained federalism and remedy
its defects, which include shrinkage of democracy.
Hy. IV. There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit democratic
citizen engagement in governance.
Taken together, these hypotheses describe if supported, a newly emerging form of
governance. I weave together the various associated constructs and propositions into a
theory of New Public Governance.
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Reasoning behind Hypothesis I
The President's Office of Management and Budget has caused many, if not all,
federal agencies to downsize and outsource many of their functions under the banner
of "competitive sourcing." Public administrators are, as a result, struggling to meet
agency mission objectives with ever-decreasing resources and increased constraints.
Citizens have been affected by loss of government-provided services and diminished
opportunities for participating in governance. Administrators and various associations
of citizens have found ways to work together to reduce the impacts of scaling back of
government. The null hypothesis is that no such forms occur, or any forms that do
arise have nothing to do with pressures of constrained federalism. Evidence of the
hypothesis can be found in (a) reduced accomplishment of agency mission-related
objectives and in reduction of services, (b) increased citizen engagement in
coproduction of government services, and (c) coproduction that evolves to a new form
of citizen engagement.
Reasoning behind Hypothesis II
Hypothesis II proposes that the emerging new forms have a coherency of
structure and function that match the theoretical constructs of a politically liberal view
of citizen participation in democracy. The null hypothesis is that emerging forms have
no coherent structure and function—each is a singular form with no common elements
orform,or their features have no correspondence with a politically liberal view of
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democracy. The phenomenon of new emergingformscould arise as a result of the
sense of responsibility to community and fellow citizens that arisesfromrelationships
formed both with other partners and agency employees. Trust that arisesfromnew
associations would also likely be a factor. My experience is that an orientation toward
the greater good naturally emanates when citizens roll up their sleeves in partnership
withfederalagencies. Evidence of the hypothesis can be found in partners' evolving
intent, increased understanding, and the arisingfrominitial engagement in
coproduction. I look to the new emerging forms to strengthen the warp and woof of
democratic processes that make government more aware of and more responsive to
citizen needs, and citizens more aware of the importance of accepting responsibility
for their own governance. The challenge is in describing and locating the contributions
such associations are making.
Reasoning behind Hypothesis III
Hypothesis III proposes that newly emerging forms of governance have the
effect of reducing constrained federalism's reported (R. C. Box et al., 2001) shrinkage
of democracy and introducing political accountability related to citizens' expectations
of government and governance. The null hypothesis is that observed forms have no
effects related to broadening democratic basis of constrained federalism, nor is
political accountability increased for elected officials. The reasons that this
phenomenon might have these results are that citizen engagement in governance will
flow naturallyfromcitizens engaging in coproduction. This is because in the course of
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their experience they will learn more about government and their role in it; recognize
that agency administrators and citizens working together can make government work
better; and that "government can do good". Evidence for this hypothesis can be found
in increasing solidarity between citizens and the agencies that they serve, as well as
decreased opportunities for politicians of all stripes to use agencies as scapegoats
when they dodge responsibility for dealing with problems that are important to people.
Reasoning behind Hypothesis TV
Hypothesis IV, that there is a common set of factors that bothfosterand inhibit
the occurrence of emergent citizen engagement in governance, suggests that there are
an identifiable set of actions that administrators and citizens alike can take to improve
American governance. The null hypothesis is that there are no common factors among
different forms and different agencies that foster or inhibit occurrence citizen
engagement. The null hypothesis argues that each engagement is a singular
phenomenon, each arising from its own unique set of circumstance. The reasoning for
this hypothesis is that if the existence of emergent citizen engagement in governance is
supported across agencies, then there is likely some causative mechanism at work
across agencies. Evidence is gathered by evaluationsfromagency administrators.
Explanatory Mechanisms
I use a simple systems dichotomy ofstructure and function to explicate the
various factors that constitute the research question. I also further refine function by
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extending the Dutch Pressure-State-Response Model (OECD, 2003). The ultimate
research question is about emergence of citizens' engagement in their own governance.
Figure 1 shows the simplest statement of the research question from a functional
perspective. The pressure of constrained federalism in this representation causes a
resultant state that has both intended and unintended consequences. Public
administrators working within this state, and in response to it, engage in constitutive
actions that ultimately lead to an emergent outcome of citizens being engaged in their
own governance. The point of my research is to determine if this phenomenon exists,
and if so, is there enough coherence in this phenomenon to describe it as an emergent
new form of governance.

Figure 1
A Functional Perspective of the Research Proposition

Pressure:
Constrained
Federalism

Reurttant State: \ \ AriaptWe Beseaoag:
Intended & unintendedV> Constitutive public
Consequences /y'
administration

Emergent Outcome
Citizen engagement
In governance

I examine the structure of the research questionfroma macro, meso, and
micro scale. The macro scale reflects the relationships of each of the hypotheses to one
another and to the functional perspective as shown in Figure 2 below. At this scale, the
functional pressure of constrained federalism leads to new forms of engagement—
partnerships in this case. Partnerships, in turn, lead to the hypothesis regarding
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elements of liberal democratic citizen engagement. Hypothesis III postulates that the
new forms retain the benefits and remedy the defects of constrained federalism.
Hypothesis IV asserts that a common set of factors foster and inhibit such citizen
engagement. Note that the factors serve as both feedback to agency administrators and
also as a beneficial unintended consequence of constrained federalism.

Figure 2
Structural Macro-View of Research Question Hypotheses
Hypothesis »
Emergent forms include elements of liberal
democratic citizen engagement

HypPlthesfrJ
New forms of citizen engagement arise in
response to constrained federalism
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Emergent forms retain benefits and
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I
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The mesoscale of the research question considers a finer scale than the
hypothesis—the explanatory mechanisms. The explanatory mechanisms serve the dual
role to (a) show that the hypotheses, as a starting point, are indeed reasonable starting
points, and (b) provide a basisforformingvariables and their constituent items for
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testing the hypotheses. Figure 3, below, shows the explanatory mechanism for
Hypothesis I regarding new forms of citizen engagement arising as a direct response
Figure 3
Mesoscale: Explanatory Mechanism for Hypothesis I
(
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to constrained federalism. The explanation goes as follows. The pressure of
constrained federalism is exercised through Congressional and executive branch
direction—law, appropriations, executive flats, regulations, and agency policy. The
agency administrator, following direction in an instrumental mode, scales back agency
programs in alignment with the new (smaller) budget and higher levels of constraints,
resulting in less production of goods and services. The public, upon experiencing a
reduction in goods or servicesfromtheir favorite agency, or the agency they love to
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hate, exert pressure on the public administrator. In an act of constitutive governance,
the administrator suggests a way that could meet their mutual interests. From this
suggestion arises a partnership where the citizen group rolls up their sleeves and
through a process of coproduction restores or mitigates loss of goods or service.

Although public administrators do many things that might constructively
address problems of governance, for purposes of building falsifiable constructs, I have
narrowed the scope of my inquiry to those actions related to citizen and group
engagement following Bovaird's (2005) constructs of coproduction, discussed in more
detail below. I morefollydevelop this broad formulation of explanatory mechanism
for hypothesis I by using a structural factors approach.
Forming partnerships as a constitutive act of governance also has strong
instrumental implications. The pressure of constrained federalism is manifest as
Executive and Congressional direction on public administrators. Examples include
Presidential Orders, OMB Circulars, Congressional appropriations, and Congressional
hearings holding agencies accountable for their actions. Pressure is exerted on public
administrators as agents in the various agencies who scale back, downsize, outsource,
and eliminate programs. The net result is a reduction of public services and reduced
contact with the public, who in turn bring pressure to bear wherever they can to
reverse, reduce, or mitigate the impacts of lost services. Many find their way to the
door of the public administrator who is directly responsible for the cutbacks. In some

Chapter I, Theoretical Framework

18

cases the administrator and members of the public reach an accord where
citizens/groups roll up their sleeves and help the administrator better reach her
agency's goals by enlisting citizens' help. It is here that it is important to note that
administrators are constrained, as always, to operate only within their authority as
prescribed in law, regulation, and policy. Any coproduction that thus arises is, by
definition, conducted for public purposes as enumerated in the applicable laws,
regulations, and policies. So while citizens are operating in pursuit of their own
interests, they are also working as agents of the public administrator accomplishing
agency mission related work. If the citizen coproduction is of any enduring length, the
administrator and individual or group will likely pursue a written agreement outlining
mutual expectations and interests regarding the work to be accomplished.
The explanatory mechanisms for hypotheses II and III rely more on reasoning
and theory than on public administrator actions as shown in Figure 4. De Tocqueville
(Elazar, 2006) reflected proclivity of Americans for forming associations. These
associations lead to discourse of both a private and public nature (Lakoff s twin
projects of self-governance cited at the beginning of this section). Burawoy (2003), in
his sociological Marxism, locates the public portion of the discourses as taking place
in the terrain of civil society with the purpose of taking action toward the state (for the
purposes here) and the market. Such discourse as it pertains to issues of governance fit
Posner's (2003) description of the liberal theory of democracy. One of the benefits of
constrained federalism is its emphasis on strict adherence to rule of law. Public
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administrators' instrumental rote in mediating partnerships is a reflection of their
constraints to not act outside of their authority prescribed by the Constitution and the
body of law and policy.
Figure 4
Mesoscale Explanatory Mechanism for Hypotheses II and III
Hypothesis H
Emergent forms include elements of liberal f
democratic citizen engagement

Hypothesis \

Hypothesis III

New forms of citizen engagement arise in
response to constrained federalism

Emergent forms retain benefits and
remedy defects of constrained federalism

Emergent Outcome:
Citizen engagement
In governance
TheoreticalAnatysis:
Democratic theory, pluralism, collective
action, coproduction. organizational
theory,socially constructed actions

Research Issues
The face of American governance and public administration is continuing to
evolve. The question of what form of governance is emerging as a result of a quarter
century of constrainedfederalismis part of a more fundamental question: What
fundamental changes are taking place in American governance and public
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administration? The followingframingquestions need to be answered to build an
understanding of this broader question:

1. What are the deep-rooted social and political changes that are taking place
which drive changes in American governance?
2. How are these deep-rooted changes manifesting themselves in American
governance policies and administrative practices?
3. How are these social and political changes altering the American
conception of public administration?
4. How will the changing conception of American public administration play
out in practice in the administration of public lands and associated natural
resources?
5. What added value can public administrators bring to facilitate change in
governance and public administration that will improve the public weal?
My research is aimed at one of the main thrusts of change taking place in
American governance—namely the quarter century of constrained federalism
catalyzed by the generally conceived failure of President Johnson's experiment with
socialism in the "Great Society." To the extent that I can answer the narrower question
that is the subject of this current research, I provide an anchor point for research being
conducted by others to explore other aspects of change in American governance and
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public administration. In the research thatfollows,I strive to touch on these more
fundamental questions as the opportunity presents itself to provide saliency for others.
In addition to the specific results of my research, there may also be utility for
other administrators and for scholars of public administration in (a) my summary of
NPM performance; (b) my working model of democratic and governance processes
situated in modern American federalism; (c) the typology of associations; (d) the
various measurement instruments and metrics employed in conducting this research;
and (e) a summary of federal government practice regarding partnerships with
individuals, associations, profit and not-for-profit organizations, and other agencies. In
addition, I believe my characterization of NPM and its strengths and weaknesses is an
ideal-type that many others will use. I believe both my initial theoretically-based ideal
type and my synthesized new ideal type for New Public Governance will be
particularly useful to public administrators and academics alike. Lastly, I believe my
methods, particularly combining theoretically and systems-based models with
empirical research, will be at least interesting and perhaps may even make a
significant contribution to the study of organizations and public administration.

Methodology Overview
Simon and Thompson (1991), reflecting on Simon's classic textbook Public
Administration (1950), argued that it "helped to redefine thefieldof study and its
practice by introducing two major new emphases: one, on human behavior and human
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relations in organizations, the other, on interaction between administration and policy"
(p. 41). Simon (1998) points out that "Modern industrial societies make important use
of both private and public organizations, and here, too, the boundary is very fluid....
[and] there is no sharp line between public and private organizations" (p. 4).
Reflecting further, Simon (2000) suggests that study of today's public administration
is the study of complex organizations, and in particular study of "mechanisms that
make complex organizations effective instruments for carrying out human purposes"
(p. 749). Human behavior, human relations, interaction between policy and
administration, and complex organizations are therefore the stuff of public
administration. By its nature then, research in the field of public administration
necessarily requires drawing from a wide range of literature—each with its own
distinctive sets of world views, values, and conventions for research;
Both the topic of my research and the field in which it lies are faced with the
challenge of mixed fields of inquiry—consideration of both quantitative and
qualitative research approaches and methods. Accordingly, I use both qualitative and
quantitative approaches and methods. Max Weber (1978) asserts that the science of
sociology rests exclusively on the foundation of actions of individual persons. This
does not exactly square with Durkheim's (Collins, 1994) notion that we are not
rational masters of our own destinies, but are constrained by the social structure we
inhabit, and that the real stuff of sociology lies in the social system and the structure of
relations between individuals. The two foci point distinctively to two completely
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different approaches to sociological inquiry (Ragin & Zaret, 1983). Weber's
epistemological analysis draws out both generalities and complexity of details by use
of ideal types and individual case studies. Durkheim's more ontological analysis also
draws out both generalities and the complexity hidden in particularities, but does so by
use of comparative analysis of relations. Barnard's (1968) approach in Functions of
the Executive is a classic Durkheimian approach. Barnard's examination of the social
structure of cooperation and its explication in great detail is an example of the
Durkheimian principle of using a unit of analysis at the level of social structure with
analysis of its corresponding factors. It is particularly interesting to note that the
dynamic difference between Barnard's approach dealing with the relations of
cooperation contrasted with Weber's approach dealing with hierarchy sparked three
decades of vigorous growth in thefieldof public administration (Perrow, 1986). I
draw on both approaches in my methodology. I use Weberian ideal types3 in adoption
of New Public Management as a reference point, and in the use of individual case
studies of agency administrators and their partnership agreements for seven federal
natural resource agencies in the Pacific Northwest. I derive empirical qualitative and
quantitative informationfromthese case studies. I use a Durkheimian approach in the
conduct of statistical analysis on a suite of variables and their constituent elements
derived from my structural factor logic model.

3

In addition to NPM, I also use Mintzberg's (1983) organization design to measure

organizational forms and my own (Larsen, 2008) Vector of Change theory to measure
organizational structure.
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Logic of Research
I drawfroma wide range of literature to form the concepts of a working model
of American federalism which I use, in turn, as a starting point for developing various
research constructs and propositions. I do so, in part, to reflect the rich study and
traditions that inform the study of public administration. I also do so because I have
found the practice of public administration for over three decades to be a remarkably
rich and professionally challenging experience. As a significant note, I grow in
admiration for my colleagues in public administration at every level of government for
their dedication to public service, creativity, energy, and perseverance in the fece of
sometimes very difficult situations. It is only appropriate that a body of literature
around such practice would by necessity be rich and varied, even though it presents a
challenge in extricating the relevant pieces for support of my research. I strive in my
research, because of the many fields and concepts I am drawingfrom,to be explicit
about how the various strands fit together. I also strive to fully account for the flow of
logic in the progression of research as I movefromthe research problem, to
hypotheses, to testing, andfinallyto conclusion. Table 1 shows theflowof my
research logic and identifies where and how each stage is discussed in the text.
My research constructs are the conceptual bridge between research concepts
developed in the literature review and testing the four hypotheses proposed for this
study. They construct the backbone around which I (a) design the particular research
methods, (b) develop variables and constituent elements, and (c) develop the
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Table 1
Flow of Research Logic and Location in Text
Stage in Flow of
Research Logic
Research Problem
Hypotheses
Explanatory Mechanisms
Model of Public
Administration
Research Concepts
Research Constructs
Research Design
Research Variables and
Constituent Items

Location in Text
Primary Discussion
Introduction, Conclusions
Theoretical Framework,
Findings
Theoretical Framework,
Methods
Introduction, Literature
Review
Literature Review, Methods
Methods-Constructs
Methods-Design
Methods-Design,
Measurement Model,

Referential Discussion
Findings summary
Introduction, Methods,
Conclusions

Findings
Theoretical Framework,
Conclusions
Theoretical Framework
Theoretical Framework
Literature Review
Theoretical Framework
Findings
Conclusion

Findings
Measurement Instruments
Statistical Model
Testing of Items
Corroboration of Elements
Corroboration of Variables
Corroboration of Hypotheses
Resolution of Research
Problem
Theory Building
Implications

Methods-Design, Subjects
Methods-Procedures
Research Findings
Research Findings
Research Findings
Findings, Conclusions
Conclusions
Conclusions
Conclusions

Theoretical Framework,
Findings, Literature Review
Conclusions
Conclusions
Conclusions

Theoretical Framework

measurement model and instruments. I develop a research structural logic model in the
methods section, comprised of variables drawnfromthe various constructs. The model
emulates explanatory mechanisms underlying the hypotheses. The research design
corresponds directly to the logic model and is designed to measure its various
constituent elements. The derivation of research concepts, logic model, and research
constructsfromthe bodies of literature is shown in Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5
Derivation of Hypotheses Variables, and Elements,
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A construct of empirically testable variables
and constituent elements drawn from
existing theories that forms the basis for four
hypotheses about emergent governance

Empirical collection of data is focused on three sources: (a) the body of law
and policy around partnerships, (b) agency administrators who form, mediate, and are
responsible for the outcomes of citizen partnerships, and (c) the formal partnership
agreements that agency administrators make with citizen groups. I collect both
quantitative and qualitative data. I also scale some of the qualitative data to allow
further statistical analysis. I use straight deductive logic in conducting analysis from
the body of law and policy because it is, of itself, direct primary evidence. I use
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statistical analysis of significance for numerical data drawnfrominstruments used in
agency administrator interviews and assessment of written agreements. I use both
deductive and inferential logicfromthe qualitative information derived from
interviews and assessment of agreements. The final aspect of methodology in the flow
of research logic is consolidation of results into conclusion. I aggregate affirmation of
the elements and variables into affirmation of the hypotheses. I aggregate the
hypotheses into resolution of the research problem. I then synthesize the various
supported elements into two different theories regarding new patterns of governance
and public administration
Scope and Policy Domain
The next question with regard to methodology is to determine which federal
policy domain would provide interesting and useful raw material for study. A
candidate domain would ideally feature (a) federal government provision ofprivate
goods or services4, (b) a contested view of highest and best purposes for an agency's
mission, (c) active political engagement by Congress and the Presidency, (d) debates
about who should benefit and who should pay, (e) differences in opinion about who
should get to set policy, and (f) implications in the practice of public administration
that might challenge academic conceptions of federal public administration. Without

4

A private good, in the economic sense, is one which is rival in consumption, where

exclusion of consumption may be practiced by both producer (in this case the government)
and consumer. One person's consumption reduces another's enjoyment of its benefit.
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developing alternatives, I suggest that the domain of public lands management and its
nexus with deeply held public and private valuesfollymeets the criteria.
Basic questions surrounding management of public lands are set against and
embroiled in the backdrop of America's continuing experiments in governance.
Consider the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area, for example, which was
created to both protect environmental values and foster economic development. It is
decreed by federal law, overseen by two states—Oregon and Washington—through a
bi-state compact and commission, administered by a federal agency—the U.S. Forest
Service—and it depends on six counties in two states to implement its provisions
through local planning and zoning regulations. What is the highest and best purpose of
public lands—particularly in the West? Who should decide—Washington D.C. or the
citizens of states where sometimes a majority of lands are federal reservations? Who
should receive their benefits—industry or the recreating public? Who should pay—
taxpayer subsidies for logging or Wilderness? And for each answer: Why? What are
the first principles? This is the stuff of democracy, and has been since before our
republic is founded. I therefore submit that public lands management is a good
candidate for study. Furthermore, I expect that evolution of public lands
administration coincides with broader tides of change taking place in the face of
American governance and the rule of law. What are the basic theoretical constructs
that shape our current day conceptions of the challenges faced by administrators in the
management of public lands and their associated natural resources?
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Administration of public lands is rife with controversy. Controversy stems
from thefeetthatfederaldecisions, whether by the President or byfieldlevel agency
administrators, allocate resources (in the economic sense) among competing needs and
interests. Some interests win. Some interests lose. Accountability for decisions is high
because the hidden hand of the market is replaced by the visible hand of public
deliberation. For management of public lands, the situation is additionally complicated
because the economic value of natural resources and use and occupancy of public
lands is not well represented in the marketplace. Adding further complication, political
interests of citizens are incompletely represented in the various processes of (a)
legislation, (b) formation of priorities for the Presidency, (c) annual appropriations, (d)
litigation, and (e) agency policy and decision-making.
Public ownership of lands in the U.S. arosefromone of two conditions: either (a)
mere is no private interest or value in the lands and they remained in custodial care of the
government, or (b) there is private interest and value, but a public policy determination is
made that a higher public interest in the lands compelled reservationfromthe private
domain. While the U.S. is widely regarded as a bastion of private property ownership and
enterprise, Clawson (1983) points out that a more accurate description is " we have a
mixed public-private situation. Many of our natural resources are publicly owned, but
privately used; on the privately owned resources, the use is heavily influenced, if not
controlled, by public considerations" (p. 7-8).
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Narrowing the scope further, natural resource management in the Pacific
Northwest also fulfills each of the criteria. Garreau (1981), in his book The Nine
Nations ofNorth America, proclaims the Northwest to be the nation ofEcotopia,
where he observes that "the politics and economics have been shaped by renewable
resources—particularly the bargain-priced hydroelectric powerfromthe Columbia
Basin complex... [of] thirty hydroelectric dams" (p. 256). He captures the spirit of
that connection by quoting part of Talking Columbia, one of the twenty-six songs
written by Woody Guthrie under commission to the Bonneville Power Administration
in the 1930s:
Uncle Sam needs wool, Uncle Sam needs wheat,
Uncle Sam needs houses 'n stuff to eat,
Uncle Sam needs water 'n power dams,
Uncle Sam needs people 'n the people need land.
Don't like dictators none much myself,
What I think is the whole world oughta be
Run by ee-lectricity... (Garreau, 1981, p. 256)
Kemmis (2001), in his book This Sovereign Land, also attests to the connection
between people and the land in the West, as well as to the depth of its political
significance. He sees:
A very powerful, inspiring, hard, and demanding set of western landscapes
having created over time a people so fundamentally defined by those places
that they must finally—must soon now—claim sovereignty over their
homeland, (p. xii)
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President Clinton, as part of his ran for Presidency in 1993 convened a forest
conference in Portland, Oregon, to "address the gridlock over management of the
Federal forestlands in the Pacific Northwest and the resulting effects on communities
and the regional economy" (Gorte, 1993, p. 1). Natural resource management in the
Pacific Northwest thus provides a good opportunity to affirm whether or not citizen
engagement in governance is arising from federal agency citizen partnerships.
Summary
Public administrators in the federal government today find themselves caught
in cross-cutting currents. On the one hand, the steady political tide toward constrained
federalism has increased pressure to scale back the size and scope of government.
Successive Presidents have worked to exert ever-stronger control over federal
agencies through the Office of Management and Budget to downsize, outsource, and
become more accountable. On the other hand, while it is part of the American
character to oppose big government, it is also part of our character to demand a full
suite of goods and servicesfromgovernment expressed through a proliferation of
special interests.
From the above described milieu, I hope through my research to: (a) reveal the
underlying workings of these dynamics, (b) explore partnerships as one possible
response of public administrators to this dilemma, and (c) explore the possibility of
new emergent forms of citizen engagement that arisefromthese partnerships. I further
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suggest that the resulting emergent forms of governance capture the best of
constrained federalism and also inject new energy into democratic citizen engagement.
My methodology is to examine a sampling of citizen partnership agreements and
interview administrators about their partnerships for a variety of federal agencies in
the Pacific Northwest. I survey both the extent of such agreements for selected field
offices and then evaluate a sample of the agreements using an instrument I developed
as part of my research. I also use an instrument to conduct interviews with
administrators. From these instruments, I conduct a statistical analysis of various
factors in hopes of developing a better understanding of the dynamics of pressures to
downsize thefederalgovernment in the face of citizen demand for more and better
federal government services. The hypotheses, null hypotheses, reasons, and evidence
is summarized below in Table 2.
The research is conducted in two phases. Thefirstphase includes (a) range
finding, (b) developing research concepts and constructs, (c) constructing useful
models for flow of logic, measurement, statistical analysis, and (d) a research design.
The second phase involves collection of empirical evidencefromthe body of law and
policy, agency administrators, and formal partnership agreements. The evidentiary
outcomes include (a) the relation of various elements of theoretical research to the
measurement model, (b) summary enumeration and evidentiaryfindings,and (c) the
meaning I make of the systematic review of quantitative and qualitative evidence. The
interpretation shows how federal public administration works in practice for public
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Table 2
Hypotheses, Null Hypotheses, Reasons, and Evidence
Hypothesis
Hy. I: New forms of

Null Hypothesis

Reasons

No new forms occur or

President Reagan and

Evidence
Reduced goods and

citizen engagement arise do not arise in response each successive

services lead to

as a response to

to constrained

President scaled back

increased citizen

constrained federalism

federalism

federal government

coproduction

Hy. II: Emergent forms

Forms have no

When citizens roll up

Citizens are increasingly

include elements of

elements of liberal

their sleeves for a cause developing a sense of

liberal democratic

democratic

they believe in, liberal

place, and from that, a

citizen engagement

engagement

democracy follows

sense of community

Hy. Ill: Emergent forms

Forms do not retain

Constrained federalism

Many agencies are

retain benefits of

benefits or remedy

is good at many things, increasing partnerships

constrained federalism and defects of constrained

and citizens are open to in the face of decreasing

reduce its shrinkage of

reengagement

federalism

budgets

democracy
Hy.PV:Thereisa

There are no common

Decentralization fosters Administrators

common set of factors

factors that affect

engagement of local

automatically pay

that foster and inhibit

democratic citizen

citizens, polarity

attention to what works

democratic citizen

engagement

inhibits it

and what does not

engagement

lands management in the Pacific Northwest, and makes an assessment of whether or
not we are turning the page on constrained federalism. The extension of my findings is
development of two new theories: (a) the Theory of New Public Governance
describing the new emerging form of citizen engagement, and (b) Principal/Agent
Theory for federal public administration. In addition Iframestandards for the practice
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of federal public administration, including standards for emergent citizen engagement
in their own governance.
Outline and Objectives of Dissertation
The objectives of this dissertation are summarized as follows:
1. Describe the theoretical basis of America's current experiment with
constrained federalism including intended and unintended consequences.
2.

Investigate the possibility that the constitutive actions taken by federal
public administrators in forming citizen partnerships results in a new
emergent form of governance.

3.

Investigate whether or not this new form, if it occurs, retains the benefits
of constrained federalism and remedies its defects.

4.

Determine if there are a common set of factors that foster and inhibit
citizen engagement in their own governance.

5. Form useful constructs toframeAmerica's current federalism and the
practice of federal public administration.
6. Establish a set of standards for the practice of federal public
administration and the newly emerging form of governance if it exists.
This dissertation is divided into six chapters, including the introduction. The
introductionframesthe research problem, identifies potential contributions, and
identifies the purpose of the study.
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Chapter 2, Theoretical Framework, builds a theoretical grounding in
democracy and constrained federalism. It identifies the American paradox of
distrusting big government while yet insisting on a full suite of goods and services. It
discusses the instrumental and constitutive roles that piiblic administrators play. This
chapter recognizes the difficulties of describing current American federalism and sets
the current research in its broader context of research issues. Hypotheses, warrants,
and related propositions are introduced. Explanatory mechanisms are discussed for
each hypothesis. Functional aspects of the research problem are explored. Structural
aspects of the research problem are explored at three different scales. This chapter
provides an overview of the methodology including (a) discussion of qualitative and
quantitative approaches, (b) flow of research logic, (c) derivation of hypotheses,
variables and elements, and (d) scope and policy domain. It provides an outline and
objectives for the report and concludes with a summary of theoretical constructs.
Chapter 3, Literature Review, explains the genesis of my research including a
detailed discussion of KettFs (2000) theory of New Public Management that describes
America's current constrained federalism. A working model of current American
federalism is described. This model is used to develop research constructs, hypotheses,
the logic model, and research design. Issues thatframethe research and that are
central to the research problem are developed in detail. Issues thatframethe research
include:
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1. Understanding competing human interests
a World views whichframevalues
b. Fundamental American values
c. Interests that flow from values
d. Allocation of public resources among competing interests
e. Conflict resolution—finding common ground
2. Systems Science in the Study of Coordination of human activities:
Sociology, Organizations, and Management
a. Overview of Systems Science
b. 1950-1959—Early Systems Approaches
c. 1960-1969—Establishing a Solid Scientific Basis of Systems
Thinking
d. 1970-1979—Emerging Critique and Explication of Systems Theory
for Organizations
e. 1980-1989—Application and Consolidation of Systems Theory
f. 1990-Present—Embracing Complexity and Rebuilding the Systems
Paradigm
g. Four Representative Organizational Systems
3. Sustainable Development: Integrating Peoples* Interests through
Governance
a. The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro
b. Imputed Structure and Function of Governance

Chapter I, Theoretical Framework
Issues that are central to the research problem include the following:
1. Public administration,
a. Structure and Function
b. Coproduction
c. New Public Management
2. Governance,
a. Transitions in governance
b. Public administration set in governance
c. Administrative law
3. American Federalism
a. Constrained federalism
b. Complex interdependence
c. Pluralism
4. Two theories of democracy
a. Conservative and liberal public administration
b. Rational choice theory
c. Learningfromchoices
d. Balancing multiple private interests
e. Finding common ground
f. Process of change
g. Emerging American communitarianism
The summary of this chapter identifies the need for new theory.
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Chapter 4, Methods, describes the research constructs and research logic model
around which the methods are developed. The research design is explained including
(a) the researcher's role, (b) research topics and geopolitical setting, research subjects
and units of measure, (c) the measurement model, and (d) measurement instruments.
In addition, this chapter covers assumptions and hmitations of the study, as well as
ethical considerations.
Chapter 5, Findings, presents, discusses, and analyzes research findings for
each hypothesis. Hypothesis I assesses new forms of citizen engagement including its
three variables of reduced public service, citizen coproduction, and emergent citizen
engagement. Hypothesis II assesses if the new forms incorporate the benefits of liberal
democracy. Hypothesis III assesses whether or not the new forms retain benefits and
remedy the defects of constrainedfederalism.Hypothesis IV assesses factors that
foster or inhibit citizen engagement.
Chapter 6, Conclusions, develops conclusions for each research issue and proposition
as well as conclusions about the research problem. In addition it develops two new
theories to explain thefindings:(a) a Theory of New Public Governance that describes
the emergent forms of citizen engagement in their own governance, and (b) the
Principal/Agent Theory for Federal Public Administration. This chapter discusses
implications of the findings for private sector managers, public sector policy and
public administration, and implications for further theory. It concludes with a
discussion of limitations of the research and identifies the need for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
My notion of New Public Governance was originally conceived of as a thought
experiment aimed at taking the best of constrained federalism—its ability to harness
unfettered growth in government despite special interests—andfindingremedyto its
unintended consequences of instrumental government, including its reported (R. C.
Box et al., 2001) shrinkage of democracy. I turned, for inspiration, to the following
four schools of theoretical thought, and to my own experience of three decades as a
public administrator.
Myfirstsource of inspiration is an exploration of constrained federalism
guided primarily by Kettl's (2000) theoretical constructs of New Public Management.
The second is a theoretical exploration of citizen action in civil society grounded in
Dahl's (e.g., (1957; 1967; 2006; R. A. Dahl & Lindblom, 1976)) and Lowi's (1969)
considerable body of work on pluralism, and catalyzed by Burawoy's (2003) work in
sociological Marxism. The third source is my career-long interest in sustainable
development, particularly my own recent explorations of the theoretical basis of
sustainability, some of which is published (2008). The fourth source of inspiration is
the considerable body of theoretical and practical work on governance conducted by
D. Morgan and others (D. Morgan, 1990,1993, Unpublished; D. Morgan, Bacon,
Bunch, Cameron, & Deis, 1994; D. Morgan & Kass, 1993) culminating in, among
other things, the notion of the constitutive role of public administrators posited by
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Morgan, Shinn, and Green (2008). Systems and management science provided an
ever-constant source of analytic power and logical rigor in these explorations. Against
the foil of thesefourtheoretical backdrops and armed with the discipline of systems
theory and management science, I drawfrommy own career-long experiences of
forging citizen partnerships to complete theframefor my present research.
Considering my immediate research problem, each hypothesis has a unique set
of research constructs, and each construct draws on a different theoretical basis or
field of study. See Table 3 below. It is apparentfromthe table that many different
strands of thinking are involved in my current research. To sort through their relative
significance, I analyzed the importance of various academic disciplines to key
concepts of my research, which is summarized in Table 4 below. I recognized from
this exercise that some fields are central to the research problem at hand and others are
useful forframingthe research. I have organized presentation of key concepts in this
paper accordingly.
The first hypothesis regarding citizen engagement is built on constructs around citizen
demands, organizational forms, citizen coproduction, civic motivations, and
democratic engagement. These constructs drawfrommanagement science, policy,
public administration, organization theory, and social institutions. The second
hypothesis regarding democratic engagement includes citizen engagement in
governance, distribution of power, conflict resolution, and public discourse; drawing
from sociology, pluralism, social capital, political economy, theories of democracy,
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Table 3
Research Constructs and Related Fields of Study, Theory, or Source ofInformation
Hypothesis and Research Constructs

Field of Study, Theory, or Source

Hy. I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a Response to Constrained Federalism
Citizen demand for goods and services

Management Science

Structure and function of organizational forms

Competitive sourcing

Form of citizen engagement less than 25

Public Administration

years old

Organization Theory:

Coproduction initiated by citizens

Sociology: Social Institutions, structure, function

Citizen motivation for civic engagement

Public Administration: "new governance"

Democratic citizen participation
Hy. H: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal Democratic Citizen Engagement
Democratic citizen engagement

Sociology: Civil society; Pluralism

Distribution of power

Social Capital

Interest-based conflict resolution processes

Political Economy: Complex interdependence

Hands-on governance aimed at consensus

Theories of democracy:

Public discourse for greatest common good

Theory of Sustainability
Discourse Theory

Hy. Ill: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained Federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage of Democracy
Positive Values of Constrained Federalism

Governance forms. New Public Management

Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism

American political institutions, Democratic Theory
Political philosophy, Federalism/anti-federalism

Principal-Agent TheoryforPublic Administration Contract law
Legislative Dictum

Public policy process

Executive Dictum

American government and politics

Judicial Dictum

Congress and the Presidency

Fealty to Citizens

Theory of Sustainability

Hy. IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster and Inhibit Democratic Citizen Engagement
Factors that foster citizen engagement
Factors that inhibit citizen engagement

Experience of public administrators

Chapter II, Literature Review

42

and sustainability. I develop a theory of value to aid in measurements for the third
hypothesis regarding benefits and defects of constrained federalism, drawingfromthe
theory of New Public Management, American political institutions, federalism,
governance, and theory of democracy. For development of principal/agent theory, I
drawfromcontract law, federal acquisition regulations, the Constitution, the theory of
sustainability, and the field of public administration. For the fourth hypothesis
pertaining to factors that affect democratic citizen engagement, I drawfromthe
experience of agency administrators.
I have organized the Literature Review into two main sections. The first
section is issues thatframethe research, and covers topics which provide a necessary
foundation and conceptualframesfor my research. This first section is further divided
into three subsections: (a) understanding competing human interests, (b) coordination
of human activities—sociology, organizations, and management, and (c) integrating
interests into organizational activity—sustainable development.
The second section is issues that are central to the research problem, and
covers topics that are necessary to form constructs for testing hypotheses, variables,
and constituent elements. The second section is further subdivided into subsections of
(a) theory of democracy, (b) governance, (c) federalism, and (d) public administration.
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Table 4
Correspondence* of Academic Disciplines to Key Research Concepts
Key Concepts
Citizen
Liberal
Constrained
Engagement Democracy Federalism

Academic Discipline

Contract
Law

Citizen
Coproducfon

Issues that are Central to the Research Problem
Public Administration

central

central

central

central

central

Governance

central

central

central

central

tangential

Rule of Law, Public Policy

central

central

central

central

tangential

American Federalism

central

central

central

central

tangential

Political Economy

central

central

central

tangential

tangential

Theory of Democracy

central

central

central

peripheral

tangential

U.Si Political Institutions

central

central

tangential

tangential

tangential

Issues that Frame the Research
Sociology-Collective Action

central

central

peripheral

tangential

central

Pluralism

central

central

tangential

tangential

central

Sustainable Development

central

central

tangential

peripheral

tangential

Organization Theory

central

tangential

peripheral

tangential

tangential

Management Science

tangential

tangential

peripheral

central

tangential

Systems Science

peripheral

peripheral

peripheral peripheral

peripheral

World Views

peripheral

peripheral

peripheral peripheral

peripheral

Note. ""Correspondence is defined as (a) central when the concept is part of the main stream of
study of the discipline, (b) tangential when the concept is or has been significantly influenced
but is not in the mainstream of the academic discipline, and (c) peripheral if neither applies.
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Issues that Frame the Research

In this section I review theory and literature thatframesmy area of research. It
lays the foundation for the next section that reviews theory and literature for issues
central to my research problem and testing my hypotheses. I strive in this first section
to illuminate deeper social and political currents at play to shed light on underlying
issues that challenge public administrators. Three areas of consideration in this section
are: (a) understanding competing human interests, (b) coordination of human
activities—a systems science exploration of sociology, organizations, and
management, and (c) integrating interests intp organizational activity—sustainable
development, Table 5 below.
I start the subsection on understanding competing human interests with a
discussion of world views which scholars use toframethe fundamental assumptions
and values of their particular fields of studies. From here, I discuss fundamental
American values thatframeour collective notions of governance including discussions
of (a) public valuesforpublic officials, (b) private values arisingfromplural interests,
(c) implications for public lands policy, and (d) social bondsfroma sense of place. I
then discuss how multiple interestsflowfromvalues, followed by an examination of
the allocation of public resources among competing interests. I close this subsection
with a discussion of how tofindcommon ground among competing interests. I
organize discussion of issues thatframethe research is as follows:
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Table 5
Organization of Issues that Frame the Research
Subsection

Topics

Understanding competing human

World views which frame values,

interests

Fundamental American values,
Interests that flow from values,
Allocation of public resources among
competing interests,
Conflict resolution—finding common
ground,

Systems Science in the Study of

Overview of Systems Science

Coordination of human activities:

1950-1959—Early Systems Approaches

Sociology, Organizations, and

1960-1969—A Scientific Systems Basis for
Organizations

Management

1970-1979—Emerging Critique and
Explication of Systems Theory for
Organizations
1980-1989—Application and Consolidation
of Systems Theory
1990-Present—Embracing Complexity and
Rebuilding the Systems Paradigm
Four Representative Organizational Systems
Sustainable Development:

The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro

Integrating Peoples' Interests

Imputed Structure and Function of
Governance

through Governance
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Understanding Competing Human Interests
Thefirstthree topics mark a progressionfromworld views, through American
values, to citizen interests thatflowfromthe values. The next topic regarding
allocation of public resources among competing interests deals with the distorted
markets in public goods. It queues up the imperfect and highly visible world that
agency administrators face in their decision-making. The topic on conflict resolution
frames what happens when citizen interests collide with agency decisions. The topic
on sociological aspects of policy takes a deeper look at the human dynamics at work.
The next three topics on systems and management science give rigor to research about
organizations, public administration, and management. The last topic, sustainable
development, provides an integrative balance and provides the beginnings of a theory
of value for various aspects of governance.
I strive in this first section to answer the basic questions fundamental to my
research. What are the basic theoretical constructs and relations that shape the
challenges faced by public administration? In the second section, I take up the
question of how does public administration issues fit into the question of challenges of
governance? What are the pieces of the public administration and governance
clockworks and how do they interact? These questions are the central topics of ray
research investigation. They are the basic systems question pf public administration
and governance: What is the structure and function of the American system of public
administration? And how does it fit within the American system of governance?
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World Views
Public administration, as noted by D. Morgan, Shinn, and Green (2008), has
both instrumental and constitutive dimensions. The instrumental dimension is framed
by politically conservative values while the constitutive dimension may beframedby
liberal values. Rather than resolving the dynamic tension, the American approach to
public administration is to espouse an instrumental role for federal public
administrators while at the level of practice placing administers in the position of
successfully performing both instrumental and constitutive roles. Many normative
discussions around the role of public administration in a separation of powers system
founder on conflict arisingfromfundamental differences in underlying values. Any
theoretical discussion that puts public administrators in charge of resolving competing
value tensions raises serious issue of authority and legitimacy. This research project
examines the role of administrators who are placed precisely in this position as a result
of the constrained federalism arisingfromthe New Public Management moverment.
The propositions in this research aim at bridging world views to better inform
public administration research and practice. Each of the disciplines and theories that
contribute to the study and practice of public administration reflect a particular world
view. The problem with different world views is that each entrains a particular set of
values, assumptions, logic,frameof reference, and notions of what constitutes
legitimacy—all of which are usually implicit and thus hiddenfromothers who do not
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share the same world view. The answers to the most significant challenges of public
administration depend importantly upon one's view of the world.
Heppner, Kivlighan, and Wampold (1999) assert that world views "are the
philosophical foundations that guide understanding of the world and how inquiries are
made tofartherthat understanding" (p. 236). They posit four world views:
1. Positivism employs the scientific method. It holds that the nature of the
universe can be known and the scientist's goal is to discover the natural
laws that govern the universe.
2. Post-positivism also employs the scientific method, but recognizes truth
cannot be fully known. We must therefore make probabilistic statements
rather than absolute statements about truth. Methods include peer review
and scientific community arbitration.
3. Constructivism holds that ideas about the world are constructed in people's
minds. Reality is created by the participants of any system, the investigator,
and object under consideration, which cannot be conceived of separately.
General methods are hermeneutics and dialectics. There are no truths to be
discovered. Methods are recursive rather than linear—results and method
influence each other.
4. Critical Theory holds that people's social constructions are shaped by their
environment. Investigation involves investigator/subject dialogue, and the
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dialectic should lead to the participant's understanding that social action is
needed to change the social order.
Heppner, Kivlighan, and Wampold believe that awareness of the paradigm at
hand is crucial to match appropriate methods to belief systems and to create research
that is relevant for the associated body of knowledge. I consider these world views as
Weberian ideal types, each one defining a particular point on a continuum of world
views marked near one end—say the right—by positivism and the other—say the
left—by critical theory. In tliinking about the purposes at hand, it should be sufficient
to distinguish between two world views: (a) a world view with central tendencies
around Positivism and Post-positivism, hereinafter referred to as a positivist view; and
(b) a second world view with central tendencies hovering around constructivism,
hereinafter referred to as a constructivist view. The authors also distinguish qualitative
research and methodsfromquantitative, noting the general affiliation of quantitative
research with positivist and post-positivist enquiry and qualitative research with
constructivist and critical theory research. For this research then, I subsequently
discuss a qualitative and a quantitative approach. The characteristics of the two
approaches, drawnfromthe work of these authors, are shown in Table 6.
From a substantive perspective, the partnerships that are the object of my
research are one of the tools that public administrators in my case studies use to help
redeem their complex and multi-dimensional responsibilities. As such, they are one of
Simon's (1997) "mechanisms that make complex organizations effective instruments

Chapter II, Literature Review

50

Table 6
Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Approaches after Heppner et. al
Dimension

Quantitative

Qualitative

Reality

Truth exists; behavior discoverable
and governed by rules, laws

Reality is a social construction; there
are no truths to be discovered

World
Representation

Mathematical, verbal description of Linguistic; symbolic
quantitative results

Constructs hypotheses; theoryDomain knowledge and theory driven; deductive

Data-driven; previous knowledge
Can bias results; inductive

Intellectual bases Mathematics, statistics, logic,
physical sciences

Linguistics, philosophy, sociology,
anthropology, literature

Level of Inquiry

Reductionist, atomistic

Holistic

Investigator Role Objective, dualistic

Subjective, interactive

Role of subjects
or participants

Subjects: naive to experimental
hypotheses and are acted upon

Participants fully informed, involved
in research, evaluation, and results

Generalizability

A sample is used to generalize to
population; deductive

Applicability is more important than
Generalizability; inductive

Bias

Problematic; must be reduced

Accepted and acknowledged

Validity

Minimizes alternative explanations

social utility, uses triangulation

Reliability

Measurements reflect true values

Not relevant

Product

Scientific journal report, statistical or Written in common language;
mathematical results, domainaccessible regardless of domain,
specific language
available and relevant to
participants

Audience

Academic community; policy
implications made by academics

Academic and general audiences;
policy implications integral

Control

Controls external influences, and
detects causal relationships

Involves understanding complex
relationships among various factors

Goals of study

Discover truth; explain, predict,
affirm; extend knowledge

To describe, interpret, critique,
revise, and change

Researcher voice Detached, objective scientist
Power structure

Involved investigator and participant

Dominant academic view for tenure Gaining recognition; recognition
funding, publication, and promotion outside academia is important
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for carrying out human purposes" (p. 1), and part of the "organization design [which]
focuses on balancing the gainsfromcoordination against its costs" (p. 4). However,
the reason for my inquiry, as Simon reminds us, is also to deal with the deeper issues
of "first, the distribution of power in modern society, and second, the distribution of
the social product" (p. 7). Many aspects of the first topic of mechanisms and
organization design are appropriately explored with a positivist view of efficiency and
efficacy, depending on just the facts at hand. However, the second topic of distribution
of power and social product is an entirely different matter. It can only be accessed
through a constructivist view shaped by human intent, values, and aspirations.
So, my research is firmly stuck in two worlds. The mechanisms and parts of
my topic exist in a positivistic world where things are measured, connected,
reconfigured, and performance evaluated. The meaning and implications of how the
parts are connected and their outcomes, however, exist in a constructivist world
created by convention, law, policy, and ideology; and measured by human values. I
accordingly use a quantitative approach to measure the individual variables associated
with my hypotheses, and a qualitative approach to evaluate the constructive meaning
of what I find in the positivist world. Next, I turn my attention to values.
Fundamental American Values
Questions surrounding management of public lands for public and private purposes are
often driven by deeply held underlying values. Krutilla et al. (1983) asserts that one of
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the most fundamental choices a government makes "is in how it defines property
rights—that set of economic and social relationships which determine how each
individual may gain access to and use the scarce resources of the society" (p. 548).
The question of management of public lands is how to set conditions of access,
transfer, or use of such rights or property—determining if it should be completely free
or restricted in specific ways for broader public interest. Okun (1975) frames these
public policy choices as a conflict of opposing value systems. He observes that these
choices arisefromthe American "double standard of a capitalist democracy, professing
and pursuing an egalitarian political and social system and simultaneously generating
gaping disparities in economic well-being," pointing out that society "faces a tradeoff
between equality and efficiency" (p. 1). Three fundamental sets of American values drive
the politics and administration of federal public lands and their associated natural
resources. The value sets are: (a) public valuesforpublic officials, (b) private values of
free market private enterprise, and (c) private values arisingfromplural interests.
Public valuesfor public officials. What values should guide federal public
administrators? Our federal system is based on the doctrines of separation of powers,
checks and balances, State rights under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution,
individual rights, and rule of law, among others. In Figure 6,1 distinguish four
categories of American institutions of Constitutional governance: (a) federal
government, (b) federal governance, (c) state (and local) government, and (d) rights of
private persons. A public administrator is bound not only by executive branch dicta,
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but obviously also by laws, court decisions, and the Constitution. It follows that public
administrators are bound by the Constitutional reservation of powers to the states or to
Figure 6
American Institutions of Constitutional Governance
legislative Power
U.S. Congress
{Article I)

Judicial Power
Supreme & inferior Courts
{Article HI)

Constitutional Institutions
Executive Power
U.S. President
(Article 11}

Reservation of powers*
(Tenth Amendment)

Recognition of Persons
Bill of Rights
(Amendments IV- IX.X1V)

Recognition of States
(Article IV)

>- of the Federal Government

>-

Of Federal Governance

Of State (and Local] Government,
J>- Ofrightsof private persons,
(Civil Society, family,& commerce]

Note. * "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" (Tenth Amendment),
the people—that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States respectively, or to the
people." More concretely, a manager of federal lands is therefore strictly limited to
making only those decisions and taking only those actions that have an exact and
particular basis in law—the starting point for my principal-agent theory.
Private values of free market private enterprise. A second fundamental
American value is the primacy offreemarket private enterprise. Levine (1995) argues
thatfreeenterprise is the path tofreedom.Liberty is both a means and an end. Liberty
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as means consists of the ability to make individual choices as a consumer and seller in
the private market place. Liberty as an end consists of our individual and collective
aspiration "to assure the conditions needed to sustain our independence of action and
initiative" (p. 3). He asserts that modern men and women pursue three projects in their
freedom—esteem, autonomy, and security. He argues that free markets provide
opportunities to realize thefruitsof people'sfreedom.He concludes that, to the extent
that the state protectsfreemarkets, the state also protectsfreedom,This point
demonstrates the foundational conservative nexus betweenfreeenterprise and
individualfreedomand the self-evident self-justifying proposition that competitive
sourcing federal government services, besides reducing the size and scope of
government, equates to liberation of its citizens. Being one of the twin pillars upon
which this country is founded, free enterprise alsoframesthe role of administrators of
public lands. It provides a measure of efficiency for allocation of resources among
competing needs; it provides a mechanism for providing government goods and
services through contracting; and it provides a model and concept of organizational
management for administrators to strive to emulate. This notion offreeenterprise is
one of the founding principles of the theory of New Public Management, which I use
as an ideal type to describe America's current constrained federalism.
Private values arisingfromplural interests. There is a deep and abiding desire
within the American spirit to form associations—the third fundamental value under
consideration. De TocqueVille reflected back to Americans the centrality of
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associations to their way of life. In his essay, Democracy in America (1956), he finds
that "[i]n no country in the world has the principle of association been more
successfully used, or applied to a greater multitude of objects, than in America.
Besides the permanent associations... [townships, cities, and counties], a vast
number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals" (p.
95). Although I take up a discussion of pluralism in more detail below, for the
purposes of the present discussion I focus on values as expressed by associations—
more contemporarily known as special interest groups.
Social bondsfroma sense of place. Bellah (1985) closely examines the conflict
between American individualism and community. He argues that, at the end of the
day, we all depend on the sense of belonging, the values, and the support of
community. He argues through case studies that our individualism interferes with
obtaining our greater common good. In his 1995 lecture at Portland State University,
Bellah (1995) points out that individualistic opportunity is not enough. He argues that
community is not just a contractual association for the maximization of individual
interests, but is a shared concern with the greater community good. He suggests that
any institution needs to ask what constitutes being a good institution and needs to form
goals based on its shared values. Reflecting on societal aspirations, he suggests:
Those who imagine that we can focus on opportunity virtually alone, allowing
individuals to make whatever arrangements they please to fulfill their choices,
overlook much about social reality. They forget that institutions... which are
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the specific expressions of community, are necessary even to create the kind of
person who can respond to real opportunity- (para. 19)
His suggestion, although he was not likely contemplating it at the time of his speech,
has a strong parallel in the instrumental versus constitutive actions of governance
undertaken by federal administrators. Moreover, the human aspiration to which he
alludes, of making the community, institution, or even government better, are exactly
the same aspirations that I see emergefrompartnerships. His views are often referred
to as communitarian.
Social bonds of the kind considered by Bellah arefrequentlyanchored to a
sense of place. Austin (2002) explores the relationship between social bonds and place
in a recent Bureau of Land Management research proposal. He suggests that social
bonds—the glue for social discourse about the common good—might be strengthened
by fostering a sense of place. Heframeshis proposal around two opposing
propositions: (a) social bonds emerge from dynamic civil discourse about issues—a
view he claims is supported by nearly all civil society literature, and (b) social bonds
are a prerequisite to social discourse. He explores the literature on the formation and
functioning of civil society and points out the following three functions that are
performed by civil society: (a) offering self-governance throughfreemarkets, (b)
rebuilding human values, and (c) building social capacity for political participation.
He notes that the literature is remarkably silent on the question of what enables social
discourse to occur in thefirstplace. To hisfirstquestion of what allows social
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discourse to occur in the first place, Austin answers that the social bond comes first
He synthesizes the explorations of civil society, place, and social bond into the
hypothesis that "physical place, acting both at and below the level of consciousness,
creates a common mind and in doing so contributes to the construction and structure
of the social bond" (p. 359). Austin anchors important features of American civil
society to the uniquely American sense of place.
Carry the notion of social bonds further, Bang, Box, Hansen, and Neufeld
(2000) explore themfromthe perspective of social change, a discussion I take up in
more detail later. For the purposes of the current discussion, the authors suggest that
Americans begin policy debate with a deeply rooted first language of individualism
based on the normative classic liberal view, but often employ a second language of
community when confronted with ordinary problems where neighbors might be able to
help each other. They further suggest that this often leads to an interesting American
dichotomy of a. professed ideology of individualism contrasted to an enacted ideology
of community. They assert that "career public administrators should consciously
choose their relationships to citizens and elected representatives, since their work
cannot be value-free and they have a duty to the public to be self-aware about whom
they serve and for what purposes" (p. 375). The most important question, they believe,
is "how to bring an administrative model of open, dialogic practice alive in the current
political and institutional environment" (p. 375)—an open public discourse "as free as
possiblefromthe manipulation and distortion of power and hidden agendas" (p. 376).
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This point corresponds exactly to the view that public administration plays a
constitutive role in both policy development and implementation.
Kemmis (1990) looks closely at the values and politics of place. He takes up
the case for special federal treatment of the West, proclaiming that the current
framework of federalism leads to suboptimal allocation of public resources. He claims
that the current processes for decision making about public lands is biased against
finding solutions—against making allocations of land and resources in the best public
interest. His argument is that current federal processes are biased against the values,
social bonds, and politics that stemfroma community's connection to place. He
argues that special interests can veto community initiatives and that it is very difficult
for federal officials to forge common ground in the face of conflicting values and
interests. His claim is that the dynamics lead to a stasis where the community's
interest is not well-served. He believes that foregoing decisions to allocate use of
public lands and natural resources is, infeet,a decision itself—a decision that favors
federal interests over local interests. In his subsequent book on politics of place in the
West Kemmis (2001)frameshis argument by noting that the eight states of the
interior West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming)—260 million acres-more than 48 percent of the land base—are
substantially owned by the federal government and managed by agencies based in
Washington, D.C. He proposes giving the western states control over federal land. In
place of the current management by federal agencies, he offers an approach that takes
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into account natural topographical and ecological features, and brings together local
community residents with a vested interest in ensuring the sustainability of their
communities. Kemmis adds an additional critical dimension to the question of greater
good. The question is: To whom should the benefits accrue?
Implicationsfor public lands policy. While current federal natural policy
formulation is often conflicted by strong federal interests attempting to prevail over
local community interests, it is also conflicted by its historical setting in hierarchy, by
its contemporary setting in fast-paced change dominated by capitalism, markets, and
special interests. Political solutions to the most pressing problems often do not resolve
the inherent conflicts, but merely pass them on, unresolved, to be sorted out by
agencies. When this happens, public administrators are faced with the struggle to
implement laws and policies that contain within them provisions at odds with the main
intent of the policy. A classic case of this situation is President Clinton's "Salvage
Rider Bill" signed in 1995.
The Salvage Rider bill aimed at increasing salvage timber harvest from public
lands, particularly the U.S. Forest Service. Remarkably, it suspended agency citizen
appeal processes and made environmental assessment under the National
Environmental Policy Act discretionary. The bill was an attempt to overcome the
gridlock in federal forest management policy. Upon the Bill's passage, the
Administration immediately secured a memorandum of understanding between the
Secretaries of affected departments requiring compliance with all environmental
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laws5. On the one hand, the Bill spawned so much controversy that its implementation
was extremely difficult. On the other hand, the requirement of meeting all
environmental laws in contradiction to the Bill itself, ensured difficulty, and time
consuming processes for the Forest Service who was charged with its implementatioa
In the end, parties on all sides were grateful when the Bill's provisions expired.
It is also possible that this phenomenon of policy reforms containing
provisions at odds with their own intent is an artifact of the American dichotomy of a
professed ideology of individualism contrasted with an enacted ideology of
community. Particular provisions of a reform policy, according to this idea, might be
codified in the first language of individualism and associated instrumental intent while
the intent of the reform is cast in the second language of community where means are
more important than efficiency. If so, this would imply that such conflicted policies
reflect a deeper conflict writ on the American psyche—the conflict between individual
rights and community interest.
It is thus apparent that public lands policy is bounded by mutually opposed
boundary conditions: (a) there is an expectation of reaching rapid consensus on

5

As Chief of Staff for the Undersecretary for Natural Resources and the Environment
at the time, it was my job to write the memorandum of understanding and obtain all the
various Secretaries' signatures and support. Ironically, I also later found myself bound to
implement its provisions and endure its controversies as Forest Supervisor of the Mt. Hood
National Forest.
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confounding social problems at which new policy reform aims; (b) there are
unresolved differences in fundamentally opposed interests embedded in the new
policy; (c) there are overly detailed and self-defeating policy prescriptions; and (d)
there arefrequentlydeeper conflicts between the need to protect individual liberty
even while pursuing community interests. All of this leads to a most challenging task
for public administrators. How can the public interest be best served in meeting the
intent of new policy reforms within the carefully circumscribed available tools? Austin
suggests that even a humble land management agency like the Bureau of Land
Management might be able to foster the social bonds that create public discourse.
More radically, reflecting on the various propositions outlined above, public
administrators might be able employ citizen discourse in the arena of civil society as a
mediating structure for the twin problems of tempering (a) the zeal of NPM reform
enacted as policy beyond administrative capability and (b) the insatiable citizen desire
for goods and servicesfroma government that they insist remain small. It just might
be that citizens are the ultimate antidote and balance wheel for administrators faced
with the often impossible task of producing more with less in the face of significant
policy constraints.
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Interests FlowfromValues
Interests in public lands and their natural resources can be structured as shown
in Figure 7. They can be characterized as being offivedifferent kinds: (a) public
interests expressed through formal means—extant legislation, public policy, and
appropriations, (b) public and private interests expressed through informal dynamic
means—political influence on federal agency policies and decision-making, (c) private
interests expressed in the marketplace where applicable, (d) private interests expressed
through pluralism—special interest groups, and (e) public interests expressed through
checks and balances between and within branches of government (for example, the
judicial system with its ever-growing body of case law, the Offices of Inspectors
General, and the Government Accounting Office). Federal decisions regarding use and
occupancy of public lands have been a significant, sometimes dominant, factor in the
settlement and development of the Pacific Northwest. Decisions by public officials in
the Pacific Northwest have historically been controversial and remain so to this day.

From the few simple constructs of administration of federal public lands and
public and private interests outlined above, three value sets are articulated that
emanatefromthe uniquely American experience: (a) public values for public officials
that have an exact and particular basis in law, (b) private values offreemarket private
enterprise, and (c) private values arisingfromplural interests—special interest groups.
These three principal sets of values lead to a multiplicity of interests pursued in the
management of public lands.
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Figure 7
Influence of Public and Private Interests on the Use and Occupancy of Public Lands
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An agency administrator responsible for public lands management has a highly
specified set of interests articulated in a great body of federal law and policy
applicable to their respective agency. Each agency administrators is charged to:

1. Redeem their agency's mission as set out in law.
2. Follow a host of other applicable laws, including the Endangered Species
Act, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act,
Administrative Procedures Act, and the Civil Rights Act.
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3. Meet annual targets and direction set by Congressional appropriations.
4. Meet policy direction set by the President's Administratioa
5. Follow the strictures of burgeoning environmental case law.
6. Administer all the various permits for use of public lands.
Values pertaining tofreemarket private enterprise play out several ways in the
administration of public lands. First, there is the notion embedded in constrained
federalism and articulated in the theory of New Public Management that goods and
services provided by government can be more efficiently provided by the private
sector, a discussion I elaborate on below. Second, private companies often collaborate
in partnership with government agencies to pursue commonly held interests. Lastly,
markets are sometimes used or created to allocate goods and services. Consider the
case of a private company in partnership with a federal agency. In such partnerships,
the interests of the company are as carefully circumscribed, if not as prescriptively, as
the interests of a public official. The interests include the articles of incorporation of
the company, fiduciary responsibilities to the company and investors, duties toward the
company's Board of Directors, maintaining company competitiveness, and meeting any
strategic intent or goals the company has fashioned.
Values pertaining to plural interests are singular according to the particular
interests represented. However, many organizations—special interest groups—enter
into partnership with federal agencies. By the time an association of people with
common interests has coalesced to the point that the association can enter into an
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agreement with a federal agency, they will likely have memorialized their mission and
organizational goals. In addition, many of these organizations have evolved a great
deal farther, approaching the specificity and formality of interests that rival those of a
private company. As an example, the Executive Director of the Mazamas, a 100-year
old organization dedicated to mountaineering and mountaineering education in the
Pacific Northwest, is compelled to redeem her responsibilities as articulated in the
organization's articles of incorporation, responsibilities to her Board of Directors,
fiduciary responsibilities to her organization and its funding entities, and to work to
fulfill the organization's strategic plan, the first page of which is shown in Figure 8. In
addition, the plan identifies a set of strategic goals listed below:

1. Education Goal: Mountaineers have the skills, knowledge and ethics to
safely enjoy the mountain environment.
2. Recreation Goal: More people have the opportunity to participate in alpine
climbing and complementary outdoor activities.
3. Conservation Goal: Mountain environments are wisely protected and
managed to balance their use for public enjoyment and their value as
natural habitats.
4. Information Goal: Mountaineers have access to reliable alpine information
to support their education, recreation and conservation interests.
5. Organizational Structure Goal: Mazamas has the organizational structure
to effectively fulfill its mission.
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6. Financial Health Goal: Mazamas has stable and sufficient financial
resources to effectively fulfill its mission.
To analyze how these interests and others come to bear on administration of
public lands and natural resources, Ifirstexplore the challenges associated with
creating and allocating resources among competing uses. I then consider problems
associated with imperfect representation of political interests and reflect on the public
policy implications. I next reflect on the complex nature of making public decisions in
the richly value and interest laden terrain of public lands management. Drawing from
the theory of rational choice, I create a framework for finding and working on
common interests and point to how conflicts in interest might be resolved. I offer a
vector of change theory to explicate organizational intent, action, and outcomes. I then
offer conflict resolution as aframeto understand the dynamics of interactions and
possible pathways to resolution. I close by drawing together the strands of interestbased conflict resolution and decision making into a model of strategic collaboration.
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Mazamas Mountaineering Club Strategic Plan, Page One

Mazamas Strategic Plan
May 2003

H

The virion of the future is that Mazamas will continue its more than 100-year tradition a
a leader and recognized resource for mountaineering and mountaineering education.
Mazamas will remain committed to becoming increasingly active in Our community to
ensure the continuing protection, conservation and access to mountain wilderness.
Mazamas will remain one of the premier mountaineering organizations to fund scientific
research into the mountain environment. Mazamas will promote alpine exploration and
will strive to facilitate a broad range of mountaineering experiences for the community.

Mazamas provides a comprehensive mountaineering program with allied activities that
enhances the participants' enjoyment and protects the alpine environment.
VAUJSH
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Inclusive - As a volunteer-based organization, Mazamas is committed to the participation
of its membership in making a difference for the enjoyment and protection of the alpine
environment. With support from a professional staff, the organization's work is
fundamentally the job of members and volunteers. When appropriate, we lead, undertake
and engage in broad-based coalitions to further our mission and extend our reach.
Integrity - Mazamas is trusted and relied on for its opinions and well researched
information. Mazamas bases its advocacy positions on sound science, its mission and its
core values. As a result, the organization has great credibility among opinion leaders and
other members of the climbing community.
L e a d e r s h i p a n d T e a m w o r k - Leadership requires teams and teams need leaders.

Through the challenge of climbing, individuals develop and improve their leadership skills
both in mountaineering and in their lives. We encourage climbers to set, attain and exceed
personal mountaineering goals as a step in their leadership development. We also work to
develop the teams necessary to succeed, and help climbers and others improve their ability
to work together to accomplish important goals.
Competent - Mazamas promotes preparedness as a fundamental component of safety and
enjoyment of recreational activities.
Camaraderie - Mazamas engages in serious recreation with a spirit of fun, enjoyment and
fellowship.

Version Date: 05/31/03a
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Allocation ofPublic Resources among Competing Interests
Government has a responsibility to provide for public goods in both senses of
the term—providing common public goods as well providing as goods and service.
While the notion of public goods, on its face, is seemingly easy to define, public goods
in fact occupy a wide spectrum. The most basic definition from the MIT Dictionary of
Modern Economics (Pearce, 1992) is a "commodity or service which if supplied to
one person is available to others at no extra cost." While the above definition is
probably first put forward by Paul Samuelson, he offers a more rigorous definition
(1954) of a public good to be one "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtractionfromany other
individual's consumption of that good" (p. 387). This is the classic definition for a
non-rival good. Placing public goods in a fuller context in keeping with the public
lands discussion, he asserts (1964) that "Government provides certain indispensable
public services without which community life would be unthinkable and which by
their nature cannot appropriately be left to private enterprise" (p. 159). Public goods in
the common understanding include non-rival non-excludable goods, as well as
"common pool goods" that, while non-excludable, are rival—an example might be
fishing, wherefishermencan take up all the available spots, but other fishermen
cannot be excluded because the spots are public. Non-excludability leads to market
failures, because the good can be obtained at no cost and no one is willing to pay for
it, thus potentially depleting the resource, in this case thefishin the river.
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Market failures in public goods classically stemfromtwo causes, (1) the freerider, who does not pay for the good, and (2) transaction costs, where the cost of
transactions to secure the good are out of proportion to the value of the good
(Goodstein, 2005). Thefree-ridercauses the famous tragedy of the commons, where
the public good is exploited to the point that its quality is impaired to the point of
reducing overall social benefit. Levine (1995) more fully describes market failures as
stemming from (a) problems of interdependence (where the markets create
externalities not in the collective interest of society), (b) problems of exclusion (where
lack of information or barriers preclude free participation in markets), and (c)
problems of inequality (where issues of fairness arise). He poses three different ideas
for sorting out when market solutions are best. They are: (a) democratic processes
(otherwise known by our founding fathers as tyranny of the majority), (b) equal
opportunity (where expansion of choice can increase overall social welfare), and (c)
equal regard (which embodies individual capacity to choose not limited by desperation
born of poverty and economic insecurity). The duty of sorting this out falls to the
public lands manager.
Public officials, like public lands administrators, are driven not by the hidden
hand of the market place as would be a private manager but, instead, by the visible
hand of public policy deliberation, set in a decision space fully circumscribed by law
and policy. Public allocation of goods and services is shaped by seeking the greatest
overall benefit to the public considering theframeworkof law and policy—not in the
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market place—and after fiill consideration of public comment obtained through due
process of public decision-making. It is the public administrator who strives to
maximize public benefit under the non-market framework of law and policy. There is
a problem however.
What about the disenfranchised? While the legal and policyframeworkof
public land managers is spelled out in some detail, the voices of the politically and
economically disenfranchised are missingfromthe political dialogue that created the
carefully laid out legal and policyframework.Their interests therefore are often
missingfromthe duties required by those laws and policy. Their voices are also often
missingfromadministrators' public policy dialogue regarding the highest and best use
of lands, money, and opportunity for public lands management. Okun (1975) makes a
strong argument that the rights bequeathed to citizens are done so irrespective of
social, cultural, or economic station—that all citizens have equal rights under the law
and should therefore have equal opportunity. He asserts that the American
"distribution of rights stresses equality even at the expense of equity andfreedom"(p.
8). He further argues that "[s]ociety needs to keep the market in its place. The domain
of rights is part of the checks and balances on the market designed to preserve values
that are not denominated in dollars" (p. 13). From a practical standpoint, the effect of
this on the domain of public lands management is that voices of the politically and
economically disenfranchised have been historically and are currently missing. The
Civil Rights Act makes provision in Title VI that the government shall not
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discriminate in any of its external programs, which means for public lands managers,
mainly recreation programs. Every recreation permit issued on public lands thus has a
clause regarding the necessity of the permit holder to ensure that discrimination does
not take place. Public lands administrators thus have the responsibility for preserving
values not denominated in dollars on behalf of all citizens, even those who are
disenfranchised.
What about on-the-ground economics of public lands management? There is a
problem inherent in public finance for public lands management: There is no direct tie
between demand for goods and services and Congressional appropriations.
Appropriations for recreation on public lands have been level or going down steadily
for two decades. Recreation demand has been going up significantly over the same
time period. In addition, the federal road system that serves recreation is deteriorating.
No solution is in sight for the burgeoning backlog of road and recreation facility
maintenance needs across public lands agencies. There is also no tie between the
Administration's budget to Congress and current on-the-ground needs for roads and
recreation facilities. There are precious few appropriations available for making new
investments to better meet today's recreation demand.
Conflict Resolution—Finding Common Ground
Finding common ground among varied interests is the underlying challenge. It
becomes obvious,fromthe brief consideration of interests outlined above, that dealing
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with the policy issues of public lands management becomes more than operationally
deciding about optimal improvements on a campground here or road maintenance
there. Finding the greatest common good in management of public lands is most
fundamentally about finding and acting on common interests. Once common interests
emanating from public and private values are identified, it becomes an organizational
and leadership challenge of finding, organizing, and deploying organizational
resources to capture the benefits that can flowfromworking together on common
interests. In the end, dealing with public land management in this context requires
marshalling public and private resources around cpmmon interests. Discovering those
common interests requires forging relationships (between collaborating agencies,
citizens, and companies) that are of sufficient depth and subtlety to allow those
common interests to emerge.
Conflict resolution is the pathway to common interests. I start this section with
a brief rationale of why I believe a conflict resolution model of interaction is a good
way to find and act on common organizational interests. From my own experience as a
public administrator for over three decades, I have come to a deep appreciation of the
role conflict plays for both people and organizations to sharpen focus, heighten
resolve, and catalyze needed change. It has been my experience that only through the
heat of conflict can the necessary energy be marshaled to change organizational
direction. Conflict can turn an organization's attention awayfrompetty problems of
the day to address issues that stand in the way of meeting its objectives or mission. I
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have also observed that if building positive relations with other organizations is not
purposefully attended to, the relations will decay to being non-productive or counterproductive. Positive inter-organizationaT relationships seldom materialize of their own
volition. When working relations need repairing, approaching themfroma conflict
orientation allows the two organizations to discover the rub points and then examine
the underlying interests where common ground might be found.
From a more theoretical standpoint, Berlin, Hardy, and Hausheer (1998)
remind us that ideas about politics and virtually all public enquiry "springfrom,and
thrive on, discord" (p. 192). In concert with Madison's (2003) warnings about the
tyranny of faction and the use of morality as the basis for public policy, Morrow
(1987) acknowledges the primacy American of plural interests:
The founders' hope that interest would play the role of virtue in the new republic
has been realized beyond their wildest expectations. The norms of political
pluralism have in fact displaced both classical democratic theory and classical
administrative theory in the real world of American government, (p. 161)
We are therefore compelled to pay heed to common ground from plural interests and
conflicts. With this rationale, I briefly examine the theory of conflict resolution.
Gould (2006) identifies nine approaches in common use for conflict resolution.
Each is based on a particular world view of conflict, a particular kind of practice, and
is subject to a particular criticism as shown in Table 7. From these choices, it is
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apparent that problem-solving and transformative models have utility for
constructively dealing with conflicting interests arising potentially conflicting value
sets. The problem-solving model is well suited to organizational issues that revolve
around individuals in different organizations and their conflicts. This model is limited
in that it is oriented to solving problems, not building relations, but if a particular
problem needs tofixed,it is just right. The transformative model is more robust and
has great utility for building individual and organizational relationships that are
sufficiently deep and strong to explore conflicts, differences of views, underlying
interests, and find common interests. The legal model has a modicum of utility for
organizations, but its use has the consequence of creating a winner and a loser—hardly
the formula for positive long-term relations.
Being a practitioner as well as student of conflict management between large
organizations, my prescription for dealing with conflicts arisingfromadministration of
public lands is an action-oriented model. The model is based on theories of (a) rational
individual choice to understand how people make choices, (b) my own vector of
change model to understand how people and organizations form and act on intent, (c)
Bronfenbrennner's theory of individual human development (which frames people and
organizations as situated in their own problems, in their own development, and in their
own efforts to understand and act on the world), and (d) the current theory and practice
of interest-based negotiation and conflict resolution. I have validated it through
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empirical practice. Simply formulated, the model is comprised of the following six
steps:
1. Seize conflicts between people and organizations as a gateway to
understand barriers (to reaching organizational objectives or mission) to
provide (a) an opportunity to learn about your own problems, and (b) an
opportunity to learn about problems of a valued partner.
2. Learn the principles of interest-based negotiation and conflict resolution to
(a) discover underlying interests behind manifest problems, and (b)
discover common interests that form the basis for collaborative action.
3. Jointly size up the milieu in which your organizations are mired to (a) learn
morefollyabout each other's interests, beliefs, and opportunities, and (b)
form joint intent about foture mutually desired outcomes.
4. Make plans to marshal and deploy resources to create the mutually desired
outcomes!—particularly planning and organizing joint initiatives.
5. Pay attention to ongoing conflicts and as well as information from the
outside world to refine joint actions towards mutually desired outcomes.
6. Jointly size up the new situation in which you find yourselves mired.

Chapter II, Literature Review

76

Table 7
Nine Approaches to Conflict Resolution after Gould (2006)
Approach

Presupposition

Practice
Adversarial. Alternatives
are generally
compromises.

Criticism
Win-lose, compromises do
not address deeper
interests.

Legal

People need to be
protected through legal
advocacy.

Problem-Solving

The conflict as a problem Mediators are seen as
to be solved.
experts who create winwin resolutions

The model is
individualistic and avoids
broader community

Transformative

Conflict is an opportunity Longer processes that
for relationship-building, take up deeper issues.
growth.

Does not fit with
disputant desires for crisis
management.

Therapeutic

Conflict is driven by
psychological and
emotional issues.

Deals with the
psychological and
emotional aspects.

Crises not avoided,
Therapeutic goals may
exceed disputant desires.

Spiritual/
Religious

Conflict driven by deepseated spiritual and
religious values.

Requires understanding
disputants' beliefs
and values.

Conflict resolution
practitioners lack
credibility in this
approach.

Social Liberation

Conflict driven by
oppression that must be
interrupted.

Requires embracing cultural This approach is not
frames. Mediator cannot be appropriate outside of
objective.
special situations.

Feminist

Conflict is driven by
Requires understanding of
gender based differences gendering issues and how it
affects Conflict Resolution.
and gender bias.
Must address social values.

A feminist approach to
may be perceived as a
power imbalance in favor
of women.

Indigenous

Conflict driven by context,
us vs. them, rather than
individuals. Conflict
Resolution focuses on the
context rather than actors

Group participation,
apology, forgiveness,
restitution and
reconciliation. Use of
traditional ceremony.

This approach may be
perceived as undermining
individual responsibility
and recreating premodern sensibilities.

Drama
Re-Scripting

Conflict driven by a sense
of tragedy, rigidity, or lack
of creativity. Transformed
into comedy by rescripting roles, attitudes
and conflict itself.

Tragedy is overcome by
A drama re-scripting
flexibility, creativity, and approach to Conflict
transformation. Requires Resolution may be
analysis of social and
perceived as undermining
relational roles, and
traditional identities and
diverse perspectives
cultural practices.
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Systems Science in the Study of Coordination ofHuman Activities:
Sociology, Organizations, and Management
Society, both its liberal and conservative elements, expects all of its various
institutions, particularly government institutions to resolve its conflicts and get on with
the business of providing for the greater public weal. For the purposes of this research,
I deeply examine organizations, the entities we collectively invest with the charge to
do society's bidding. I do so by using a systems view of organizations. I approach the
literature of system science as it pertains to organizations by introducing itfromthree
different frames: (a) sociologyfroma systems view, (b) systemsfroman organization
theory view, and (c) systemsfroman early management science view. Three
snapshots of the science of sociology are taken with an eye to systems: (a) one taken
by Meadows (1957) in his call for a systems approach, (b) one by W. R. Scott (1975)
who captures the emergence of organizations as a separate field of study, and (c) the
last taken by Camic and Gross (1998) who examine the current projects in sociology,
noting that "Sociological theory has a long history of taking stock of itself' (p. 453).
Meadows (1957), in an article entitled Models, Systems and Science, outlines
the logic of systems and argues that fellow sociologists need to (1) think in terms of
systems and remember that:
(2) "system" is itself a model, the primordial (if indeed not Procrustean) model
in fact, (3) the history of science indicates a succession of models by which
systems have been explored and explained, (4) the dominant model of system
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analysis today is the organic image, and (5) any model patterned analysis...
involves valuable possibilities as well as serious but often overlooked
limitations (p. 3).
W. R. Scott (1975) dates the emergence of organizations as a distinctive field of
sociology to the first translations of Weber (1975), to works by Michels (1949) on
bureaucracies, and to Merton (1952) outlining boundaries of studies of organizations,
and a series of case studies. All lead to the situation where "For thefirsttime
sociologist are engaged in the development and empirical testing of generalizations
dealing with the structure and function of organizations as organizations" (W. R.
Scott, 1975). This is a decidedly systems approach, dealing as they do with structure
as a dependent variable, closed and open system models, and moving from case to
comparative studies. Waldo, in Organization Theory: Revisiting the Elephant (1978),
observes that for the modem era the study of organization "is characterized by
diversity, heterogeneity, competition, and changing fashions... typologies abound:
claims are vigorously asserted that this or that is the real elephant, or at least the most
important part of the elephant" (p. 590). He offers (a) conceptsfromsociology such as
goal specificity, and (b) systems theory as a mechanism to provide considerable
measure of continuity and agreement in the field.
Camic and Gross (1998) identify the following eight active intellectual projects
in sociology since the mid-1980s: (a) construction of analytical tools for empirical
research, (b) synthesis of multiple theoretical approaches, (c) refining theoretical
research programs, (d) stimulating dialogue among different theoretical perspectives,
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(e) enlarging and reconstructing current theoretical approaches, (i) analyzing past
theoretical ideas, (g) diagnosing contemporary social conditions, and (h) dissolution of
sociological theory. The authors cite systems thinking as the primary mechanism for
synthesis of multiple theoretical approaches. Thefieldsof sociology, organizations,
and systems science influence each other strongly.
Systems science and organization theory are closely intertwined in both
business management and public administrationfieldsof study. It is difficult to draw a
clear line between systems thinking approached from a business or public
administration perspective and systems thinking approached from a distinctive
separate study of organizations. The distinction, however, highlights the more
instrumental nature of business and administration approachesfromthe hybrid study
of organizations approach. Herbert Simon is single-handedly responsible for this
difficulty. He is a prolific writer and researcher whose work profoundly influenced
sociology, business, public administration, and study of organizations. Although
Simon's study is situated in business and public administration, systems thinking in
the study of organizations!—no matter what thefield—movesthrough much of its
development at his hands. His following titles illustrate the point: A Behavioral Model
of Rational Choice (Simon, 1955), Administrative behavior; a study of decisionmaking processes in administrative organization (Simon, 1957b), Models of man:
social and rational; mathematical essays on rational human behavior in a social
setting (Simon, 1957a), The sciences of the artificial (Simon, 1969), Rational Decision
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Making in Business Organizations (Simon, 1979), Models of bounded rationality
(Simon, 1982), and The Architecture of Complexity (Simon, 1996).
Just like any study of physics must build on Newtonian mechanics, any
discussion of a systems approach in organizational management must build on
Barnard's (1938,1968), The Functions of the Executive, where he painstakingly builds
"a comprehensive theory of cooperative behavior in formal organizations" (p. vii), and
where he identifies the executive's role to "preside over and adapt... the processes
which relate the cooperative system to its environment and which provide satisfaction
to individuals" (p. viii). W. R. Scott (1981) wrote a text that not only framed the study
of organizationsfroma systems science viewpoint, but actually structured the field of
organization studies—a point that I take up subsequently in this review.
Management is the common framework, reference point, language, set of
meanings, and a bias toward results that agency executives of all stripes share in
common. Even though the particulars differ, when colleagues from different agencies
get together, they rapidly find the conversation turning to the management challenges
of their jobs. It is not that executive leadership in agencies is just one simple common
thing. As a matter of fact; it sometimes is an extraordinarily complex multi-faceted
challenge. It consists of coordinating people who (a) have disparate motivations and
skills and (b) who often reside in different sections of the organization, with (c) often
conflicting goals between people and divisions, and (d) often maddeningly scarce
resources—all toward toward common purpose. These challenges and the
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determination to surmount them, are what agency administrators have in common.
Chester Barnard (1968) knows this and captured it well in his book Functions of the
Executive.
Barnard (1968) observes that cooperation "originates in the need of an
individual to accomplish purposes to which he is by himself biologically unequal
[C]ooperation speedily becomes a constantly changing system made up of interrelated
biological, psychological, and social elements" (p. vii) that achieve organizational
purpose and satisfy individual motives. He asserts that the executive's role is to
"preside over and adapt... the processes which relate the cooperative system to its
environment and which provide satisfaction to individuals" (page viii). Barnard also
recognizes the common bond that executives share:
Many times I have noted that executives are able to understand each other with
very few words when discussing essential problems of organization, provided
that the questions are stated without dependence upon the technologies of their
respectivefields.This is strikingly true, in fact chiefly observable, when men
of radically different fields discuss such questions, (p. xxvii)
The point is that public administrators who are agency administrators serve executive
functions for their organizations as executives, irrespective of their public
employment.
What, one might ask, do management studies in systems have to do with the
research problem at hand? There are two answers. The first is that the common
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framework of management among agency administrators has a unifying feature—a
strong desire—to "cut to the chase" and make something concrete happen. Agency
administrators desire to provide goods and services, even in the face of diminished
resources due to constrained federalism. This desire for outcomes is a prime motivator
to form partnerships in coproduction with citizen groups. This bias for results finds
more formal expression in Peter Drucker (2001): "Finally, the single most important
thing to remember about any enterprise is that [its] results exist only on the outside...
.Inside an enterprise, there are only costs" (p. 12).
The second answer to the question of the relevancy of the management literature
to the research problem is that the literature of management is comfortable (as are
managers themselves) with the integration of hierarchy and cooperation. Perrow
(1986) points out that Barnard is enormously influential in the modern conception of
organizational theory. Barnard spawned the "institutional school" as represented by
Philip Selznick, the decision-making school as represented by Herbert Simon... [and]
the human relations school" (p. 63). Perrow acknowledges that thefieldof
organizational theory is dominated by Weber and Bernard—Weber concentrating on
the flow of power through organizations and Barnard emphasizing cooperation.
Drucker (2001), in answer to the question, "What is management?" replies:
There are three tasks, equally important but essentially different, that
management has to perform to enable the institution in its charge to function
and to make its contribution...
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1. Establishing the specific purpose and mission of the institution, whether
business enterprise, hospital, or university,
2. Making work production and the worker effective,
3. Managing social impacts and social responsibilities, (p. 14)
Drucker also directs attention to the primary task of coordination. He says:
Management is about human beings. Its task is to make people capable of joint
performance, to make their strengths effective and their weaknesses irrelevant...
Because management deals with the integration of people in a common venture,
it is deeply embedded in culture, (p. 11)
The closing point for this introduction is that the management theme of power and
cooperation in organizations strongly parallels the theme of instrumental vs.
constitutive public administration raised by D. Morgan and others in governance,
which is one of the primary focal points of this research.
Summary Overview of Systems Theory
John Weltman (1972), in writing about international relations, suggests that for
"application to an analytic field of amorphous boundaries and great complexity, one
that demands investigation not constricted by the frontiers of traditional academic
disciplines, systems theory appears to be very promising" (p. 593). Systems theory
serves the same function for the study of organizations. It has the ability to provide a
imifying thread among the sometimes-disparate approaches in the study of
organizations. Weltman characterizes the systems approach as having its origins in (a)
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sociological functionalism and (b) general systems theory. His assignment to
sociology of one of the roots is particularly useful because he references sociology's
constructs of structure and function in aiding the transformation by functional
sociologyfromthe notion of "society" to "social system." To state the obvious, the
same can be held for study of organizations. He characterizes systems theory as
beginning with the identification of "isomorphics" (structural similarities) between
situations that allow for the generation of hypothesis regarding the situations.
Bertalanffy (1969) states that "The isomorphism... is a consequence of the fact that,
in certain respects, corresponding abstractions and conceptual models can be
applicable to different phenomena. Only in view of these aspects will system laws
apply" (p. 36). Bertalanffy fixes wholism and unification as general system theory's
raison d'etre, which suggests that systems theory has great utility for analysis of the
sharp reductionism evident in American federalism's finely divided authority scattered
among multiple levels of government with its multiple checks and balances between
and within branches of government. Both authors develop the notions of closed and
open systems—the primary distinguishing factor being whether or not the system in
question is isolated or interacts with its environment. Weltman identifies the intention
of a common holistic bent between sociological functionalism and general systems
theory.
Three people are regarded as pioneers of cybernetics and the science of
systems; they are mathematician Norbert Wiener, neurophysiologist Warren
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McCulloch (R. McCulloch, 1989; W. S. McCulloch & Pitts, 1943), and Jay Forrester
—professor at the Sloan School of Management at MIT (Rav, 2002). Two seminal
works were published in 1948—Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics, or Control and
Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1948), and The Mathematical Theory
of Communication by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver (1949) which is the
foundation of information theory. The Society for General Systems Research was
established in 1954 and led by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Other scientists
joined the effort: the mathematician A. Rapoport, the biologist W. Ross Ashby, the
biophysicist N. Rashevsky, the economist K. Boulding. (de Rosnay, 2000).
References on early cybernetics and systems theory include An Introduction to
Cybernetics by Ashby (1956) which, despite being a small paperback, is a seriously
theoretical and mathematical treatment. Among other things, Ashby introduces the
notion of requisite variety for control of systems. Umpleby and Dent (1999) in The
Origins and Purposes of Several Traditions in Systems Theory and Cybernetics tell the
story and history of general systems theory. Klir (1972) recounts Trends In General
Systems Theory. Bertalanffy (1972) evaluates the modern systems approach in the
context of the history of ideas in his The History and Status of General Systems
Theory. Basic resources on cybernetics and systems theory are provided at the
Principia Cybernetica web site (Heylighen, Joslyn, & Turchin, 1993), an
interdisciplinary academic domain. Basic books in cybernetics and systems analysis
are listed on the site by Joslyn and Heylighen (1996), papers by Heylighen (1995), a
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bibliography on the evolution of complexity by Heylighen (1997), and classic
publications on complex evolving systems by de Rosnay (2000).
1950-1959—Early Systems Approaches
The beginnings of systems science, noted above, include the works of Wiener
(1948), McCulloch, Forrester, Shannon and Weaver, Bertalanffy, Rapoport,
Rashevsky, and Ashby. Simon (1955) in A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice
constructs definitions and models of rational choice, identifying humans as goalseeking organisms existing within certain boundary conditions. He sets out terms and
definitions that constitute many of the elements of general systems theory. His aim is
to construct a theory of the behavior of individuals or groups making decisions in
organizations. In Administrative Behavior Simon (1957a) examines the character and
functions of the organization system through the process of human problem solving.
He uses input, process, and output to characterize the system. In this book, Simon
acknowledged the role of Barnard (1938) who provided a systems-based
comprehensive theory of cooperative behavior in organizations. In his book Models of
Man, Simon (1957b) collected essays published in various journals that give a strong
mathematical treatment to his models of man. Cadwallader (1959) in The Cybernetic
Analysis of Change in Complex Social Organizations conceptualizes complex social
organizations as learning systems and proposes a variety of cybernetic models for their
understanding.
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Boulding (1956) describes General Systems Theory—The Skeleton of Science
as aframeworkof structure of systems "on which to hang the flesh and blood of
particular disciplines and particular subject matters in an orderly and coherent corpus
of knowledge" (p. 208). In Cybernetics and Management Stafford Beer (1959)
outlines cybernetics as the science of communication and control, draws a comparison
between man-made cybernetic systems and organisms, discusses probability, and
relieves cybernetics of the bogeyman of totalitarianism.
1960-1969—A Scientific Systems Basis for Organizations
With regard to systems in the study of organizations, W. G. Scott (1961) lays
out what could perhaps be best characterized as a proto-systems approach where he
identifies four pillars of classic organization theory: (a) division of labor, (b) scalar
and functional processes (chain of command and functional groupings), (c) structure
(relationships of functions), and (d) span of control. To the classic view he adds the
neoclassical view through which he reinterprets the pillars with an element of
dynamism, adding the "informal organization" reminiscent of Barnard's social
motivations for cooperative behavior in formal organizations. While he notes that
"Modern organization theory is in no way a unified body of thought" (p. 16), he
characterizes the various ingredients involved in system analysis:

1. The Organizational System—the Parts of the System and Their
Interdependency: the individual, the formal structure, the informal
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organization, fusion process (status and role patterns), and physical
environment of work;
2. The Linking Process—Interaction of the Parts: Communication network,
balance (including the notion of an equilibrating mechanism between the
parts and the necessity for control and regulation of open human systems),
and decisions; and
3. The Goals of Organizations—Growth, stability, and interaction.
In W. G. Scott's view, "[m]odera organization theory is on the periphery of
general system theory" (p. 20). Both study (a) individuals and their movement in and
out of the system, (b) interaction of individuals with the environment found in the
system (foreshadowing G. Morgan's (1997) Images), (c) interactions among
individuals, and (d) growth and stability of systems. Blau and W. R. Scott (1962)
wrote an early text on systems aspects of organizations that helped structure the field
of organizational sociologyfroma systems perspective.
Baumol's Economic Theory and Operations Analysis (1961) is primarily a
book on micro-economic theory and mathematical economics, but he uses rigorous
systems analysis in microeconomic settings looking at the firm and its objectives,
input-output analysis, decision-making and game theory, thus setting an example and
establishing mathematical rigor for a systems approach of a subset of organizations.
Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig (1963) in The Theory and Management of Systems
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refine the systems approach, examining in turn (a) systems philosophy, (b) systems
design and analysis, and (c) systems management. In Systems Theory and
Management, the same authors (Johnson, Kast, & Rosenzweig, 1964) review
Bertalanffy's General System Theory: A New Approach to Unity ofScience (1951) and
Boulding's General Systems Theory: The Skeleton of Science (1956). They recognize
these two as thefirstbooks that provided the foundation for general systems theory
and built concepts to apply general systems theory to management.
Katz and Kahnfirstformulated open systems theory in the study of
organizations in their series of empirical studies and conceptual schemes in The Social
Psychology of Organizations (Katz & Kahn, 1966, 1978), wherein they characterized
nine characteristics of open systems applicable to the study of organizations.
Thompson (1967) makes the argument in Organizations in Action that organizations
are open systems and must therefore be viewed as natural systems. Thompson holds
that while organizations are open systems, they are still subject to the rational
requirements of closed systems. Lyden (1969) deserves special mention. In his review
titled Systems Theory in the World of Management he shows how three classic works,
(Katz and Kahn, 1966), (Buckley, 1967), and (Thompson, 1967) all cited above,.
weave together (a) the process basis of systems theory, (b) systems theory and
functional analysis, and (c) natural systems and rational systems.
Buckley (1967) relates general system theory to theoretical sociology in
Sociology and Modem Systems Theory. He critiques existing models, details basic
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concepts of systems theory in relation to sociology, considers organization and
institutionalization, and concludes with a discussion of social control, process
legitimacy, and bureaucracy, noting the importance of "morphogenic processes"
(transformation) from pressures within and without. Buckley's (1968) book Modern
Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientists includes thefifty-sevenarticles which
formed the basis for his earlier book. Drawnfromdiverse fields, these articles
illustrate that scientific models developed in one field have applicability in others—
one of the basic intents of the systems approach. The Systems Approach by
Churchman (1968), is a simple and accessible primer in systems and their application.
Stafford Beer (1968) in his book Management Science: The Use of Operations
Research presents concepts and methods of systems science in an understandable form
for both students and businessmen. This work is rich in diagrams and illustrative
examples. Kast and Rosenzweig (1969) in their Organization and Management: A
Systems and Contingency Approach consolidate and lay out a very solid foundation in
the systems approach to organizations. They build conceptual foundations; trace the
evolution of organization and management theory; discuss environment, boundaries
and goals; organizational technology and structure; and examine psychosocial and
management systems; concluding with comparative analysis, contingency views, and
change. The Sciences of the Artificial is Simon's (1969) synthesis of complexity—how
it can be researched, managed, responded to, and understood by men and computers.
1970-1979—Explicating Systems Theory for Organizations
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Kelleher (1970) lays out The Challenge to Systems Analysis: Public Policy and
Social Change through a series of chapters written by practitioners. Laszlo (1972) lays
out a world systems view and explores the natural philosophy of new developments in
the sciences. In A General Formulation of the LeChatelier-Samuelson Principle,
Eichhorn and Oettli (1972) develop the systems notion that when conditions change, a
system in a stable equilibrium will shift in a way to compensate for the changed
condition. An Introduction to General Systems Thinking by Weinberg (1975,2001) is
a moderately rigorous, yet accessible text that is rich with interesting examples. De
Rosnay (1979) published The Macroscope, A New World Scientific System which is a
remarkable book intended to inform people about the "system revolution." The
Entropy Law and the Economic Process (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971), while being the
only book not strictly about systems cited in this bibliography, is a stunning work that
is both deeply theoretical and philosophical in its rigorously mathematical descriptions
and models of economics in terms of the laws of physics. It is included here because it
sets the bar for mathematical rigor in its treatment of many systems-analysis-like
building blocks of logic and process. Stafford Beer's (1975,1994) Platform for
Change is an exhortation to the world to employ the profound strength of systems
theory, analysis, and approach to understanding the world around us and make better
choices about what we do. In his words, the book deals with "a very large subject:
how the science of effective organization, which we call cybernetics, joins hands with
the pursuit of effectivefreedom,which we call politics" (p. 451).
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W. R. Scott (1975) offers conceptsfromsociology such as goal specificity, and
systems theory as a mechanism to provide considerable measure of continuity and
agreement in the field. He notes "For thefirsttime sociologist are engaged in the
development and empirical testing of generalizations dealing with the structure and
function of organizations as organizations" (p. 1). Aldrich's Organizations and
Environments (1979) bridges the study of formal organizations and social
organizations. He examines numbers of organizations and organization forms rather
than individual organizations, focuses on dynamic changes rather than static
descriptions, ill the expectation that by doing so, both research and theory will flow.
Knight and McDaniel (1979) in Organizations: An Information Systems Perspective
posit the organization's response to complexity to be (a) reducing the need for
information exchange, (b) developing buffers for limited systems, (c) reorganizing
around critical systems, and (d) displaying creativity through increasing unanticipated
outcomes (p. 9).
Hart and W. G. Scott (1972) find that systems theory has been limited by an
"unarticulated image of the moral nature of man" (p. 533). And they proclaim to have
found the "optimal image of man" for systems theory in B. F. Skinner's Beyond
Freedom and Dignity (1971)—an image of man without autonomy who is merely
shaped by his or her contingent environment. Exton (1972) begins to explore the dark
side of systems approaches by focusing on the results of application of systems theory
and ascertains them to parallel disturbing contemporary developments of the use of
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drugs; violent crime; and student, women, and minority activism. In General Systems
Theory: An Inquiry into Its Social Philosophy, Peery (1972) examines the values and
assumptions of general systems theory and concludes that it is "ideologically biased
toward an order perspective which emphasizes stability and system maintenance rather
than change." He also shows that general systems theory "views conflict as
dysfunctional rather than as a source of organizational adaptation" (p. 495). Thayer
(1972), taking the same vein farther, finds that general systems theory did not deliver
on its promise. Instead, it leads to a depersonalization of social interaction, overemphasizes determinism and the single organization, is mechanistic, and requires
perpetual growth which will ultimately lead to our destruction. Philips in The
Methodological Basis of Systems Theory (1972) argues that the central
methodological principle of systems theory is impossible to apply because every
systems method is an extension rather than a replacement of the mechanistic view.
As a theoretical antidote to the critics of systems thinking, Ericson (1972), in
Visions of Cybernetic Organizations creates a Hegelian dialectical transform for
man's worst conjured fears of robotized man-surrogates, such as "cyborgs," into a call
to maximally "utilize cybernetic science and computer technology within a general
systems framework, to build... [a] worldwide value consensus heretofore
unrealizable" (p. 428). Duncan's (1972) article is an extended review of Miller's
Living Systems Theory (1972) which creates a theoretical framework for organizing
organizational research. Included in his framework are levels of living systems starting
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with cells, organ, organism, group, organization, community, society, and concluding
with supra-national system. He describes "emergent" characteristics that arise from
aggregation of lower order systems. He also describes 20 essential processes or
subsystems of living systems. In General Systems Theory: Applications for
Organization and Management, Kast and Rosenzweig (1972) pose a series of
dilemmas for applying general system theories to the study of organizations and
propose that researchers study "contingency views" that are a search for
configurations among subsystems.
Gray (1972), in memory of Bertalanfify, urges his colleagues to (a) develop a
field of theoretical management similar to the work Bertalanfify did in biology, (b)
include Bertalanffy's notion of streaming equilibrium—open systems and dynamic
equilibrium—in the theory of management science, and (c) to recognize that the
frontier of management science is to discover the higher order organizational laws
rather than those more easily observable in the lower strata of hierarchical structures.
Gray and Rizzo (Bertalanfry, Gray, & Rizzo, 1973) make a tribute to the ideas of
Bertalanffy and their worldwide impact in Unity Through Diversity.
Powers in Feedback: Beyond Behaviorism (1973) shows that a properly
organized control system will produce required output even in the face of
unpredictable disturbances. He also suggests that a control-system model of the brain
explains existence of goals or purposes, and that a person's behavior is control of the
input, not the output. Piotr Sztompka, a Polish sociologist (1974) constructs and
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conducts arigorouslogical reconstruction, critical appraisal, and generalization of
sociological functionalism as systems theory, while condemning most traditional
functionalism. Its strength lies in its great detail in sociology; its weakness is failing to
note important systems considerations such as closed versus open systems. Gall's
(1977) book Systemantics deserves special mention because, as a humorous book that
pokes fun at systems analysis, it provides insights into its shortcomings. Its subtitle is
How Systems Work and Especially How They Fail. In Analysis of Complex Systems,
White and Simmons (1977) show how deconstructing a larger system into a series of
smaller subsystems can decompose the problem of controlling a large system into a
series of interlinked sub-problems of manageable size.
Essentials of Management (1974,1978) is an abridged version without
references—essentially a handbook for managers—of their more complete
Management: A Systems and Contingency Analysis ofManagerial Functions, (1976).
In the former publication, they arrange a rigorous systems treatment (footnoted and
explicated in the 1976 version) of management functions under traditional managerial
functions of planning, organizing, staffing, leading, and controlling. Boothroyd, in his
book Articulate Intervention (1978) explains the theory of operations research and
applied systems analysis, and offers, in the words of the author, "a coherent point of
viewfromwhich to regard high-level advisory, managerial, and administrative
activity" (p. xi).
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Pfeffer in his Organizational Design (1978) deals with power and structural
analysis. He examines (a) who governs, (b) the management of interdependence
within organizations, (c) governance and control processes, and (d) how organizations
design their environment rather thanfittingto the environment. Pfeffer and Salancik's
book The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective
(1978) is dedicated to the proposition that to truly understand an organization one
must understand the environment in which it operates, and more particularly the
resourcesfromits environment on which it depends. Waldo, in taking stock of
Organization Theory: Revisiting the Elephant (1978), as previously cited, offers
systems theory as a unifying element in the study of organizations which he
characterizes asfraughtwith diversity, heterogeneity, competition, and changing
fashions. Katz and Kahn (1978) offer a second updated version of their work The
Social Psychology of Organizations. Aldrich's Organizations and Environments
(1979), cited earlier, bridges the study of formal organizations and social
organizations. Simon, in his article on Rational Decision Making in Business
Organizations (1979) advances the concept of "bounded rationality," the notion that a
manager or enterprise behaves in a manner that is nearly optimal with respect to its
goals within the bounds that its resources allow. He argues that a decision maker will
"search" tofindbetter choices and will stop searching when hefindsone that
"satisfices"—that meets his or her level of "aspirations." Knight and McDaniel (1979),
cited earlier, explicate organizations' responses to complexity.
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1980-1989—Consolidation of Systems Theory. "The Study of Organizations"
by Katz, Kahn, and Adams (1980) is an assembly of thirty-eight articles on the social
psychology of organizations and their open-system model. In a review of Aldrich
(1979), Knight and McDaniel (1979), Pfeffer (1978), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978),
cited above, McGowan (1980) sizes up the understanding of how organizations
influence change.
Amerikaner (1981) employs general systems theory in the study of personality
growth, individuals in larger systems, and integration between systems theory and
personality theory in Continuing Theoretical Convergence: A General Systems Theory
Perspective on Personal Growth and Development. Espejo and Harnden (1989) are
editors of a volume that interprets and shows applications of Beer's viable system
model. Thorsheimand Roberts' (1984) book Metaperspectives: The Systems
Approach and its Vision illustrates applications of systems thinking for visioning the
future, curriculum, and for social science research to meet society's needs.
W. R. Scott (1981,1987,1992,1998,2003) authored a comprehensive work,
Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, in multiple editions that codified
and synthesized thefieldof systems study of organizations. He used an approach of
rational, natural, and open systems arguments that helped structure the entire field and
"still functions to tame and order afieldof study that, atfirstexposure, appears to be
chaotic and, indeed, is crowded with competing theories and paradigms" (p. ix).
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Simon's Models ofBounded Rationality (1982) is an encyclopedic classic that
collects sixty of Simon's papers previously unpublished in book form. Volume I
includes public choice, rational choice under uncertainty, technological change, and
structure of economic systems. Volume II includes the businessfirmas an
organization, the economics of information processing, economics and psychology,
and substantive and procedural rationality. Eadie and Steinbacher (1985) present a
case study of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services exploring Strategic Agenda
Management: A Marriage of Organizational Development and Strategic Planning. G.
Morgan's (1988) "Riding the Waves of Change" is interesting in that it is replete with
systems concepts, but does not once mention general systems theory or cybernetics.
Shangraw, Crow, and Overman (1989) propose public administration to be a "design
science," and as such, an artificial or synthetic science. Itsframeworkis comprised of
three elements: (a) inner and outer environments of public administration, (b)
prescriptive and descriptive design approaches, and (c) aframeworkfor research at the
system, institutional, and instrumental levels. Pondy and Connolly (1989) in their
work Systems, Knowledge and Organizational Development start to develop a
taxonomy of subsystem couplings, describing how tightly coupled a subsystem is
internally, and how tightly coupled it is to its larger system.
1990-Present—Embracing Complexity
Heylighen, Rosseel, and Dmeyere (1990) examine self-steering and cognition
in complex systems in Toward A New Cybernetics. Heylighen (1990) presents a
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comprehensive systems exhortation in Representation and Change, A
Metarepresentational Frameworkfor the Foundations ofPhysical and Cognitive
Science, that in his words "proposes a cross-fertilization between cognitive science
and theoretical physics, within aframeworkinspired by systems theory" (p. 2). Lam
(2000) describes how nature self-organizes in his descriptive theory called "active
walks" by which agents in a complex system communicate indirectly with each other
through their interaction with the landscape they share. Mulej and others (2004)
reformulate Bertalanffy's systems thinking to make it more understandable and
defensible. Hatfield and Hipel (2002) extend systems thinking to risk analysis. UsoDomenech, Mateu, and Patten (2002) formulate a mathematical theory of physical
processes in stimulus-response and state-transition components of causality. De
Rosnay's (2000) "History of Cybernetics and Systems Science," cited earlier, is a
brief, well-written history available on the "Principia Cybernetica Web" site
(Heylighen et al., 1993). Heylighen (2004) provides a full bibliographic listing of his
76 published articles andfivebooks on cybernetics and systems theory, also available
on the "Principia Cybernetica Web" site.
Daneke (1990) asks the question in an article of the same name: is there A
Science of Public Administration? He does so based on his argument that "Many
realms of social inquiry... are in the midst of an era of unprecedented
epistemological introspection" (p. 383). He calls for rechanneling the current diffuse
intellectual energy into reform organized around systems' "basic unifying paradigm,"
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advancing it toward a new "advanced systems theory," derivedfromthe leading edge
of our current systems, sociological, physical, biological, and cognitive sciences.
Niklas Luhmann is a prolific German sociologist and theorist whose writings are
grounded, according to Misgeld (1994), in systems-theoretical, quasi-cybernetic
reformulations of structural functionalism. The Luhmann works cited here are those
reviewed by Misgeld: (Luhmann, 1990a) (Luhmann, 1990b) (Luhmann, 1991,1993).
In the same integrative theme, Heylighen, (1992) explores the application of systems
theory to human motivation in his work titled: A Cognitive-Systemic Reconstruction
of Maslow's Theory of Self-Actualization.
Jenner (1994), in Changing Patterns of Power, Chaotic Dynamics and the
Emergence of a Post-modern Organizational Paradigm, views the organizational and
management system as a whole for his unit of analysis, and argues that a shift in
powerfrombusinesses to consumers has cause a shift in the system as a whole away
from hierarchical to embracing decentralization of power, worker empowerment, and
emergence of lateral or horizontal communication channels. Simon's The Architecture
of Complexity (1996) is actually the third edition of a work that started with his
seminal article on the architecture of complexity published in 1962. The article
captured what he had learned about the structure of complex systems over his 30 year
period. This third addition, more than three decades later, includes much additional
and updated information on systems and complexity.
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Neumann (1996) in his article What Makes Public Administration a Science?
Or, Are Its 'Big Questions' Really Big? calls for revisiting organization theory, public
management, and the relation of public organization to its environment in light of the
new paradigm emerging in physical science of viewing natural systems as non-linear,
complex, and chaotic. Overman (1996) explains how the new sciences of chaos theory
and quantum theory relate to public administration theory and practice. McWhinney
(1997), in Paths of Change: Strategic Choices for Organizations and Society, outlines
theories of change with systems thinking imbedded throughout. Machado and Burns
(1998) conceptualize and analyze Complex Social Organization: Multiple Organizing
Modes, Structural Incongruence, and Mechanisms of Integration.
G. Morgan (1997), in discussing the unfolding logics of change, strives to
provide a foundation for understanding the "secrets of the universe... the generative
processes that link implicate and explicate orders" (p. 252). Cohen (1999), in an
Introduction to the Special Issue: [of Organization Science] Applications of
Complexity Theory to Organization Science, begins the issue by noting that the study
of complex system dynamics has progressed furthest in the natural sciences, but is
beginning to penetrate the social sciences. Gregersen (1999) in an interesting
theoretical article explains use of autopoietic systems in his theology.
The journal Organization Science devoted a special issue in 1999 (Vol. 10,
No. 3) to applications of complexity theory to organization science where the editors
(Anderson, Meyer, Eisenhardt, Carley, & Pettigrew, 1999) assert "work on systems
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theories is among the enduring accomplishments of the previous generation of
organizational researchers" (p. 374-375), and work with complex systems is the work
of the future. While the editors ofOrganization Science may be right, the treatment of
systems in the study of organizations, as a distinct field of its own, is nonetheless
probably best characterized as eclectic and proceeding by fits and starts.
Svyantek and Brown (2000) articulate elements of a research agenda in A
Complex-Systems Approach to Organizations. Heylighen (2000) provides a
comprehensive documentation of his Principia Cybernetica Web project on
cybernetics and systems theory. Paul van Geert (2000) proposes a most interesting
mechanism in The Dynamics of General Developmental Mechanisms: From Piaget
and Vygotsky to Dynamic Systems Models. He argues that the concept of general
developmental mechanisms constitutes one of the few basic laws of learning and
change. Clam (2000) takes a deeply theoretical excursion in System's Sole
Constituent, the Operation: Clarifying a Central Concept of Luhmannian Theory to
capture the essence of systems. Svyantek and Brown (2001), in their article on
Complex Systems, Time and Graphical Analysis of Organizational Behavior, show
how this approach can reveal various aspects of complex system behavior. Kenrick
(2001) makes the argument in Evolutionary Psychology, Cognitive Science, and
Dynamical Systems: Building an Integrative Paradigm that evolutionary
psychologists, dynamical systems theorists, and traditional cognitive scientists need to
work together to build a unifying paradigm. Hendry (2003), in his self-explanatory
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article The Structure and Significance of Strategic Episodes: Social Systems Theory
and the Routine Practices of Strategic Change, draws on Luhmann's social systems
theory for its development. Wang (2004), in an interesting bridge between theory and
popular practice, makes a map of logic corresponding to his title From General System
Theory to Total Quality Management.
Four Representative Organizational Systems
Four representative organizational systems can be characterized from the
literature discussed above. The first, developed by G. Morgan (1997), represents an
approach arisingfromthe study of organizations. The second, developed by Beer
(1972a, 1972b, 1981) represents perhaps the most important characterization of an
organization arising from systems science. The third, developed by Mintzberg (1983),
while not explicitly a systems approach, describes both form and function of
organizations in the classic business management sense and is used in my current
research as part the measurement process. The fourth, developed by the author,
(Larsen, 2008) synthesizes the approaches above and is also used to describe and
analyze the form and function of organizations in my current research.
G. Morgan's images of organizations. G. Morgan's model for analyzing
change in Images of Organizations (1997), in keeping with the eclectic approach
favored by those who study organizations, employs a hybrid approach that examines
change through different system views. To accomplish this task, he uses four lenses:
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autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980), chaos and complexity theory (Kelly, 1994)
(Kauffman, 1993) (Langton, 1992) (Lewin, 1992), cybernetic ideas on feedback loops
(Maruyama, 1963), and dialectic tension (see Figure 9). Using autopoiesis he argues
that particular systems are guided by their own lights—that the outside environment is
not directly experienced but, instead, the system experiences only its own imperfect
representation of the outside environment. Through the lens of chaos and complexity
theory, systemic intentions fade but the patterns of their responses to the outside
environment come into sharp view. Cybernetics strives to illuminate hidden feedback
/

loops connected to the system or proposition at hand. Dialectics causes the systems,
their patterns of responses and connections to subsystems and other systems to fade;
but spotlights attraction of opposites and the power they generate.
Figure 9
An Overview ofG. Morgan's Eclectic Model
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Autopoiesis

/
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Beer's Viable Systems Model. Stafford Beer developed a cybernetic Viable
Systems Model of organizations. He is "widely acknowledged as the founder of the
field of Management Cybernetics" (Rosenhead & Martin, 2002). In the words of his
editor, "It took the author 30 years to develop the ^Viable System Model" (VSM),
which sets out to explain how systems are viable [italics in original] - that is, capable
of independent existence" (Espejo & Harnden, 1989). In review of the various systems
models and approaches arisingfromthe study of systems, Stafford Beer's Viable
System Model, see Figure 10, appears to be the most comprehensive and generally
accessible. It is, however complicated and difficult to simplify, particularly from the
original text. The best description of the model that the author has been able to find is
"The Viable Systems Model Pack," (Walker, 2001) available on the web. It is
originally published as part of a training packet prepared by Jon Walker in 1991 with
the financial assistance of Directorate General XXIII of the Commission of the
European Communities. The following summary is adaptedfromWalker's work.
Beer's viable system model is built on the proposition that a system seeks to
maintain its own viability in the face of a constantly changing environment. The
model has three main parts: Operation, Environment, and Metasystem. Within the
organization, System 1 is the Operation; Systems 2-5 are part of the Metasystem. The
environment is broadly perceived by the planning system within the Metasystem, and
experienced and interacted with by the operational units. This organizational model
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specifies rive systems or functions within an organization. To them, I add a sixth—the
information system. Taken together they are as follows:

1. Operation function: Comprised of the entire set of field level or basic
production operational units.
2. Stability regulation function: Schedules production and resolves conflicts
between operational units.
3. Internal optimization function: Directs operation of the operational units.
4. Planning function: Responsible for future plans and strategies and
anticipation of changes in the external operating environment.
5. Executive function: Steering, policy, and external interface.
6. Information function: Flow of information which makes the system run.
An information system makes the model run, but the VSM approach is based on the
idea that if everything is operating normally, the system needs no intervention. If
everything is normal, no information flows—information is generated for changes.
Mintzberg's organizational typology. Mintzberg (1983) provides a useful
typology for analyzing organizational forms, identifying five basic parts arranged as
shown in Figure 11, below. The operating core: directly produces products and
services. The strategic apex ensures that the organization's mission is effectively met.
The middle line joins senior managers to producers with formal authority. The
technostructure is where professionals provide analytic control/guidance. Lastly,
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Figure 10
An Overview of Beer's Viable System Model
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the support staff provides a wide range of support outside of direct production. His
model is developedfromth eidea that organizational structure needs to accomplish
two primary tasks: (a) division of labor into individual tasks and (b) coordination
among the tasks. He identifies five coordinating mechanisms that describe how
organizations coordinate their work: mutual adjustment, direct supervision,
standardization of work processes and outputs, and standardization of worker skills.
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Figure 11
Five Basic Parts of Organizations after Mintzberg (1983)
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The operating core secures inputs for production, transforms inputs to outputs,
distribute outputs, and maintain the associated factors of production—both processes
and physical equipment. The strategic apex (a) ensures that the organization efficiently
meets its mission; (b) manages the organization's boundary conditions, in particular
ensuring that the organization meets the needs of those to whom it is accountable; and
(c) develops the organization's strategy. The middle line connects the operating core
to the strategic apex by exercise of formal authority. The technostructure is removed
from the operating flow, but they are the ones who "design it, plan it, change it, or
train the people who do it" (p. 15). The support staff provides a wide range of
specializedftinctionsto provide support to the organization outside the technical and
operational aspects of production. From these basic elements, Mintzberg characterizes
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five different configurations—ideal types—of the five basic organizational elements
as shown in Table 8 below.
Table 8
Five Organizational Configurations after Mintzberg
Configuration
Simple Structure
Machine Bureaucracy
Professional Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
Adhocracy

Identifying Characteristic

Key Organizational Part

Classic hierarchical supervision

Strategic Apex

Standardization of work processes

Techno structure

Standardization of skills

Operating Core

Standardization of outputs

Middle Line

Mutual adjustment

Support staff / Operating Core

Vector of Change Systems Model. I developed the fourth organizational
system, a Vector of Change organizational model It blends management science,
systems science, and public administration perspectives. I formalized the model
drawingfromthe literature above regarding systems science and organization theory.
The actual working model upon which the formal model is based, however, has been
developed, used, and refined over the course of my thirty year career. The Vector of
Change systems model (Larsen, 2008) animates a simple classic closed system by
simply setting it in its boundary conditions.
The model is based on a concept similar to Habermas' (1972,1974,1979)
views, that there are two fundamental conditions underpinning human society and
culture: work and interaction. The "work" here is the simple input/process/output
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system, and the "interaction" is the process of forming intent and observing and
reflecting on the second order effects, as well as their effects on the greater world, that
arisefromaccomplishment of work. "Forming intent" is the contemplation of work to
initiate change as shown in Figure 12. The existing situation corresponds to boundary
conditions, or social milieu, relevant to the input/process/change system under
consideration. The new situation corresponds to the desired change in state of the
existing situation which will be caused, in part, by operation of the vector of change
and, in part, by exogenous factors. "Forming intent" is the linkage between the
existing situation and initiation of a change sequence. It provides a mechanism to
capture the beginnings of the dynamism leading ultimately to a purposeful attempt to
cause change. "Second order effects" emanatefromfirst order system outputs and are
the linkages between the first order outputs and any change in the greater outside
world. A way is thus provided to systematically describe the linkages between primary
first order outputs and the new situation. Three feedback loops are described6, which
perform the following functions: (a) negative feedback provides course correction
information, (b) positive feedback provides destination correction information, and (c)

6

Negative and positive feedback loops are use here in the general systems theory

approach of characterizing feedback. Feedback is "negative" when information is supplied
back to the system that it is off course, as in an autopilot. Positive feedback means that while

you might be on the right course, your destination may not be right, i.e., the destination airport
might be fogged in and an alternative landing spot needs to be found. Both feedback loops are
internal to and part of the system under consideration. Meta-feedback loops are related to but
outside the system under consideration and function to change the system itself.
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meta-feedback provides information that alters the system itself. The three main units
of analysis are the existing situation, the new or desired situation, and the vector of
change. Subunits of analysis are: (a) input, process, and output of the vector of change;
(b) linkages of forming intent and second order effects; and (c) feedback loops linking
outcomes and the various elements. G. Morgan's and Beer's approaches to systems
informed the development of my Vector of Change systems model. Mintzberg's
organizational system and my Vector of Change model are used to characterize and
describe organizational structure and function as part of my measurement model. They
are used as part of the instruments for agency administrator interviews and assessment
of partnership agreements.
Figure 12
Vector of Change Model
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Sustainable Development:
Integrating Interests through Organizations
The nexus between sustainability and governance provides a window into the
challenges we are currently facing in American governance. Sustainabilityfocuseson
preventing or dealing with social, economic, or environmental externalities—those
unintended consequences that go beyond the scope and time of immediate actions to
their broader and longer term, often adverse, effects. I argue that the quest for
sustainability is humankind's straggle to understand and do something about our
socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home—now and for the future.
Sustainability depends more rigorously—in most of its popular formulations—upon
the integration in policy and practice of its various social, economic, and
environmental dimensions so that society and individuals can better understand and
act in their best long-term interest. Formulated this broadly, sustainability has much in
common with the very notion of governance—securing the common weal. According
to Contandriopoulos et al. (2004):
...all definitions of governance are related to the problems of securing
convergence among a diversity of actors and organizations, of redistributing
power in an organizational or social field characterized by a high level of
heterogeneity and of gaining sufficient legitimacy to act in the name [and
interest] of the collectivity, (p. 627)
The integration inherent in the idea of sustainability is the very antithesis of the
fragmentation and reductionism of today's governance as manifest by the checks and
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balances offinelydivided authority scattered among multiple levels of government
and the proliferation of special interests borne of hyper-pluralism. Policy emerging
from this milieu of governance is pre-ordained to be narrowly constructed and rife
with unintended consequences including the shrinkage of democracy (R. C. Box et at,
2001) associated with constrained federalism, for example.
Having thus introduced the dynamic tension at the nexus of sustainability and
governance, I come to the question of what might be done about it. I suggest that this
tension contributes to the new form of emergent governance that is the subject of my
current research. In this context, public administrators become more than mere
bureaucrats following dicta of their political masters, they become agents of political
change by striving to integrate governance and bring government and the choices it
makes closer to its citizens - thus, in the liberal tradition of democracy, providing
opportunities for citizen engagement and stewardship.
Citizen action to influence governance typically takes place outside of the
formal institutions of governance because it originates in the terrain of civil society.
Citizen action through partnerships, however, while it may originatefromcivil
society, falls under the embrace of governance as soon as an agency administrator
enters into a partnership agreement that extends his or her governmental authority to
the actions provided for in the agreement. These partnerships, as the result of
agreements made with agency administrators, are thus conducted wholly within the
American Constitutionalframeworkof governance. Citizens and organizations take

Chapter II, Literature Review

114

actions in the terrain of civil society. Citizens and corporations take actions in the
private sphere of the market place. Citizens, non-governmental organizations, and
corporations all affect governance—sometimes even profoundly—in modern
democracies. When they do so through partnerships at the hands and bidding of public
officials doing the public's business, they are influencing governance within the
framework of American Constitutional governance.
In a recent unpublished work (Larsen, Unpublished), I offered the first general
theory of sustainability. I recount in it, the genesis of sustainability and the
development of its foundational concepts. I derive seventeen axioms that express the
fundamental building blocks of sustainability. More importantly, for the purposes of
my research problem, I derive a set of strategic goals for sustainable governance that I
later used as a theory of value to evaluate constrained federalism and the newly
emerging form of governance arisingfrompartnerships—New Public Governance. In
the next few paragraphs I provide background information on the development of the
idea of sustainable development and how it is related to strategic governance.
The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro
The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, more properly known as the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), is generally viewed
as the birth of the concept of sustainable development. During its negotiations, nations
of the world forged a consensus about how to best achieve such development.
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Humankind, however halting its first steps, has thus embarked on its quest for
sustainable development.. The opening line of the Preamble to Agenda 21, the
Conference's most substantive agreement, defines today's situation:
Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a
perpetuation of disparities between and within nations, a worsening of poverty,
hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing deterioration of the
ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. (Chapter 1, Section 1)
There is a related modern systems project posited by Zwick (Unpublished) that
he situated in a macro-historical view of human history. To this project, he ascribes
three roles: (a) resolving the problems wrought by a "science and technology have
become too complex and powerful to be understood and controlled," (b) "to foster a
productive interaction between science and religion," and (c) "to help us understand our
socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home" (p. 121). The quest for
sustainable development aims exactly at his third role which informs my following
definition.
The questfor sustainability is humankind's struggle to understand and do something about our socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home.
The basic concept of sustainable development is generally viewed as having
been conceived by the Brundtland Commission report "Our Common Future" (World
Commission on Environment and Development., 1987) which explored, framed, and
defined sustainable development. The June 1992 Earth Summit went beyond
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formulating a shared definition of sustainable development to forging a consensus
among nation-states of the world on what to do about it. Interestingly, the inherent
tension between development and protection of the environment is embedded in the
very genesis of the conference. Developed countries originally proposed an
international conference to protect the environment—albeit mostly the environment of
developing countries. Developing countries would only agree to such a conference if it
would secure the right to develop their own natural resources as well as provide the
means7 for their development—the purpose served by the Rio Declaration.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United Nations,
1992c) is one of the founding documents of sustainability. It, along with a statement of
forest principles, and Agenda 21, a 40-chapter world plan of action to implement
sustainability together are the world consensus agreements that came out of the Earth
Summit in Rio, the birth of sustainable development. The declaration articulates the
ultimate role of governance in sustainability and sustainable development. The Rio
Declaration has two remarkable attributes: (a) it is a consensus forged from the very
deep divide between developing and developed countries and was the last thing agreed

7

Developed countries, it is argued, must atone for past sins of colonization and for the

fearsome burden they imposed on developing countries through the twin assaults of (a) aid
offered in the form of large scale external debt, on (b) the precondition of undertaking
fundamental economic reforms. The economies of many developing countries are burdened
with high external debt repayment requirements while their people suffered because of the
strictly imposed economic discipline. More than one regime fellfromthe resultant pressure.
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to in two years of negotiations, and (b) it is the consensus of nations of the world—a
statement of 27 principles that articulate the responsibilities governments have toward
their own citizens and the rest of the world. I reproduce a topic outline of each
principle, shown in Table 9, and offer it as the ultimate model for the role of
governance in humankind's quest for sustainable development. Reflecting on all the
points above, it is obvious to me that the question of the government's proper role is a
continuing work in progress. The consequences of a government's choices are
intertwined with the welfare of its citizens, its continued position in the world order,
and ultimately its destiny among the fete of nations. These questions, probably only
second to war, are ultimately among the toughest questions governments face. It is
therefore necessary to have a citizenry capable of redeeming its democratic
responsibilities wisely both in the ballot box and in the day-to-day engagement in
democracy. It is therefore imperative to have a people, a government, and a society
capable of learning and adapting to changing circumstances—a task towards which the
quest for sustainable development is uniquely suited.

Chapter II, Literature Review

118

Table 9
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
1: Human beings are at the
centre of...sustainable
development...

2: States have the
sovereign right to
exploit their own
resources...

3: ...meet...needs of present
and future generations.

4: ...environmental protection
[is]...part...of development-

s'. All States and people
shall cooperate in...
eradicating poverty...

6: ...the least developed... shall
be given special priority....

7: States shalL.conserve,
protect and restore...Earth's
ecosystem...

8: ...eliminate
9: ...strengthen...scientific
unsustainable patterns
understanding through
of production and
exchanges...
consumption...

10: ...encourage public
awareness and
participation...

11: ...enact effective
environmental
legislation...

13: ...compensation for...
environmental damage..

14: [discourage harm to
15: ...precautionary approach,
environment or human
health]

12: ...open international
economic system...

16: ...polluter should... bear the 17: Environmental impact 18: [notification for] natural
cost of pollution...
assessment... shall be
disasters or other
undertaken...
emergencies...
19: ...notification [of]... transboundary environmental
effect...

20: Women... [are]
essential to achieve
sustainable
development.

21: ...youth...should be
mobilized...global
partnership...

22: Indigenous people and their
23: [protect resources of
communities...have a vital role... oppressed people]

24: Warfare is inherently
destructive of sustainable
development...

25: Peace, development and
environmental protection
are interdependent and
indivisible.

27: ...good faith [effort]... of
the principles... in this
Declaration...

26: States shall resolveenvironmental
disputes peacefully...
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Imputed Structure and Function of Governance
I conducted an analysis of the Rio Declaration to simplify and reduce it into its
structural and functional components as shown in Table 10 below8. From this analysis,
the Rio Declaration articulates a system of governance that places human beings at the
center. These five key functions become strategic goals for sustainable governance:
1. Meet the needs of both present and future generations,
2. Make provisions for states to utilize their own resources—consistent with
subsequent provisions,
3. Make provisions for states to conserve, protect, and restore ecosystem
functions,
4. Avoid harm to the environment or human health, and
5. Foster peace, development, and environmental protection.
The structural elements of the Declaration contain matters pertaining to both domestic
and international affairs of a country. Sorting the elements and considering the
international aspects first, the elements articulate a set of tactical objectives for a
nation to pursue in its international relations:

8

Table 10 reflects original numbering in the text. While delegates could agree to elements,

they could not agree to any particular ordering because any ordering, it was feared, would imply
relative importance of one item to another. The original order is merely an artifact of negotiation
sequence. I have renumbered items sequentially, retaining the original order among like elements.
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1. Foster an open international system.
2. Provide notification for natural disasters or other emergencies.
3. Provide notification for trans-boundary environmental effects.
4. Make provision for global partnerships for mobilization of youth.
5. Acknowledge warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.
6. Make provisions for the peaceful resolution of environmental disputes.
The remaining elements deal with domestic issues and become imperatives for
a national government to meet in redeeming responsibilities to its citizens—in the
language of management, these are tactical objectives for national governance:
1. Incorporate environmental protection as part of all development activities,
2. Contribute to cooperation in eradicating poverty,
3. Give special priority to the least developed people,
4. Eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption,
5. Strengthen scientific understanding through exchanges between scientists,
6. Encourage public awareness and participation,
7. Enact effective environmental legislation,
8. Provide compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage,
9. Employ the precautionary approach in development activities,
10. Establish a system where polluters bear the cost of pollution,
11. Provideforenvironmental impact assessment of contemplated development,
12. Include women in development activities,
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Table 10
Systems Explication of Rio Declaration into Constituent Structure and Function
Function
(Strategic Goal)
3: ...meet...needs of
present and future
generations.
2: States have the
sovereign right to
exploit their own
resources...

System Description
1: Human beings
are at the centre
of...sustainable
development...

Structure (Tactical Objectives)
4: ...environmental protection [is]...part...of development...
5: All States people shall cooperate in...eradicating poverty...
6: ...the least developed... shall be given special priority....

27: ...good faith
[effort]... of the
principles...in this
Declaration...

8: eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption

7: States
shall...conserve,
protect and
restore... Earth's
ecosystem...

9: strengthen...scientific understanding through exchanges...

14: [discourage
harm to
environment or
human health]

12: ...open international economic system...

10: ...encourage public awareness and participation...
11: ...enact effective environmental legislation...

13: ...compensationforadverse effects of environmental damage...
15: ...precautionary approach...

25: Peace,
development and
environmental
protection are
interdependent and
indivisible.

16:...polluter should...bear the cost of pollution...
17: Environmental impact assessment..shall be undertaken...
18: [notification for] natural disasters or other emergencies...
19: notification [of] transboundary environmental effect
20: Women [are] essential to achieve sustainable
development.
21: ...youth...should be mobilized...global partnership...
22: Indigenous people and communities have a vital role
23: [protect resources of oppressed people]
24: Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development
26: States shall resolve... environmental disputes peacefully...
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13. Mobilize youth for sustainability,
14. Protect indigenous people and their communities, and
15. Protect the resources of oppressed people.
I later use the strategic goals of governance as a theory of value to compare New
Public Management, otherwise known as constrained federalism, to the emerging form
of governanceflowingfromfederal citizen partnerships, otherwise known as New
Public Governance.
Issues Central to the Research Problem
Public administration has its origins in the progressive era of the late 1800s and
early to mid-1900s. Salamon (2002) observes that classical public administration
theory "posited a new type of institution, the democratic public agency, that would
overcome the three major problems long associated with government bureaucracy in
the American mind—that is, excessive administrative discretion, special-interest
capture, and inefficiency" (p. 9). From the beginning, public administration has
concerned itself with the business of (a) restricting government agencies to
administration of policy rather than making it, (b) staffing of agencies based on
competence rather than influence, and (c) management principles aimed at efficient
dispatch of duties. This section is arranged around public administration and its sociopolitical context.
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Public administration itself is taken up first, considering (a) its structure and
function, (b) citizen involvement in coproduction, and (c) the current American
manifestation of New Public Governance. The context of governance is taken up next,
focusing on (a) transitions in governance, (b) public administration as set in
governance, and (c) administrative law. American federalism is considered with
respect to (a) constrained federalism, and (b) its countervailing complex
interdependence. Pluralism is explored with respect to (a) dynamic change, (b)
problems with pluralism, (c) a theory of value, and (d) a macro view of pluralism. This
section is concluded with an examination of two American theories of democracy and
its implications for (a) conservative and liberal forms of public administration, (b)
rational choice theory which guides individual choices, (c) learning from choices, (d)
balancing of multiple private interests, (e)findingcommon ground among interests, (f)
the process of change, and (g) emerging American communitarianism.
Public Administration
While acknowledging that it is not entirely new but builds instead on a rich
history, Salamon coins the term new governance to mark a shift in paradigm from
classic hierarchy tofinding"commonalities flowing from the tools of public action
that they [public agency programs] employ. It thus shifts the unit of analysis from the
individual program or agency to the distinctive tools or technologies that programs
embody" (p. 10). He outlines shifts infivekey areas: (a)froma focus on programs
and agencies to afocuson nature of various instruments, (b) a shift in organizational
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formfromhierarchy to network, (c) a shift in dynamicsfrompublic vs. private to
public and private, (d) a shift in the exercise of powerfromcommand and control to
negotiation and persuasion, and (e) a shift from an orientation toward management
skills to enablement skills. My theory of New Public Governance strives to build on
Salamon's notion of new governance.
Structure and Function
From a systems perspective, public administration can be viewed as an open
system with particular structure and function as shown in Figure 13. As a system,
public administration is represented here has having (a) an internal structure with
constituent properties and (b) external system function with emergent properties.
Figure 13
The Structure and Function of Public Administration Expressed as a System
Emergent
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The emergent properties of the public administration system are its external functions.
I identify three outcomes of public administration: (a) operational outcomes comprised
of public consumption of agency goods or services; (b) tactical outcomes of meeting
particular public needs and operating within legal constraints; and (c) strategic
outcomes of operating within and executing statutory authorities and purposes,
meeting political mandates (whether set by Congress or the Executive Branch) and
properly exercising authorities as specified in case law or by Court decision.
The most foundational constituent property of the internal public
administration system structure is its relevant boundary conditions which include
authorities, mandates, and public needs. From their boundary conditions, agencies
form strategic intent based on deploying authorities and mandates to meet public
needs. From strategic intent, tactical decision-making occurs, committing people and
resources to actions that leads to operational provision of goods and services.
With this foundation, I similarly employ a systems approach to describe
structural elements and relations for public administration under New Public
Management. There are only a small number of institutional actors: citizens, political
institutions, interest groups, and agencies. I determined above that New Public
Management operated under a conservative political view of governance. Under that
view, citizen engagement in governance is limited to voting for elected officials and
engaging in classic pluralism through interest groups to influence elected officials
who, in their capacity as primary agents in a representative democracy, (a) exercise
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specific discretion over agencies, who in turn (b) only provide public goods and
services at and by their direction. This is also a representation of the classic form of
public administration, with careful separation between administrative discretion and
making of policy—the former the domain of bureaucrats, and the latter the domain of
elected officials.
Coproduction
Coproduction falls within one of three options an agency administrator can take
in any particular program area when faced with downsizing. Administrators can (a)
prioritize the program output in question and cut something else, (b) reduce or
eliminate the program output, or (c)findsome other means to accomplish outputs
without expenditure, or with little expenditure, of appropriated funds. Coproduction
falls in the last category of achieving a particular program output with little or no
expenditure of scarce financial resources.
Coproduction first appeared in the public administration literature in the late
1970s. It was explored as an attempt to understand the "sobering effect on the theory
and practice of public administration" (c. H. Levine, 1984, p. 178)frompassage of
Proposition 13 in California and similar taxing and spending limits in other
jurisdictions. Such limits are seen as citizen revolt against "the intricately complex
political and administrative structure of the public sector [which has become]...
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hopelessly beyond the reach of the average citizen through the traditional formal
mechanisms of political participation—voting, parties, and interest groups" (p. 178).
Levine observed that the "linkage between citizens and their government has
become strained over the past two decades" (p. 178) and such alienation is set in the
broader disaffection of legitimacy of government brought about by Vietnam,
Watergate, and social factors of rapid spatial mobility and urbanization. Levine noted
because of spending limits, the link between public support and funding for agency
programs suddenly became painfully visible. Mechanisms of coproduction for
reducing costs for delivery of services and involvement of communities and citizens
are already well understood as shown by Table 11, adaptedfromLevine (p. 79).
Several scholars have elaborated morefollyon the meaning and value of
coproduction. Alford (2002) argues that public "clients are not simple utility
maximizers but are also motivated by a complex mixture of nonmaterial incentives"
(p. 32). Ferris (1984) recognizes several important aspects of coproduction, which he
calls "coprovisioa" Coproduction is an expression of collective choice and its
hallmark concept is "the involvement of citizens in their roles as consumers in the
production of collective goods and services" (p. 325). Second, he suggests that
coproduction by its very nature, "facilitates allocative efficiency by providing a
vehicle for citizens to express their demands for publicly provided goods and services"
(p. 327). He observes connection between citizens' demands for goods or services and
the likelihood of coproduction
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Table 11
Methods to Reduce Cost and Build Supportfor Public Services after Levine (1984).
Delivery Mechanisms

Purpose
Privatizing service delivery

Contracting with a private for-profit firm
Franchising services to a private firm. Vouchers, user
fees and charges to ration demand for services
Shedding responsibility to private or non-profit
organizations

Intergovernmentalizing
service delivery
arrangements

Shedding services or other units of government

Improving operating
productivity

Methods to monitor performance

Sharing service responsibility
Sharing functions of data processing, planning,
communications

Methods to maximize output per dollar
Methods to improve financial decision making
Methods to track costs
Methods to monitor and manage contracts

Deprofessionalizing
bureaucracies

Civilianizing sworn personnel
Using volunteers and paraprofessionals
Using reserves and auxiliaries

Devolving service
responsibility

Neighborhood organization of sen/ice delivery
Self-help
Coproduction
Public/private partnerships to solve community
problems.
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being adopted. Parks et al. (1981) notes the contribution of coproduction to increasing
effectiveness and efficiency of government. Brudney and England (1983) explore the
delicate balance government officials must seek between resources and expectations
of the citizenry and the augmentation that coproduction provides. Lastly, Whitaker
(1980) discovers that not only does coproduction change and augment provision of
public goods, it also changes citizen/client behavior, perspectives, and expectations.
Twenty years later, there has been a reemergence of coproduction in the public
administration literature. Bovaird (2005) conceives it as an emerging paradigm within
complex adaptive systems. He observes that the scope of coproduction has been
extended to service commissioning, planning, and design. He explores a variety of
definitions, favoring Joshi and Moore's (2004) while noting its restriction to state
agencies. I build on Joshi and Moore's definition and broaden it to include
participation of individual citizens as well The resultant comprehensive definition of
institutionalized coproduction, of which citizen stewardship—the subject of this
paper—is a subset, is as follows:
Institutionalized coproduction is the provision of public services through longterm relationships between public agencies and citizens.
Bovaird explores a range of provider-user relationships shown below in Table 12.
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Table 12
Public Service Provider and User Relationships after Bovaird (2005)
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user/community and
professionals

Co-delivery of user/
community planned
services

User/community delivery of
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Traditional selforganized community
provision of services

Users/community User/community
delivery professionally
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New Public Management
Coproduction often resultsfromthe pressure of constrained federalism,
defined here as New Public Management, to reduce the size and scope of federal
government. At its best, New Public Management captures the lofty intent of
lawmakers, executives, administrators, and citizens alike to reform government—to
enable the government to better serve its citizens. NPM attempts to create, through
policy in the public sector, what the hidden hand of the market creates in the private
sector. Kettl (2000) suggests that NPM revolves around six core ideas: a) greater
productivity, b) use of market incentives to root out bureaucratic pathologies, c) better
public service, d) improving responsiveness through decentralization, e) improvement
of policy and its monitoring, and f) accountability for results. In short, NPM can be
well characterized as a managerial approach to governance.
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Kettl traces its origins to New Zealand where reformers started with a wellthought out plan to (a) privatize programs wherever possible, (b) substitute market
incentives for command-and-control bureaucracies, and (c) focus only on outputs and
results instead of budgets. These initiatives rely on new institutional economic
theories, theory of the agency problem, and private sector management reforms which
respectively drove: (a) breaking the grip of special interests on policy, (b) resolving
the high initial transaction costs for the civil servant contracts-for-results-for-pay
approach, and (c) giving government managers wide latitude for the tasks at hand—
letting and making managers manage. Output-based contracts between government
officials and government managers are said to be the "keystone" of their efforts. To
round out NPM as an ideal type of public administration, we need to more folly
specify its various attributes, first with regard to its model of governance and secondly
by taking a close look at its cultural dimensions.

NPM set in traditionalfederalism. Being rooted in a politically conservative
view, New Public Management reflects a simple traditional view of governance
represented by the classic Federalist model. Citizens in a representative republic vote
for elected officials as shown in Figure 14 below, and then their duty as citizens is
done. The rest of the time they tend to their lives in the space of civil society. Many, in
the American tradition of association, form interest groups and strive to influence
elected officials from their terrain of civil society. The political leaders, in true
representative form legislate and direct the machinery of Statefromtheir own counsel.
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The executive branch agencies are the chief objects of their legislation and directives.
Public administrators follow their dicta and dispense goods, services, and provide a
little governance for citizens who in turn vote and form civic associations to influence
distribution of federal largesse. While this model is simple, it provides the starting
point for two more elaborate formulations, (a) one taken up shortly that elaborates on
authority-based and contract-based conceptions of governance, (b) and the other taken
up in the conclusion that distinguishes New Public ManagementfromNew Public
Governance.
Figure 14
Relations between Institutional Actorsfor New Public Management
Civil Society

Constitutional
Governance

Voting

Joining in
Common
Interest
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Cultural dimensions ofNPM. New Public Management has significant cultural
dimensions. Hood (1998) explores the cultural dimensions of NPM through cultural
frames first proposed by Douglas (1982), and later by Thompson, Ellis, and
Wildavsky (1990) who express culture in terms of the degree of individual integration
into bounded units (group) and the extent to which an individual is subject to
externally imposed restrictions (grid). There arefivearchetypes: (a) individualism
represented by the self-made manufacturer low in both group and grid; (b) fatalism
represented by the non-unionized weaver low in group but high in grid; (c)
egalitarianism represented by the communard high in group but low in grid; (d)
hierarchy represented by the high-caste Hindu villager high both in group and grid;
and (e) autonomy represented by the hermit who opts out of both group and grid.
Hood uses these archetypes toframethe 2,000 year old debate over what
constitutes good government. Synthesizing Hood, NPM is (a) individualist in that it
encourages new ideas and entrepreneurial business concepts, (b) bierarchist in that it
employs hierarchy as its means, (c) egalitarian in that it is intended to promote the
greater good, and (d) fatalist in that disenfranchised people or high purposes are
disempowered and have no recourse, Table 13 below. I argue that NPM even appeals
to the hermit's autonomy in that it can serve as a politically acceptable tool available
for those who would eviscerate government—an ultra-conservative view that enjoys a
modicum of political support. NPM thus has features that correspond to each cultural
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frame. Whether an attribute is good or bad depends, among other things, on one's own
underlying political views.
Table 13
Cultural Attributes ofNew Public Management
Group
Grid
High

Low

Low
Fatalistic: NPM offers little recourse for

High
Hierarchical: NPM employs

those who disagree with it

hierarchical methods

Individualistic: NPM encourages new

Egalitarian: NPM aims at promoting

ideas and entrepreneurial application of

the greater good

best business concepts
Autonomous (no group, no grid): NPM can be used to eviscerate government

Emergent problems of NPM. At the outset, there are two fundamental problems
with NPM that cannot be easily overcome: (a) the hidden hand of the market is often
replaced with the hand of contested political choice, and (b) lack of transitivity
between the problem being solved and the instrument used to solve it. The market
allows consumers (as the keepers of their own particular utility functions) to maximize
their utility within the constraints of their income and choices offered in the market. In
the public sector, however, the definition of public utility with regard to governance is
contested and decided politically. Similarly, the choices about which government
services and functions to offer are similarly limited, not by market creativity and
consumer demand, but, instead by contested political choice. One example is the
contradiction between our mutually exclusive high and unmeetable expectations of
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government with our desire for inexpensive unobtrusive government. Another
example is the conservative political view of the size and scope of government in
opposition to the liberal political view. NPM's answer to the first problem of contested
political choice is to choose to narrow the function of government to mere provision of
services—typically contracting out existing agency programs to the fullest extent
possible. NPM's does not have an answer to the second problem. It merely continues
deflecting blame for continuing political problems to agencies.
As citizens in pursuit of our own self-realization projects, we want responsive
government that gives us what we want, when and where we want it, and we want
choices. But we do not want government to infringe on our style or to pay high taxes.
These two expectations are mutually exclusive. Resolving the conflict requires
resolving the conflicting expectations. NPM however, does not resolve the conflicting
expectations; it merely chooses the second expectation of small unobtrusive
government along with its associated reduction in size, scope, and provision of public
services. NPM chooses not to respond the high expectations of government. President
Reagan said government is not the solution, it is the problem. Under NPM the problem
is not resolved. The solution does not fit the problem More formally, there is a lack of
transitivity between instrument and problem.
Kettle (2000) notes that "Most discussions of public management reform begin
with aflawedpremise: that management reform is most fundamentally about
management

Elected officials do not pursue management reform for its own sake
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but because they believe it helps them achieve a broader political purpose" (p. 67). So,
at its worst then, NPM becomes a conservative tool for political reform stuck with the
impossible task of fixing politics by working on the bureaucrats instead of the
politicians.
Origins of NPM. Felts and Jos (2000) trace the origins and resonance of NPM
in a broad economic and cultural epistemology that explores the way we think about
time and space. Modern capitalism, according to Felts and Jos, "demands that the
official business of public administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously,
continuously, and with as much speed as possible" (p. 520). Hierarchy, they report, is
the prescription historically employed by both private and public organizations to
achieve maximum efficiency because it provides predictability and uniformity within
a stable legal and administrative system. They find that today's heavy emphasis on
markets is, however, our collective response to a "remarkable consensus that
bureaucracy has outlived its usefulness for pursuing either profits or public purposes"
(p. 522). They suggest that NPM owes its genesis to a "Progressive era conviction that
representative democracy would only survive if it could deliver services efficiently"
and observes that "the speed with Which market based management techniques have
begun to reshape the theory and practice of public administration is astonishing" (p.
519). They see a blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors with a
concomitant mismatch between values of efficiency in the private sector and values of
"equity, constitutional stewardship, public spiritedness, and citizenship" (p. 520) in the
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public sector. They distill the fundamental conflict between (a) the speed and tempo of
modern society, its plural interests, and high expectations for rapid change, with (b) an
historic much slower-pace model of bureaucracy developed when communication is
much slower, interests more homogeneous, and expectations about the rate of change
are more modest.
Empirical results ofNPM. Kettl (2000) examined empirical results of new
public management from a global perspective. He found that common roots of the
NPM revolution are a desire for (a) greater productivity, (b) more reliance on markets,
(c) devolvement to smaller units of government, and (d) enhanced accountability for
specific measurable results. The common fundamental values are normative marketbased and managerialist ideologies. The common theoretical bases are new
mstitutionayorganizational economic theories, public choice theory and assumptions
that better government management will solve economic and social ills. The emergent
results are large privatized sectors; atomized government, particularly in Britain and
other countries following "Westminster Reforms"; downsizing; and increased
contracting out. Public perceptions of government failed to improve and grave
difficulties arose in measuring results. All this shows a striking empirical trend of
movementfromNPM's egalitarian aspirations originating in the high group low grid
quadrant of grid-group theory to the individualist low group low grid quadrant using
authoritative high group high grid hierarchical means. Government has moved from
working for the greater public good through egalitarian public processes toward a
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more narrowly defined outcome of self-interest—particularly corporate economic
interest—and has accomplished this through authoritarian political decision making.
Box, Marshall, Reed, and Reed (2001) posit that NPM has caused shrinkage in
democracy. They argue that despite our democracy's success in securing individual
liberties and material success of a wealthy society, vexing problems remain. Among
them they include "poverty, poor-quality education, inequalities of race, gender, and
wealth, crime and violence, destruction of forest, farmland, wildlife habitat and other
natural resources, and pollution of air and water" (p. 608). The problem with NPM is
not necessarily that these individual problems exist, but, rater that they persist despite
all being reasonably solvable. The real problem they argue is that NPM creates a
political situation political will cannot be generated to solve the problem because:
[T]he public lacks the knowledge and political influence to give public
administrative agencies a mandate to solve them. Various barriers stand in the
way, such as control of information and the policy-making process by interest
groups and economic elites, inertia in bureaucratic organizations, and
resistance by "experts" to democratic governance, (p. 608-609)
While NPM draws its public supportfromcitizens' desire for political reform, it
works in the wrong venue. Political reform cannot be wroughtfromreforming the
bureaucracy.
Virtues and vices ofNPM. New Public Management has both virtues and vices.
NPM's five areas of strengths are: (a) its emphasis on customer service, which has the
potential to rebuild citizens' faith in government, (b) its effectiveness at eliminating
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red-tape, (c) its allowance for government to act as a learning organization, (d) the
ability for it to be employed as part of a system of checks and balances to increase
government effectiveness and sharpen its purposes, and (e) (borrowing from its
Westminsterian roots rather than American form) its potential for fostering
professionalism and managerial competence in the executive branch. NPM's largest
challenges are that it: (a) serves up public agencies as scapegoats for politicians who
dodge responsibilities, (b) avoids the hard work offindingroot causes to social
problems, (c) makes it too easy to blame government instead of solve problems
because everybody loves to hate government, (d) offers an easy Trojan horse for those
who would eviscerate government, and (e) some (R. C. Box, Marsehall, G.S., Reed, G.
J., and Reed, CM., 2001) believe that it eliminates agencies as the last bastion of
American democracy and thereby degrades democracy and democratic process.
Virtues of NPMfrommy perspective, taking a broad view of NPM's
intentions and outcomes, are that only NPM can provide the necessary political muscle
in a democracy to (a) downsize a bloated government; (b) actually improve efficiency
and efficacy of government services and functions; (c) foster professionalism,
managerial skills, and accountability in public administration; and (d) increase
fungibility between public and private management under the Westminster approach.
NPM, however, does not function as well in the arena of ethics and citizen
engagement. Proclaiming no ethics is still an ethical stance—despite protestations to
the contrary. NPM is deficient in the ethical arena because (a) devolvement results in
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no one being responsible for the whole so that ethical accountability evaporates; (b)
tracking ethics does not map well onto an outputs-based accountancy and metric; (c)
when governance is pushed down to street-level bureaucrats, lack of ethical
accountability and standards can cause unintended results; (d) managers become more
privately and less civic minded; and (e) most importantly, as agencies embrace NPM
they become less connected to the social fabric of the very communities they serve. In
doing so, they may become more efficient in providing services, but broader
normative and ethical questions go unanswered. For example, school lunches may be
provided efficiently, but the need for feeding unwed teen mothers and their babies
may go unanswered. NPM reduces the opportunities for citizen engagement to address
peoples' concerns and thus shrinks opportunities for democratic participation.
OMB downsizing of federal agencies. To understand how an alternative to
NPM might arise, we need to take a closer look at the effects of NPM and its
associated waves of competitive sourcing on agencies and their delivery of services 9 .

The agency reports "Through a process called "studies," the cost of doing work in-house is
compared to the cost of contracting work out. Based on that comparison, the most efficient
and cost effective means of getting the work done is selected

In a Full Study, the

government also develops a Most Efficient Organization (MEO), costs it out, and uses that
cost as its "bid"forthe work.... Only work classified as "commercial activity" under the
Federal Activity Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) is subject to competitive sourcing studies.
Federal agencies are required to annually inventory each position and determine whether it is
"commercial" or "inherently governmental," or a combination of both." (USDA Forest
Service, 2006)
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Everyone below the level of agency political appointees and their immediate office is
fair game in OMB's eyes for increased efficiency through downsizing, outsourcing, or
narrowing of scope. Specifically, support staff, technostructure, operating core, and
middle line (under a scenario where a unit's entire function is outsourced) could all be
competitively sourced. Typically, under OMB-directed competitive sourcing, an
agency has only one of two choices: either (a) outsource the area studied, or (b) move
immediately to a "most effective organization." continuing business as usual is not a
choice. Although the basic organizing principle of NPM is increased efficiency, not
diminishment of public services, I would argue that, in line with Kettl's observation
that politicians take up NPM only for political reasons, there is another significant
ideological goal at work—the goal of aggressively reducing the size and scope of the
federal government under a conservative political ideology. The net result is reduction
of government services, narrowing of program benefits, and constraining citizen
engagement—in short, constrained federalism.
Governance
While NPM has one answer to the limits of agency discretion, the question still
remains. What limits should there be to administrative discretion? The basic questions
surrounding management of public lands are set against the backdrop of America's
continuing experiments in governance. What is the highest and best purpose of public
lands? Who should decide? Who should receive their benefits? Who should pay? And
for each answer, Why?—what are the first principles? This is the stuff of democracy,
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and has been since before our republic is founded. One would therefore expect the
evolution of public lands administration to coincide with broader tides of change
taking place in the face of American governance and the rule of law.
Transitions in Governance
McKay (2000) describes transitions in American governance as falling into three
periods of (a) classic federalism up to 1933, (b) cooperative federalism starting with
the advent of the New Deal from 1933 to 1970, and (c) a new federalism including
devolution from 1970 to the present. To these, I add a fourth period of New Public
Management and Competing Interests dating from 1985 to the present. Selected
legislation that strongly affects management of the public lands and their associated
resources is shown in Table 14, below.
National Forests and their basic purposes were established during the classic
federalism period. This is an era of scientific management for "the greatest good for
the greatest number in the long run" (Wilson, 1905, pp. 4 -5). Utilitarian public land
management characterized by high commodity production marked the period of
cooperative federalism. Environmental regulation started in the latter part of the 1960s
and reached robust proportions in the 1970s.
The period of New Public Management and Competing Interests begins in 1985. This
period is marked by two strong currents, one of downsizing and downscaling
government and the other of various competing interests scrambling to get their piece
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of the federal largesse. I choose the mid-1980s because that is when the United States
started seriously implementing a more conservative view of government, scaling back
both its size and scope. The idea of New Public Management started half a decade
earlier in New Zealand and in Great Britain under the conservative leadership of Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher. President Reagan captured the heart of it, where he
equates smaller government tofreedom,in his State of the Union Address, February 4,
1986:
Government growing beyond our consent [has] become a lumbering giant,
slamming shut the gates of opportunity, threatening to crush the very roots of
ourfreedom.What brought America back? The American people brought us
back — with quiet courage and common sense; with undying faith that in this
nation under God the future is ours, for the future belongs to the free.
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Table 14
Selected Federal Public Land Management Legislation by Period
Period
Legislation
Classic Federalism, up to 1933

Forest Reserve Act 1891
"Organic" or Forest management Act of 1900
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918
Mineral Leasing Act 1920

Cooperative Federalism, 1933 to
1970

Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960
Wilderness Act of 1964
National Environmental policy Act of 1969

New Federalism, 1970 to 1985

Clean Air Act of 1970
Endangered Species Act of 1973
Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974
National Forest Management Act of 1976
Clean Water Act of 1977

New Public Management and
Competing Interests, 1985 to
present

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
Healthy Forests Restoration Act 2003
Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004
Secure Rural Schools and Community SelfDetermination Act of 2000
Stewardship Contracting in Appropriations Act of 2003
National Forest Dependent Rural Communities
Economic Diversification Act of 1990
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Public Administration Set in Governance
Public administration is set in and reflects the broader society and political
system in which it is set. D. Morgan, Shinn, and Green (D. F. Morgan, Shinn, &
Green, 2008a), focusing on the changing tides of administrative discretion, note that
questions surrounding discretion and its abuse "cannot be separatedfromthe
generative power of the animating principles that gave birth to our nation in 1787" (p.
2). They describe a progression that complements McKay's models of federalism: (a)
Jacksonian democracy and "ordinary virtue," 1830 - 1850; (b) Populism and neutral
competence, 1880-1910; (c) Progressivism and scientific management, 1900 - 1930;
(d) The New Deal and the administrative state, 1930 -1960; and (e) Globalization,
Tribalism and Post-Modernity, 1970 - present. In an important way, the National
Forest Management Act can be seen as an example of McKay's devolution leaving the
task of sorting out the embedded inconsistencies in American values and expectations
to thefieldunits of the U.S. Forest Service. I suspect the same is true for many other
federal agencies.
What might cause this kind of social change? I suspect that two fundamental
social processes are taking place with regard to social change. Thefirstprocess is that,
in a very fundamental way, we Americans merely oscillate between two different
conceptions of government: (a) constrained federalism characterized by the theoretical
constructs of New Public Management associated with a strictly representative form of
democracy discussed below as Posner's type two democracy, and (b) a more liberal
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conception of federal agency functioning served by the theoretical constructs of
pluralism and a liberal view of citizen engagement in democracy discussed below as
Posner's type one democracy. The second social process taking place might not be an
oscillation, but a directional change of movingfromfierce American individualism to
a more community-centered sense of working for the greater common good. With
respect to change in governance, I suspect America is currently located in the middle
of a periodic transition where the current narrow strictures of governance reflecting a
constrained federalism are giving way to a new governance where citizens are
reclaiming responsibilities for their own governance one step at a time.
Administrative Law
Cooper (2000), paraphrasing de Tocqueville, declares that "sooner or later
most important political problems in America are transformed into administrative
problems which, in turn, find their way into the courts" (p. xv). His point is that there
is a very strong nexus and dynamic interaction between law and public administration.
Cooper points out that political leaders of both parties have blamed the law and legal
processes for most of the country's ills for more than two decades. Nonetheless, our
constitutional republic is still relatively young and the importance of rule of law still
burns brightly as part of the collective American consciousness. We, as corporations,
government agencies, special interest groups, and individuals, are all eager to pursue
legal remedies before all else Mis. And at the end of the day, every citizen is bound by
the rule of law. Cooper notes that, ironically, many of the difficulties faced by political
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administrations over the last two decades at both state and federal levels have been
largely brought on by themselves because they fail to comprehend the central role of
law and administrative policy to governance.
The rule of law is an important concept for federal public administration and is
fundamental for development of the constructs for my research problem. It is
important to develop the idea of authority for action known best by senior public
administrators and scholars of public administration, Namely, as an outgrowth of
tending to the first task of classic public administration theory, public officials are
strictly limited to making only those decisions and taking only those actions that have
an exact and particular basis in law. This limit arises philosophically from the notion
of "limited government," a Lockean notion which presupposes that the things most
valued by individuals are held privately and do not come into existence because of
government. In this case, the purpose of government is to protect these privately held
goods and to act only based on the explicit authority given to it through legally defined
channels, i.e., elections, courts, legislative bodies, executive orders, etc. This limit also
arises more concretelyfromthe doctrines of separation of powers and States' rights
under the tenth amendment to the Constitution—that "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for
the States respectively, or to the people. Public administrator decision-making then,
which has an exact and particular basis in law, is thus an often used as a unit of
measure for much political science and public administration inquiry and debate.
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Public administrators' decisions and their decision-making space is also the fulcrum
for accountability and checks and balances between and within branches of
government. Further highlighting the importance of administrator decision-making,
Herbert Simon (1997), accordingly, made decision-making the central focus of his
study of public administration. Cooper (2000) prefaced his comprehensive textbook on
Public Law and Public Administration with a remake of Alexis de Tocqueville's
familiar observation that most political problems in America are sooner or later
transformed to legal problems as follows: "Sooner or later most important political
problems in America are transformed in to administrative problems which, in turn,
find their way into the courts" (p. xv).
American Federalism
Taking a closer look at governance and the structures of American federalism,
Cooper (2003) distinguishes two dimensions in the federal matrix of relations. He
discusses a vertical authority-based dimensionflowingfromthe U. S. Constitution,
through law-making entities, agencies, and citizens. He recognizes a horizontal
negotiation-based dimension between levels of government. I have developed a
working model of American federalism, Figure 15 below. It is an amalgam of how 1
have experienced government to work acrossfederal,state, and local levels during my
career and how I know it works through my studies of public administration. It is
ordered in six functional levels:
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1. Creation of an over-archingframeworkof first principles for laws through
the U. S. Constitution;
2. The law-making function at federal, state, and local levels, including only
authorizing law, not appropriations, at the federal level;
3. A tactical functional level where law is interpreted, and governmental
activities are funded—through appropriations at the federal level—and
directed;
4. An operational level where the actions of government are planned,
organized, and method of delivery selected;
5. An execution level where government goods, services, and activities are
rendered through direct provision, contracting, and partnerships of all kinds
including with citizens, non-governmental organizations, other agencies,
and corporations; and
6. The consumption level where citizens receive the benefits of governmental
goods, services, and other activities of governance.
Figure 15
Constitutional Governance and Structure ofAmerican Federalism
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To Cooper's vertical dimension of authority, I add another vertical dimension
of legitimacy that flows in the opposite direction, originating in the people and
culminating in the Constitution. Notice that I have separated the authorizing function
of legislatures, as well as commissions at the local level,fromthe
appropriating/budgeting function. Congress, at the federal level operates in two
modes, first creating laws that operate in the long term until they are changed, and
then conducting appropriations to implement authorizing laws oh a yearly basis that
defines activities that the federal government will undertake in any given year. I have
similarly excised executive branch functions into directing activities at the tactical
level and implementing activities at the agency level. I do this because it is the
agencies who are held accountable by the courts and Congress in the main, not the
executive offices of the President or the President himself.
The tactical level has three sets of players at each level of government. The
function of yearly or biennial appropriations/budgets comesfromfederal and state
legislatures and often commissions at the local level The function of directing comes
primarilyfromthe executive branch, but sometimes the direction is contested by the
courts or legislative body. It is worth noting that the contested direction is almost
always taken up with the agency, not the executive. The job of interpreting the law is
contested space—both the courts and the executive think it is their job. Legislatures
often believe their direction is self-evident. It is the agencies ultimately that all three
branches hold accountable for problems—never themselves.
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The provision of services deserves significant attention here. The indirect
provision of services by agencies has grown to truly gargantuan proportions as shown
by the following examples. Cooper reports that the federal government spends $200
billion each year on contracts and states spend even more at $275 billion per year. On
the citizen coproduction side of service delivery, the Corporation for National and
Community Service (2007) reports that "in 2006, 61.2 million adults volunteered
throughout the Uriited States, representing 26.7 percent of the population" (p. 1). They
report (2007) the 8.1 billion hours citizens worked is worth $152 billion. Having
considered the structure and function of federalism, I now turn to exam how the
federal government itself has responded to a quarter century of constrained federalism.
Constrained Federalism
Constrained federalism has two signature characteristics, one being the notion
that government service can best be provided by the private sector wherever possible
for the sake of economic efficiency. The second is the belief in representative
government and its associated hierarchical power. Posner (2003), in a discussion that
is taken up later in the section on democracy, points out that the subject and nature of
debates about governance are construed very differently between liberal and
conservative views. In the liberal view, moral and political philosophy and the greater
public good is seen as the appropriate subject for debate. Those with a conservative
view however, see the world quite differently. To them, they don't think debates about
the greater good "is the most productive way for people to spend their time.... They
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see politics as a competition among self-interested politicians, constituting a ruling
class, for the support of the people" (p. 144).
I represent a conservative view in Figure 16 below, showing where
governance, theflowof goods and services and connection between citizens and their
representatives fit. To that, I add a second model of governance showing where and
how contracting fits into the scheme. In conservative authority-based governance
power flowsfrompeople who vote to their elected representatives who, in turn, direct
public agents—administrators—in the conduct of government and provision of its
goods and services. In the authority-based model, citizens interact with agencies as
they dispense federal goods and services—which taken together constitute integrated
delivery of governance-goods, and services, and government interaction.
When government adheres to the principles of constrained federalism, shown
above as the Theory of New Public Management, much of what government does is
contracted out according to the body offederalcontract law and federal acquisition
regulations, also shown above. Agency administrators then draw up specifications for
goods and services, solicit bids, award and administer contracts, and close each one
out in turn. When government goods and services are contracted out, the integrated
nexus between citizen, government official, and theflowof goods and services is
broken apart. Contractors are accountable to government agents in the delivery of
goods and services, not to citizens as was the case under mere authority-based
governance. Citizens cannot, under contract-based governance, go to the contractor to
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Figure 16
Authority-Based and Contract-Based Federal Governance
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solve extra-contractual problems. The contractor is only accountable to the contracting
officer according to the terms of the contract, which undoubtedly made no allowance
for citizen interaction. Concerned citizens can turn to the government official, but she
reports that she is sorry about the difficulties, but the contractor is following the terms
of the contract. Nothing can be done. Citizens only recourse in governance is thenvote in the ballot box. While government may be more efficient under contract-based
governance, it achieves its efficiency as the result of not having to mess with people.
This model is contrasted with a more collaborative model in the conclusion. The
strength of the conservative model of governance is that it is simple and has few
moving parts whose relations are firmly defined. The real world, on the other hand, of
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conservatives and liberals alike is a far more complicated world. I turn next to a
concept drawnfrominternational relations to shed light on the nature and implications
of a complex interdependent world.
Complex Interdependence
The concept of complex interdependence first put forward by Keohane and
Nye (Keohane & Nye, 2001) has application far beyond international political
economy where it is first articulated. It names and describes the phenomenon that
occurs when individuals, organizations, and countries become more intertwined in
global capitalism and networked relations—leading to the recognition that we are ail
in this together. If my interests are connected to yours, then what happens to you
affects me. At a fundamental level it is an antidote to America's fierce individualism
at the cost of community. For more immediate purposes, it provides part of the
explanation of why citizen partnerships in coproduction evolve to citizens becoming
engaged in their own governance.
In the tradition of Marx, complex interdependence is the Hegelian dialectical
transform of realism. Keohane and Nye (2001) pursued complex interdependence "as
a thought experiment about what politics might look like if the basic assumptions of
realism are reversed" (p. 275). Complex interdependence thus sits at the opposite end
of the spectrumfromrealism, which in this context is the idea that international
politics is a raw struggle for power punctuated by the threat or actual use of military
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power for political purposes. But the concept is equally applicable to domestic
politics. Liberalism can be taken in a political and economic sense. Political liberalism
means (a) an absence of coercion; (b) being autonomous, self-directed, or seeking sel£
fulfillment; and (c) in the republican liberal sense, freedom from subjugation (Gaus,
2003). Economic liberalism is the "doctrine which advocates the greatest possible use
of markets and the forces of competition to coordinate economic activity" (Pearce,
1999).
Complex interdependence, according to Keohane and Nye, has three defining
characteristics: (a) multiple channels connecting societies creating norms and nonofficial linkages that mediate and moderate narrow self-interest, (b) absence of
hierarchy for countries among issues at different times and circumstances, and (c)
while still important, military force is not readily deployed and is often not relevant for
resolving issues. A fourth characteristic, not discussed by the authors, is that neither
politics nor economics alone dominates the relationship—in other words; the relation
exists in more than one dimension. The significance of complex interdependence is
that it increases with decreasing hegemony and that issues can be strategically linked
to other issues to better serve countries' self-interest in a way that redistributes power.
Distribution of power. Political processes, according to Keohane and Nye, are
the mechanisms by which power is distributed. They contrast political processes under
conditions of realism and complex interdependence for five factors: (a) goals of actors,
(b) instruments of state policy, (c) agenda formation, (d) linkages of issues, and (e)
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roles of international organizations. The starting point of the scope of the overall
system defined by complex interdependence is the realm of international relations
including both political and economic dimensions. The scope is, by assumption,
limited to situations not marked by dominant factors of realism, i.e., war, the threat of
war, or armed interventions are not among the policy instruments being considered.
This system considers states as the dominant actors, but recognizes other actors, such
as international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and corporations (which
Keohane and Nye are relatively silent about). Political liberal perspectives add to the
scope the notion that actors are not coerced or subjugated, and act in their own selfinterests (whatever they may be), including association in factions such as treaties.
Economic liberal perspectives allow for the definition put forward so far, but sharpen
the focus on states and institutions as economic entities and similarly add economic
associations such as the European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement.
Included in the system are social, political, and economic transactions played out
among the actors. The units of analysis are the structural aspects including actors and
regimes (sets of arrangements that govern interdependent relationships), flows of
transactions in a macro sense, and actors or associations of actors' instruments of
policy played out on the world stage.
Boundary conditions. The boundary conditions relevant to complex
interdependence include Marx and Wallerstein's (1984) world view of the dominance
of capitalism. Included also is the technical ability to carry on transactions and
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communications of all sorts across national boundaries. Another boundary condition is
imperfect information in the face of a complex and stochastic ebb and flow of the
world economy and events. Additional boundary conditions are historical inertia and
choice: We got where we are because of what came before us and it is now up to us to
choose. Liberal perspectives add the notion of autonomy, and freedom of subjugation
other than the right to experience the consequences of our own actions in a "free
market of experience". Economic liberalism adds that free markets are no respecters of
state or institution. Markets do what they do—allocate efficiently.
Forming intentfor change. Forming intent includes Keohane and Nye's
notions of agenda setting "as the complexity of actors and issues in world politics
increases, the utility offeree declines and the line between domestic policy and
foreign policy becomes blurred: as the conditions of complex inter-dependence are
more closely approximated, the politics of agenda formulation becomes more subtle
and differentiated" (p. 28). Liberalism adds the idea that states and other actors in
pursuit of their own agendas increasingly enlighten their self-interest to include the
interests of others and act on these interests through increasingly strategic and
discriminating linkage of issues. The extension of political liberalism allows formation
of factions and ensuing pluralism of interests. Economic liberalism adds seeking ways
to stimulate the world system to find new equilibriums in the areas of (a) reduction of.
production costs, (b) innovations promising high profits, (c) political redistribution
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resulting in transfer of surplus profit to workers thus augmenting world demand, and
(d) expansion of the world-economy.
The vectors of change associated with complex interdependence describe
goals, processes, and results of consciously focused efforts at change in the world
system. Goals of actors—inputs—vary by issue area and become increasingly difficult
to clearly define in the face of the complexity and the stochastic nature of world
markets and interests. Other players such as non-governmental organizations,
corporations, and international institutions, as well as special interest groups also each
have their own goals. Keohane and Nye suggest that agendas/goals are affected by
changes of power within issue areas, international regimes, rise and fall of power of
actors, linkages among issues, and politicization resulting from increased
interdependence. Processes are the instruments available to actors to meet their goals.
Processes include (a) policy instruments of states, they (b) issue specific power
resources (available to actors), they include (c) regimes (the sets of arrangements that
govern interdependent relationships, manipulation of interdependence through linkage
of issues and other means), and (d) specific venues available to other actors such as
capital investments by corporations, mobilization of relief efforts by nongovernmental organizations, and so on.
The outputs are attainment of the specific goals and strategic objectives
intended by whomever set the particular vector of change in motion in the first place.
Examples of such outputs include meeting protocols for a certain stage of ascension to
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the European Union, creation of a certain manufacturing capacity in a country,
agreements to bilateral cultural exchange, the Convention on Biodiversity, breaking
down trade barriers, creation of new markets, or a host of other specific outputs.
Political liberalization adds vectors of change aimed at increasing freedom, clarifying
autonomy, democratization, and perhaps collaborations in our collective selfrealization project offindingand creating meaning through individual actions
supported by government. Economic liberalism adds measures that put the world
economy on an increasingly efficient neo-orthodox economic course.
Second order effects are independent of the system, ideologies, approaches, or
doctrines, and are only the result of the vectors of change operating on the existing
situation. Second order effects can be completely absent or absorbed, or can cause
transformations from current state to future state. Doctrine or ideology matters only
from the standpoint that each doctrine or ideology tracks changes that are recognized
by its own reticular activating system according to its own metrics. The recognized
changes are the raw information for the linkages of the various parts—the feedback
loops. Self-correcting feedback loops exist between the outputs and process, and
outputs and inputs (goals), adjusting each as necessary. Higher order feedback loops
exist between second order effects and the formation of intent for change and operate
at the level of reconstructing vectors of change—inputs, processes, and expected
outcomes.
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The system of change outlined above moves in a variable quantum of one
vector's worth of change at a time. Borrowingfromlessons of chaos and general
systems theory, large multi-party vectors might cause only small changes; a small
vector might transform a world in dynamic disequilibrium—think Berlin Wall. Three
conclusions can be drawnfromthe theoretical analysis undertaken above: (a) complex
interdependence has a lot of explanatory power for how the world works, (b) while not
undertaken as an extension of liberal philosophy, complex interdependence resonates
well with a liberal world view, and (c) lastly, those with conservative views and other
narrowframesof reference wouldfindthemselves constantly at odds with the world of
complex interdependence—thus constantly striving to structure it in simpler ways. We
next turn to pluralism as anotherframeto understand the complexity of our world.
Pluralism
Pluralism is an inherent and fundamental part of the workings of American
democracy. Baskin (1970) goes so far as to suggest "an almost conspiratorial
symbiotic relation between the pluralist model and the corresponding reality.... The
model itself teaches political vocabularies and role orientations resulting in forms of
behavior that confirm the appropriateness of its own categories" (p. 72). Because of
the foundational nature of pluralism for governance, I (a) explore interactions of
pluralism with political institutions, (b) explore pluralism's shortcomings through the
eyes of its critics, and (c) derive a normative theory of value of public weal based on a
critique of pluralism. Conn (1973) defines four distinct senses of pluralism: (a)
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pluralism of values, (b) cultural pluralism, (c) structural pluralism referring to the
structures of government, its inherent decentralization and its embedded checks and
balances within and between structures, and (d) social pluralism which addresses the
diversity of interests that organize and compete for policies to fulfill their interests. It
is this latter sense which informs our current discussion about NPM. Figure 17 shows
a political institution taking action that (a) directly affects citizens, (b) citizens forming
a group around common interests, (c) which in turn directly influences the political
institution, and lastly, (d) direct interaction of citizens. Kernell (1993) suggests,
however, that direct public pressure is relatively weak in comparison.
Dahl (1967) sets forth the classic tenet of pluralism: "Instead of a single center
of sovereign power, there must be multiple centers of power, none of which is or can
be wholly sovereign.... to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle
conflicts peacefully" (p. 24). He predicts:
Because one center of power is set against another, power itself is tamed,
civilized, controlled, and limited to decent human purposes, while coercion, the
most evil form of power, is reduced to a minimum (p. 24)
Because even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions they
strongly object to, pluralism assumes that the consent of all is won in the long run.
Because constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary in order
to make their decisions, citizens and leaders will perfect the precious art of dealing
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peacefully with conflicts, and not merely to the benefit of one partisan but to the
mutual benefit of all the parties to a conflict.
Figure 17
Interactions between Political Institutions, Citizens, and Organized Interest Groups

Dynamic change. Dynamic change presents more of a challenge for pluralism.
In examining the process of political change itself, Levi (1949) traces the simple
measured process of change in law to occur in three stages: (a) the creation of the legal
concept, (b) the period when the concept is fixed and cases are determined case-bycase through rigorous reasoning by example, and lastly (c) the breakdown of the
concept when reasoning by example has moved ahead of the concept and a new
concept emerges. Evolution of law as a whole, according to Levi, is driven by changes
in social theories or society which are in turn tempered in a step-wise fashion by the
process of legal reasoning, giving meaning to ambiguity and testing this meaning, case
by case, against the social backdrop. This evolutionary process that ties specific
practice to more abstract principles, Levy argues, is what creates legitimacy,
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relevance, and accountability in the eyes of those who are ruled by the law. This view
of measured change is useful in illuminating its basic elements: (a) genesis, (b) stasis,
and (c) breakdown. However, it is not sufficiently robust to deal with the fierce
competition in the marketplace that drives change in the real world we live in.
Carmines and Stimson (1989) characterize this world as one where "large
numbers of potential issues compete with one another for the highly limited attention
of the public in an ever changing political environment" (p. 4). Sundquist (1983)
examines several models for issue evolution and the alignment and realignment of
parties around issues, and suggests a refinement of the basic elements of change to be
(a) causation, (b) process, and (c) consequence. His idea is to array one set of (polar)
interests against another for an issue, and then define changes in cleavages as issues
evolve or are displaced with new issues. This more detailed analysis then sets the stage
for an examination of the life cycle of issues that Carmines and Stimson propose. In
their model, political change is marked by a "critical moment" where change is large
enough to be visible. Change then, does not end with the critical moment, but
continues in a dynamic fashion over an extended period. The continued change after
the initial shock defines an evolutionary model of change that is fully consistent with
Baskin's (1970) observations of "a multiplicity of groups coming into and leaving
policy politics at varying rates of frequency and intensity" (p. 75). For purposes of
dealing with change then, the model that I employ here for describing pluralism's
pressure is a dynamic growth model of change marked by an initial stimulus,
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subsequent response that is comprised of dynamic realignment of plural interests, and
emergent results.
Problems with pluralism. There is an inherent problem in discussing normative
expectations of pluralism because, as is noted above, Conn (1973) points out that
pluralism in one sense embodies a multiplicity of competing value systems. Manley
(1983) observes that pluralism itself "lacks a clear principle or theory for assessing
just and unjust distributions of wealth, income, and property. It lacks a theory of
value" (p. 376). The difficulty is further compounded because in the strictest sense
pluralists reject the notion of public interest. Baskin asserts "social interest can be little
more than the sum, often conflicting, of these group-desired outcomes. There is no
absolute public with its own static interest" (p. 77). Despite these difficulties, Baskin
(1970), asserts that there is the paradigmatic value of consensus associated with
pluralism: "it is consensus, according to group theory, that sustains the orderliness and
stability both of pluralist politics and of the public domain" (p. 82). It is this sense of
consensus that anchors coproduction as an expression of shared common values rooted
in plural interests.
Theory of value. Starting only with Baskin's paradigmatic value of consensus,
inferred pluralist values can be deducedfromthe shortcomings of pluralism articulated
by ardent pluralists. The inferred positive value can be constructedfromthe inverse of
the areas of harm that pluralists would normatively want to be protected. Dahl (1967)
ascertains four harmful defects of pluralist systems in the areas of (a) injustices and
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inequalities, (b) deformation of civic consciousness, (c) distortion of the public
agenda, and (d) wrongful appropriation of public functions. Dahl and Lindblom (1976)
declare that "more money, energy, and organizational strength is thrown into
obstructing equality than into achieving it, more into constraining our liberties than
into enlarging them, and more into maintaining the corporate domain as a private
preserve than into making its public acts public" (p. xi). The inverse of the harms
identified above are no less than many of the basic principles the founding fathers
strove so mightily to achieve in the framing of the Constitution. Beginning the list of
inferred normative values starting with consensus, one would have to add social
welfare, drawing for support on Sundquist's (1983) observation that "During the
Reagan administration, the national commitment to some programs in these [social
welfare] areas is scaled back but few are eliminated; the structure of the welfare state
that remains in place reflects a genuine national consensus" (p. 7). While there
certainly may be more, here is a summary of the inferred pluralist normative values
discussed to this point: (a) consensus, (b) political equality, (c) a certain economic
equality, (d) liberty, (e) transparency of public process, and (f) social welfare.

Pluralism has no shortage of critics. They comefromthe left, they come from
the right, and they comefromwithin. Pluralism's old antagonist, according to Manley
(1983), is elitism. The basic argument of elitism is that such an important and
fundamental job as governance needs to be conducted by the best leadership available
because such superior skills are crucial to its success. Such people, according to Dahl
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(1967), are people who are skillful, wise, and virtuous. Posner (2003) makes the
empirical argument that "despite many legal and institutional changes since 1787, the
American political system still is better described as elite democracy than as either
deliberative or populist democracy" (p. 150). He asserts that power has shifted from
elected officials to appointed officials and career civil servants—a point central to my
main thesis. Posner observes that, "successful political candidates are not random
drawsfromthe public at large. They are smarter, better educated, more ambitious, and
wealthier than the average person" (p. 154). Implied criteria for evaluation of political
institutions arisingfromthese critics of pluralism would thus be (a) efficiency of
policy deliberations, (b) efficiency of operations for implementation of policy, and (c)
the skills of people who ascend to positions of political and agency leadership.
Browne (1990) finds that the proliferation of organized plural interests has led to
the cultivation of specific and recognizable exclusive niches. He observes that most
interests accommodate one another by concentrating on narrow issues. Posner and
Browne would be eagerly joined by Lowi (1969) who describes the breakdown of
pluralism and rise of an oligarchy of special interests culminating in what he
characterizes by means of a quotationfromWalter Lippmann as a "derangement of
power" (p. 86). Lowi's passion is driven by the headlong rush of Congress to give
away its law-making discretion to agencies and narrow self-interests. He says,
"Besides making conflict-of-interest a principle of government rather than a criminal
act, participatory programs shut out the public" (p. 86). All of this, according to Lowi,
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results in (a) weakening of popular government, (b) creation and support of privilege,
(c) the simple conservatism of resistance to change, and (d) the extreme conservatism
of sharing governmental power with private organizations. He concludes that because
of the aforementioned tendencies, access and power is heavily weighted toward
established interests. Parenti (1970)framesthe argument that anti-pluralist critics
believe political and administrative officers operate as servants of important interest
groups rather than guardians of the unorganized majorities, resulting in "many
instances [where] public decision-making authority has been parceled out to private
interests on a highly inegalitarian basis" (p. 503). From this discussion arises
additional criteria for public weal, including: (a) the degree to which greater public
interests are part of the policy dialogue, (b) the way tfyat policy is formulated amidst
conflicts of interest, (c) the degree to which abdication of public decision-making
authority to private interests is resisted, and (d) the degree to which change is
embraced, rather than resisted, when the situation calls for change.
An overview of pluralism. Manley (1983) describes that Dahl and Lindblom who
"have been so disturbed by the system's [pluralism's] performance that they have
issued radical-sounding calls for major structural reforms and redistribution of wealth
and income, and have even questioned the capitalist system itself' (p. 369). Conn
(1973) points to the more theoretical problem of scientific inadequacy of the pluralist
literature. He argues that the fundamental linkages of pluralism to democracy have (a)
faulty and unfounded assumptions about their relationship, and (b) analytically unclear
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andflawedlogic because their definitions are so intertwined. Conn notes that the
arguments between historic antagonists of pluralism have actually diverted attention
from these scientific deficiencies in pluralism. The collective rationality of social
choice theory, according to Miller (1983), stands in stark opposition to the collective
preferences of pluralism. However, Miller deduces that the instability of political
choices that social choice theorists see in pluralism is the very thing that fosters and
ensures the stability of pluralist political systems over the long run. Twofinalcriteria
from pluralism's critics are thus the "democratic-ness" of pluralism's results and
regime stability.
There undoubtedly are many more criteria for evaluating public weal that could
be drawnfromsupporters and critics of pluralism not included here. From this brief
present discussion, however, it is possible to present a tentative theory of value. It is
characterized by criteria for evaluating what constitutes the public interest based on
notions of pluralism which have been identified to be: (a) fostering consensus, (b)
political equality, (c) a certain economic equality, (d) liberty, (e) transparency, (f)
social welfare, (g) efficiency of policy deliberations, (h) efficiency of policy
implementation, (i) the skills and professionalism of people in positions of political
and institutional leadership, (j) the degree to which greater public interests are
incorporated in policy dialogue, (k) how policy is formulated amidst conflicts of
interest, (1) the degree to which abdication of public decision-making authority to
private interests is resisted, (m) the degree to which change is embraced, when the
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situation compels it, (n) the degree to which core democratic values are fostered, and
(o) regime stability. This set of values is used in formulating questions in the two
instruments to correspond to research constructs, variables, and constituent items
pertaining to measuring and assessing degree of response to a liberal conception of
democracy. While this section established a metric for a liberal view of democracy,
the next section takes up the point that there is not just one, but two, views of what
constitutes democracy at its best.
Two Theories ofDemocracy
Posner (2003) develops two constructs of citizen engagement in a democracy.
Type-one democracy is epitomized by citizens coming together to engage in public
discourse about the greater public good. Type-two democracy characterizes citizens in
avid pursuit of their own self-interests—depending on representative democratic
processes and checks and balances to ensure that the greater public good is met.
Ackerman (1991) extends Posner's notion proposing that citizens alternate between
types one and two democracy, depending on the situation.
Conservative and Liberal Public Administration.
The intersection of type-one democracy with public administration is active
citizen engagement with administrators on matters of public interest. The intersection
of type-two democracy with public administration is voting for members of Congress
and the President, who exercise control over the bureaucrats. Public administrators can
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thus be seen as a nexus for engagement in type-one democracy and as an instrument
for doing the work of political masters in type two. Based on these two ideal types, it
is apparent that citizens who choose to interact with administrators under type-one
democracy would do sofroma basis of engaging in public dialogue about the greater
common good with overtones of moral and political philosophy. Citizens who choose
to interact under type-two democracy would likely only do so through their elected
representatives—either through constituent services provided by Members of
Congress or executive branch exercise of power to secure self-interest. Posner notes
type-one democrats are curiously drawn to type-two means for instrumental type-one
ends—because type-one democracy is honored more in the breach and in fact rarely
works—'they may be said to desert democracy in the pinch" (p. 159). Defenders of
type-one deliberation ironically often feel they have a better grip on truths that should
emergefrompublic deliberation than do the hoipolloi.
Citizens, according to Posner's (2003) ideas, have one or the other, or if
Ackerman (1991) is right, both predicted responses to reduction in benefits. Type-one
citizen activists strive to influence local public administrators who make decisions
about local programs. Type-two citizen activists strive to influence their elected
representatives. And some do both. Several agency competitive sourcing programs
have been put on hold by Congressional action when angry stakeholders have made
their sentiments known. And at least some agency administrators seize the opportunity
to match high citizen interest with opportunities for coproduction. If such responses
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occur, then excesses of NPM that adversely affect citizens' interests to the point of
mobilizing them to action is buffered both by direct political action and by citizens
taking political action by seizing opportunities for coproduction.
Posner's (2003) articulation of types one and two democracy, Table 15 below,
mirror the debates between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists during the founding of
our country. The genius of our particular form of government is that it did not solve
but rather institutionalized the dilemma. We are thus foreordained to keep two
diametrically opposed points of view in our consciousness while we swing like a
pendulum from one side to the other. I compare type-one to type-two democracies by
examining : (a) focus of reasoning, (b) beliefs about politics, (c) purpose of political
debate, (d) subject and nature of debates, and (e) conditions for effective deliberation.
In type-one democracy, democracy itself is viewed as a process worthy Of
discussion, participation, deliberation, and reflection. According to this view,
participating in governance is more than a necessary duty of citizens, it is an honor
and from it human worth will grow. Type-one democracy is premised on each
citizen's moral right to participate in governance of society and moral duties to
participate intelligently in governance, discuss issues in an open minded fashion with
other citizens, and base political opinions and actions on one's honest opinion formed
of due deliberation on what is best for society. This section observes that people have
one of two views about democracy, and sometimes perhaps both. The next will
examine how people come to their views in the first place and how they act on them.
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Table 15
Comparison ofPosner's Type-one and Type-two Democracy
Dimension

Type-one Democracy

Type-two Democracy

Focus of
Reasoning

Normative, deliberative, and about Positive, instrumental reasoningends—determining what is best for most effective means to a given end
society as a whole
such as self-interested action

Belief about
politics

Has intrinsic value, and is an
ennobling, central activity of
citizens

Purpose of
political Debate

"Public deliberation focused on the Secure protection of property rights
common good" (Cohen, 1989, cited and commerce
in Posner, 2003, p.132)

Subject and
Nature of
Debates

Over moral and political
philosophy, notoriously
inconclusive—indeterminate and
interminable

Conditions for
effective
deliberation

Substantial redistribution wealth to Americans' commercial, egalitarian,
create political equality
individualistic, hard-working, and
Philistine and inventive nature

Unillusioned about democracy,
politics is ancillary, not central

Pursuit of self-interest,
"competition among self-interested
politicians, constituting a ruling
class, for support of the people"
(Posner 2003, p.144)

Rational Choice Theory.
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1996) locate individual action in the social situation
from which it emerges by way of rational choice theory. They assert that rational choice
theory plays an important role in unifying theoretical and empirical work in sociology.
According to the authors, rational choice theory is "a simple action theory that is deemed
useful because it allows us to understand how aspects of a social situation can influence
the choices and actions of individuals" (p. 128). In its simplest formulation, interests and
opportunities guide actions that are bestfromthe individual's standpoint. Because
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sociology concerns itself with social systems and change, the authors situate individual
choice in relation to macro level events or states. Figure 18 (after Figures 2 and 3, pp 128
and 129) shows how individual action is informed by the current state of affairs and the
change intitlestate of affairs as affected by individual action.
Figure 18
Rational Choice Theory after Hedstrom and Swedberg

Macro state or event
att- I

Macro state or event

att = 2

Hedstrom and Swedberg (1996) suggest rational choice theory plays an important
role in unifying theoretical and empirical work in sociology. According to the authors,
rational choice theory is "a simple action theory that is deemed useful because it allows us
to understand how aspects of a social situation can influence the choices ad actions of
individuals" (p. 128). In its simplest formulation, interests and opportunities guide actions
that are bestfromthe individual's standpoint. Because sociology concerns itself with
social systems and change, the authors situate individual choice in relation to macro level
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events or states. Figure 18 (after Figures 2 and 3, pp 128 and 129) shows how individual
action is informed by the current state of affairs and the change in the state of affairs as
affected by individual action
LearningfromChoices.
Bronfenbrenner (1989), as described by Sigelman (1999), created an ecological
systems theory of individual human development that embedded:
The developing person... in a series of environmental systems that interact
with one another and with the individual to influence development. In
Bronfenbrenner's view, people are not just lumps of clay molded by outside
forces. They shape their physical and social environments and are, in turn,
shaped by the environments they have helped create. In other words, the
relationship between person and environment is one Qi reciprocal influence
[italics in original]; person and environment form a dynamic, ever-changing
system, (p. 44)
Bronfenbrenner emphasizes the individual human dimension of development.
His approach places people not only in the center of their own personal development
but also in the center of conflict situations and their resolution. This view
conceptualizes conflicts as situated in the broader social milieu and conflicts as a
societal phenomena played out by individual actors.
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Balancing Multiple Private Interests.
D. Morgan (D. F. Morgan, Green et aL, 2008), in examining the foundations of
American governance, observes that American government has been deliberately
created to serve legally defined purposes within a largerframeworkof constitutional
authority. The principles upon which these purposes rest can be traced to 17th century
England where he identifies two major characteristics of public interest: (a) balancing
of multiple interests, and (b) public interest as promotion and protection of private
interest. From these historical beginnings, he gleans four important assumptions of
democratic governance: (a) "public interest cannot be defined without taking into
account the private interests of subjects" (p. 6), (b) public interest itself is an
artificially constructed notion, (c) the purpose of government is to establish a
correspondence between public and individual interests, and (d) interest itself is not
the ideal foundation for government, just the best available. Morgan notes the ensuing
central dilemma for our present day democratic governance: "How can we appeal to a
higher and commonly shared sense of ethical duty within a society almost exclusively
devoted to the protection and promotion of individual liberty?" (p. 6) It can be seen
that our very notion of government is formed around securing and defining private
interest for the common good and the heart of private interest is securing a person's
natural right to property.
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Finding Common Ground.
Finding common ground among varied interests is the challenge. It becomes
obvious,fromthe brief explication of interests above, that dealing with the policy
issues of public lands management becomes more than operationally deciding about
optimal improvements on a campground here or road maintenance there. Finding the
greatest common good in management of public lands is most fundamentally about
finding and acting on common interests. Once common interests emanating from
public and private values are identified, it becomes an organizational and leadership
challenge of finding, organizing, and deploying organizational resources to capture the
benefits that canflowfromworking together on common interests. In the end, dealing
with public land management in this context requires marshalling public and private
resources around common interests. Discovering those common interests requires
forging relationships between collaborating agencies, citizens, and companies that are
of sufficient depth and subtlety to allow those common interests to emerge.
Process of Change.
Thinking through this phenomena of the dynamic tension surrounding the
proper role of government and the ensuing choices as the polity movesfromfirstone
balance point with regard to the role of government and then to another, I am
reminded of Carmen and Stimson's ideas of issue evolution and Gersick's (1991) idea
of change occurring through a process of punctuated equilibrium. Carmines and
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Stimson (1989) characterize this world as one where "large numbers of potential
issues compete with one another for the highly limited attention of the public in an
ever changing political environment" (p. 4). Sundquist (1983) examines several
models for issue evolution and the alignment and realignment of parties around issues,
and suggests a refinement of the basic elements of change to be (a) causation, (b)
process, and (c) consequence.
His idea, as mentioned above, is to array one set of (polar) interests against
another and then define changes in cleavages as issues evolve or are displaced with
new issues. This more detailed analysis sets the stage for examination of the life cycle
of issues that Carmines and Stimson propose. In their model, political change is
marked by a "critical moment" where change is large enough to be visible. Change
does not end with the critical moment, but continues in a dynamic fashion over an
extended period. The continued change after the initial shock defines an evolutionary
model of change that isfollyconsistent with Baskin's (1970) observations of "a
multiplicity of groups coming into and leaving policy politics at varying rates of
frequency and intensity" (p. 75). For purposes of dealing with change, the model that
is employed here for describing pluralism's pressure is a dynamic growth model
marked by an initial stimulus, subsequent response comprised of dynamic realignment
of plural interests, and emergent results. Gersick takes the process of issue evolution
and change one step further by examining theories of changefromsix different
domains and conceptualizing change as a punctuated equilibrium. He found that:
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"Each theory examined here centers on the same paradigm, or basic gestalt, of
issue evolution: relatively long periods of stability (equilibrium), punctuated
by compact periods of qualitative, metamorphic change (revolution). In every
model, the interrelationship of these two modes is explained through the
construct of a richly durable underlying order or deep structure. This deep
structure is what persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it
is what disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation
during revolutionary punctuations." (p. 11-12)

Emerging American Communitarianism.
Bang, Box, Hansen, and Neufeld (2000) compare American communitarian
thought in political culture and its influence on public administration with Danish
republican thought, historical development, and influence on governance. They
contrast (a) the classical Greek republican view of citizenship where "people's lives
are enriched by joining together to pursue goals that reach beyond each individual,
embodying a vision of the common good" with (b) the classic liberal view of citizens
being "protectedfromthe community and other citizens by a bundle of rights" (p.
369),findingthat Americans normatively prefer the latter. They suggest Americans
begin with a deeply rootedfirstlanguage of individualism based on the normative
classic liberal view, but readily employ a second language of community when
confronted with ordinary problems where neighbors might be able to help. They
observe that this leads to an interesting American dichotomy of a professed ideology
of individualism contrasted to an enacted ideology of community. They assert public
administrators should "consciously choose their relationships to citizens and elected
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representatives, since their work cannot be value-free and they have a duty to the
public to be self-aware about whom they serve and for what purposes" (p. 375). The
most important question, they believe, is "how to bring an administrative model of
open, dialogic practice alive in the current political and institutional environment" (p.
375), "asfreeas possiblefromthe manipulation and distortion of power and hidden
agendas" (p. 376). The difference between instrumental current governance and the
need for sustainability's integration can thus be cast as the difference between valuing
individual versus community perspectives.
Summary
My conception of New Public Governance arosefroma thought experiment I
conducted that pursued a politically liberal antidote to NPM's politically conservative
outcomes and sought to temper NPM's reported (R. C. Box et al, 2001) shrinkage of
democracy. Dahl's conception of pluralism is the starting point. It is informed by
Salamon's concept of new governance and my own experiences of working with the
public to temper the adverse effects of continued downsizing in my own agency. From
these beginnings, I conceptualized the idea of NPG. While I have collected anecdotal
evidencefromcolleagues in other agencies about their burgeoning efforts in
volunteerism, partnerships, and coproduction in response to their own downsizing, I
know of no research done on the matter. From my perspective several fundamental
aspects of New Public Governance need investigating. Among them are:

Chapter II, Literature Review

180

1. What various forms of coproduction actually arise as the result of NPMdriven scaling back or instrumentalization of government function?
2. What factors favor or discourage the occurrence of NPG?
3. In the spectrum of non-governmentally provided public services, where
does contracting stop and citizen engagement to temper NPM start?
4. And where does citizen engagement stop and naked self-interest start?
5. What circumscribes agency administrators' discretion in pursuing NPG?
6. What are the legal and ethical bounds, and checks and balances that
temper administrators' zeal in operating outside the bounds of authority?
7. In the spectrum of possible forms NPG can take, what discrimination can
be made with regard to self-interest, political interests, and altruism?
8. Where on the continuum of individual vs. community perspectives dow
various forms lie?

Beyond research aimed at uncovering the forms and workings of NPG, the
question remains at hand whether New Public Governance or NPM is better able to
help public administrators navigate challenges they face of finely divided authority,
hyperpluralism, and boutiquing of policy delivery across the many multi-jurisdictional
administration landscapes. The problem of measuring efficacy of NPM and New
Public Governance is that there is no "objective" basis of measuring the quality of
governance. At the heart of every public policy debate is the question of federalism—
who gets to decide and at what level of government? As McKay points out, the scope
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of federal government is hotly contested by our founding fathers and the debate
continues to the point that the debate itself is institutionalized.
Once the form of New Public Governance is well characterized, I envision a
calculus for measuring efficacy akin to the economists' test of the Pareto optimality
where no Pareto improvement is possibles—where no reallocation of resources would
make at least one person better off without making anyone worse off. Such a calculus
would then measure to what extent citizens and public administrators embraced the
notions of NPG. To that extent only and for those citizens and administrators only,
their Pareto-like optimality would be increased. The acid test would then be the proof
of the pudding—measuring whether or not and to what extent citizens and public
administrators voted with their feet by embracing the opportunities afforded by NPG.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
I employ both qualitative and quantitative research methods to achieve rigor
and gain reflective insights about my hypothesis, variables, and constituent items. I
use afive-tierresearch design aimed at (a) characterizing various aspects of
propositions put forward, (b) documenting the presence or absence of various
elements of the propositions, and (c) ultimately at constructing new theory based on
deductive reasoning and statistical significance. Thefivetiers are (a) creation of
research constructs, (b) development of a research design to test constructs, (c)
empirical collection of information, (d) test of constructs, and (e) theory construction.
The research constructs are comprised of variables to test the hypotheses and
the logic that connects them. The constructs also include individual propositions of
one of the new theories I construct. Constructs, as discussed below, are created from
existing theories and principles drawnfromthe academic literature in various
disciplines, the applicable body of law and regulations, agency policy, and directives
issued by the presidential administration. The constructs center on the four hypotheses
and are aimed at capturing emerging patterns of governance arising from citizen
partnerships undertaken by federal agency administrators as they redeem their
responsibilities under American constitutional governance. The hypotheses and null
hypotheses are shown below in Table 16.
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Table 16
Hypotheses and Null Hypotheses
Hypothesis

Null Hypothesis

Hy. I: New forms of citizen engagement arise as Hy0.1: No new forms occur or do not arise
a response to constrained federalism
in response to constrained federalism
Hy. II: Emergent forms include elements of
liberal democratic citizen engagement

Hy0. II: Forms have no elements of liberal
democratic engagement

Hy. Ill: Emenjent forms retain benefits of constrained Hy0. Ill; Forms do not retain benefits or
federalism and reduce its shrinkage of democracy
remedy defects of constrained federalism
Hy. IV: There is a common set of factors that
Hy0. IV: There are no common factors that
foster and inhibit democratic citizen engagement affect democratic citizen engagement

I develop a research structural logic model comprised of variables drawn from
the various constructs. The model emulates explanatory mechanisms underlying the
hypotheses. The research design corresponds directly to the logic model and is
designed to measure its various constituent elements. Data is collected through (a)
assessment of federal agency partnership agreements, (b) instrumented interviews with
the agency administrators who create and implement agreements, and (c)
documentation of laws and policies pertaining to federal partnerships.
Empirical testing is accomplished through deductive reasoning and statistical
analysis. Andfinally,supported constructs are integrated by construction of new
theory. Two theories are constructed. The first is a theory of governance which
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accounts for emergent properties of citizen engagement in federal agency partnerships.
The theory acknowledges the constitutive role that federal public administrators play
in the continuing evolution of democracy and governance. Its logic is built on weaving
together supported variables and their constituent elements. The second theory is
ancillary to the first and arose early in the process of identifying research issues and
reviewing the literature. It is a principal-agent theory for federal public administration
that reflects the Constitutional framework in which agency administrators work. This
theory is simple and is comprised of four straightforward propositions. As a result of
its early emergence and simplicity of formulation, its propositions are incorporated as
part of the research constructs which are then empirically and directly tested.
Each of the levels in my research design uses several sources and kinds of
information as reflected in Table 17. Constructs are createdfromexisting theory, law
and policy. Research design draws on the epistemology of the various propositions
under consideration and matching of methods to the paradigm orfieldstudy most
appropriate for the propositions being considered. Empirical information is collected
from agency administrators, assessment of partnership agreements, law, and policy.
Constructs are tested by deductive reasoning and statistical analysis. Theory is
constructed from empirically supported constructs.
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Research Constructs
As the first step in research design, I create a structural logic model comprised of
variables and constituent elements drawnfromexisting theory to describe a potential
new emerging form of governance. My summary hypothesis is that this new form of
Table 17
Five Tier Research Design: Sources and Nature ofInformation
Level

Creation of constructs

Sources of Information

Nature of Information

Academic literature

Existing theory and principles

Legal databases

Administration directives

Code of Federal Regulations

Law and agency policy

Office of Management and Budget
Agency policy and manuals
Research Design

Academic literature

Epistemology of constructs

Constructs to be tested

Quantitative Methods
Qualitative Methods

Collection of information

Executed agency agreements
Agency administrator
Informants

Qualitative and quantitative
information by instruments
Legal and policy citations

Legal databases
Agency policy and manuals
Test of constructs

Theory construction

Deductive reasoning

Direct confirmation

Statistical analysis

Statistical significance

Supported research constructs,

Integration of supported

Existing theory and principles

constructs, law, and policy

Law and agency policy

into new theory
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governance emerges from constitutive public administration and citizen action through
partnerships. I draw on the following fields of study, as shown above in Figure 5 in the
Theoretical Framework chapter, to create a construct of empirically testable variables
and constituent elements that form the basis for the research structural logic model and
mechanism for testing of the four hypotheses.
1. Public administration. Public administration set in a Constitutional federal
republic is used to develop basic concepts. The theory of New Public
Management is used as an ideal type to describe benefits and difficulties of
the current American experience of constrained federalism.
2. Social and political institutions. Political institutions of pluralism and
sociological institutions of citizen action in the terrain of civil society are
used to conceptualize citizens' pursuit of their interests.
3. Governance and democracy. Political economy and theories of democracy
are used to characterize the dynamics around which American political
debates revolve and the roles of public administrators.
4. Administrative practice. The body of law, regulation, and policy pertaining
to federal agency partnerships with citizen groups is used to define the
playing field in which administrators redeem their agency's mission.
5. Systems and organizations. Systems science, the study of organizational
forms, and the sociology of associations are used to conceptualize
relationships between administrators and citizens.
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Taken together, I use thesefieldsof study to develop a working model of public
administration described above in the section on research issues. While I develop
several concepts for understanding interactions of federal public administrators with
citizen groups, the concepts are not the point of the research but merely a means to an
end. The concepts form the basis for identifying research constructs which, in turn, are
used to develop the structural logic research model. I discuss the progression from
research concepts to measurement elements in the design of research methods below.
The challenge is to specify a logicfromthe research concepts for the
hypothesized emerging form of governance in a way that resonates with public
administrators as representing actual practice, and yet provides a rigorous basis for
creating falsifiable propositions. Administrators might do many things to
constructively address problems of governance caused by constrained federalism. But
for purposes of building falsifiable constructs, I have narrowed the scope of inquiry to
those actions related to citizen engagement following Bovaird's (2005) construct of
coproduction, which he defines as citizens engaging in coproduction with agencies to
provide services. The simplest expression of the logic is shown in Figure 1 above
where pressures of constrained federalism lead to a resultant state embodying both
intended and unintended consequences. As an adaptive response, administrators act
within the new state by capitalizing on its benefits and mitigating the harm of its
unintended consequences (i.e., downsizing, competitive sourcing, and narrowing the
scope of governance) which ultimately often reduce public services.
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The particular adaptive response under scrutiny in this research is the response
of administrators turning to citizen partnerships to mitigate reduced public service.
This in turn, leads to citizens being engaged in their own governance. The
phenomenon of citizens engaging in their own governance is generally viewed as
democracy in its liberal form, and more specifically here is an integral part of my
constructed theory of New Public Governance. The broadest formulation of research
question for this simply formulated logic is whether or not constitutive actions taken
by public administrators in forming partnerships result in an emergent outcome of
citizens engaging in their own governance. This simple formulation however needs to
be more fully explicated to create falsifiable hypotheses. For this task, I turn to the
socio-political working model of public administration, more fully described in the
Research Issues section above, to shed light on moving parts and connections thereof.
I synthesize a structural logic model, shown in Figure 19, comprised of a series
of variables and their respective linkages. The model creates a pathway —an
explanatory mechanism of variables—describing (a) emergent citizen engagement in
governance that (b) accrues the benefits of liberal democracy, (c) retains the benefits
of constrained federalism, and (d) remedies the defects of constrained federalism, and
(e) factors that foster and inhibit emergent citizen engagement.
The research design structural logic model shown in Figure 19 reflects the
initial condition of constrained federalism and the flow of causality for each variable.
It starts with an initial condition of constrained federalism and a given causality of its
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Figure 19
Research Design Structural Logic Model Variables
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effects upon (a) public service levels, and (b) the body of law and policy that
constrains federal partnerships. It is worth noting that the causality between
constrained federalism and reduced public service is largely a functional outcome
expressed by the administration and Congress in directing agency actions through
executive fiats and Congressional Appropriations. There is also causality between
constrained federalism and the body of law and agency policy that can be viewed as a
structural outcome—creating the rules by which the game of public administration
must be played.
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I take as given that constrained federalism is a significant determinant for
reduced public service (RPS) and the current body of law and policy (BLP) governing
partnerships. The nature of causality is explored in the section on research issues
above. RPS is hypothesized to cause citizen coproduction (CCop), which, in turn, is
hypothesized to evolve to emergent citizen engagement in governance (CEv)—the
first hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that CEv accrues benefits of liberal
democracy (BLDem). The third hypothesis is that CEv retains benefits of constrained
federalism (BConF), which is also hypothesized to be cause by BLP, while remedying
its reported defects (RDef). The fourth hypothesis captures factors that foster (Fos)
and inhibit (Inh) citizen engagement.
Design of Research Methods
This section on design of research methods is comprised offiveparts: (a) the
researcher's role, (b) geo-political and issues setting, (c) research subjects, (d) the
measurement model, and (e) measurement instruments. My primary interest in
designing the research method is to derive a rigorous empirical test for my hypotheses.
The hypotheses camefirst.From them, I created the socio-political working model of
public administration set in liberal and conservative views of governance and
democracy discussed in research issues above. I captured the aspects that I expected to
be most useful in understanding and revealing emergent citizen engagement as an
antidote to a quarter century of constrained federalism.
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Referring to Figure 5, above, I developed a set of research concepts (see
Appendix A) which formed the backbone of my research. I developed measurement
approaches and measurement models for each research concept (Appendix B). From
the research concept measurement models I developed measurement questions
(Appendix C) that would be translated to individual elements in instruments for
interviewing administrators and assessing written partnership agreements (Appendix
D). From this point, I assembled the various concepts, measurement models, and
measurement questions into the structural logic model shown in Figure 19. This logic
model provides the bridge to organize and assemble the statistical model. While logic
of this progression is linear, its application is recursive. As I worked out details of one
aspect of the progression, it would affect—because of the tight logical linkages—other
aspects. This in turn, would have additional affects that would need to be worked out.
The final solution to integrating the logic is to explicitly recognize the importance of
the research concepts as reflected in Figure 5.1 discuss additional details in the
sections on measurement models and measurement instruments below.
Researcher's Role
Discussion of the role of the researcher in design of research methods is often
relegated to the last item considered in methods. In the spirit of full disclosure
however, I feel compelled to fully describe the researcher's role early in the discussion
on methods. I do so for two reasons. First, my research employs mixed qualitative and
quantitative methods in afieldalready rife with cross-disciplinary overlap. While this

Chapter III, Methods 192
present research is located primarily in thefieldsof public administration and
governance, it draws heavilyfromthefieldsof organizational theory, management
science, sociology of institutions, political institutions, political economy, systems
science, study of organizational theory, administrative practice, and theory of
democracy. Eachfieldhas its own imperatives with regard to disclosure of the
researcher's role and the voice and style in which the research is reported. Heppner,
Kivlighan, and Wampold, (1999) point out that the differences go deeper, to the level
of world view. They characterize research methods on a continuumfrompositivist to
post-positivist and constructivist, continuing to critical theory world view. Each has, in
addition to the factors identified above, its own (a) logic, (b) intellectual basis, (c)
nature of inquiry, (d) notions of reliability and validity, and (e) its own power and
authority structure in academia. Research employing qualitative methods often
requires the researcher to take an active and personal voice and conduct full disclosure
of the researcher's role to the subjects being studied, to the issues being studied, and
the professional biases that he or she might bring to the research. Otherfieldsrequire
the researcher and his or her role, potential biases, and voice to recede to the far
background—letting the facts and hard deductive science speak for itself.
The second reason I feel compelled to full disclosure is that as a researcher, I
am far from dispassionate on the subject of public administration and governance. I
come to this research with over three decades of experience in federal public
administration, nearly two decades of which has been as an agency administrator. As
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such, my experience as a federal administrator has been strongly influenced by a
quarter century of dominant constrained federalism. Moreover, the very genesis of this
current research resulted from a thought experiment I conducted aimed at taking the
best of constrained federalism and finding a politically liberal antidote to remedy its
reported (R. C. Box et al., 2001) defects of shrinkage of democracy and other
unintended consequences related to more instrumental government. From my
perspective, the best of constrained federalism is threefold: (a) its strong reliance on
rule of law, (b) its ability to harness the power of unconstrained special interests in our
democracy (our founding fathers' tyranny of factions), and (c) to serve as a foil for
burgeoning government in the face of limitless demands arising from hyper-pluralism.
Having made an argument that favors both a quantitative and qualitative
methodsframe,I want to use the most rigorous methods possible to affirm or refute
my various propositions. To that end I have a bias toward using straight deductive
logic when I can, and when I can't, using quantitative methods employing solid tests
of statistical significance. Within this more positivistframework,however, I want to
include the more qualitative information gainedfromthe experience of other federal
public administrators, as well as my own experience. By doing so, I add a more
reflective, constructivist, or even critical world view to create fuller context, add more
meaning, and contribute to a more accurate reflection of the richness of public
administration as practiced. I strive to strike a balance both in disclosure and voice to
fit the topic at hand. I let the facts speak for themselves, but I also let my voice
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become more active when I fill in the picture with my own experiences and
perspectives of those of other administrators whom I interviewed. I close this section
noting that, I strove for rigor by using a very carefully crafted instrument to conduct
the interviews in accordance with good sociological qualitative methods practice.
Research Subjects
A variety of federal natural resource management agencies in the Pacific
Northwest are actively involved in natural resource management. Members of the
Provincial Interagency Executive Committees that are formed to coordinate
implementation of the Northwest Forest Plan—an outgrowth of President Clinton's
political involvement in the Northwest—represented a good starting point for a list of
federal agencies to consider for investigation. Atfirst,I considered only land
management agencies. But as thoughts about this research evolved, I engaged my
executive colleagues in discussions about their partnerships and whether or not they
observed an evolution of such partnerships rising to the level of citizen engagement in
governance. To my amazement, all confirmed such a trend—even the regulatory
agencies. Federal agency members of the provincial committee, of which I have been
a member for a decade, include executivesfromthe Forest Service, Bureau of Land
Management, National Marine Fisheries Service, US Fish and Wildlife Service,
Environmental Protection Agency, and Bonneville Power Administration, as well as
Tribal representatives.
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Units ofMeasure.
Analysis of the ethical considerations surrounding research involving human
subjects led me to clarify the research sharply in several regards, particularly units of
measure. First, although the topic might be interesting, this research is not about
individual agency or agency administrator performance, nor is it about differences
between agencies or public administrators. Federal agencies and their administrators
as a group, and their partnerships -with citizens are the primary units of measure under
investigation in this study. It follows that individual samples are comprised of
individualfieldagency administrators and their individual written partnership
agreements with citizens. The study is not designed with sufficient precision to detect
differences between agencies. To do so would require investigating multiple field
units of each agency to account for variations within agencies.
Agency Administrators.
Federal agencies with field missions are typically organized in regions
(although each agency has their own ideas of what constitutes the boundaries of a
federal region), with smaller organizational field divisions and subdivisions. What
level of agency administration is most appropriate to investigate? The PIECs are
represented at the organizational level where public administrators of their respective
units are considered executives in that they have authority over and command of
significant agency resources, and are in charge of field units covering specific
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geographic areas. For land management agencies, the executives are Forest
Supervisors of National Forests and District Managers for Bureau of Land
Management Districts. This level of federal public administrator is typically referred
to as an agency administrator. Administrators at this level have the authority to enter
into partnerships with other agencies and citizen groups and are the officials who
decide what partnerships to form and with whom—for both the land management and
regulatory agencies. Thisfieldlevel agency administrator thus seems to be the ideal
level of public administrator to investigate for the purposes of this research.
I selected onefieldunit agency administrator for each of the seven federal
agencies identified above, striving for afoilgeographic representation across the
province. For one agency I interviewed two agency administrators, one relatively
newly assigned as the agency administrator, and the other the previous administrator
under whom most of the agency agreements are formed. The offices of the field units
investigated are located in Eugene, Corvallis, and Portland, Oregon. For agency
administrators, n = 8.
Research about agencies and their administrators is focused on three primary
sources of information (a) the body of law and agency policy pertaining to authority of
agencies and administrators regarding partnerships; (b) federal agency administrators
themselves, serving as expert informants about their roles, motivations, actions, and
partnerships; and (c) the partnership agreements themselves. Agencies and their
administrators are accordingly investigated in three ways: (a) investigation of the body
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of law and agency policy guided by the individual research concept measurement
models, (b) through instrumented assessment of the formal written agreements
between agency administrators and citizens/citizen groups, and (c) through the eyes of
agency administrators, using them in the capacity of expert informants through
instrumented interviews. Both interviews with administrators and assessment of
agreements are conducted through the use of instruments that reflect measurement
elements rigorously derived from research concept measurement models.
Agency Partnerships with Citizens.
A second area of investigation for this research is into formal partnership
agreements. I chose to investigate partnerships for the same field units whose agency
administrator I interviewed. My thinking is that this approach would allow me to gain
the most possible insight into agency administrator thinking about partnerships as well
as their experiences with the results.
Examination of each agency's agreements proved to be an interesting
endeavor. I had hoped to be able tofinda historical record of partnership agreements
in each agency sufficient to detect differences in numbers and kinds of agreements
before and after the advent of constrained federalism 25 years ago. I found, instead,
that most agencies kept records of agreements for only a few years, and in addition are
quite attentive to cleaning records of old files no longer active or needed. I also found
that all agencies are subject to moderatelyfrequentchanges in record keeping systems
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prompted by changing computer technologies, increasing accountability, and everchanging agency policy. The net result is that a historical record of agreements does
not exist. Records go back at most for less than ten years. In my original research
design, I had hoped to be able to confirm administrators' assessments of agency trends
with hard facts and figures. It is a hope not realized. I also discovered that some
agencies are much more prolific than others in forming partnership agreements; so
while some agencies have only a few formal agreements, others have many.
I originally expected to encounter a large number of agreements for each field
unit, thus necessitating creation of a sampling scheme for agreements to allow for a
reasonably attainable intensity of investigation. Because agency records are not as
exhaustive as I expected, the overall number of agency citizen partnership agreements
to be investigated is not as high as expected. I was able to examine nearly all
individual agency agreements for which they have afile—arecord going back
typically for only two or three years. The only exception was an occasionally missing
activefilethat was being used the day of my investigation. For agreements, n = 98.
Research about partnerships is also focused on three primary sources of
information including (a) the body of law and agency policy pertaining to partnership
agreements, (b) federal agency administrators, serving as expert informants about
agreements, and (c) the partnership agreements themselves. Instruments were designed
to collect information from each of these three sources.
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Measurement Model
My measurement model is put together with approximately equal portions of
theory, practicality, and the idea of using agency administrators in charge of federal
field units as expert informants. I strive to balance qualitative with quantitative
approaches. Using the working model of public administration discussed in the section
on research issues above, I developed for each hypothesis (a) a series of research
concepts (Appendix A); and for each concept (b) a measurement approach, and (c) a
measurement model (Appendix B). To guide derivation of testable elements, I make
an assessment of the level of doubt based on existing theory and literature, as well as
my experience as an agency administrator. I also make an assessment of the centrality
of the concept to my thesis. From these assembled parts I develop corresponding
falsifiable measurement questions (Appendix C). I also collected descriptive data
about partnerships that is not used in testing hypotheses, but which was used to fill out
my understanding of structural and functional aspects of the various organizational
forms employed in partnerships.
All of the variables identified in the structural logic model, Figure 19 above,
except BLP, the body of law and agency policy, are variables that are incorporated in
the structural factor model used for statistical analysis. The method of inquiry for BLP
is direct affirmation or refutation of its associated research conceptsfromthe body of
law and agency policy regarding partnerships. Each variable, except BLP, has
constituent falsifiable questions that are in turn broken down into falsifiable elements,

Chapter III, Methods 200
each with a corresponding instrument query employed during administrator interviews
or partnership agreement assessments.
I was faced with a conceptual and methodological choice for the value to be
added by agency administrators to my research project. The alternatives I considered
were to (a) use questionnairesfilledout by the agency administrators electronically or
by mail (with a large n but comparatively less detailed information); (b) use a smaller
number of short instrumented interviews (with a smaller number n but more detailed
information); (c) employ a comparatively small number of focus interviews of
significant duration (with a small n, but a correspondingly larger amount of
information collected); and (d) employ a case study approach, where I would choose
one or two administrative field units (with conducting in depth analysis, but with an n
= 1 or n = 2). I chose to do a small number of detailed and highly focused interviews
aimed at collecting a significant amount of infbrmatioa So I chose to maximize the
value added of individual agency administrators at the cost of a small n = 8 for the
administrator's instrument. On the other hand, investigations at field level
administrative units allowed me access to a large number of agreements, with an n =
89.1 ended up assessing almost all formal partnership agreements entered into by the
seven agencies over the last two to three years. My intention is for the larger n of
agreements to balance and augment the small n for agency administrators.
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Measurement Instruments
Individual research concept measurement models, measurement elements, and
associated measurement questions discussed above are used to develop four
instruments (Appendix D). Instrument A, the Individual Agreements Instrument, is
used to assess the formal partnership agreements executed by the seven federal
agencies. Ninety-eight individual agreements are assessed using the instrument. A
total of 38 queries*—points of evaluation—are made for each agreement. Instrument B,
the Administrators' Instrument, makes 78 individual queries of agency administrators
regarding their motivations, roles, perspectives, actions, and evaluations of
themselves, their partners, their partnership agreements, and their assessments of
whether or not citizen engagement in governance emergesfromtheir partnerships.
Instrument C, the Agreements Summary Instrument, is designed to detect trends in
partnerships based on the number and kinds of partnerships agencies formed prior to
and after the onset of constrained federalism. Alas, agency records proved far too
spotty to provide any basis for assessing trends. As mentioned above, a historical
record of agreements hardly existed, going back at most for less than ten years. The
significance of this point is that it was not possible to independently corroborate
agency administrators' assessments regarding the historical trends in partnership
agreements. Instrument D, is a qualitative instrument designed to elicit agency
administrators' assessments of patterns and trends over time in agency partnerships.
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Both qualitative and quantitative responses are entered into two separate SPSS
databases, one for administrators and one for agreements. The databases are not joined
because the interviews and assessment by the researcher are two different
methodologies with two distinct set of variances and potential errors. The qualitative
answers are scaled where possible. The resultant balance of qualitative and
quantitative measurement elements in SPSS is shown in Table 18, below. A detailed
accounting of structural logic model variables and their constituent measurement
elements by element SPSS variable names is shown in Appendix E. In every case, the
scales are set up so that a value of zero constitutes failure to reject the null hypothesis.
Any values significantly different from zero affirm the hypothesized relationship.

Procedures
The second level of the research design involves collection of information
around constituent elements of variables elaborated in the structural logic model which
is developed, in turn,fromthe research concepts and associated measurement models
developed at the first level. Empirical collection of information around constituent
elements takes three forms: (a) direct observation of the body of law, regulation, and
policy around federal agency partnerships as they pertain to individual elements; (b)
structured interviews with expert informants who are the actual federal agency
administrators in charge of field units, responsible for forming partnerships, and
agreeing to their associated agreements; and (c) structured evaluation of the
partnership agreements forged by these public administrators or their predecessors.

Chapter III, Methods 203
Table 18
Structural Logic Model Variables and SPSS Variable Measurement Elements
Number of SPSS Variable Elements

Variable

Agreements Instrument

Administrator Instruments

Quantitative Qualitative

Quantitative

Qualitative

Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a Response to Constrained Federalism

Reduced Public Service

Citizen Coproduction

19

20

Coproduction Evolves

17

5

20

20

17

Hypothesis II: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal Democratic Citizen Engagement

Benefits of Liberal Democracy

4

5

Hypothesis III: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained Federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage of
Democracy
Benefits of Constrained Federalism

9

Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism

5

1

5

4

11

Hypothesis IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster and Inhibit Democratic Citizen Engagement
Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement

7

2

Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement

3

2
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Data Sources and Collection
The interviews of administrators and evaluation of their partnership
agreements are carefully structured by means of instruments. The instruments are
developed so that each question is aimed at either affirming or refuting an individual
constituent element of variables in the structural logic model. Data collected from the
instruments is subsequently entered into a statistical data and analysis program—SPSS
14.0 for Windows.
Administrator interviews.
At the beginning of the interviews with agency administrators, I gave them (a)
a copy of the project summary and prescribed consent form according to University
human subjects research guidelines, (b) a brief summary of each concluding with
signatures on the consent form, and (c) a brief overview of the kinds of questions I
would be asking, advising them that they could read along as I asked them the
questions and recorded their answers. I then introduced them to the few measurement
concepts detailed at the end of the instruments and asked if they have any questions
before I proceeded. I then administered Instrument D, the short answer summary
agreements questionnaire. After that I administered the larger Instrument B,
administrators' questionnaire. I asked interviewees to stop me anytime I needed to
clarify questions. This happened infrequently, perhaps one or two times per interview.
At the conclusion of the interview I thanked them for their time and made
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arrangements for a subsequent visit to assess their partnership agreements. In every
case they had me make direct arrangements with their contracting officers.
Partnership Agreements.
I met with contracting officers at the appointed time and gave each a very brief
overview of my research. The agency administrator, in every case, made prior
arrangements with the officer so that they understood and were comfortable with my
perusal of their contracts. I first asked for summary information about their agency
agreements. It is at this point that I discovered the lack of historical agency records
and discovered that the reasons are that all agencies experienced (a) moderately
frequent changes in record keeping systems prompted by changing computer
technologies—with one system not being compatible with the next, (b) increasing and
ever-changing standards for accountability, and (c) ever-changing agency policy and
interpretations with regard to partnership authorities. I was then given a stack of
agreements or pointed to a file system where the active or open agreements are kept. I
then assessed each agreement by (a) reading it through to get a sense of its form and
purpose, and then (b) answering the queries in the questionnaire, one-by-one.
Individual agreements tookfiveto ten minutes apiece to assess, and my whole review
typically took three to four hours.
For both agency administrator interview and partnership agreement
instruments, I entered both the qualitative and quantitative data into the two respective
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SPSS databases. At the conclusion of an evening's data entry, I reviewed the database
for errors or unexpected entries. I have set up the SPSS database so that for
quantitative entries, the program would only accept pre-defined values. At the final
conclusion of data entry, I again reviewed the data to ensure that the scale vector
always pointed the same direction—that is the higher the value, the higher the
likelihood of affirming the hypothesis for a given measurement element. Values of
zero always indicated failure to reject the null hypothesis. As afinalexercise, I edited
and organized the databases by hypotheses and variables for easy future reference.
Data analysis
The third level of the research design tests the research constructs—the
constituent items for each variable in the structural logic model-—against the
empirically collected data. Each item is tested against the data associated with the
empirically collected data. I use standard statistical analysis to test means of samples
against the null hypothesis. In every case, I score items according to a scale where 0
constitutes no measured effect and the top score, typically 3 for a four point scale
constitutes full effect. I use a Students two-tailed t-test for independent samples to test
significance. I use a commonly accepted standard for social sciences of a probability
of 95%, or p < .05.1 use Cronbach's Alpha to test reliability using oc > .70 for
acceptable reliability, .70 > a; > .60 for marginal reliability.
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Presentation of the results of qualitative data is somewhat problematic. The
data set, by design, does not have a large enough sample size to justify a grounded
theory approach to analysis of data. Despite the small sample size, the amount of
qualitative data collected is rather large, Appendix F, and far too large to present in its
entirety as results. I therefore use an approach that is a simple analogue to grounded
theory to present representative results. My analogue is to select representative agency
administrator responses. I represent responses in the results section that are given by
more than one agency administrator. I select the one response that most eloquently
represents a particular commonly held view. I then also comment on the nature of the
responses where the pattern, tone, or lack of common view is noteworthy to be
considered as part of the evaluation in the Findings chapter.
Verification
I drawfromthere are three main sources of empirical information to conduct
my research. The first is the body of law and policy as it pertains to citizen
partnerships with federal agencies. This information is direct evidence without the
need for intervening measurement so the reliability of the information contained
therein is very high. Errors could occur around this source of information in the form
of omissions—overlooking important applicable law or policy—or in
misinterpretation of its application. To minimize the potential for both kinds of error, I
consulted with federal agency administrators and contracting officers to ensure proper
interpretation.
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The second source of information is formal agreements between citizen groups
and agencies. The formal agreements are also direct evidence. I measure them by
means of an instrument I developedfromthe research questions at hand (Appendix
D). I use a four-point Likert (Gob, McCollin, & Ramalhoto, 2007; Reynolds & Jolly,
1980; Spector, 1976) scale to assess to what extent an individual agreement is
responsive to the question at hand. I found, in its use, that I needed to develop criteria
for interpretation which I documented in my journal. I am familiar with both form and
content for the agreements, so have little difficulty in their interpretation. I have
originally been concerned with a sampling scheme for agreements and anticipated
dealing with sampling error. I ended up using a sample size that approximated 100%
of the agreements field units have made over a period of several years. The only
agreements I didn't review are the ones being actively worked by a contracting
officer—for my purposes, a completely random effect of small significance.
The third source of information is interviews with agency administrators from
seven different field units of federal natural resource agencies. I structured a
comprehensive instrument for the interviews that explored all significant aspects of
my research questions. I use two types of questions, directly scaled quantitative and
qualitative fill-in-the blank. Quantitative questions required the administrator to select
an answerfroma four-point scale—see Figure 20 below for an example. For
administrator responses to open-ended qualitative questions, I use the information for
two purposes: (a) the substantive answers provide qualitative perspective, meaning,
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and context, and (b) I scale the answers to determine to what extent responses conform
to my research constructs.

Several sources of error can arisefromhuman subject interviews in this
situation: (a) the subject not understanding an appropriate context for question, (b) the
subject not understanding the immediate question at hand, (c) a desire to select the
right answer—the answer the interviewer might want to hear, and (d) answering the
question without much thought. I addressed the context by and definitions by
preparing a short written summary (Appendix G). I asked questions about the topic at
Figure 20
Sample Question from Administrator's instrument
IIIB-l. As an administrator, to what extent do you provide opportunities for active citizen or public participation in
agency activities:
Part a: With respect to planning and decision-making?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>9096

Frequently
9096-5096

Sometimes
5096-1096

Rarely
<10%

Part b: With respect to delivery of government services or implementing projects?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
9094-50%

Sometimes
5096-1096

Rarely
<1096

Parte: With respect to evaluation or monitoring of government services or projects?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>9096

Frequently
9096-5096

Sometimes
5096-1096

Rarely
<1096
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hand several different ways in the instrument to mitigaterightanswers. I administered
the instrument orally and provided the administrator a written copy so he or she could
read along if desired. I presented many opportunities for administrators to ask
questions as we moved through the instrument. I also alerted them I would be asking
questions in several different ways, pointing out when I was doing so. Administrators
paid rapt attention during their entire interview.
In addition to the qualitative aspects of reliability discussed above, I conducted
statistical measure of the reliability of variables and variable constituent elements. I
used Cronbach's Alpha to numerically assess the reliability and SPSS graphs to
visually assess relationships. I ran multiple iterations of Cronbach's Alpha to identify
two thresholds for my data: (a) the set of variable elements that minimally met the
criteria of oc > .70, and (b) the set of variables that maximize oc. In the first case, the
identified elements are all reliable measures of the variable at hand; and in the
second case, the identified elements do the best and most parsimonious measure
of the variable at hand. Following the qualitative principle of triangulation, one last
verification that I have conducted involved engagement of my colleagues—fellow
agency administrators—in formulation and testing of the various ideas, concepts, and
experiences around citizen partnerships.
I used Cronbach's Alpha method to analyze reliability of items using a criteria
of (a) oc > .70 for acceptable reliability, (b) .70 > oc> .60 for marginal reliability, and
(c) oc < .60 for not acceptable reliability. I made allowance for a category of marginal
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utility due to the small n = 8 for the administrator's instrument. I conducted separate
statistical and reliability analysis for data coming from the administrator's instrument
and agreements instrument because the two instruments have different sources of
information (administrator interviews and assessment of formal agreements), different
purposes, and different logics. Six of eight variables fall in the category of
confirmatory analysis because they are based on constructs firmly grounded in the
literature and existing theory. The two remaining variables—Fas-factors that foster
citizen engagement, and /n/i-factors that inhibit citizen engagement-are subject to
exploratory analysis, because the hypothesis which theyfellunder is that such a set of
factors exists, not that the set has particular attributes.
Assumptions
I start with the assumption that Pacific Northwest federal natural resource
agency public administrators are not significantly different than other public
administrators. This assumption leads to the possibility of generalizing results to more
than the immediate region. For the same reason, I assume that people who live in the
Pacific Northwest are not significantly different with regards to their participation in
partnerships or their desires to engage in governance. More generally, I assume that I
can generalize the phenomena I observe here. I assume, as with all human subject
experiments, that the amount of bias due to my presence as a researcher is not
significant.
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Limitations
Generalizationfrommy small sample to the world of public administration is
quite a leap. My study can, at best, raise the question about emergent citizen
engagement in other settings.
Ethical Considerations
This research project aims at discovering if new organizational forms of
collaboration between federal agencies and citizens, non-governmental organizations,
corporations, and other agencies are arising in response to continuing pressure to scale
back the size and scope of federal agencies. The research will determine if such new
organizational forms function to expand citizen engagement in democratic or
governance processes within theframeworkof American federalism.
The project studies the organizational form, structure, and emergent functions
of federal agency collaborations for coproduction of public goods and services. The
majority of collaborations under study are those where a written agreement has been
made between the agency and collaborators) specifying the nature of such
collaborations. Written agreements typically take the form of memoranda of
understanding, permits, or contracts of various forms. The remaining collaborations to
be studied are those arisingfromagency procedures designed to foster coproduction in
planning or provision of public goods or services. The procedures in question are
specified in law, regulation, or policy. In all cases, the subject of inquiry is the
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organizational form, structure, and emergent functions, not the participants
themselves. Study of human subjects is not the object of this research.
Data is collected by two methods: (a) investigator review of written
agreements or documentation of agency procedures guiding collaborations in
coproduction, and (b) interviews with agency officials who have responsibility for
entering into and overseeing such agreements or have responsibility for initiating and
overseeing agency processes aimed at creating collaboration. Review of written
agreements and agency procedures, as well as interviews with agency officials is
guided and recorded by means of an instrument designed to capture salient features of
form, structure, and function in an objective and reproducible manner that will allow
statistical analysis of the various characteristics.
Exemption Claim for Waiver of Review
This research project falls wholly under the provisions of exemption category
number five pertaining to research and demonstration projects conducted by or subject
to the approval of department or agency heads which are designed to evaluate various
aspects of public benefit or service programs. The object of study for research under
this project is organizational form, structure, and function arising from federal agency
collaborations with citizens, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and other
agencies for the purposes of coproduction of public goods and services.
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Data sources are written agreements, agency procedures, and interviews with
public agency officials. The unit of analysis is the organizational form arising from
such federal agency collaborations. Data collection is guided by and documented
through an instrument designed to provide for statistical analysis of various
characteristics of organizational form, structure, and function. While the names of
signatories are on written agreements, no data regarding individuals is collected
including their identity. The subject of interviews with public officials is the individual
and collective agency collaborations in coproduction of public goods and services.
The instruments used to guide and document interviews is parallel to the instruments
used for review of written agreements and procedures. The names of interviewed
public officials is documented, but not used as data for any part of the analysis or
reporting.
Subject Recruitment
The only human subjects directly involved in this research project are public
officials who provide information about the organizational form, structure, and
function of federal agency collaborations with citizens, non-governmental
organizations, corporations, and other agencies for the purposes of coproduction of
public goods and services. No information is collected about individuals who
participate in the collaborations. Information is collected for many different
collaborations. The source of data is written agreements including permits and
contracts, agency procedures, and interviews with public officials responsible for
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initiating and overseeing such collaborations. Collaborations are investigated for seven
federal agencies in Oregon and Washington: The USDA Forest Service, Bureau of
Land Management, National Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries
Service, Environmental Protection Agency, Natural Resources Conservation Service,
and Bonneville Power Administration. Interviews were conducted with one or two
officials per agency—typically the agency or program administrator, contract officers,
or planning officials. Interviewees were selected based on their responsibilities and
familiarity with their agency's partnership activities.
Informed Consent
The object of study for this research project is the organizational forms,
structures, and emergent functions associated with federal agency collaborations with
citizens, non-governmental organizations, corporations, and other agencies. Although
people and their respective organizations participate in the collaborations, they are not
the object of study for this project. No human subjects are the object of study for this
project. The unit of analysis for this project is organizational forms. The sources of
data are (a) written agreements with agencies, (b) agency procedures, and (c)
interviews with public officials who are responsible for initiating and overseeing
agency collaborations. The interviews is focused on organizational form, structure,
and function of collaborations, not on the interviewee. Informed consent with the
interviewed public officials is nonetheless appropriate to secure his or her permission
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to conduct the study and to insure his or her informed understanding and consent for
participation in the research project and data collection within the agency.
First Person Scenario
Human subject reviews typically consider first person scenarios to assess the
potential impact of research on subjects of the research. The following narrative is
created to represent the experience of a public official who agrees to cooperate in this
research project. Such a public official would be an agency or program administrator
who is familiar with and has responsibility for initiating and overseeing collaborations
that his or her agency or program enters into for the purpose of coproduction of public
goods or services.
I received a phone callfromthe principle investigator of this research project.
He requested an appointment to discuss my potential support of his research
project. He explained he was examining organizational forms associated with
collaboration initiated by federal agencies to enlist partners in coproduction of
public goods and services.
At the appointed time, the researcher came to my office and explained the
purposes of his study and proposed data collection methods that would involve
my agency in some detail. After asking several questions to clarify the nature
of his research, I agreed to support my agency's participation in the research
project. I identified two additional people who would be helpful—my
contracting officer who could provide access to our written agreements, and
one of my planners who has a good understanding of our procedures for citizen
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engagement in planning. I also agreed to participate as an interviewee with
regard to our agency's collaborations.
After the data collection was completed for my agency, the contracting officer
and planner reported that the researcher's scheduled appointments were
conducted courteously and with efficiency. At my interview, the researcher
was well-prepared and stuck closely to the questions regarding organizational
forms of our agency's collaborations. Thefirstset of questions pertained to
individual collaborations and the second set to our collective collaborations.
He concluded the interview by showing me the data collection instrument used
to study our written agreements and agency procedures. I asked for a copy of
the report, which the researcher promised to deUver upon its completion. I am
looking forward to the results.
Potential Risks and Safeguards
No human subjects are the object of study for this research project. The object
of study is the organizational forms, structure, and function associated with federal
agencies' collaborations in coproduction of public goods and services. One of the data
sources about such organizational forms is agency public officials who have
responsibility for initiating and overseeing such collaborations. There are no potential
physical, social, psychological, or economic risks associated with the interviews,
collection of data about written agreements, agency procedures, and organizational
forms that an agency's collaborations take. There is a remote hypothetical legal risk
associated with exposure of a contractor's proprietary business information (associated
with a contract to the researcher during analysis of contracts for collaborations aimed
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at coproduction of public goods and services). This risk is mitigated by requesting
only information contained in the contract, not information about the contractor. I
further mitigate the appearance of impropriety by showing the contracting officer my
completed instruments reflect no documentation of proprietary business information of
contractors. Agency officials might be offended or uncomfortable if information about
his or her agency or collaboration activities is incorrect or cast in a poor light. The first
line of defense for this potential issue is to make no agency- or program- specific
attributions in the manuscript. This research project is not about differential or
aggregate federal agency performance, but is instead about organizational forms that
arise in collaborative coproduction activities. This potential difficulty is also managed
by offering the opportunity for interviewed agency or program administrators to
review thefinalmanuscript prior to its issuance to ensure that no potentially
embarrassing agency-specific information is released. A third potential source of
difficulty might be uncomfortable questions by employees, legal counsel, or
contracting officials regarding my research that the agency or program administrator
might not be able to answer. I mitigated this potential difficulty by leaving a sumnlary
of my research project at myfirstappointment and by assuring all who I come in
contact with that I would be more than happy to answer any questions.
Potential Benefits
There are no tangible anticipated benefits to agency or program administrators
for participation in my study. The only benefits are the intangible benefits of
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contributing to the body of knowledge about public administration relevant to
partnerships and agencies' role in them. I will capitalize on the opportunity for
accruing the benefits by thanking them once again in a letter of transmittal for the final
manuscript of my dissertation.
Records and Distribution
No human subjects are the object of research in this project. The only names of
people associated with the research are the names of agency or program administrator
interviewees. Their names willriotbe reported or made available to other scholars
who request use of my data. I will maintain segregation of name and instruments by
having the name recorded on the folder in which the instrument is contained, not on
the instrument itself. Records associated with the research are kept at my home in a
file cabinet dedicated to the research project.
Appendices
Data will not be collected on human subjects so there are no human subject
surveys associated with this project. Instruments are developed to guide and document
study of organizational form, structure, and function to be derivedfromreview of
agency written agreements and procedures. A parallel instrument is also developed to
guide and document interviews with public officials regarding organizational forms of
collaborations for coproduction.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
My summary hypothesis is that a new form of governance emergesfromthe >
constitutive actions taken by federal public administrators. The particular constitutive
action being investigated is public administrators' formation of citizen partnerships to
help with their struggle to meet increasing demand for public services with decreased
resources. More specifically, my research investigates the claim that formation of
citizen partnerships by public administrators results in the hypothesized emergence of
citizen engagement in their own governance.
I present findings below following the structural logic model I develop above to
test the hypotheses and associated research constructs. The model, shown in Figure 19
above, is comprised of a series of variables and their respective linkages. The model
creates a pathway—an explanatory mechanism of variables and linkages—describing
(a) emergent citizen engagement in governance that (b) accrues the benefits of liberal
democracy, (c) retains the benefits of constrained federalism, and (d) remedies the
defects of constrained federalism; along with (e) factors that foster and inhibit
emergent citizen engagement.
Hypotheses
My summary hypothesis is sub-divided into four individual hypotheses which
are, in turn, further subdivided into variables and constituent elements as follows.
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Hy. 1. New forms of citizen engagement arise as a response to constrained
federalism—variables RPS, Reduced Public Service; CCop, Citizen
Coproduction; and CEv, Coproduction Evolves.
Hy. 2. Emergent forms include elements of liberal democratic citizen
engagement, citizens engaging in their own governance—variable BLDem,
Benefits of Liberal Democracy.
Hy. 3. Emergent forms retain benefits of constrained federalism and remedy its
defects which include shrinkage of democracy—variables BLP, Body of
Partnership Law and Policy; BConf, Benefits of Constrained Federalism,
and RDef, Remedies Defects of Constrained Federalism.
Hy. 4. There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit democratic
citizen engagement in governance—variables Fos, Factors that Foster
Citizen Engagement; and Inh, Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement.
One variable, BLP, the Body of Law and Policy, drives Hy. Ill, but pertains to and
permeates all other variables and hypotheses. It is, accordingly, presented as the first
finding.
The research design structural logic model shown above in the methods
chapter, Figure 19, reflects the initial condition of constrained federalism and flow of
causality for each variable. It starts with an initial condition of constrained federalism
and a given causality of its effects upon (a) public service levels and (b) the body of
law and policy that constrains federal partnerships.
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I presentfindingsfor the eight variables, organized by hypotheses. Six of the
variables, all except the Fos and Inh, factors that foster and inhibit citizen engagement,
are subject to predictive confirmatory analysis because they are based on constructs
firmly grounded in the literature and existing theory. The two remaining variables,
factors that foster and inhibit citizen engagement, are subject to descriptive exploratory
analysis because the hypothesis guiding them is that such a set exists, not that it has
particular attributes. I discuss predictive quantitative results for each variable first,
followed by an analysis of the reliability. I follow the quantitative discussion with a
discussion of the qualitative and descriptive findings. I close each section with a short
summary. I use Cronbach's Alpha to analyze reliability using a criteria of (a) oc > .70
for acceptable reliability, (b) .70 > oc > .60 for marginal reliability, and (c) oc < .60 as
not acceptable reliability.
Variable BLP: Body ofLaw and Policy
Data for variable BLP, Body of Law and Policy, is drawnfromadministrative
law and policy as it pertains to partnerships. It drives Hy. Ill, Emergentforms of citizen
engagement retain benefits of constrainedfederalism and remedy its defects which
include shrinkage of democracy. It however, permeates each of the other hypotheses
and variables. For purposes of testing this variable, I consider five constituent items for
which I conduct predictive confirmatory analysis. The constituent items for this
variable are: (a) the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977, (b)
OMB as the gatekeeper of executive branch direction, (c) agency partnership policies
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and regulations, (d) the body of other laws that grant exact and particular partnership
authorities, and (e) agency organic legislation—the body of law and policy that creates
each agency and its purposes, and establishes the authority for it to operate. Variable
BLP has an implicit hypothesis and null hypothesis:
Hy. 0. Partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement in
governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional
institutions of American federal governance.
Null Hy. 0. Agency administrators have considerableflexibilityto form
partnerships within the space of civil society at large.
Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977.
Foremost in administrative law for partnerships is the Federal Grants and
Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977, 31 U.S.C 6301-6308, (Government Printing
Office, 2008)—the first constituent item under consideration. This law requires Federal
agencies to characterize and structure their relationship between a Federal and a nonFederal party as either (a) a procurement, or (b) Federal financial assistance—no
provision is made for an alternative choice, see Appendix H for a facsimile of the Act.
The selection of the particular instrument to document the transaction shall be
determined by the relationship. Agencies are required to base selection of the
appropriate instrument in accordance with provisions of the Act and make decisions on
the classification of transactions by considering specific laws and regulations. Under
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the Act, there are two choices: either a procurement transaction, or a federal financial
assistance transaction.
Under the Act, an agency is required to use a procurement transaction where
the intention is to acquire goods or services for the direct benefit of the agency. These
transactions are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulations that require
competitive procedures. A federal financial assistance transaction—a grant or
cooperative agreement—is required to be used to transfer something of value to
support others' activities for public benefit—not to receive a product or service that is
a deliverable for agency benefit. If there is a particular authority granted by a federal
law, and if there are available appropriations, then either a grant or cooperative
agreement is required. The test is whether or not the agency is substantially involved.
If not, a grant is the appropriate instrument. If the agency is substantially involved,
then a cooperative agreement is required. In addition, all of these transactions are also
governed by the Office of Management and Budget and assorted regulations in the
Code of Federal Regulations.
The summary finding for this item is that the Federal Grants and Cooperative
Agreements Act of 1977 makes provision for only two possible agency relationships
with a partner. The relationship is either (a) a procurement relationship, or (b) a
Federal financial assistance relationship redeemed through a grant or cooperative
agreement. While no provision is made for an alternative choice, it actually recognizes
that a third case exists when (c) other legislation creates particular authorities for a
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relationship structured outside provisions of the Act. The Act also vests a great deal of
power in OMB. At section 6307, the Director of OMB is given authority to issue
supplementary interpretative guidelines or exempt a transaction or program of an
agencyfromthe Act. Partnerships and purposes specified in this item take place
wholly within the space of constitutional institutions of American federal governance.
OMB and Circular A-110.
The second item under consideration for variable BLP is the Office of
Management and Budget, known popularly as OMB. It is one often offices of the
Executive Office of the President including, among others, the Council of Economic
Advisers, Council on Environmental Quality, and the National Security Council.
OMB's predominant mission (OMB, 2008) is to "assist the President in overseeing the
preparation of the federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive

,

Branch agencies" (p. 1). OMB is widely regarded, for good reason in the context of
federal public administration, as being one of the most powerful political institutions in
government. It is one of the few entities with both mandate and capability to drill down
into agency situations and follow up—not with a recommendation, but with action.
When OMB speaks to a federal agency or administrator, it speaks with the authority of
the President. OMB has the temperament, will, ability, and a history to sanction any
recalcitrant agency. More particularly, OMB oversees and coordinates federal
procurement, financial management, information, and agency regulation. In keeping
with the spirit of New Public Management, its "role is to help improve administrative
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management, to develop better performance measures and coordinating mechanisms,
and [harkening back to the Reagan and Carter Presidencies] to reduce any unnecessary
burdens on the public" (p. 1). Partnership agreements fall under OMB Circular A-l 1010
(OMB, 1999), Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements With
Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations. Its
purpose is to set standards for uniformity and consistency across federal agencies:
OMB will review agency regulations and implementation of this Circular, and will
provide interpretations of policy requirements and assistance to insure effective
and efficient implementation. Any exceptions is subject to approval by OMB, as
indicated in Section

.4 in the Attachment. Exceptions will only be made in

particular cases where adequate justification is presented, (p. 2)
Section 5, Required Action, sets the tone for agency flexibility under the administrative
requirement:
The specific requirements and responsibilities of Federal agencies and
institutions of higher education, hospitals, and other non-profit organizations
are set forth in this Circular. Federal agencies responsible for awarding and
administering grants to and other agreements with organizations described in

Circular A-l 10 is issued under the authority of 31 U.S.C. 503 (the Chief Financial
Officers Act), 31 U.S.C. 1111,41 U.S.C. 405 (the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act),
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, and E.O. 11541 ("Prescribing the Duties of the Office of
Management and Budget and the Domestic Policy Council in the Executive Office of the
President").
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paragraph 1 shall adopt the language in the Circular unless different provisions
are required by Federal statute or are approved by OMB.
The summary finding for this constituent item pertaining to Circular A-11 is
that the circular elaborates in great detail on the principles articulated in the Federal
Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977. In forming partnerships, Federal
administrators have only one of three choices (a) follow the requirements of the Act of
1977 and OMB Circular A-l 10 unless (b) different provisions are required by federal
statute, or (c) different guidelines or exemptions are approved by OMB. Partnerships
and purposes specified in this item take place wholly within the space of constitutional
institutions of American federal governance.
Agency Partnership Policies.
Each department and agency of the federal government has promulgated its own set of
policies and regulations guiding partnerships and partnership agreements. For example,
the Forest Service Manual, FSM 1500 - External Relations, Chapter 1580 (USDA
Forest Service, 2002), provides agency direction for grants, cooperative agreements,
and other agreements. The first section of this chapter, 1580.1 - Authority, directs:
The Forest Service must have appropriate statutory authority prior to entering
into any grant, cooperative agreement and other agreement, which could result
in the use, obligation, or other commitment of any Forest Service resources.
The manual recites the provisions of the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements
Act of 1977 that structure agency relations with non-federal entities. The manual
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identifies 38 Forest Service statutory authorities (see Appendix I and also Figure 21
below), that relate to grants, cooperative agreements, and other agreements. Nine of the
Acts are government-wide in scope, nine are agency-wide, and 13 create authorities for
four different agency mission areas. The Manual specifies authorities, objectives,
policy, responsibility, definitions, instruments, certification requirements for grants and
agreements specialists, and standards of competency and training requirements fpr
specialists—all in great detail. In addition, the manual states that if funding a specific
project is contemplated as the result of any memorandum of understanding, agreement,
contract or purchase order, the project needs to be independently authorized under
specific authority. I have examined the partnership authorities for six other federal
natural resource agencies and found that Forest Service policy is only distinguished by
the number of statutory authorities. All other agencies examined go to a similar level of
detail for policy direction in their own areas of authority. I graphically represented
Forest Service authorities as being representative of agencies situations in Figure 21
above. The summary finding for agency policies is that agencies faithfully reiterate
provisions of the Federal Grants and Agreements Act of 1977 and OMB Circular A110. Agencies do exercise their options to obtain exemptionsfromOMB, and agencies
exhibit great diligence in certification, standards, training, monitoring, and oversight in
the areas of partnership authorities. While agencies do establish procedures to grant
themselvesflexibilityin this area, they are nonetheless very tightly constrained.
Partnerships and purposes specified in this item take place wholly within the space of
constitutional institutions of American federal governance.
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Figure 21
Forest Service Agreements and Transactions*
Procurements
Agreements &Transactions
Covered under FGCAA+
Federal Financial Assistance

Agreements &Transactions
Not Covered under FGCAAt
Sale of Government property & services for full value
Collection agreements for full value
•nnnmmMHM

Outside of Scope of FGCAAt < H

M

Interagency and intra-agency agreements
Leases, licenses, or permits

J

Gifts or donations
——^pt

Exempt by OMB Approval <

u

Cooperative Law Enforcement Agreements
Cooperative Forest Road Agreements
Cooperative Fire Protection Agreements
Participating Agreements
Challenge Cost-Share Agreements

Exempt by Specific Statutory
Language

Joint Venture Agreements
Cost Reimbursable Agreements
Cooperative Research &Development Agreements

Note. * Reference Forest Service Manual Chapter 1580. f Federal Grants and Cooperative
Agreements Act of 1977
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Specific Partnership Authority Legislation.
The next item under consideration is the body of other laws that grant exact and
particular partnership authorities to particular agencies, each law according to its own
particular purpose with its own particular specifications and constraints. Specific
partnership authority legislation occurs in two varieties. The first creates authority to
enter into partnerships for specific purposes contemplated by the Act using the existing
framework of procurements and agreements created by the Federal Grants and
Cooperative Agreements Act. Drawing on the Forest Service as an example again, I
have selected five representative examples of legislation to illustrate the first variety of
special legislation for specific purposes.
1. The agency was granted the authority under the America the Beautiful Act of
1990 (16 U.S.C. 2101, Subtitle C, Pub. L. 101-624), to provide financial and
technical assistance to Stateforestryagencies and others, and enter into costsharing agreements with individuals for the purposes of encouraging owners
of nonindustrial private lands to plant and maintain trees and improve forests
in rural areas. The appropriate instrument under this Act is a standard grant
or cooperating agreement, depending on the work and nature of relationship.
2. The National Trails System Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1246(h), Pub. L. 90-543)
authorizes providing of limited financial assistance to encourage acquisition,
protection, operation, development, maintenance, and management of
National Forest System trails. It also authorizes the agency to provide
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technical assistance to volunteers and volunteer organizations that plan,
develop, maintain, and manage trails. The agency is authorized to make its
facilities, equipment, tools, and technical assistance available to volunteers
and volunteer organizations. Only cooperative agreements may be used under
the Act.
3. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1271 et seq., Pub. L. 90542), may be used to acquire, protect, and manage river resources. The Act
applies inside or outside a federally administered area and to rivers, which
are components of the National Wild and Scenic River System and to other
rivers. The agency may utilize or make its facilities, equipment, tools, and
technical assistance available to volunteers and volunteer organizations. Only
cooperative agreements, not grants, may be used.
4. The Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970 (16 U.S.C. 1701-1706,1723) as
amended by the Title II, Public Land Corps Act of 1993 (Pub. L. 91-378),
authorizes the Forest Service to enter into procurement contracts or
cooperative agreements with any qualified youth or conservation corps
established by a State or local government, an Indian tribe, or a non-profit
organization, to conduct conservation projects on public lands, Indian lands,
Or Hawaiian homelands. The agency is authorized to (a) provide room and
board, transportation, supplies, and equipment, (b) provide each participant
and resource assistant with a living allowance not to exceed the maximum
living allowance authorized by Section 140(a)(3) of the Act, (c) to provide
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educational benefits, (d) to accept donations of funds, services, facilities,
materials, or equipment for purposes of operating the Public Land Corps. The
Forest Service share of costs may not exceed 75 percent. The cooperators
share of the matching requirement may be provided through a payment in
cash or in-kind, fairly evaluated, including facilities, equipment, or services.
The cooperators share may include contributions from other non-Federal
sources. The form of agreement is a cooperative agreement or a procurement
contract.
5. The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research Act of 1978, as
amended (16 U.S.C. 1641-1646, Pub. L. 95-307) creates authority for the
Forest Service to accept, hold, and administer donations and contributions for
the purposes of the Act. The Act authorizes the Forest Service to expand
research activities to encompass international forestry and natural resource
issues on a global scale. In addition, the Forest Service is authorized to issue
grants and cooperative agreements on a competitive basis to any entity or
individual. There are no matching requirements. The minimum matching
contribution for cooperative agreements must be at least 20 percent of the
estimated total cost of the project.
The second variety of specific partnership authority legislation creates authority
to enter into partnerships for specific purposes utilizing particular agreements not
covered under the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act. The additional
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forms of agreements created for the Forest Service outside of the Act are participating
agreements, challenge cost-share agreements, joint venture agreements, cooperative
research and development agreements, and cost-reimbursable agreements. Four pieces
of legislation create the authorities for the additional agreement instruments:
1. Cooperative Funds and Deposits Act of December 12,1975. (FSM 1580.12).
This Act authorizes the Forest Service to enter into cooperatively performed,
mutually beneficial National Forest projects with non-Federal parties in four
specific areas: (a) cooperative pollution abatement; (b) cooperative
manpower, job training and development programs; (c) development and
publication of cooperative environmental educations and forest history
materials; and (d) forestry protection. The instrument for this Act is a
bilaterally executed participating agreement.
2. Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1992. (FSM
1580.12).This Act is popularly known as the Wyden Amendment Act in the
Pacific Northwest that allows the agency to spend money on public and
private land outside a National Forest boundary when benefits accrue to the
public. One often-used example is culvert replacements for county roads that
impedefishpassage to spawning areas within the National Forest. This Act
authorizes the Forest Service to cooperate with other parties to develop, plan,
and implement projects that are mutually beneficial to the parties that
enhance Forest Service activities. Finance projects with matching funds from
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cooperators. Cooperators may be public and private agencies, organizations,
institutions, and individuals. The Act requires matching contributions and
makes provision for a bilaterally executed cost share agreement.
3. National Agricultural Research, Extension and Teaching Policy Act of 1977,
as Amended. (FSM 1580.13). This Act together with delegations of authority
from the Secretary of Agriculture authorizes the Forest Service to use:
a) Joint venture agreements with any entity or individual, provided the
objectives of the agreement serve the mutual interest of the parties in
agricultural research, and teaching activities of the Forest Service and
all parties to the agreement contribute resources to the accomplishment
of those objectives, and
b) Cost reimbursable agreements with State cooperative institutions, or
other colleges or universities, for the acquisition of goods or services,
including personal services, without seeking competition, to conduct
agricultural research, or teaching activities of mutual interest.
4. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986. (FSM 1580.11). This Act authorizes
the Forest Service, to transferfederallyowned or originated technology to
State and local governments and to the private sector. The Act authorizes an
agreement between one or more federal laboratories and one or more nonfederal parties under which the Forest Service provides personnel, services,

Chapter IV, Findings 235
facilities, equipment, or other resources with or without reimbursement. This
Act does not authorize transfer of funding by the Forest Service to non-federal
parties. The non-federal parties may provide funds, personnel, services,
facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the conduct of specified
research and development projects that are consistent with the mission of the
Forest Service. The instrument for this Act is a bilaterally executed cooperative
research and development agreement.

The summary finding for the item of specific partnership authority legislation is
that most such legislation creates authority for specific purposes, but relies on the
framework created by the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act, making, at
most, only surgical changes in particular requirements such as the percentage of
required partner contributions. The remaining legislation that contemplates
partnerships for execution of its purposes creates authority for new instruments, but
specifies the purposes to which such instruments are aimed. Partnerships and purposes
specified in this item take place wholly within the space of constitutional institutions of
American federal governance.

Agency Organic Legislation
Each agency has an entire body of law that establishes its primary purposes and
methods of operations. Examples include the National Park Service Organic Act (16
U.S.C. 1, 2, 3, and 4), (39 Stat. 535) and amendments thereto; The Forest Reserve Act
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of 1891; the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, P.L. 86-517; the National Forest
Management Act, P.L. 94-588; the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act, P.L. 95-313;
and the Forest and Rangelands Renewable Resources Planning Acts, P.L. 95-307.

Federal agencies all exist within the American system of governance arising
from its constitutional origins, divided into three branches, subject to rule of law, and
constrained by multiple layers of checks and balances. The system is based on the
doctrines of separation of powers, State, and individual rights under the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution, and rule of law. Taking a closer look at American
institutions of Constitutional governance, Figure 6 above in the section on Theoretical
Framework, I distinguish four such institutions: (a) federal government separated into
three branches, (b) reservation of powers, (c) state (and local) government, and (d)
rights of private persons. A public administrator is bound not only by executive branch
orders, but obviously also by laws, court decisions, and the Constitution. It follows that
public administrators are bound by the Constitutional reservation of powers to the
states or to the people, which says that "the powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States
respectively, or to the people." In short, public administrators are strictly limited to
making only those decisions and taking only those actions that have an exact and
particular basis in federal law. It is important, therefore, to know whether the NPG
actions described in this study are taken by federal agencies within or outside their
specified and limited legal authority. It is my contention, based on the review of the
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various forms of legal authority governing NPG agreements that are the subject of this
study, that these new forms of governance have been consciously forged wholly within
the space of the Constitutional institutions of American federal governance.

Summary Variable BLP.

Variable BLP includes the following five constituent items: (a) the Federal
Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977, (b) OMB as the gatekeeper of
executive branch direction, (c) agency implementing policies and regulations, (d) the
body of other laws that grant exact and particular partnership authorities, and (e)
agencies organic legislation. Each constituent item is supported for its significance and
high reliability by its strict basis in federal administrative law. All actions considered
in the above five items are found to take place wholly within the space of
Constitutional institutions of American federal governance.

From a qualitative standpoint, all administrators talked about the checks and
balances they are subject to within their own agency. All administrators are faced with
the requirement that whatever agreements they are contemplating be exactly
formulated to the standards set in law and regulation for the particular type of
agreement. In addition, many administrators have discussed the challenge of fitting
particular desired partnership processes or outcomes within the required framework of
administrative law—with the default being no agreement unless such a nexus can be
demonstrated. Further, administrators report many partners complain about the high
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hurdles for entering into partnerships with federal agencies. The past Chief of the
Forest Service is oft-quoted in the agency as having said that "partners really have to
want to partner with us to put up with all the red tape." Such compliance is
independently assessed, confirmed, certified, and enforced by their contracting officer,
much the same way a professional engineer certifies that a set of construction plans are
adequate for the design and intended purposes of the project.
Taking all the constituent items of this variable together, plus the qualitative
information, I make a compellingfindingof a rigid structuring of agency partnerships,
which when coupled with OMB and the sanction of the force of law, results in a highly
constrained operating environment for federal agency and agency administrators'
pursuit of partnerships. The implicit null hypothesis for variable BLP is rejected:
Agency administrators do not have considerableflexibilityto form partnerships within
the space of civil society at large. The implicit hypothesis and veracity of variable BLP
is thus supported: Partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement
in governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional institutions of
American federal governance.
Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement
Hypothesis I states that new forms of citizen engagement arise as a response to
constrained federalism. Hypothesis I is constructed of the following three variables:
RPS, Reduced Public Service; CCop, Citizen Coproduction; and CEv, Coproduction
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Evolves. A total of 118 constituent items are measured, 37 of which are used for
predictive affirmation and 81 for descriptive exploration. Qualitative and quantitative
information is collectedfromboth the administrator's and agreements instruments.
Variable RPS: Reduced Public Service
Data for variable RPS, Reduced Public Service, is drawnfromthe
administrator's instrument. See Table 19 below. The data serves as both predictive
affirmation for testing the hypotheses and as descriptive exploration. Qualitative
information from administrators is collected regarding funding trends and impact on
agency missions. The qualitative information is scaled for predictive affirmation.
Predictive Quantitative Results for RPS.
Reduced public service as the result of constrained federalism can manifest in a
number of ways. The administrator's instrument is designed to elicit information about
those ways involving partnerships. The particular lens used for the quantitative portion
of the administrator's instrument is an assessment of the agency administrator's
reasons for forming citizen partnerships. The scale used is a four point scale with
categories assessingfrequencyof occurrence of the phenomenon at hand. The scale is
(a) almost always, or > 90% of the time; (b)frequently,or 90% to 50% of the time; (c)
sometimes, or 50% to 10% of the time; or
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Table 19
Constituent Items for Variable RPS—Reduced Public Service
Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Administrator's instrument
IBlaARedCap

Administrators reason reduced agency capacity

Numeric

Ordinal

Predictive

IBlbAPubDem

Administrators reason public demand services

Numeric

-Ordinal

Affirmation

IBlcAPartReq

Administrators reason is partner request

Numeric

Ordinal

IBleABeyMiss

Administrators reason is work beyond mission

Numeric

Ordinal

IBlfABeyExp

Administrators reason is work beyond expertise

Numeric

Ordinal

IBlgABeyCap

Administrators reason is work beyond capacity

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2kPRedCap

Partner's reason is reduced agency capacity

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2IPPartDem

Partner's reason better meet partner demands

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2mPAgReq

Partner's reason response to agency request

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2oPBeyMiss

Partner's reason is work beyond scope mission

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2pPBeyExp

Partner's reason is work beyond unit's expertise

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2qPBeyCap

Partner's reason is work beyond unit's capacity

Numeric

Ordinal

IBljAOther

Administrators reason is other

Alpha

Nominal

Descriptive

IB2tPOther

Partner's reason is other

Alpha

Nominal

Exploration

IDlRegFundTre 25 year trend in agency regional funding

Alpha

Nominal

•

ID2UnitFundTr

10 year trend in funding at local unit level

Alpha

Nominal

•

ID3FundMiss

Affect of funding local ability to meet mission

Alpha

Nominal

•

IBljAOScale

Administrators reason is other-scaled

Numeric

Scale

Predictive

IB2tPOScaie

Partner's reason is other-scaled

Numeric

Scale

Affirmation

iDlRFTScale

25 year trend in agency regional funding-scaled

Numeric

Scale

ID2UFTScaie

10 year trend in funding at local level-scaled

Numeric

Scale

ID3FMScale

Affect of funding ability to meet mission-scaled

Numeric

Scale

Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directly from instrument; scaled values are numeric data
directly from instrument or derived from alpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

•
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(d) rarely, or < 10% of the time. It is scoredfrom3 to 0 with 3 representing almost
always and 0 representing rarely, Figure 22. The means of the results are shown in
Table 20 below.
Figure 22
Sample Scale Used in Administrators Interview Instrument
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%-50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

I asked agency administrators to assess their own motives as well as their
partner's motives. The variable RPS contains 17 items, 12 of which are questions that
the administrator directly related and 5 items that are scaled values derived from
administrators' qualitative responses. I ranked the items in Table 20 by mean. The four
highest means are a scaled assessment of administrator's aggregate qualitative openended responses. I provided an opportunity for unstructured responses to learn from the
administrators and to affirm or reject my own ideas of relevant factors. The highest two
quantitative responses of administrators as to their reasons is the decline in agency
funding. The administrators mostfrequentreasons for forming partnerships have to do
with not being able to meet the agency's mission and to meet the partner's needs. The
leastfrequentlynoted reasons are partner's consideration of agency capacity and
needed work being outside the scope of agency's mission, expertise, or capacity. The
null hypothesis is incorporated into the scales for the various items. A score of 0 is the
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null hypothesis for the item. Looking at the significance in Table 21 below, all
elements are significantly different from 0 at the p < .05 level, with the exception of
one variable, "partner's reason is reduced agency capacity", which has p = .051. The
null hypothesis is therefore rejected for each item.
Table 20
Comparison of Means for Variable RPS
N

Std. Error
Std.
Mean Deviation
Mean

Administrators reason is other-scaled

5

3.00

.000(a)

.000

Partner's reason is other-scaled

7

3.00

.000(a)

.000

25 year trend in agency regional funding-scaled

8

2.75

.707

.250

Effect of funding on local unit ability to meet its mission-scaled

8

2.63

1.061

.375

Partner's reason is to better meet partner's demands

8

2.25

.707*

.250

Administrators reason is partner request

8

2.25

.707*

.250

Administrators reason is work beyond unit's capacity

8

2.00

.926*

.327

10 year trend in funding at local unit level-scaled

8

1.88

1.356*

.479

Administrators reason is public demand for services

8

1.75

1.035*

.366

Partner's reason is in response to agency request

8

1.75

.886*

.313

Administrators reason is reduced agency capacity

8

1.50

.926*

.327

Administrators reason is work beyond scope unit's mission

8

1.50

.926*

.327

Administrators reason is work beyond scope unit's expertise

8

1.38

.916*

.324

Partner's reason is work beyond scope unit's mission

8

1.38

1.188*

.420

Partner's reason is work beyond unit's capacity

8

1.25

1.282*

.453

Partner's reason is reduced agency capacity

8

1.13

1.356*

.479

Partner's reason is work beyond scope unit's expertise

8

1.13

1.126*

.398

Element
Administrator's instrument

Note: * t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0. * Items marked with an asterisk meet
reliability criteria of Cronbach's Alpha > .70.
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Table 21
Significance ofMeans for Variable RPS**
sig.
Element**

t

df

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

Administrator's instrument
Partner's reason is to better meet
9.000
partner's demands
Administrators reason is partner
9.000
request
Administrators reason is work beyond
6.110
unit's capacity
10 year trend in funding at local unit
3,910
level-scaled
Administrators reason is public
4.782
demand for services
Partner's reason is in response to
5.584
agency request
Administrators reason is reduced
4.583
agency capacity
Partner's reason is work beyond scope
3.274
unit's mission
Administrators reason is work beyond
4.245
scope unit's expertise
Administrators reason is work beyond
4.583
scope unit's mission
Partner's reason is work beyond unit's
2.758
capacity
Partner's reason is reduced agency
2.346
capacity
Partner's reason is work beyond scope
2.826
unit's expertise
25 year trend in agency regional
11.000
funding-scaled
Affect of funding on local unit ability to
7.000
meet its mission-scaled

7

.000*

2.250

1.66

2.84

7

.000*

2.250

1.66

2.84

7

.000*

2.000

1.23

2.77

7

.006

1.875

•74

3.01

7

.002*

1.750

.88

2.62

7

.001*

1.750

1.01

2.49

7

.003*

1.500

.73

2.27

7

.014*

1.375

.38

2.37

7

.004*

1.375

.61

2.14

7

.003*

1.500

.73

2.27

7

.028*

1.250

.18

2.32

7

.051*

1.125

-.01

2.26

7

.026*

1.125

.18

2.07

7

.000

2.750

2.16

3.34

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

Note. * These items meet reliability criteria of Cronbach's Alpha > .70. ** Two items, all scaled from
qualitative responses, are rejected from comparison to the null hypothesis because their variance is 0.
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Predictive reliabilityfor RPS.
The reliability of the estimates for significance is not as high as the individual
item significance. Table 22 shows acceptable reliability for all of the ordinal items that
are assessed numerically by agency administrators. These items are identified with an
asterisk on Tables 20 and 21. The reliability for items based on scaled qualitative data
is not acceptable. SPSS is not able to run reliability on the scaled data because
assumptions for the analysis are violated. The standard deviation for several items
equaled zero. In addition, the others have a polar distribution, scores of either 0 or 3.
The lack of reliability of these scaled items is due to the small number of samples and
paucity of measurement points.

Table 22
Reliability for Variable RPS*
Element for Variable RPS

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

IBlaARedCap
Administrators reason reduced agency capacity

1.50

.926

8

IBlbAPubDem
Administrators reason public demand services

1.75

1.035

8

IBlcAPartReq
Administrators reason is partner request

2.25

.707

8

IBleABeyMiss
Administrators reason is work beyond mission

1.50

.926

8

IBlfABeyExp
Administrators reason is work beyond expertise

1.38

.916

8
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Element for Variable RPS

Mean

IBlgABeyCap
Administrators reason is work beyond capacity
IB2kPRedCap
Partner's reason is reduced agency capacity
IB2IPPartDem
Partner's reason better meet partner demands
IB2mPAgReq
Partner's reason response to agency request
IB2oPBeyMiss
Partner's reason is work beyond scope mission
IB2pPBeyExp
Partner's reason is work beyond unit's expertise
IB2qPBeyCap
Partner's reason is work beyond unit's capacity

j

Std. Deviation

200

92g

1

3

1.356

2.25

.707

1J5

^

N
g

m

3g

1.188

1 U

i

m

125

l 2 g 2

g

g

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .80 for 12 items.

Descriptive qualitativefindingsfor RPS.
A synthesis of agency administrator responses to questions in the instrument is
shown below in Table 23, where the questions are shown as they appeared in the
instrument. The answers shown here are representative. I followed the convention in
synthesis in that I show only items that are identified by more than one administrator. I
use the administrator response that best represented the point in question. Beyond the
items asked in the questionnaire administrators reported considering partner's interests,
their own balance of mission-critical versus conservation priorities, and continued
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engaged as things they considered in making a decision whether or not to enter into
partnerships. They reported that their partners considered opportunities to participate in
agency change, management, and nobility of agencies' purposes, as self-interest and
interest in the welfare of the community. Agencies reported decreased funding and
increased restrictions over the last 25 years, although patterns varied among agencies.
All administrators felt pressed: some were only able to do mission critical activities,
and others reported not being able to get their work done without the help of others.
Summary Variable RPS.
Variable RPS has a total of 22 constituent items of which (a) five are qualitative
alphanumeric nominal measures used for descriptive exploration, (b)fiveare numeric
scaled measures used for predictive affirmation, and (c) 12 are numeric ordinal
measures used for predictive affirmation. Of the 17 numeric items used for predictive
affirmation, two are rejected from t-testing to compare means because their variance is
0. Means for all of the remaining 15 items are significantly different than zero—the
null hypothesis—at p < .05. Reliability testing using Cronbach's Alpha shows that 12
items meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at the level of oc = .80 for 12 items.
The null hypothesis is rejected, therefore Variable RPS is supported.
Variable CCop: Citizen Coproduction
Data for variable CCop, Citizen Coproduction, is drawnfromboth the
administrators and agreements instruments in Table 24 below. The data primarily
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serves as descriptive exploration, with a few scaled qualitative items providing direct
predictive affirmation for testing the hypothesis. Qualitative information is collected
from administrators with regard to the structure and function of organizational
arrangements made with partners. I also looked for evidence of reference to partnership
organizational structure and function in partnership agreements.
Table 23
Administrators Responses for Variable RPS
IA-1. Thinking about why you enter into coproduction agreements with your local unit's various
external partners, how often do the following factors influence your decision to enter into such
agreements? j) Other or additional reasons:
- opportunity for input into agency change, participation in management, nobility of managing
America's natural resources
- balancing mission-critical with broader conservation goals
- to be engaged, to know what other partners intend to do
IA-2. Thinking about why partners enter into coproduction agreements with your agency, how often
do you estimate that following factors influence partners' decisions to enter into agreements?
t) Other or additional reasons:
- ' • • • ' • -

-••• •
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- money, economic development, jobs
- opportunities to influence agency, to improve quality of local community life
- the more we work with partners, the more we find we can meet their needs as well as our
own agency needs
ID-1. What has been the trend with your agency's funding at your local unit level for the past 25 years?
- federal support decreased, increased federal restrictions
- reduced every year since I've been in the agency
- roller coaster and long term downward trend
ID-2. What has been the trend with your agency's funding at your local unit level for the past 10 years?
- most decline in past 10 years, recent increase last four years
- upward funding trend in 90s due to citizens increased concerns with environmental issues,
flattened mid-late 90s
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- budgets cut more than in half plus inflation costs
- flat, which is a decrease due to inflation which overall reduced organization by 25%
ID-3. Has this change in funding had an effect on your local unit's ability to meet its mission? If so, how?
- still meeting core mission, although a lot has fallen by the wayside, harder to meet basic
responsibilities under law
- agency cannot independently get our work done, but partnerships have let us accomplish a
tot of our work
- forced us to increase efficiency by pushing priority setting to the lowest level possible

Table 24
Constituent Items for Variable CCop
Variables and Constituent Items
Label

Type

Measure*

IB3aaTrendTop Trends in top management involvement

Alpha

Nominal Descriptive

IBSabTrendMid Trends in middle management involvement

Alpha

Nominal Exploration

IB3acTrendOps Trends in operational involvement

Alpha

Nominal

IB3adTrendTec Trends in technical involvement

Alpha

Nominal

IB3aeTrendSup Trends in support staff involvement

Alpha

Nominal

IB3afTrendldeo Trends in ideology

Alpha

Nominal

IB3cTrendOthe Trends in other aspects of organizational forms

Alpha

Nominal

IB3bgTrendSit

Trends in external situation

Alpha

Nominal

IB3bhTrendAg

Trends in agency situation

Alpha

Nominal

IB3biTrendStrat Trends in forming intent or strategic goals

Alpha

Nominal

IB3bjTrendTac

Alpha

Nominal

IB3bkTrendOps Trends in operational objectives

Alpha

Nominal

IB3blTrendOps Trends in operational processes

Alpha

Nominal

IB3bmTrendTac Trends in tactical outputs

Alpha

Nominal

IB3bnTrendAtt

Trends in attainment of strategic goals

Alpha

Nominal

IB3boTrendNe

Trends in desired new external situation

Alpha

Nominal

Name

Purpose

Administrator's instrument

Trends in tactical goals
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Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

IB3bpTrendMo Trends in monitoring and evaluation

Type

Measure*

Alpha

Nominal

ID4FundPart

Effect change in funding on partnerships

Alpha

Nominal

IDSPartKinds

Patterns and trends in kinds of partnerships

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

ID6PartNumber Patterns and trends in number of partnerships

Purpose

IB3aaTTScale

Trends in top management involvement-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3abTMScale

Trends middle management involvement-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3acT0Scale

Trends in operational involvement-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3adTTScale

Trends in technical involvement-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3aeTSScale

Trends in support staff involvement-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3afTIScale

Trends in ideology scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3cT0Scale

Trends in other aspects of org. forms-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3bgTSScale

Trends in external situation-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IB3bhTAScale

Trends in agency situation-scaled

Numeric

Scale

!B3biTSScale

Trends in forming intent or strategic goals-scaled

Numeric

Scale

lB3bjTTScale

Trends in tactical goals-scaled

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

Predictive

Numeric

Scale

Affirmation

Numeric

Scale

IB3bkTOOScale Trends in operational objectives-scaled
IB3blT0PScale Trends in operational processes-scaled
IB3bmTT0Scale Trends in tactical outputs-scaled
Trends in attainment of strategic goals-scaled
IB3bnTAScale
Trends in desired new external situation-scaled
IB3boTNScale
Trends in monitoring and evaluation-scaled
IB3bpTMScale
Effect of funding on partnerships-scaled
ID4FPScale
Patterns trends of kinds partnerships-scaled
ID5PKScale
ID6PNScale

Patterns trends number partnerships-scaled
Agreements Instrument

lAlGenesis

Genesis of reproduction

Numeric

Nominal Descriptive

lAldGenesisOt

Genesis of reproduction other party

Alpha

Nominal Exploration

IA2aFunExSitN

Characterization existing external situation

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

IA2bFunExAgen Characterization existing agency situation
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Variables and Constituent Items
Type

Measure*

IA2cFunlntentN Characterization forming intent strategic goals

Alpha

Nominal

IA2dFunTacticN Characterization of tactical goals

Alpha

Nominal

IA2eFunOpObN Characterization function operational objectives

Alpha

Nominal

IA2fFunOpProN Characterize of functional operational processes

Alpha

Nominal

IA2gFunTacOut Characterization of functional tactical output

Alpha

Nominal

IA2hFunStratO Characterization of functional strategic goal

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

IA2kFunTacFee Characterization of functional tactical feedback

Alpha

Nominal

IA2IFunStratFe Characterization of functional strategic feedback

Alpha

Nominal

IA2mStrucTopN Characterization of structural top management

Alpha

Nominal

IA2nStrucMidN Characterization of structural element middle

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

IA2rStrucldeoN Characterization of structural element of ideology

Alpha

Nominal

IA2sStrucOther Description of other elements of organizational

Alpha

Nominal

Numeric

Nominal

Numeric

Nominal

IA2cFunlntent

Reference functional forming intent, strategic goals Numeric

Nominal

IA2dFunTactic

Reference functional element of tactical goals

Nominal

Name

Label

attainment
IA2iFunNewExt Characterization of functional desired external
situation
IA2jFunOpFeed Characterization of functional operational
feedback

management
IA2oStrucOpsN Characterization of structural operations or
processes
IA2p5trucTech

Characterization of structural technical staff or
processes

IA2qStrucSupp Characterization of structural support staff or
processes

form
IA2aFunExSit

Reference functional existing external situation

IA2bFunExAgen Reference functional existing agency situation

Numeric

Purpose
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Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

IA2eFun0p0b

Reference functional operational objectives

Numeric

Nominal

IA2fFunOpPro

Reference functional operational processes

Numeric

Nominal

IA2gFunTac0ut Reference functional element of tactical output

Numeric

Nominal

IA2hFunStratO

Reference functional strategic goal attainment

Numeric

Nominal

IA2iFunNewExt Reference functional desired external situation

Numeric

Nominal

IA2jFun0pFeed Reference functional operational feedback

Numeric

Nominal

IA2kFunTacFe

Reference to functional tactical feedback

Numeric

Nominal

IA2IFunStratFe

Reference to functional strategic feedback

Numeric

Nominal

IA2mStrucTop

Reference to structural top management

Numeric

Nominal

IA2nStrucMid

Reference to structural middle management

Numeric

Nominal

IA2oStrucOps

Reference to structural operations or processes

Numeric

Nominal

IA2pStrucTech

Reference structural technical staff, processes

Numeric

Nominal

IA2qStrucSupp

Reference structural support staff, processes

Numeric

Nominal

IA2rStrucldeo

Reference to structural element of ideology

Numeric

Nominal

Purpose

Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directlyfrominstrument; scaled values are numeric data
directlyfrominstrument or derivedfromalpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

Predictive Quantitative Results for CCop.
Constituent items for the variable CCop, Citizen Coproduction, are ranked by
means in Table 25. The items with the highest means are ^rends in tactical goals,
operational processes, response to external situation and changes in the kinds of
partnerships available and pursued. The items with the lowest means are involvement
of agency operational, technical, and support staff; monitoring and evaluation, and
changes in operational objectives. All items for the citizen coproduction variable are
significant at the p > .05 level, Table 26.
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Table 25
Comparison of Meansfor Variable CCop
Std.
Element

Std. Error

N

Mean Deviation

Mean

Trends in tactical goals-scaled

8

3.00

.000(a)

.000

Trends in operational processes-scaled

8

3.00

.000(a)

.000

Trends in external situation-scaled

8

2.88*

.354

.125

Patterns and trends in kinds of partnerships-scaled

8

2.88*

.354

.125

Trends in top management involvement-scaled

8

2.63

1.061

.375

Patterns and trends in number of partnerships-scaled

8

2.88*

.354

.125

Trends in other organizational forms for partnerships-scaled

7

2.71

.756

.286

Trends in middle management involvement-scaled

8

2.63*

1.061

.375

Trends in forming intent or strategic goals-scaled

8

2.63

1.061

.375

Trends in attainment of strategic goals-scaled

8

2.63*

1.061

.375

Trends in ideology-scaled

8

2.63*

1.061

.375

Trends in agency situation-scaled

8

2.63*

1.061

.375

Effect of change in funding on partnerships-scaled

8

2.63*

1.061

.375

Trends in tactical outputs-scaled

8

2.25*

1.389

.491

Trends in desired new external situation-scaled

8

2.25*

1.389

.491

Trends in operational objectives-scaled

7

2.14

1.464

.553

Trends in operational involvement-scaled

8

1.88*

1.356

.479

Trends in technical involvement-scaled

8

1.88*

1.553

.549

Trends in monitoring and evaluation-scaled

8

1.88

1.356

.479

Trends in support staff involvement-scaled

8

1.25*

1.282

.453

Note, "t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0. * Fourteen items marked with an
asterisk have acceptable reliability at oc = .72. for 14 items.
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Table 26
Significance ofMeans for Variable CCop
Sig.
Element**

df

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

Trends in top management
7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

Trends in operational involvement-scaled

3.910

7

.006

1.875

.74

3.01

Trends in technical involvement-scaled

3.416

7

.011

1.875

.58

3.17

2.758

7

.028

1.250

.18

2.32

7.000

7

.000*

2.625

1.74

3.51

9.500

6

.000

2.714

Trends in external situation-scaled

23.000

7

.000*

2.875

3.17

Trends in agency situation-scaled

7.000

7

.000*

2.625

3.51

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

Trends in operational objectives-scaled

3.873

6

.008

2.143

.79

3.50

Trends in tactical outputs-scaled

4.583

7

.003*

2.250

1.09

3.41

7.000

7

.000*

2.625

1.74

3.51

4.583

7

.003

2.250

1.09

3.41

3.910

7

.006

1.875

.74

3.Q1

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

involvement-scaled
Trends in middle management
involvement-scaled

Trends in support staff involvementscaled
Trends in ideology (beliefs, traditions,
norms, values, culture)--scaled
Trends other aspects of organizational
forms for partnerships-scaled

2.02

3.41

Trends in forming intent or strategic
goals-scaled

Trends in attainment of strategic
goals-scaled
Trends in desired new external
situation-scaled
Trends in monitoring and evaluationscaled
Effect of change in funding or
organizational capacity on

Chapter IV, Findings 254
Sig.
Element**

t

df

23.000

7

.000

23.000

7

.000

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

2.875

2.58

3.17

2.875

2.58

3.17

partnerships-scaled
Patterns and trends in kinds of
partnerships-scaled
Patterns and trends in number of
partnerships-scaled

Note. All items meet the criteria for reliability of oc > .70. * Items marked with an asterisk are part of
a set with maximal« = .93 which means that they do the best job of explaining variance. ** Two
items are excluded because there is no variance.
Predictive Reliabilityfor CCop.
Most of the items for variable CCop, Citizen Coproduction, proved reliable. All
items in this variable, except three, are descriptive exploratory. The administrator's
instrument contained 20 numeric items, of which 14 are found to be reliable at oc =
.72. (See Table 27 below.) Several items are excludedfromthe analysis because the
variance is zero. Higher reliability could be obtained at the expense of excluding some
of the sample. With a small n = 8,1 chose the highest reliability that included all eight
samples. Maximal reliability, for the administrator's instrument, suggested that any of
three items could explain all the variation at oc = 1.00, Table 28 below. The perfect
reliability is a function of a small n = 8. The agreements instrument contained 18
numeric items of which all 18 are found to be reliable at oc = .83, Table 29 below. The
data are binary and all descriptive exploratory, so no reliability maximization is
attempted.
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Table 27
Reliability/or Variable CCop*
Element for Variable CCop

Mean

Std. Deviation

Trends in middle management involvement-scaled

2.63

1.061

Trends in operational involvement-scaled

1.88

1.356

Trends in support staff involvement-scaled

1.25

1.282

Trends in ideology-scaled

2.63

1.061

8

Trends in external situation-scaled

2.88

.354

8

Trends in agency situation-scaled

2.63

1.061

8

Trends in forming intent or strategic goals-scaled

2.63

1.061

8

Trends In tactical outputs-scaled

2.25

1.389

8

Trends in attainment of strategic goals-scaled

2.63

1.061

Trends in desired new external situation-scaled

2.25

1.389

8

Patterns and trends in kinds of partnerships-scaled

2.88

.354

8

Trends in technical involvement-scaled

1.88

1.553

Patterns and trends in number of partnerships-scaled

2.88

.354

Effect of change in funding on partnerships—scaled

2.63

1.061

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha == .72 for 14 items.

N
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Table 28
Reliability of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable CCop*
Element for Variable CCop

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Trends in ideology-scaled

2.63

1.061

8

Trends in agency situation-scaled

2.63

1.061

8

Trends in attainment of strategic goals-scaled

2.63

1.061

8

____________________________________________________•________•___•

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = 1.00 for 3 items.

Table 29
Reliability of Agreements Instrument for Variable CCop*,
— « _ _ _ » • < _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i

•

i _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Element for Variable CCJop**

•,

i

i

i

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

.82

.388

88

.35

.480

88

.83

.378

88

.97

.183

88

.93

.254

88

Agreements Instrument
IA2aFunExSit
Reference to functional element of existing agency situation
IA2bFunExAgency
Reference to functional element of existing agency situation
IA2cFunlntent
Reference to functional element of forming intent or strategic
goals
IA2dFunTactic
Reference to functional element of tactical goals
IA2eFunOpOb
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Element for Variable CCop**

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

.91

.289

88

.84

.368

88

.68

.468

88

.76

.429

88

.57

.498

88

.60

.492

88

.06

.233

88

.52

.502

88

.73

.448

88

Agreements Instrument
Reference to functional element of operational objectives
IA2fFunOpPro
Reference to functional element of operational processes
IA2gFunTacOut

Reference to functional element of tactical output
IA2hFunStratOut
Reference to functional element of strategic goal attainment

IA2iFunNewExt
Reference to functional element of desired new external
situation
IA2jFunOpFeed
Reference to functional element of operational feedback
IA2kFunTacFeed
Reference to functional element of tactical feedback
IA2IFunStratFeed
Reference to functional element of strategic feedback
IA2mStrucTop
Reference to structural element of top management
IA2nStrucMid
Reference to structural element of middle management
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Element for Variable CCop**

258

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

.91

.289

88

.64

.484

88

.83

.378

88

.17

.378

88

Agreements Instrument
IA2oStrucOps
Reference to structural element of operations or operational
processes
IA2pStrucTech
Reference to structural element of technical staff or processes
IA2qStrucSupp
Reference to structural element of support staff or processes
IA2rStrucldeo
Reference to structural element of beliefs, traditions, norms,
values, or culture

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .83 for 18 items. ** Two items are excluded because they have no variance.

Descriptive Qualitative Findings for CCop.
A synthesis of agency administrator responses to questions in the instrument
relating to variable CCop, Citizen Coproduction, is shown below in Table 30. The
questions are shown as they appeared in the instrument. The answers shown here are
representative. I followed the convention in synthesis that I show only items that are
identified by more than one administrator. I use the administrator response that best
represented the point in question. For this series of questions administrators reported
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on trends with regard to partnerships for nine structural and eight functional aspects of
their organizations.
Table 30
Administrators Responses to Variable CCop

IA-3. Part a: Thinking about you and your partners and how you both structure your respective
organization's engagement under all your various agreements, what trends have you noticed
over the past ten years in how these various parts of your and your partner's organization get
involved in planning, organizing, implementing, or evaluating partnership activities?
a) Top management involvement
- setting the tone, more open, support more initial investment for long-term payoff
- a complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships
- more engaged in collaborative partnerships, less engaged in hierarchical partnerships
b) middle management involvement
- increasing involvement due to complexity
- have become more active proponents because of benefits of partnerships
- desire for more engagement, but pressed because of downsizing
- a complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships, moved from
ESA regulation to facilitation
- middle managers play more of an advisory role
c) operational involvement
- increasing desire for partnerships, but increasing tension of demand for core duties
- rely on partners more, spend more time on partnerships
- little change
- a complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships, moved from
ESA regulation to facilitation
d) technical involvement
- increasing involvement due to complexity
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- stable, but Increasing unmet demand for services
- more important because of complexity, it's what we offer, but partners do too increasingly
- now invited at the front end to use better technology
e) support staff involvement
- recent increase
- unengaged
- burden of process has increased a lot, with little support help, burden shift to specialists
- down (except for agreements staff)

f) Trends in ideology
- more belief in benefits of partnerships, more support for local activism, more credibility,
support and acceptance
- none of us have resources to do it independently, a lot more possibilities arise from working
together-resources and expertise
- A complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships
- desire for partnerships increasing of time, historical hierarchical walls are breaking down
- operating core has opened itself to collaboration with others-it's the new norm
IA-5. Part b: Thinking about the range of your agency's partnerships and changes over time, what
trends have you noticed over the past ten years that are relevant to how your agency and
your partners work together with respect to the following functional aspects?
g) other aspects of organization forms for partnerships
- figuring out where agency's responsibility stops and other's starts, boundaries of partnerships
- innovations, thinking outside the box, local creative initiatives and new ideas, professional
accountability for decisions
- more strategic, leverage limited resources, look hard for partner strategic alignment, partners
help retain capacity
- partners now demand time with us, insist on having a voice, more willing to share expertise,
agency has changed too
- more free-flowing partnerships, with decreasing $, partnerships more concentrated on
essential accountable core outcomes
- technology and data exchange have increased, partners are a different, younger generation
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than the agency
h) external situation
- world is far more complex, we all are attempting larger scale restoration
- steady population increase and pressure on land resulting in increased interest in protecting
environment and restoration
- trying to be more strategic by embedding conservation biology principles
- changes to timber dependent communities, evolution from anger to willingness to work with
us and find common ground
- we no longer see ourselves as adversaries
- last year a huge shift to global climate change and "Last child in the woods"
- more free-flowing than in the past, more open communications
- more of an awareness that we're all in it together
i)

agency situation

- restoration has become a core mission
- initially a regulatory bureaucracy, now evolving to more use of partnerships with state and
local entities
- increasing incentives to focus on where we can find agreement and be successful
- many experience agency as more inclusive and deliberately seeking common ground
- downward trends in $, necessity is the mother of invention
- more rigid operating environment in the past, now more open to opportunities
j)

forming intent or strategic goals

- political and legal complexity results in less control of our destiny
- changes reflect changed citizen interests
- ecological recovery planning taking a larger role in strategic intent
- we use to decide, now we engage partners in forming strategic intent
- goals are more long term, less narrow, more aimed at common ground
- every 4 years we come up with a different way of doing it-we never get out of storming
- increasingly consider agency strategic goals, striving to find common ground
k) tactical goals
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- sharper, more clearly defined
- recently changed through new partners and sources of funds
- always driven by budget, staffing, and capacity
- sharpened to a results focus in a basin-wide setting
- goals go beyond administrative boundaries
- look at collective resources and figure out how to bring them together
- increasingly concerned with achieving sustainability, working with partners to develop tactics
I)

operational objectives

- more common, more efficient, less controversy
- no qualitative change but increase In number of objectives attained due to increased partners
- diversify portfolio of activities, encompassing use of personal skills
- sharpened to a results focus in a basin-wide setting
- more tailored to desired outcomes in a sharply defined scope
m) operational processes
- smoother
- new services, new partner capabilities
- trend toward innovations, steering around bureaucratic and legal constraints
- trying to build more collaboration into it
- in the past, we have to lead, now a lot of partners bring serious expertise to the table,
sometimes partners lead
- we work harder on meeting partner's objectives too
- more informal, flexible, more local long-standing relationships
n) tactical outputs
- aiming toward health of the resource, having fish return increases society's awareness of
importance
- more outputs because of landscape scale, broader support, and more $
- more comfortable with taking advantage of other's skills, expertise, and ideas
- more fluid partnerships produce more dynamic results
o) attainment of strategic goals
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- more accountability as an administrator from all entities
- partnerships increasingly help us achieve agency strategic goals
- partners help us consider longer term goals with all kinds of resources, S, people, expertise,
politics
- agency has matured into a results orientation
- strategic goals have stayed the same, but ability to meet them has increased
- more transparent discussion of strategic goals
p) desired new external situation
- working towards mitigation aimed at sustainable restoration given climate change and the
scale of human development
- making a bigger and bigger difference
- partnerships have built community support for active public forest management, our awards
become community celebrations
- more concerned with building and maintaining long-term relationships instead of just outputs
- recognizing we need to give a little to get a little, partner's needs matter too
- now getting a better view of possibilities for greater change, more robust tools for greater
change
q) monitoring and evaluation
- still not doing it well, but starting to focus more on performance monitoring
- continuing lack of agency $, recognition of importance of monitoring to adaptive
management, better data tech and sharing
- more joint monitoring and evaluation
- now credible partners increase our credibility which builds trust with other groups
- little change, our partner's awareness has increased
ID-4. Has this change in funding or organizational capacity have any effect on the coproduction
partnerships your agency forms? If so, what has been the effect?
- as program goes up so do number of partnerships-partnerships are our delivery mechanism
- developed new partners with $, improved relations with citizen groups, focus on local
partnerships
- Partnerships revolve around agency's regulatory mission, agency moved to providing
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standards rather than technical assistance
- we've have to become more creative, take advantage of new authorities, external funding,
partnerships
- we're reaching out to non-traditional partners including urban groups and youth
- increasing interagency partnerships, also increase private lands partnerships with owners and
watershed associations
- great effect, many more partnerships than ten years ago because we have more $ to pay for
partner's interests
10-5. What patterns and trends have you noticed over the past years with respect to the kinds of
coproduction partnerships entered into by your agency?
- no one common design, but the common denominator is trust
- more focused on specific projects in specific areas rather than larger scope, increased local
support
- partnerships evolved to become much broader-based embracing multiple objectives, more
different kinds of partners involved
- from user-oriented to much broader nontraditional groups
- partnerships are more on an equal basis now with no one partner dominating, better
integration
ID-6. What patterns and trends have you noticed over the past years with respect to the number of
coproduction partnerships entered into by your agency?
- informal partnerships have increased dramatically-interconnections
• dependent on the administration, partnerships not mission-critical, play increasing role in
mission especially recovery plans for threatened and endangered species
- increased slightly, includes environmental education, focused on leveraging results on the
ground
- growth in numbers of partnerships has almost been exponential, particularly through growth
in networks
- opportunities are countless, the more we get out, the more we find

Summary Variable CCop.
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Variable CCop has a total of 79 constituent items of which (a) 59 items are
qualitative alphanumeric nominal measures used for descriptive exploration, (b) 17
items are numeric scaled measures also used for descriptive exploration, (c) three items
are numeric scaled measures used for predictive affirmation. Of the* 17 numerical items
used for descriptive exploratory measures, means are significantly different than
zero—rejection of the null hypothesis—at p < .05. Reliability testing using Cronbach's
Alpha shows 11 items meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at the level of oc = .72
for 14 items. Of the three numeric items used for predictive affirmation, means are
significantly different than zero at p < .05. Reliability testing using Cronbach's Alpha
shows all three items meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at the level of oc — .72
for 14 items. The null hypothesis is rejected, therefore Variable CCop is supported.
Variable CEv: Coproduction Evolves
Data for variable CEv, Coproduction Evolves, is drawnfromthe administrator's
instrument, Table 31 below. The data all serve as predictive affirmation for hypothesis
I. Quantitative information is collected from administrators in three areas: (a)
administrator's motivation for forming citizen partnerships, (b) administrator's
assessment of partners' motives for entering into partnerships, and (c) administrator's
assessment of evolution of partnerships.
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Table 31
Constituent Items for Variable CEv
Variables and Constituent Items
Label

Name

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Numeric

Ordinal

Predictive

Numeric

Ordinal

Affirmation

Administrator's instrument
IBldAKnow

Administrator's reason to build stakeholder
support

IBlhACivEng

Administrator reason is to provide civic
engagement

IBliAVolOpp

Administrator reason to provide volunteerism

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2nPKnow

Partner's reason is to build knowledge or

Numeric

Ordinal

support
IB2rPCivEng

Partner's reason is desire for civic engagement

Numeric

Ordinal

IB2sPVolOpp

Partner's reason desire volunteer opportunities

Numeric

Ordinal

IB4EvolvCop

Evolving coproduction to democratic

Numeric

Ordinal

engagement
IB5alOPartSelf

% partner's individual self-interest ten years ago Numeric

IB5blOPartGrp % partner's group self-interest ten years ago

Scale

Numeric

Scale

% partner's enlightened self-interest ten years ago Numeric

Scale

IB5dlOPartCom % interest service local community 10 years ago Numeric

Scale

IB5elOPartPub % interest service to public 10 years ago

Numeric

Scale

IB5alPartSelf

% partner's narrow individual self-interest today Numeric

Scale

IB5blPartGrp

% partner's narrow group self-interest today

Numeric

Scale

IB5clPartEnl

% partner's with enlightened self-interest today

Numeric

Scale

IB5dlPartCom

% partner's interest local community service

Numeric

Scale

Numeric

Scale

IB5clOPartEnl

today
IB5elPartPub

% partner's interest in service to public today

Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directlyfrominstrument; scaled values are numeric data
directly from instrument or derivedfromalpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.
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Predictive Quantitative Results for CEv.
The four point scale mentioned above is used to measure howfrequentlythe
administrator or partner is motivated toward partnerships by the given item, using
categories to assessfrequencyof occurrence of the phenomenon at hand. The scale is
(a) almost always, or > 90% of the time; (infrequently, or 90% to 50% of the time; (c)
sometimes, or 50% to 10% of the time; or (d) rarely, or < 10% of the time. It is scored
from 0 to 3, with 3 representing almost always and 0 representing rarely. The means
are all between 1 and 2, which suggests that identified items are considered more than
10% of the time, but less than 90% of the time. I think administrators would have
preferred a five-point scale to allow a middle selection. All item means are
significantly different than zero at a p < .05, Table 32, so the null hypothesis is
rejected for the items having an acceptable level of reliability. Administrators
Report that they and their partnersfrequentlyconsider a) building stakeholder
knowledge or support, and (b) civic engagement when contemplating forming
partnerships. Partners additionally report that coproductionfrequentlyevolves to
citizen engagement, Table 33 below. They additionally note that partners are
sometimes motivated by volunteer opportunities.
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Table 32
Significance of Variable CEv
95% Confidence
Mean

Sig.
Element
Administrator's instrument
Administrator reason to build support
Administrator's reason civic
engagement
Administrators reason is to provide
opportunity for volunteerism
Partner's reason is to build knowledge
or support
Partner's reason is desire for civic
engagement
Partner's reason is desire for volunteer
opportunities
Evolution of coproduction to
democratic citizen engagement

(2-tailed) Difference

Interval
Lower

Upper

1.750

1.01

2.49

.003

1.688

.77

2.61

7

.028

1.250

.18

2.32

7.000

7

.000*

1.750

1.16

2.34

4.249

7

.004*

1.750

.78

2.72

2.986

7

.020*

1.375

.29

2.46

4.333

7

.003*

1.625

.74

2.51

t

df

5.584

7

.001

4.339

7

2.758

Note. * Items denoted by an asterisk have acceptable reliability of\& =. 72 for 4 items.

Table 33
Reliability of Variable CEv
Element

N

Std.
Std. Error
Mean Deviation
Mean

Administrator's instrument
Administrator's reason is to build stakeholder knowledge,
support

1.75

.886

.313

Partner's reason is to build knowledge or support

8

1.75*

.707

.250

Partner's reason is desire for civic engagement

8

1.75*

1.165

.412

Administrator's reason is to provide civic engagement

8

1.69

1.100

.389

Evolution of coproduction to democratic citizen engagement

8

1.63*

1.061

.375

Partner's reason is desire for volunteer opportunities

8

1.38*

1.302

.460

Administrator's reason is to provide for volunteerism

8

1.25

1.282

.453

Note. * Items denoted by an asterisk have acceptable reliability ofE =. 72 for 4 items.
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Administrators assessed, by means of detailed responses in the interview
assessment, that partners' patterns of motivations have shifted significantly over the
last ten years as shown by Table 34 below. I developed a five-point scale to assess
partners' motivations that had narrow self-interest on one end and broader service to
the public on the other. The means suggest that, on the average, partners were mostly
motivated somewhere between narrow group and enlightened self-interest ten years
ago, in comparison to somewhere between enlightened self-interest and service to the
local community today, Table 35 below at a significance of sig. (2-tailed) =. 000,
Table 36 below.

Table 34
Administrators' Assessment of Partners' Motivation Shifts*
Ten years ago
Partner's motives

Today

Mean%

Weight

score

Mean% Weight

score

a) Narrow individual self-interest

26.25

0

0.00

14.00

0

0.00

b) Narrow group self-interest

23.125

1

23.125

14.125

1

14.13

t) Enlightened self-interest

24.375

2

48.75

20.00

2

40.00

d) Service to the local community

16.00

3

48.00

26.875

3

80.63

e) Broader service to the public

10.25

4

41.00

25.00

4

100.00

Note. Difference between the means Sig. (2-tailed) = .000.
Predictive Reliability for CEv,
Variable CEv, Coproduction Evolves, has seven ordinal and ten scaled items. Of
the seven ordinal items, four have acceptable reliability at oc = .72 for four items,
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Table 37 below. The scaled items describe administrator's estimates of changes in
partner's motivations between ten years ago and today. The estimates are made
by distributing percentages for each of five categories of self-interest ranging
from the narrow self-interest to broader public service. The difference is
significant at the sig. (2-tailed) = .000, (see Table 34 above), so the null
hypothesis is rejected. Reliability is maximized with three items, (see Table 38
below), suggest that the three factors of partner's interests in civic engagement
and volunteering, along with the evolution of coproduction to citizen engagement
best explain variable CEv.

Table 35
Comparison of Means ofPartner's Motives between Ten Years Ago and Today
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation Variance

Partners Ten Years Ago

100

0

4

1.61

1.262

1.594

Partners Today

100

0

4

2.39

1.333

1.776

Valid N (listwise)

100

Table 36
Partners'
Differences in Meansofof
Partners'Motivations
Motivationsbetween
betweenTen
TenYean
Years Ago and Today
95% Confidence Interval
Sig.

Mean
Difference

Item

t

df_

(2-tailed)

Partners Ten Years Ago

20.674

99

.000

Partners Today

25.440

99

.000

of the Difference
Lower

Upper

2.610

2.36

2.86

3.390

3.13

3.65
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Table 37
Reliabilityfor Variable CEv*
Variable CEv Item

Mean

Std. Deviation

Partner's reason is desire for civic engagement

1.75

1.165

Partner's reason is to build knowledge or support

1.75

.707

Evolution of coproduction to democratic citizen engagement

1.63

1.061

Partner's reason is desire for volunteer opportunities

1.38

1.302

Mean

Std. Deviation

Partner's reason is desire for civic engagement

1.75

1.165

Evolution of coproduction to democratic citizen engagement

1.63

1.061

Partner's reason is desire for volunteer opportunities

1.38

1.302

N

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .72 for 4 items.

Table 38
Maximum Reliabilityfor Variable CEv*
Variable CEv Item

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .81 for 3 items.

Summary Variable CEv.

Variable CEv has a total of 17 constituent items of which (a) seven items are
numeric ordinal measures used for predictive affirmation, and (b) ten items are

N
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numeric scaled measures also used for predictive affirmation. Of the seven ordinal
measures used for predictive affirmation, all means are significantly different than
zero—rejection of the null hypothesis—at p < .05. Reliability testing shows that four
of the seven items meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at the level of oc = .72 for
four items. Of the ten numeric scaled measures used for predictive affirmation, all are
combined into a single test of differences between two sets of means. The difference is
found to be significant at Sig. (2-tailed) - .000. Reliability testing shows that the two
items that describe the two sets of means meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at
the level of oc = .95 for 2 items. The null hypothesis is rejected for both cases,
therefore variable CEv is supported.
Summary Hypothesis L
Hypothesis I was constructed of three variables: RPS, Reduced Public Service;
CCop, Citizen Coproduction; and CEv, Coproduction Evolves. A total of 118
constituent items are measured, 37 of which are used for predictive affirmation. Of the
37 items, ten are extracted and combined into two new items for a new total of 29
items used for predictive affirmation. The means of all 29 items are significantly
different than the null hypothesis at p < .05. Reliability testing shows that 21 of the 29
items meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at oc > .70. The null hypothesis is
rejected for each of the 21 items and for each of the three associated variables. The null
hypothesis for Hy. I was rejected, therefore Hy. I was supported. New forms of citizen
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engagement are found to arise as a response to constrained federalism, within the
scope, parameters, and assumptions of this research project.
Hypothesis II: Benefits of Liberal Democracy
Hypothesis II states that emergent forms include elements of liberal democratic
citizen engagement—citizens engaging in their own governance. One variable,
BLDem, Benefits of Liberal Democracy is used to test this hypothesis. Tests are
conducted using nine constituent itemsfromboth the agreements and administrator's
instruments. Only quantitative information is collected for this variable. All constituent
items are used for predictive affirmation.
Variable BLDem: Benefits ofLiberal Democracy
Data for variable BLDem, Benefits of Liberal Democracy, are drawnfromboth
the administrators and agreements instruments. See Table 39 below. Five items came
from the agreements instrument and four itemsfromthe administrator's instrument.
The items are all used for predictive affirmation. Data for this variable are aimed at
finding out whether or not partners engaged in activities that exhibit the attributes of
liberal democracy, and whether or not partnership agreements made provisions for or
acknowledged items that also exhibit attributes of liberal democracy.
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Table 39
Constituent Items for Variable BLDem—Benefits of Liberal Democracy
Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Administrator's instrument
IIBlPartBroad

partner's seek to broaden basis public support

Numeric

Ordinal

Predictive

IIB2aPartlnter

partner's interest-based conflict resolution

Numeric

Ordinal

Affirmation

IIB2bPartOther partner interest-based conflict resolution others Numeric

Ordinal

IIB2cPartAgenc partner's use interest-based conflict resolution

Numeric

Ordinal

IIB3PartPublnv

Numeric

Ordinal

IIA60therPotlnt Provision acknowledgement interests of others

Numeric

Scale

IIA7ConflictR

Numeric

Scale

IIA8Publnvolve Provision public involve coproduction activities

Numeric

Scale

IIA12CitPart

Numeric

Scale

Extent of partners seeking public involvement
Agreements instrument

Provision conflict resolution agency and partner

Acknowledgement role for citizen participation

Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directly from instrument; scaled values are numeric data
directlyfrominstrument or derivedfromalpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

Predictive Quantitative Results for BLDem.

The four point scale mentioned above is used to measure benefits of liberal
democracy. Items from the administrator's instrument have means between 1.13 and
2.25, Table 40 below; and means are all significant at levels of sig. (2-tailed) = .000 to
.007, Table 41 below. According to administrators, partners frequently (a) sought
active public involvement in partnership activities, (b) sought to broaden the basis of
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public support for partnership activities, and (c) employed interest-based intergroup
conflict resolution. Similarly, partners sometimes use interest-based conflict resolution
with others. Items from the agreements instrument have much smaller means between
.31 and .57, and means are all significant at levels of sig. (2-tailed = .000. Partnership
agreements rarely or sometimes incorporate (a) provisions for public involvement in
coproduction activities, (b) acknowledgement of interests of others, (c)
acknowledgement or provision of citizen participation, and (d) provisions for conflict
resolution between the agency and partners.
Table 40
Comparison of Means for Variable BLDem
Element

Std.
Std. Error
N__ Mean Deviation
Mean

Administrator's instrument
Extent of partners seeking active public involvement

8

2.25*

1.035

.366

Extent of partner's seeking to broaden basis of public support

8

2.00*

.535

.189

8

1.75*

.886

.313

8

1.75*

.886

.313

8

1.13*

.835

.295

Provision for public involvement in coproduction activities

86

.57*

1.035

.112

Provision for acknowledgement of potential interests of others

88

.47*

.946

.101

Acknowledgement or provision of role for citizen participation

89

.44*

.891

.094

Provision for conflict resolution between agency and partner

89

.31*

.717

.076

Extent of partner's use of interest-based intergroup conflict
resolution
Extent of partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution
with the agency
Partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution with others
Agreements Instrument

Note. * All items noted by an asterisk are reliable at the level of oc > .7

Chapter IV, Findings 276
Table 41
Significance ofMeans for Variable BLDem
95% Confidence Interval
Element

t

Sig.
Mean
df (2-tailed) Difference

Lower

Upper

Administrator's instrument
Extent of partner's seeking to broaden
10,583

7

.000*

2.000

1.55

2.45

6.148

7

.000*

2.250

1.38

3.12

5.584

7

.001*

1.750

1.01

2.49

5.584

7

.001*

1.750

1.01

2.49

3.813

7

.007*

1.125

.43

1.82

4.619

87

.000*

.466

.27

.67

4.142

88

.000*

.315

.16

.47

5.104

85

.000*

.570

.35

.79

4.638

88

.000*

.438

.25

.63

basis of public support
Extent of partners seeking active public
involvement
Extent of partner's use of interest-based
intergroup conflict resolution
Extent of partner's use of interest-based
conflict resolution with the agency
Extent of partner's use of interest-based
conflict resolution with others
Agreements Instrument
Provision for acknowledgement of
potential interests of others
Provision for conflict resolution
between agency and partner
Provision for public involvement in
coproduction activities
Acknowledgement or provision of role
for citizen participation

Note. * All items noted by an asterisk are reliable at the level of « > .7
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Predictive Reliability for BLDem.
All items for variable BLDem, Benefits of Liberal Democracy, are used for
predictive affirmation; All 9 items in this variable proved reliable at oc =r .73 for 5
items for the administrator's instrument, and oc = .94 for 4 items for the agreements
instrument, Tables 42 and 43 below—denotation of which is noted in Tables 39 and
40. Finding maximal reliability shows that 3 out of 5 items best explained BLDem for
the administrator's instrument at oc = .93 for 4 items, and 2 out of 4 items best
explained the variable for the agreements instrument at oc = .97 for 2 items,
Tables 44 and 45 below. Variable BLDem is therefore best explained, according to
administrators, by the extent of partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution
for inter-group conflicts, conflicts with others, and conflicts with the agency.
According to evidence in the agreements, the variable is best explained by
provisions for acknowledgement of potential interests of others for citizen
participation in partnership activities.

Table 42
Reliability of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable BLDem*

IIBlPartBroad

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

2.00

.535

8

1.75

.886

8

Extent of partner's seeking to broaden basis of public support

IIB2aPartlnter
Extent of partner's use of interest-based intergroup conflict
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Mean

Std. Deviation

N

1.13

.835

8

1.75

.886

8

2.25

1.035

8

Std. Deviation

N

resolution

IIB2bPartOther
Extent of partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution
with others

IIB2cPartAgency
Extent of partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution
with the agency

IIB3PartPublnv
Extent of partners seeking active public involvement

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .73 for 5 items.

Table 43

Reliability of Agreements Instrumentfor Variable BLDem*
Mean
IIA60therPotlnt

.48

.959

85

.33

.730

85

.58

1.039

85

.46

.907

85

Provision for acknowledgement of potential interests of others
IIA7ConflictR
Provision for conflict resolution between agency and partner
IIA8Publnvoive
Provision for public involvement in coproduction activities
IIA12CitPart
Acknowledgement or provision of role for citizen participation

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .94 for 4 items.
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Table 44
Maximal Reliability of Administrator's Instrument for Variable BLDem*

IIB2aPartlnter

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

1.75

.886

8

1.13

.835

8

1.75

.886

8

Extent of partner's use of interest-based intergroup conflict
resolution

IIB2bPart0ther
Extent of partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution
with others

IIB2cPartAgency
Extent of partner's use of interest-based conflict resolution
with the agency

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .93 for 3 items.

Table 45
Maximal Reliability ofAgreements Instrument for Variable BLDem*

IIA60therPotlnt

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

.47

.946

88

.44

.895

88

Provision for acknowledgement of potential interests of others

IIA12CitPart
Acknowledgement or provision of role for citizen participation

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .97 for 2 items.
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Summary Variable BLDem.
Variable BLDem has a total of nine constituent items of which (a) five are
numeric ordinal measures used for predictive affirmation, and (b) four are numeric
scaled measures used for predictive affirmation. Of the nine numerical items used for
predictive affirmation, the means are all significantly different than zero—rejection of
the null hypothesis—at p < .007. Reliability testing shows all 9 items meet the criteria
for acceptable reliability at the level of« = .73 for 5 items and oc = .94 for 4 items.
The null hypothesis is rejected, therefore variable BLDem is supported.
Summary Hypothesis II.
Hypothesis II is constructed of only one variable, BLDem. A total of nine
constituent items are measured for Hy. II, all of which are used for predictive
affirmation. The means of all nine items are found to be significantly different than
zero—the null hypothesis—at p < .007. Reliability is acceptable at the level of oc ^
.70. The null hypothesis for Hy. II is rejected, therefore Hy. II is supported. Emergent
forms of citizen engagement include elements of liberal democratic citizen
engagement—citizens engaging in their own governance*
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Hypothesis HI: Retain the Benefits and Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism
Hypothesis III states that emergent forms retain the benefits of constrained
federalism and remedy its defects, which include reported (R. C. Box et al., 2001) and
experienced shrinkage of democracy. Two variables, BConF, Retain the Benefits of
Constrained Federalism, and RDef, Remedies the Defects of Constrained Federalism,
are used to test the hypothesis. A total of 35 constituent items are measured for this
variable, all of which except one, are used for predictive affirmation, Table 46 below.
Tests for both variables are conducted using itemsfromthe agreements and
administrator's instruments.
Variable BConF: Retain the Benefits of Constrained Federalism
Data for variable BConF, Retain the Benefits of Constrained Federalism, is
drawnfromboth the administrators and agreements instrument, Table 46 below. Four
items camefromthe administrators' instrument and twelve itemsfromthe agreements
instrument. All items, with the exception of two items in the agreements instrument,
are quantitative and used for predictive affirmation. Data for this variable are aimed at
determining to what extent emergent forms retain the benefits of constrained
federalism. The administrator's consideration of litigation and sense of duty for citizen
engagement is measured. Partnership agreements are evaluated to identify the extent
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Table 46
Constituent Items for Variable BConF—Retain Benefits of Constrained Federalism
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Variables and Constituent Items
Type

Measure*

Purpose

Numeric

Ordinal

Predictive

IIBSaAdmCitPln sense of duty citizen engagement in decisions

Numeric

Ordinal

Affirmation

IIB5bAdmCitPrj sense of duty citizen engagement in projects

Numeric

Ordinal

IIB5cAdmCitMo sense of duty citizen engagement in monitoring

Numeric

Ordinal

Alpha

Nominal

Name

Label

Administrator's instrument
IIB4Admf.it

Administrator consideration of litigation issues

Agreements Instrument
IIAlaCopPurp

Purpose of coproduction

Descriptive
Exploration

IIIAlAccountEvi Evidence of clear accountability for results

Numeric

Scale

Predictive

IIAlbCopPurp

reference to alignment with agency mission

Numeric

Scale

Affirmation

IIA2aPartTrans

Partner's transaction costs of coproduction

Numeric

Scale

IIA2bAdmTrans Agency transaction costs partner's coproduction Numeric

Scale

HA3PartAuto

Numeric

Scale

IIA4PartAccoun Partner's accountability for coproduction

Numeric

Scale

IIA5CopProf

professionalism embodied in coproduction

Numeric

Scale

IIA9LegAuth

Reference to legislative authorities

Numeric

Scale

IIAlOExecPol

Reference to executive branch policies

Numeric

Scale

IIAllDueProces Provision for due process

Numeric

Scale

IIIAlAccount

Numeric

Scale

Partner's autonomy to change coproduction to
match changed conditions

Extent of clear accountability for results

Note.* Ordinal values are numeric data directlyfrominstrument; scaled values are numeric data
directly from instrument or derivedfromalpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

•
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that the agreements (a) make reference to legislative authorities, executive branch
policies, and alignment with agency mission; (b) provide evidence of clear
accountability for results and partner's role in accountability; (c) create procedural
burdens-red tape; (d) create efficiency of autonomy for partner's actions; and (e) make
provision for due process and professionalism in partnership activities.
Predictive Quantitative Results for BConF.
The four point scale mentioned above is used to measure the benefits of
constrained federalism. Itemsfromthe administrator's instrument have means between
2.13 and L38, Table 47 below; and means are all significant at levels of sig. (2-tailed)
= .000 to .006, Table 48 below. Administrators (a)frequentlyhave a sense of duty for
citizen engagement in planning and decision-making11, (b) sometimes or frequently
considered litigation potential when forming partnerships12, and (c) sometimes felt a
sense of duty for citizen engagement in projects or service delivery8 and in monitoring
or evaluating outcomes8. Agreements (a) almost always made reference to agency
mission and made provision for due process, extensive partner accountability for
results, and partner autonomy to respond to changed conditions; (b)frequentlyto
almost always made reference to legislative authorities, referenced executive branch

11

However, this item did not have acceptable or marginal reliability.

12

These three items have only marginal reliability of oc = .62 for 3 items.
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policies, and embodied professionalism in partnership activities; and (c) sometimes
incurred transaction costs for partnership activities13.

Table 47
Comparison of Means for Variable BConF
Element

N

Std.
Std. Error
Mean Deviation
Mean

8

2.13

.835

.295

8

1.63*

1.188

.420

8

1.38*

.744

.263

8

1.38*

.744

.263

Administrator's instrument
Administrators sense of duty for citizen engagement in
planning and decision-making
Extent of Administrators consideration of litigation issues
regarding coproduction
Administrators sense of duty for citizen engagement in projects
or service delivery
Administrators sense of duty for citizen engagement in
monitoring of projects or service
Agreements Instrument
Strength of reference to alignment with agency mission
Provision for due process or Administrative Procedures Act
standards
Partner's accountability for coproduction
Extent of clear accountability for results
Partner's procedural transaction costs associated with
coproduction
Partner's autonomy to change coproduction to match changed
conditions
Reference to legislative authorities
Degree of professionalism embodied in coproduction activities

89

2.84**

.474

.050

89

2.74**

.440

.047

79
83

2.71**
2.70**

.663
.619

.075
.068

79

.86

1.163

.131

79

2.67*

.729

.082

89
89

2.48**
2.37**

.881
.509

.093
.054

Reference to executive branch policies

89

1.93**

1.250

.133

Agency procedural transaction costs for coproduction

79

1.163

.131

.86

Note. * Only three administrator's instrument items noted by asterisks achieved marginal
reliability, <x = .62 for 3 items. ** Eight out of 10 items in the agreements instrument have

acceptable reliability, oc = .77 for 8 items.

13

The two items related to this last point did not have acceptable or marginal reliability.
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Table 48
Significance ofMeans for Variable BConF

,

Element

t

5ig.
Mean
df (2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

Administrator's instrument
Administrators sense of duty for citizen
engagement in planning and decisionmaking

7.202

7

.000

2.125

1.43

2.82

Administrators sense of duty for citizen
engagement in projects or service
delivery

5-2 27

7

.001

1.375

.75

2.00

Administrators sense of duty for citizen
engagement in monitoring of projects
or service

5227

7

.001

1.375

.75

2.00

Extent of Administrators consideratidn
of litigation issues regarding
reproduction

3870

7

Q06

1.625

.63

2.62

56.540 88

.000

2.843

2.74

2.94

6 579

78

•00°

M1

-60

78

-O00

-861

-60

112

32.568 78

.000

2.671

2.51

2.83

36.306 78

.000

2.709

2.56

2.86

4

88

.000

2.371

2.26

2.48

Reference to legislative authorities

26605

88

QQQ

2483

Reference to executive branch policies

y^ g 8 j

88

QQQ

58.748

88

-000

396g9

g2

000

Agreements Instrument
Strength of reference to alignment with
agency mission
Agency's procedural transaction costs
associated with partner's coproduction
Agency's procedural transaction costs
associated with partner's coproduction
Partner's autonomy to change
coproduction to match changed
conditions
Partner's accountability for
coproduction

-

_ _ 7q

1 12

-

Degree of professionalism embodied in
coproduction activities

Provision for due process or
Administrative Procedures Act
standards
Extent of clear accountability for results

3-975

230

267

^ ^ss

167

2 20

2.742

2.65

2.83

2699

256

2g3
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Predictive Reliability for BConF.
Variable BConF, Benefits of Constrained Federalism incorporated four items
from the administrator's instrument and 12 itemsfromthe agreements instrument. Data
from the administrator's instrument did not meet the test of reliability of oc > .70,
Table 49 below; only marginal reliability is achievable with oc = .62 for 3 items,
Table 50 below. Most of the 10 itemsfromthe agreements instrument achieved
reliability at oc = .77 for 8 items, Table 51 below. The remaining two items did not
meet marginal reliability. Maximal reliability shows that six items best explained the
variable at oc = .89 for 6 items, Table 52 below. Variable BConF is therefore best
explained by the following itemsfromthe agreements instrument (a) strength of
reference agency mission, (b) evidence of clear accountability for results, (c) partner's
accountability for coproduction, (d) reference to legislative authorities, (e) reference to
executive branch policies, and (i) provision for due process or administrative
procedures act standards.
Table 49
Reliability of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable BConF*
Mean
Hm
i

ii

.1 i i

ml

ii I i.

•

•

IIB4AdmL.it

i

Std. Deviation
—

„ — , . , i —„ — . . I , , . , , „ .

N
,.

M......I..,,

.,,..,.1..,.

1.63

1.188

8

2.13

.835

8

Extent of Administrators consideration of litigation issues
regarding coproduction

IIB5aAdmCitPin
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Administrators sense of duty for citizen engagement in
planning and decision-making

IIB5bAdmCitPrj

1.38

.744

8

1.38

.744

8

Administrators sense of duty for citizen engagement in projects
or service delivery

IIB5cAdmCitMon
Administrators sense of duty for citizen engagement in
monitpring of projects or service

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .58 for 4 items.

Table 50

Maximal Reliability of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable BConF*

IIB4AdmLit: Extent of Administrators consideration of litigation

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

1.63

1.188

8

1.38

.744

8

1.38

.744

8

issues regarding coproduction

IIB5bAdmCitPrj: Administrators sense of duty for citizen
engagement in projects or service delivery

IIB5cAdmCitMon: Administrators sense of duty for citizen
engagement in monitoring of projects or service
Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .62 for 3 items.
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Table 51
Reliability of Agreements Instrument for Variable BConF*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

2.82

.500

79

2.67

.729

79

2.71

.663

79

2.38

.514

79

2.54

.917

79

IIAlOExecPol

2.16

1.126

79

IIIAlAccountEvi

2.72

.619

79

IIAllDueProcess: Provision for due process or Administrative

2.82

.384

79

IIAlbCopPurp: Strength of reference to alignment with agency
mission

IIA3PartAuto: Partner's autonomy to change coproduction to
match changed conditions

IIA4PartAccount
Partner's accountability for coproduction

IIA5CopProf
Degree of professionalism embodied in coproduction activities

IIA9LegAuth
Reference to legislative authorities

Procedures Act standards
Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .77 for 8 items.
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Table 52
Maximal Reliability ofAgreements Instrument for Variable BConF*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

2.82

.500

79

IIIAlAccountEvi

2.72

.619

79

IIA4PartAccount

2.71

.663

79

2.54

.917

79

2.16

1.126

79

2.82

.384

79

IIAlbCopPurp
Strength of reference to alignment with agency mission

Partner's accountability for coproduction

IIA9LegAuth
Reference to legislative authorities

IIAlOExecPol
Reference to executive branch policies

IIAllDueProcess
Provision for due process or Administrative Procedures Act
standards

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .89 for 6 items.
Descriptive Qualitative Findings for BConF.
Partnership agreements are pursued for a wide variety of purposes in the Pacific
Northwest. See Table 53 below. Most pursue wildlife or fish habitat restoration
projects either as mitigation for other adverse effects on the environment (43
agreements) or unrelated to mitigation (23 agreements) for a total of sixty six
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agreements. Nine agreements are formed for the purposes of structuring long term
working relationships around community-based ecological restoration and
conservation education. Eight agreements are directly for the purposes of interpretation
and environmental/conservation education. Two agreements focused on law
enforcement. One agreement involved establishment of a "River Keeper" position to
coordinate and facilitate theflowof natural resource information regarding the
Willamette River Basin among Federal, Tribal, State, and local agencies as well as
citizen groups.
Partnership agreements almost always specified provisions for partner
accountability in great detail. Almost all have provisions similar to standard
procurement contracts (42 and 8 agreements). See Table 51 below. Many others (27
agreements) have specifications for partner performance spelled out in the agreement.
The remaining agreements have miscellaneous provisions. One agreement requires
annual executive group meetings of agency and partner organizations.
Table 53
Purpose and Accountability Mechanisms for Partnership Agreements
Purpose of Agreement
Mitigation for habitat loss and alteration for important habitats through restoration,

Number
43

enhancement, and management
Projects aimed at restoration, conservation, or management of natural resources

23

including wildlife and fish habitat restoration and associated surveys.
Structure long term working relationships around community-based ecological
restoration and conservation education

9
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Purpose of Agreement

Number

Interpretation and environmental/conservation education

8

Youth corps natural resource projects

3

Law enforcement

2

Interagency coordination of natural resource information for Willamette River Basin.

1

Total number of partnership agreements

89

Partnership agreement accountability mechanisms
References, Payment contingent on results

42

Specification in duties of partners section.

27

Task order process, project reports

8

Covered in the purposes section

1

Specified reporting comparing accomplishments to standards

1

Working agreement

1

Provision for agency inspectors

1

Annual meeting of executive group

1

Partner's contract

1

Number of partnership agreements

83

Summary Variable BConF.
Variable BConF has a total of 16 constituent items of which (a) four are numeric
ordinal measures used for predictive affirmation, (b) one is an alpha-numeric nominal
measure used for descriptive exploration, (c) one is an alphanumeric nominal measure
used for predictive affirmation, and (d) 10 are numeric scaled measures used for
predictive affirmation. Of the 14 numeric items used for predictive affirmation, the
means are significantly different than zero—rejection of the null hypothesis!—at p <
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.006. Reliability testing shows that (a) the four numeric ordinal items meet only
marginal reliability at oc = .63 for 3 items, and (b) eight of the 10 numeric scaled
measures meet acceptable reliability at the level of oc = .77 for 8 items. In summary, of
14 numeric items used for predictive affirmation, all have means significantly different
than zero, the null hypothesis, and eight of the items have acceptable reliability, while
an addition three items have marginal reliability. The null hypothesis is rejected,
therefore variable BConF is supported.
Variable RDef: Remedies the Defects of Constrained Federalism
Data for variable RDef, Remedies the Defects of Constrained Federalism, is
drawnfromboth the administrators and agreements instrument. See Table 54 below.
The data all serve a predictive affirmation function for the variable. All the data are
quantitative, except for four items in the agreements instrument. Various dimensions of
the administrator's connection to the social fabric of the community are investigated
using five items, while three items measure administrator's performance providing
opportunities for citizen engagement in planning and decision-making, project
implementation, and monitoring. Administrators are used as expert informants to
assess whether or not citizen's understanding increasedfrompartnership activities in
the areas of (a) checks and balances in American federalism, (b) accountability in
federalism, and (c) how to be most effective in exerting pressure in the federal
structure. Agreements are examined for evidence of (a) dealing with ethical issues, (b)

Chapter IV, Findings 293
agency serving the needs of the community, (c) agency connection to the social fabric
of the community, and (d) provision for civic engagement.
Table 54
Constituent Items for Variable RJDef
Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Numeric

Ordinal

Predictive

IIIB2aAdmSocFI Administrator connection social fabric individual Numeric

Ordinal

Affirmation

IIIB2bAdmSocF connection social fabric agency administrator

Numeric

Ordinal

connection social fabric local administrative unit Numeric

Ordinal

Administrator's instrument
IIIBlAdmCSvc

IIIB2cAdmSocF

motivation to serve needs of local community

IIIB2dAdmSocF connection social fabric as a local public agency

Numeric

Ordinal

IIIB3aAdmDecO provided citizen engagement in decision-making Numeric

Ordinal

!IIB3bAdmDelO provided citizen engagement in projects

Numeric

Ordinal

IIIB3cAdmMon

Numeric

Ordinal

...~. ~ . . „ , . . Coproduction's role in increasing citizen
IIB4aCopUCkB
j
.. J :
r u .
JU7
K
understanding
of checks and balances

.,
.
Numeric

„ ,. .
Ordina

...•>*..,. ... . Coproduction's role in increasing citizen
HIB4bCopUAcct u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t v i n f e d e r a l i s m

.,
.
Numeric

„ .. ,
Ordinal

provided opportunities for citizen monitoring

.•.„„ „ ..„
role in increasing citizen understanding of how
IIIB4cCopUPres t o b e s t e x e r t pressure in American federalism

„,

Numer,c

« . . .

0rd,nal
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Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Agreements Instrument
IIIA2EthicsEvide Evidence of dealing with ethical issues

Alpha

Nominal

Predictive

IIIA3AdmComE Evidence of agency serving needs of community

Alpha

Nominal

Affirmation

IIIA4AdmSocEvi Evidence of agency connection to social fabric

Alpha

Nominal

IIIA5AdmCivEng Evidence of provision for civic engagement

Alpha

Nominal

Numeric

Scale

HIA3AdmComm evidence of agency serving needs of community Numeric

Scale

IIIA4AdmSocia! evidence of agency connection to social fabric

Numeric

Scale

IIIA5AdmCivicE evidence of provision for civic engagement

Numeric

Scale

IIIA2Ethics

evidence for dealing with ethical issues

Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directly from instrument; scaled values are numeric data
directly from instrument or derived from alpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

Predictive Quantitative Results for RDef.

The four point scale mentioned above is used to measure remedies to the defects
of constrained federalism. Items from the administrator's instrument have means from
.63 to 2.00. See Table 55 below. The means are all significant at levels of sig. (2-tailed)
= .000 to .049. See Table 56 below. Administrators report that they frequently (a) are
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motivated to serve needs of the local community14, (b) experience connection to the
community in their role as agency administrator15, and (c) their belief that partnerships
play an increasing role in citizen understanding of how to best exert pressure in
American federalism16. Administrators report they sometimes to frequently: (a)
experience connection to the community as an individual and in the persona of their
local administrative unit or public agency17; (b) provide opportunities for citizen
engagement in planning and decision-making, as well as in projects or agency delivery
of services18, (c) in their belief that partnerships increase citizens' understanding of
checks and balances, as well as (d) increase accountability of American federalism19.
Agency administrators provide opportunity for citizen engagement in monitoring or
evaluation only rarely to sometimes. There is sometimes evidence of agreements
dealing with ethical issues, and rarely evidence of agency connection to the social
fabric, or of provision for civic engagement in partnership projects.

14

The reliability of the two items that measure this did not reach marginal reliability of oc > .60.

15

The reliability of the four items that measure this only reached marginal reliability of oc = .62 for

4 items.
16

The reliability of the three items that measure this only reached marginal reliability of oc = .67

for 3 items.
17

The reliability of the four items that measure this only reached marginal reliability of oc = .62 for

4 items.
18

The reliability of the three items that measure this did not reach a marginal level of reliability at

oc > .60.
19

The reliability of the three items that measure this only reached a marginal reliability of oc = .67 for

3 items.
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Table 55
Comparison ofMeans for Variable RDef
Element

N

Std.
Std. Error
Mean Deviation
Mean

8

2.00

.535

.189

8

1.81*

.753

.266

8

1.63*

.518

.183

8

1.50*

1.195

.423

8

1.50*

.756

.267

8

1.50*

1.195

.423

8

1.50

1.414

.500

8

1.38*

1.188

.420

8

1.38*

.916

.324

8

1.25

.707

.250

8

.63

.744

.263

Administrator's instrument
Administrators motivation to serve needs of the local
community
Administrators connection to community social fabric as an
agency administrator
Coproduction's role in increasing citizen understanding of how
to best exert pressure in American federalism
Administrators connection to community social fabric as an

individual
Administrators connection to community social fabric as a local
administrative unit
Administrators connection to community social fabric as a local
public agency
Administrator-provided opportunities for citizen engagement
in planning and decision-making
Coproduction's role in increasing citizen understanding of
checks and balances in American federalism
Coproduction's role in increasing citizen understanding of
accountability in American federalism
Administrator-provided opportunities for citizen engagement
in delivery of services or projects
Administrator-provided opportunities for citizen engagement
in monitoring or evaluation
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Element

N

Std.
Std. Error
Mean Deviation
Mean

Agreements Instrument
Extent of evidence for dealing with ethical issues

89

1.67

1.338

.142

Extent of evidence of agency serving the needs of the
89

.46**

.942

.100

89

.38**

.776

.082

80

.26**

.807

.090

community
Extent of evidence of agency connection to social fabric of the
community
Extent of evidence of provision for civic engagement

Note. * For the administrator's instrument, only 7 out of 11 items achieved a marginal
reliability of .70 > oc > .60. ** For the agreements instrument, 3 out of 4 numeric items
achieved acceptable reliability of oc = .87 for 3 items.

Table 56
Significance of Means for Varia Me RDef
Sig.
Element

t

df

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

1.55

2.45

Administrator's instrument
Administrator's motivation to serve
needs of the local community

.000

10.583

2.000

Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a (an)
individual

3.550

7

.009*

1.500

.50

2.50

agency administrator

6.808

7

.000*

1.813

1.18

2.44

local administrative unit

5.612

7

.001*

1.500

.87

2.13

local public agency

3.550

7

.009*

1.500

.50

2.50

Administrator-provided opportunities
for citizen engagement in
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Sig.
Element

t

df

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

298

95% Confidence interval
Lower

Upper

planning and decision-making

3.000

7

.020*

1.500

.32

2.68

delivery of services or projects

5.000

7

.002*

1.250

.66

1.84

monitoring or evaluation

2.376

7

.049*

.625

.00

1.25

3.274

7

.014*

1.375

.38

2.37

4.245

7

.004*

1.375

.61

2.14

8.881

7

.000

1.625

1.19

2.06

Coproduction's role in increasing
citizen understanding of
checks and balances in American
federalism
accountability in American
federalism
how to best exert pressure in
American federalism
Agreements Instrument
Extent of evidence for dealing with
11.804

88

.000

1.674

1.39

1.96

4.613

88

.000**

.461

.26

.66

4.643

88

.000**

.382

.22

.55

2.908

79

.005**

.263

.08

.44

ethical issues
Extent of evidence of agency serving
the needs of the community
Extent evidence of agency connection
to social fabric of the community
Extent of evidence of provision for
civic engagement

Note. * For the administrator's instrument, only 7 out of 11 items achieved a marginal reliability of .70
>oc > .60. ** For the agreements instrument, 3 out of 4 numeric items achieved acceptable reliability
of « = .87 for 3 items.
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Predictive Reliability for RDef.
All items for variable RDef, Remedies Defects of Constrained Federalism are
used for predictive affirmation. Data for items is derivedfromboth administrators and
agreements instrument. Reliability, however, is problematic for variable RDef. See
Table 57, 58, and 59 below. Two sets of itemsfromthe administrator's instrument
reached marginal reliability for a total of 7 out of 11 items: (a) partnerships' role in
increasing citizens' understanding of American federalism at oc = .67 for 3 items,
Table 55 below; and (b) administrators' connection to community social fabric in
various persona at oc = .62for4 items (Table 57 below). Out of eight itemsfromthe
agreements instrument, only three reach acceptable reliability at oc = .87 for 3 items
(Table 60 below). Denotations are made above in Tables S12 and SI 1 comparing
means and testing null hypotheses accordingly.
Table 57
Reliability Group One of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable RDef*
• ~ - «

i

'

1

— — — - — - • — ™ — — - — p < > — - » — - — - — • i ^ - — » — " * — - - ' i ^ ~

Mean

Std. Deviation

IIIB4aCopUCkBal
Coproduction's role in increasing citizen understanding of
checks and balances in American federalism

1.38

1.188

IIIB4bCopUAcct
Coproduction's role in increasing citizen understanding of
accountability in American federalism

1.38

.916

IIIB4cCopUPress
Coproduction's role in increasing citizen understanding of how
to best exert pressure in American federalism

1.63

.518

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .67 for 3 items.

1

N

- "
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Table 58
Reliability Group Two of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable RDef*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

IIIB3bAdmDelOps
Administrator-provided opportunities for citizen engagement
in delivery of services or projects
IIIB3cAdmMonOps
Administrator-provided opportunities for citizen engagement
in monitoring or evaluation
IIIB3aAdmDecOps
Administrator-provided opportunities for citizen engagement
in planning and decision-making

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .55 for 3 items.

Table 59
Reliability Group Three of Administrator's Instrument for Variable RDef*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

IIIB2aAdmSocFI
I Q~i

R

181

753

8

1 50

7Sfi

8

150

1 195

S

1 "ill

1

Administrators connection to community social fabric as an
individual
IIIB2bAdmSocFAA
Administrator's coi
Administrator's connection to community social fabric as an
agency administrator
IIIB2cAdmSocFAU
Administrator's co
Administrator's connection to community social fabric as a
local administrative unit
IIIB2dAdmSocFPU
Administrators
Administrators connection to community social fabric as a local
public agency

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .62 for 4 items.
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Table 60
Reliability ofAgreements Instrumentfor Variable RDef*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

IIIA3AdmComm
Extent of evidence of agency serving the needs of the
community

.51

.981

80

IIIA4AdmSocial
Extent of evidence of agency connection to social fabric of the
community

.20

.582

80

IIIASAdmCivicEng
Extent of evidence of provision for civic engagement

.26

.807

80

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .87 for 3 items.
Descriptive Qualitative Findings for RDef
Partnership agreements are assessed to evaluate evidence contained within the
agreement that the agency (agencies) made provisions for dealing with social
dimensions. See Table 61 below. Qualitative evidence is collected with regard to
agency provisions for (a) dealing with ethical issues, (b) serving the needs of the
community, (c) connecting to the social fabric of the community, and (d) civic
engagement. Ethical issues are addressed by 61 of 89 agreements reviewed. Ethical
provisions all have a basis in law associated with the particular kind of agreement
under consideration. Evidence of the agency serving the needs of the community or
connecting to the social fabric of the community is evident for 19 and 18 of the
agreements respectively. It is notable that the only time mention is made in agreements
about agency connection to communities is when that is the primary purpose of the
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Table 61
Social Dimensions of Agency Partnership Agreements
Evidence of Agreement Dealing with Ethical Issues
Recitations of agency obligations, prohibitions against lobbying

4

Lobbying prohibition

1

Prohibition against lobbying, drug-free workplace, small business set asides

1

Mention of not creating rights or benefits to any party against the US

3

explicit reference

43

duties

9

Number of partnership agreements that have evidence of dealing with ethical issues:

61

Evidence of Agency Serving the Needs of the Community
Purpose or nature of agreement

19

Number of partnership agreements that have evidence of serving community needs:

19

Evidence of Agency Connection to the Social Fabric of the Community
Purposes of agreement

18

Number of partnership agreements that have evidence of agency connection to social

18

fabric of the community:

Evidence of Agency Provision for Civic Engagement
Lead agency conducting specified public involvement

1

Purposes of agreement

7

Number of partnership agreements that have evidence of agency provision for civic

8

engagement:

Note. * Total number of agreements = 89.

Chapter IV, Findings 303
agreement. Provision of civic engagement is incorporated in eight agreements, seven of
which it is the primary purpose, and one of which the lead agency conducted specified
public involvement.
Summary Variable RDef.
Variable RDef has a total of 19 constituent items, of which (a) 11 are numeric
ordinal measures of predictive affirmation, (b) four are alpha-numeric nominal
measures of predictive affirmation, and (c) four are numeric scale measures of
predictive affirmation. Of the 15 numeric items used for predictive affirmation, the
means are significantly different than zero—rejection of the null hypothesis—at p <
.05. Reliability testing shows that of the 11 numeric ordinal measures, at the best, two
sets of items achieve only marginal reliability at oc = .67 for 3 items and oc = .62 for 4
items. Of the four numeric scaled items, three reached acceptable reliability at oc = .87
for 3 items. In summary, of 15 numeric items used for predictive affirmation, all have
means significantly different than zero, the null hypothesis, and three items have
acceptable reliability while an additional seven items have marginal reliability. The
null hypothesis is rejected, therefore variable RDef is supported.
Summary Hypothesis III.
Hypothesis III is constructed of three variables, BConf, RDef, and BLP
considered at the beginning of the findings chapter. A total of 40 constituent items are
measured for Hy. Ill, of which (a) five are constituent items of BLP, the body of
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administrative law as it pertains to partnerships, which are used for predictive
affirmation; and (b) 29 are numeric items also used for predictive affirmation. Of the
five constituent elements of BLP, all were significant and highly reliable. Of the 29
numeric items, all the means are significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis,
at p < .05. Reliability testing shows that 11 of the 29 have acceptable reliability at oc >
.70, and an additional seven items have marginal reliability at oc > .60. Reliability for
one of the variables, RDef, is somewhat problematic with only three offifteenitems
reaching acceptable reliability with an additional seven reaching only marginal
reliability. While the variables are supported, a question remains about whether or not
the leap should be made to affirm hypothesis III given the reliability of RDef. The
research logic and great force exerted by BLP suggests that the hypothesis be accepted.
The null hypothesis for Hy. Ill is rejected, therefore Hy III is supported. Emergent
forms of citizen engagement are found to retain the benefits of constrained federalism
and remedy its reported (R C. Box et a!., 2001) and experienced defects which include
shrinkage of democracy.
Hypothesis IV: Factors that Influence Citizen Engagement
Hypothesis IV asserts that there is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit
democratic citizen engagement in governance. No predictive claims are made for the
forms the factors will take, however a predictive claim is made about whether or not
such a set exists. The six items offer preconceived factors for evaluation by agency
administrators. This hypothesis conducts descriptive and predictive exploration
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through two variables (a) variable Fos, for those factors that foster, and (b) variable
Inh, for those factors that inhibit citizen engagement. Exploration is conducted by
means of the administrator's instrument which collected both quantitative and
qualitative information.
Variable Fos: Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement
Data for variable Fos, Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement, are drawn from
the administrator's instrument, Table 62 below. The data primarily serve as descriptive
exploration withfivepreconceived ordinal items scaled by agency administrators and
two nominal items (in the category of other factors in the instrument) that are
subsequently scaled. Data are aimed at eliciting information from agency
administrators around the attitudes, actions, agency climate, and external conditions for
factors that are conducive to citizen engagement.

Table 62
Constituent Items for Variable Fos
Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Administrator's instrument
IVBlShrnkCop

agency budgets cause desire for partnerships

Numeric

Ordinal

Descriptive

IVB2CopCiv

Coproduction leads to civic engagement

Numeric

Ordinal

Exploration

IVB4AdmComln Administrator seeks active citizen involvement

Numeric

Ordinal

IVBSAdmShare Administrator is comfortable sharing power

Numeric

Ordinal
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Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

IVB6AdmGC6

motivated by seeking greater common good

IVB7FostPart

Other factors that foster partnerships

IVB9FosterGov Other factors that foster citizen engagement

Type

Measure*

Numeric

Ordinal

Alpha

Nominal

Alpha

Nominal

IVB7FPScale

Other factors that foster partnerships-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IVB9F6Scale

Other factors foster citizen engagement-scaled

Numeric

Scale

Purpose

Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directly from instrument; scaled values are numeric data
directly from instrument or derived from alpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

Descriptive Quantitative Results for Fos,
The four point scale mentioned above is used to measure factors that foster
citizen engagement. Item means varied from 1.25 to 3.00, Table 63 below; and means
for five of the items are all significant at levels of sig. (2-tailed) = .000 to .028, Table
64 below. One item has no deviation, so statistical analysis cannot be conducted.
According to administrators, two factors frequently or almost always fostered citizen
engagement: (a) administrator motivation to seek the greater common good in planning
and decision-making, and (b) partnerships in coproduction (volunteerism). Agency
administrators noted that shrinking budgets are sometimes or almost always a causative
factor in agency motivation to seek partnerships. Administrators find that two factors —
(a) the agency seeking active community involvement, and (b) the administrator's
comfort with sharing power ~ sometimes or almost always fosters citizen engagement.
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I distinguished between fostering citizen engagement in coproductipn as separate from
fostering citizen engagement in governance. While it is hard to analyze the difference
statistically, I do discuss differences in the section on qualitative results below.

Table 63
Comparison of Meansfor Variable Fos
Std.
^

Element

N ^ Mean Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

Administrator's instrument
Other factors that foster partnerships in coproduction-scaled

8

3.00

.000(a)

.000

.518

.183

.926

.327

Extent that administrator is motivated by seeking the greater
8
common good in planning and decisions

2.63**

Other factors that foster broader citizen engagement in
8

2.50**

governance-scaled
Coproduction leads to civic engagement in governance

8

2.38**

.518

.183

8

1.50f

1.069

.378

8

1.50**

.926

.327

8

1.25

1.282

.453

Shrinkage of agency budgets is a causative factor in agency
desire for coproduction partnerships
Extent that administrator seeks active community involvement
on behalf of agency
Extent that administrator is comfortable sharing power

Note. \ cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0. ** These items have acceptable
reliability at oc = .73 for 5 items, f This item has marginal reliability at oc = .61 for 6 items.
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Table 64
Significance ofMeansfor Variable Fos
Sig.
Element

t

df

14.346

7

.000**

7.638

7

12.979

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

2.625

2.19

3.06

.000**

2.500

1.721

3.27

7

.000**

2.375

1.94

2.81

3.969

7

.005f

1.500

.61

2.39

4.583

7

.003**

1.500

.73

2.27

2.758

7

.028**

1.250

.18

2.32

Administrator's instrument
Extent that administrator is motivated
by seeking the greater common good
in planning and decisions
Other factors foster broader citizen
engagement in governance-scaled
Coproduction leads to civic
engagement in governance
Shrinkage of agency budgets causes
agency desire for coproduction
partnerships
Extent administrator seeks active
community involvement for agency
Extent that administrator is
comfortable sharing power
Other factors foster partnerships in
*
coproduction
Note. * t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0. ** These items have acceptable
reliability a t « = .73 for 5 items, f This item has marginal reliability at oc = .61 for 6 items.

Descriptive Reliability for Fos. A
11 numeric items for variable Fos, Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement, are
used for descriptive exploration. Five of seven items have acceptable reliability at oc =
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.74. (See Table 65 below.) One item, shrinkage of agency budgets, has marginal
reliability at oc = .61 for 6 items. (See Table 66 below.) The reliability for one item,
other factors that foster citizen engagement, cannot be evaluated because it has no
variance (its score is 3 for all subjects). Forthd purposes of this assessment, all factors
can be considered valid for descriptive purposes. Maximal reliability shows that three
items best explain variable Fos at oc = .76 for 3 items, Table 67: (a) extent that
administrator seeks active community involvement on behalf of agency, (b) extent that
administrator is comfortable sharing power, and (c) other factors that foster broader
citizen engagement in governance-scaled—the scaled assessment of administrator's
qualitative responses.

Table 65
Reliability Group One of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable Fos*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

2.38

.518

8

1.50

.926

8

1.25

1.282

8

Extent that administrator is motivated by seeking the greater
common good in planning and decisions

2.63

.518

8

Other factors that foster broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

2.50

.926

8

Coproduction leads to civic engagement in governance
Extent that administrator seeks active community involvement
on behalf of agency
Extent that administrator is comfortable sharing power

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .74 for 5 items.
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Table 66
Reliability Group Two of Administrator's Instrumentfor Variable Fos*
Mean

Std. Deviation

Coproduction leads to civic engagement in governance

2.38

.518

Extent that administrator seeks active community involvement

1.50

.926

Shrinkage of agency budgets causes agency desire for

1.50

1.069

Extent that administrator is comfortable sharing power

1.25

1.282

2.63

.518

2.50

.926

N

Extent that administrator is motivated by seeking the greater
common good in planning and decisions

Other factors that foster broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .61 for 6 items.

Table 67
Maximal Reliability ofAdministrator's Instrument for Variable Fos*
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Extent that administrator seeks active community involvement

150

.926

8

Extent that administrator is comfortable sharing power

1.25

1.282

8

2.50

.926

8

Other factors that foster broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

Note. * Cronbach's Alpha = .76 for 3 items.
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Descriptive Qualitative Findings for Fos.
Administrators have well-thought out ideas about what fosters citizen
engagement, as summarized in Table 68 below. Administrators' responses reflected all
of the main elements shaping rational choice theory motivations including, interests,
information, beliefs, and opportunities, as well as the power of actions. It is interesting
that, while administrators recognize many factors as the same for engagement in
governance or engagement in coproduction, they also brought a wider world view to
bear on the question. One administrator talked about an agency's commitment to
citizens and the agency's history of success in citizen engagement. Another talked
about long-term relationships and the role of outside threats. Another talked about
philosophies of governance, while another talked about people's sense of place.
Several administrators talked about increased public understanding of the role of the
environment and a challenge in their ability to sort out who is responsible for what in
increasingly complex partnership relationships. Lastly, one administrator pointed out
the importance of passion as a prime motivator.
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Table 68
Administrators' Assessments of Variable Fos
IVB-7. What other factors do you believe foster partnerships in coproduction?
-

trust

- recognition of common goals, utilizing each other's specialized skills, breadth of skills in
aggregate of partners
- personalities, personal orientation, administrator initiative, absence of legal mandates,
decreasing $--increased desire
- openness, leadership setting the right tone, partners dedication to joint interests, personal
relationships
- open dialogue, trust, constructive disagreement, trying to look through someone else's eyes,
trying for common objectives,
- outreach, developing a broader understanding of agency's mission, authorities, capabilities,
track record with partners
- common goals and interests, desire to resolve issues, desire for synergism
- common interests, willingness to accept each others' cultural differences to meet common
interests
IVB-9. What other factors do you believe foster broader citizen engagement in governance regarding
your agency's mission area?
- agency's commitment to PNW citizens, awareness of agency's history of success in citizen
engagement
- community awareness, long-term relationships, outside threats
- distrust in federal government, people's desire for a facilitating government through
incentives rather than regulation
- opportunity for productive positive engagement, engagements tied to sense of place
- meeting citizens on their turf, actively listening hearing concerns, strive for including other's
ideas, talk in simple language
- increased public understanding of the role of the environment-canary in the mine with
regard to ecological function
- clear understanding of who is responsible for what, knowing (accepting) decision space,
passion for particular project
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Summary Variable Fos.
Variable Fos has a total of nine constituent items, all used for descriptive
exploration, of which (a) five items are numeric ordinal measures, (b) two items are
alpha-numeric measures, and (c) two items are numeric scaled measures. For the seven
numeric items, six have means that are significantly different than zero—the null
hypothesis—at p < .05. The seventh item has no variance, all scores are three so it is
different than zero. Reliability is acceptable for five of seven items at oc = .74 for 5
items* While no predictive affirmation is necessary, the variable is sufficiently robust
to ensure useful and reliable descriptive explorations.
Variable Inh: Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement.
Data for variable Inh, Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement, is drawn from the
administrator's instrument, Table 69 below. The data serves as descriptive exploration
related to the hypothesis. Qualitative information is collected from administrators with
regard to their assessment of factors that inhibit citizen engagement. One item is scaled
directly by administrators, and two are scaledfromtheir qualitative response.
Reliability is not possible to assess statistically because of negative correlations among
a small set of items with a small n = 8.
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Table 69
Constituent Items for Variable Inh
Variables and Constituent Items
Name

Label

Type

Measure*

Purpose

Numeric

Ordinal

Descriptive
Exploration

Administrator's instrument
IVB3Leglnhib

Legal system inhibits broader civic engagement

IVB8lnhibPart

Other factors inhibit partnerships

Alpha

Nominal

IVBlOlnhibGov

Other factors inhibit citizen engagement

Alpha

Nominal

IVB81PScale

Other factors inhibit partnerships-scaled

Numeric

Scale

IVBlOIGScale

Other factors inhibit citizen engagement-

Numeric

Scale

scaled
Note. * Ordinal values are numeric data directly from instrument; scaled values are numeric data directly
from instrument or derived from alpha data; and nominal values are alpha data.

Descriptive Quantitative Results for Inh.
The means of three items used to measure factors that inhibit citizen engagement
range from .63 to 1.75. See Table 70 below. Using the conventionsfromthe four point
scale discussed above, administrators found that the legal system only sometimes or
rarely inhibits broader civic engagement in governance, with a level of significance of
sig. (2-tailed) = .049, Table 71 below. Despite its low scoring, the null hypothesis is
rejected, which means that, although low, it is still significantly different than zero.
Agency administrators thought it a factor, but not a strong one. The other scaled items
are explored below in the section of qualitative results.
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Table 70
Comparison of Means for Variable Ink
Std.
Element

Std. Error

N

Mean Deviation

Mean

8

1.75

.707

.250

8

.75

.463

.164

8

.63

.744

.263

Administrator's instrument
Other factors that inhibit partnerships in coproduction-scaled
Other factors that inhibit broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

Legal system inhibits broader civic engagement in governance

Note. * No test of reliability is possible due to the small number of variables, their different
natures, and the small n = 8.
Table 71
Significance of Means for Variable Inh
Sig.
Element

t

df

4.583

7

.003

7.000

7

2.376

7

Mean

(2-tailed) Difference

95% Confidence Interval
Lower

Upper

.750

.36

1.14

.000

1.750

1.16

2.34

.049

.625

.00

1.25

Administrator's instrument
Other factors that inhibit broader
citizen engagement in governancescaled

Other factors that inhibit partnerships
in coproduction-scaled
Legal system inhibits broader civic
engagement in governance

Note. * No test of reliability is possible due to the small number ofvariables, and the small n- 8.
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Descriptive Qualitative Findings for Inh.
Administrators also have many ideas about factors that inhibit citizen
engagement. See Table 72 below. As with factors thatfosterengagement,
administrators' responses substantively reflected all of the main elements shaping
rational choice theory motivations including, interests, information, beliefs, and
opportunities, as well as the power of actions. It is interesting that, while administrators
recognize common factors for engagement in governance and coproduction, they also
brought a wider world view to bear on the question of governance. The factors that
inhibit engagement in coproduction are close to a mirror of the factors that fostered
engagement in coproduction. The broader view that administrators brought to factors
that inhibit engagement in governance incorporated more of a view of people being
faced with the challenges of modernity—distrust in government, guarded personal
lives, too much information, two-income families, extreme partisanship, prejudices,
pace of life, and competing interests, as well as the more managerial foggy goals.
Table 72
Administrators' Assessments of Variable Inh
IVB-8. What other factors do you believe inhibit partnerships in coproduction?
-

lack of trust, hidden agendas, polarity of interests

- agency administrative procedures, lack of staff, too focused on narrow interests
- legal issues or liabilities, court orders, loss of $ and capacity reducing discretionary space,
decreased capacity
- lack of leadership openness, conflict between target accomplishment vs. partnerships, high
transaction cost, red tape
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- self interest, functional barriers, history of negative interactions
- budget pressure leading to not being able to put people on the ground
- regulatory constructs, hidden agendas, tru$t time required, turf differences
- no common interests, administrative procedures, lack of clear benefit for both partners
IVB-10. What other factors do you believe inhibit broader citizen engagement in governance
regarding your agency's mission area?
- lack of trust, hidden agendas, lack of understanding, polarity
- lack of agency desire to collaborate, information overload, difficulty of word-of-mouth in an
urban environment
- distrust in federal government, people being guarded about personal lives
- agency bureaucracy, lack of knowing how to best engage, as a society everyone's time is
more limited and precious
- arrogance that agency is always right, ignoring people's comments and concerns
- too much info flowing at people, 2-income families, extreme partisanship that flows through
politics at all levels
- agency inflexibility, rigid agendas, prejudices/difficult history, citizen time availability,
competing interests, pace of life
- foggy goals, lack of trust, failure to meet expectations

Summary for Variable Inh.
Variable Inh has a total of 5 constituent items all of which are used for
descriptive exploration. One item is a numeric ordinal measure, two items are alphanumeric measures, and two items are numeric scaled measures. Of three numeric
items, means are significantly different than zero, the null hypothesis, at a significance
level of sig. (Mailed) < .05. No test of reliability is possible because the data violates
assumptions of the statistical model due to a small number of items, a small n = 8, and
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differing nature of data for the items. While no assessment of reliability is possible, the
significance of differences of the means with the null hypothesis is sufficient to reject
the null hypothesis, but with marginal reliability. This suggests that this variable will
provide useful information for descriptive exploration.
Summary Hypothesis. IV.
Hypothesis III is constructed of two variables, Fos and Inh. A total of 14
constituent items are measured for Hy. IV, of which all are used for descriptive
exploration. All of the means for the ten numeric items are significantly different from
zero, the null hypothesis, at p <; .05. Reliability is acceptable for variable Fos at oc =
.74 for 5 items, out of a total of seven items, allowing the null hypothesis to be
rejected. While reliability is uncertain for Inh, the significance of differences of the
means being zero suggest that null hypotheses for Inh also be rejected. Given that null
hypotheses are rejected for both variables, the null hypothesis for Hy. IV is also
rejected but with questionable reliability.
Summary of Hypotheses
The four hypotheses are tested using a total of nine variables with 116
constituent Items, Table 73. All constituent items were significantly different than
zero, therefore the null hypotheses is rejected at sig. (2-tailed) < .05. Sixty-nine of the
constituent items had acceptable reliability at Cronbach's Alpha > .70, with an
additional 10 items which had marginal reliability at .70 > oc > .60.
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Table 73
Summary Reliability and Significance ofAll Variable Constituent Items

Hy.
Hy. I

Variable

Number of Constituent
Items
Significant
and
Reliable"
Total

RPS - Reduced Public Service

12

12

CCop - Citizen Coproduction

38

21

CEv - Coproduction Evolves

9t

6

Hy. II

BLDem - Benefits of Liberal Democracy

9

9

Hy. Ill

BConF - Benefits of Constrained Federalism

14

8(3)*

RDef- Remedies Defects of Constrained Federalism

19

3(7)*

Hy. IV

BLP - Body of Law and Policy

5

5

Fos - Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement

7

5

Inn - Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement

3

Total Constituent Items

116

69 (10)t

Note. * Constituent items significant at sig. (Mailed) = p ^ .05 and reliable at Cronbach's Alpha > .70.
f Variable CEv has 17 constituent items, but 10 were combined into two for the total of nine reflected
here. { Additional constituent items that had marginal reliability at .70 >oc > .60.

Variable BLP

The findings chapter starts with a discussion of the findings around variable
BLP, the Body of Law and Policy, which is one of the variables used to test Hy. III.
The discussion of variable BLP is taken up first in the Findings chapter because it
pertains to and permeates all other variables and hypotheses. Variable BLP considers
five constituent items, the (a) the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of
1977, (b) OMB as the gatekeeper of executive branch direction, (c) agency
implementing policies and regulations, (d) the body of other laws that grant exact and
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particular partnership authorities, and (e) agencies organic legislation. Data for variable
BLP is directly collectedfromthe body of administrative law as it pertains to
partnerships. Because of the centrality of variable BLP to this research, Iforman
implicit hypothesis and null hypothesis to treat it in a parallel fashion to other variables
considered. I tested each constituent item against the hypothesis. The hypothesis and
null hypothesis are as follows:
Hy. 1. Partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement in
governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional
institutions of American federal governance.
Null Hy. 0. Agency administrators have considerableflexibilityto form
partnerships within the space of civil society at large.
The reliability of each item is high as the result of its strict basis in federal
administrative law. All federal actions considered in the above five items are found to
take place wholly within the space of Constitutional institutions of American federal
governance. The implicit null hypothesis for variable BLP is therefore rejected:
Agency administrators do not have considerableflexibilityto form partnerships within
the space of civil society at large. The implicit hypothesis and veracity of variable BLP
is thus supported: Partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement
in governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional institutions of
American federal governance.
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Hypothesis I
Hypothesis I was constructed of three variables: RPS, Reduced Public Service;
CCop, Citizen Coproduction; and CEv, Coproduction Evolves. A total of 118
constituent items are measured, 37 of which are used for predictive affirmation. Of the
37 items, ten are extracted and combined into two new items for a new total of 29
items used for predictive affirmation. The means of all 29 items are significantly
different than the null hypothesis at p < .05. Reliability testing shows that 21 of the 29
items meet the criteria for acceptable reliability at oc > ,70. The null hypothesis was
rejected for each of 21 items and thus for each of the three associated variables. The
null hypothesis for Hy. I was therefore rejected. Hy. I was thus supported: New forms
of citizen engagement are found to arise as a response to constrainedfederalism,
within the scope, parameters, and assumptions of this research project.
Hypothesis II
Hypothesis II is constructed of one variable, BLDem. A total of nine constituent
items are measured for Hy. II, all of which are used for predictive affirmation. The
means of all nine items are found to be significantly different than zero—rejection of
the null hypothesis—at p < .007. Reliability was acceptable at the level of« > .70.
The null hypothesis for Hy. II is therefore rejected. Hy. II is thus supported: Emergent
forms of citizen engagement include elements of liberal democratic citizen
engagement—citizens engaging in their own governance.
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Hypothesis III
Hypothesis III is constructed of three variables, BConf, RDef, and BLP
considered at the beginning of the findings chapter. A total of 40 constituent items are
measured for Hy. Ill, of which (a) five are constituent items of BLP, the body of
administrative law as it pertains to partnerships, which are used for predictive
affirmation; and (b) 29 are numeric items also used for predictive affirmation. Of the
five constituent elements of BLP, all are significant and highly reliable. Of the 29
numeric items, all the means are significantly different from zero, rejection of the null
hypothesis, at p < .05. Reliability testing shows that 11 of the 29 have acceptable
reliability at oc > .70, and an additional seven items have marginal reliability a t «
> .60. Reliability for one of the variables, RDef, is somewhat problematic with
only three of fifteen items reaching acceptable reliability with an additional seven
reaching only marginal reliability. While the variables are supported, a question
remains about hypothesis HI given the reliability of RDef. The research logic and
great force exerted by BLP suggests that the hypothesis be accepted. The null
hypothesis for Hy. Ill is therefore rejected. Hy III is thus supported: Emergent
forms of citizen engagement are found to retain the benefits of constrainedfederalism
and remedy its defects, which include shrinkage of democracy.
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Hypothesis IV
Hypothesis IV is constructed of two variables, Fos and Inh. A total of 14 constituent
items are measured for Hy. IV, of which all are used for descriptive; exploration but
predictive affirmation for whether or not such a set exists. All of the means for the ten
numeric items are significantly different from zero, rejection of the null hypothesis, at
p < .05. Reliability is acceptable for variable Fos at oc = .74 for 5 items, out of a total
of seven items, allowing the null hypothesis to be rejected. While reliability is
uncertain for Inh, the significance of differences of the means suggest that null
hypotheses for Inh also be rejected. Reliability for variable Fos suggests that the
factors that foster citizen engagement are adequately descriptive. Reliability of
constituent items for Inh suggest that the factors that inhibit citizen engagement are not
adequately descriptive. Given however that the null hypotheses are rejected for both
variables, the null hypothesis for Hy. IV is therefore also rejected but with, questionable
reliability. Hy. IV is supported: There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit
democratic citizen engagement in governance, but further work needs to be done to
describe factors that inhibit citizen engagement.

Summary of Significance and Reliability
I use a probability of p < .05 to test significance of numeric constituent items for
variables employing independent samples t-tests to reject the null hypotheses. I use
deductive logic to test significance of qualitative constituent items for variable BLP to
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accept or reject the null hypothesis. I use Cronbach's Alpha to analyze reliability of the
tests using a criteria of (a) oc > .70 for acceptable reliability, (b) .70 > oc > .60 for
marginal reliability, and (c) oc < .60 as not acceptable reliability. In the case of variable
BLP, I use deductive logic to affirm reliability of constituent items. Six variables are
subject to predictive confirmatory analysis because they are based on constructs firmly
grounded in the literature and existing theory. The two remaining variables, factors that
foster and inhibit citizen engagement, are subject to descriptive exploratory analysis
for the particulars and predictive confirmatory analysis for the hypothesis because the
hypothesis guiding them is that such a set exists, not that it has particular attributes.
This research utilized a total of 134 numeric items and five qualitative items for
predictive affirmation, of which (a) 124 numeric and five qualitative items are used for
testing hypotheses I through III and (b) ten items are used for descriptive exploration
with hypothesis IV. Of the 124 items used for hypotheses I through III, (a) ten items
are further combined, (b) 83 have acceptable reliability, (c) ten have marginal
reliability, and (d) 26 did not meet minimal criteria for reliability. Ten numeric items
are used for descriptive exploration of hypothesis IV. Of the ten,fivehave acceptable
reliability and five did not.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

All four hypotheses were supported, along with an implicit hypothesis for
Variable BLP, Body of Law and Policy. Taken together, they make a strong statement
about the efficacy of partnerships in fostering active citizen engagement in their own
governance. The story goes like this:

I. New forms of citizen engagement arise as a response to constrained
federalism.
II. Emergent forms include elements of liberal democratic citizen
engagement—citizens engaging in their own governance.
III. Emergent forms retain benefits of constrained federalism, and remedy its
defects, which include shrinkage of democracy.
IV. There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit democratic citizen
engagement in governance.
V. Partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement in
governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional
institutions of American federal governance.
Enlightened public administrators played a catalytic part. And agency administrators
do not have the flexibility to form partnerships for any purposes other than those
specified in law, and thus certainly not in the space of civil society.

Chapter V, Conclusions 326
Framing the Conclusions
I consider conclusions around threeframes.The first is democracy for which I
rely heavily on Lakoff s (1996) perspective of standing back to look at the whole thing
over time, space, and human experience. The second is the theory of complex
interdependence created by Keohane and Nye (2001) where they examine
international political institutions for strands of democratic genetic DNA. The third
frame is sustainability—humankind's quest to understand and do something about our
socio-economic problems and preserve our planetary home—now and for the future.
The inescapable integration inherent in the idea of sustainability is the very antithesis
and thus the perfect antidote for thefragmentationand reductionism of today's
governance which manifests as checks and balances of finely divided authority
scattered among multiple levels of government and the proliferation of special
interests borne of hyper-pluralism.
On a more practical side, I use a four-point scale for agency administrators and
evaluation of agreements that often measuresfrequencyof occurrence for an item
under question. The choices are as follows: (a) almost always, defined at > 90% of the
time; (b)frequentlyat 50% to 90% of the time; (c) sometimes at 10% to 50% of the
time; and (d) rarely at < 10% of the time. For purposes of testing rejection of an
item's null hypothesis, I use a statistical t-test and report the means as significantly
different from the null hypothesis (value = 0) at the level of sig. (2-tailed) p < .05. It
turns out that the null hypothesis was rejected for all means (except where the item
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could not be tested because the variance was zero). For purposes of discussing results
in the conclusions, if the means are: (a) between 2.5 and 3.0,1 report them as "almost
always;" (b) between 1.5 and 2,5, as "frequently;" (c) between 0.5 and 1.5, as
"sometimes;" and (d) between 0.0 and 0.5, as "rarely." I use Cronbach's Alpha to test
reliability, reporting reliability as acceptable for oc ^ .70, marginal for .70 > oc > .60,
and unacceptable for oc < .60. All information discussed in the conclusion has
acceptable reliability unless I report otherwise.
Administrative Law for Partnerships
I discuss Variable BLP, Body of Law and Policy, first in the Findings chapter
because while it is one of the dependent variables of Hypothesis III, it pertains to and
permeates all other variables and hypotheses. Variable BLP considers five constituent
items, the (a) the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977, (b) OMB
as the gatekeeper of executive branch direction, (c) agency implementing policies and
regulations, (d) the body of other laws that grant exact and particular partnership
authorities, and (e) agencies' organic legislation. Because of the centrality of variable
BLP to this research, I form an implicit hypothesis and null hypothesis to treat it in a
parallel fashion to other variables considered. I tested each constituent item against the
hypothesis. The hypothesis and null hypothesis are as follows:
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Hy. 0. Partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement in
governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional
institutions of American federal governance.
Null Hy, 0. Agency administrators have considerableflexibilityto form
partnerships within the space of civil society at large.
I rejected implicit null hypothesis for variable BLP: Agency administrators do not
have considerable flexibility to form partnerships within the space of civil society at
large. And I thus supported the veracity of variable BLP: Partnerships and their
appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement in governance takes place wholly within
the space of the Constitutional institutions ofAmerican federal governance.
Partnerships are one additional piece of Keohane and Nye's strands of
democratic governance as discussed below under hypothesis III. This strand has the
attribute of being located, not in the terrain of civil society as the discussion below
brings out, but it is instead located wholly within the institutions of Constitutional
governance. Lakoff notes that in American federalism "popular sovereignty had been
vitiated" (p. 227) by the founding lathers in the deep separation of powers between
three branches of government. It is difficult therefore for Americans to actually
exercise their sovereignty which explains, in part, the rise of Lowi's (1979) great
nemesis hyperpluralism. While Lowi has great consternation with Congressional
abdication of their responsibilities to agencies, partnerships provide a legitimate means
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for citizens to engage actively in governance at a personal level—much different than
their impersonal comments under agencies' notice and comment process in
promulgation of regulations. In this case, the government has a face, a name, and a
handshake.
The integration inherent in the idea of sustainability is, as noted above, the
very antithesis of the fragmentation and reductionism of today's governance. Policy
emergingfromthis milieu of governance is pre-ordained to be narrowly constructed
and rife with unintended consequences. Public administrators are charged with taking
actions to accomplish their respective agency missions. By definition, this requires
integrating, organizing, and deploying resources. One of the most difficult challenges
federal natural resource management agencies face in sustainably meeting their
agency's mission is to incorporate the social dimension. Coproduction in partnerships
and the emergent civic engagement provide a legitimate effective way to incorporate
the social dimension in agency activities. The findings of my research suggest that
there is an accompanying emergent connection of administrators to the society they
serve—thus remedying one of constrained federalism's defects.
Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement
With regard to reduced public service, the interviewed administrators in federal
natural resource agencies in the Pacific Northwest frequently experience reduced
budgets and agency capacity to meet its mission. Several noted a small surge of
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funding in the early 1990s associated with increasing public environmental concerns.
Several reported that "budgets have been cut by more than half plus the effect of
inflation on top of the cuts." One administrator reports that the field unit is "is still
meeting its core mission, although a lot has fallen by the wayside and it is harder to
meet basic responsibilities under law." Administrators report that reduced capacity and
associated public demand frequently influence their decisions to enter into
partnerships. One reports that as an agency "we cannot independently get our work
done, but partnerships have let us accomplish a lot of our work." Another says, "The
more we work with partners, the more wefindwe can meet their needs as well as our
own agency needs."
I evaluate organizational structure and function of how agencies and partners
organize around their partnerships through variable CCop, Citizen Coproduct. I also
asked administrators to evaluate organizational patterns and trends. Agency
administrators report that the following items almost always are on an increasing
trend: (a) the number of partnerships, (b) kinds of partnerships, (c) middle
management involvement, (d) attainment of strategic goals, (e) agencies turning to
partnerships in the face of decreasing funding, and (f) organizational ideology
favoring partnerships. They report frequent increases for (a) operational and technical
staff involvement in partnerships, (b) tactical output attainment, and sometimes
experience increases (c) in support staff involvement—primarily contracting grants
and agreements specialists.
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Administrators said when top management gets involved, it is more frequently
for purposes of setting a positive tone for partnerships, supporting initial investments
in partnerships for long-term payoffs, and to signify a moving awayfromhierarchical
relationships with partners. They reported that middle managers were more involved
because of the benefits of partnerships, but were hard-pressed because of agency
downsizing (otherwise known in OMB-speak as competitive sourcing). Regulatory
agency administrators noted, with regard to middle manager involvement, that "a
complete paradigm shift has occurred to accomplishing conservation through
partnerships, moving awayfroman emphasis on endangered species act compliance to
facilitation of long-term conservation outcomes.
All administrators reported changes in organizational ideology increasingly
favoring partnerships. One reported, "the operating core [middle management] has
opened itself to collaboration with others—it's the new norm." Another insightful
administrator recognized an emerging challenge of "figuring out where the agency's
responsibility stops and the partner's starts;—figuring out the boundaries of
partnerships." Several reported that both they and their partners are becoming "more
strategic, leveraging limited resources, looking hard for partner strategic alignment,
and helping partners retain organizational capacity." Several also noted "partners now
demand time with us, insist on having a voice, are more willing to share expertise, and
the agency has changed too."
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With regard to the external situation, there was general acknowledgement that
"the world is far more complex, and we all are attempting larger scale restoration;"
while another noted "more of an awareness that we're all in it together."
Administrators are becoming more comfortable sharing power, "We used to decide as
an agency, now we engage our partners in forming strategic intent." With regard to
tactical goals, several characterized the situation as (a) "we've sharpened to a results
focus in a basin-wide setting," (b) "our goals go beyond administrative boundaries,"
(c) we're looking at collective resources andfiguringout how to bring them together,
and (d) we are increasingly concerned with achieving sustainability and working with
partners to develop tactics."
Administrators report "partnerships increasingly help us achieve agency
strategic goals;" and "our strategic goals have stayed the same, but our ability to meet
them has increased." The interconnectedness with partners was a frequent theme, "as
our program goes up, so do the number of partnerships—partnerships are our delivery
mechanism." Several noted the "network" nature of relationships, "informal
partnerships have increased dramatically—interconnections," "growth in numbers of
partnerships has almost been exponential, particularly through growth in networks."
The variable CEv, Coproduction Evolves, measures whether coproduction
(simply getting work done) is evolving to citizens being engaged in their own
governance. In the administrator's instrument, I ask them directly:
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Do you ever observe an evolution in how partners workfrom(a)firstbeing initially
focused on just getting the job done to (be) later on, taking a broader focus on the
issues surround the partnership activities, to (c) eventually entering into discussions
about wherein lies the greater public interest?
Administrators report that this evolution frequently occurs. I asked administrators to
evaluate changes in partner's motivations from ten years ago to today as shown in
Figure 23, below. In summary, I find a compelling argument for Hy. I based on
testing the hypothesis and reporting of agency administrators that new forms of citizen
engagement are indeed arising as a response to constrained federalism.

Figure 23
Administrators' Assessments ofShifts in Partners' Interests Over Ten Years*
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Note. * Mean for ten years ago = 26.1%, Std. Dev. = 1.26; Mean for today = 33.9%.
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Hypothesis II: Benefits of Liberal Democracy
Hypothesis II is that emergent forms include elements of liberal democratic
citizen engagement—citizens engaging in their own governance. One variable,
Benefits of Liberal Democracy, is used to measure its veracity. The null hypothesis
was rejected for all of nine constituent items. The null hypothesis for Hy. II is
therefore rejected and Hy. II thus supported: Emergentforms of citizen engagement
include elements of liberal democratic citizen engagement—citizens engaging in their
own governance.
Variable BLDem, Benefits of Liberal Democracy, is so named because there is
both theoretically and popularly, a different view about what exactly constitutes
democracy at its best. Posner (2003) captures it well in his description of type-one and
type-two democracy. Type-one democracy is premised on each citizen's moral right to
participate in governance of society and moral duties to participate intelligently in
governance, discuss issues in an open minded fashion with other citizens, and base
political opinions and actions on one's honest opinion formed of due deliberation on
what is best for society. Type-two democracy is realistic, cynical, and premised on the
notion that politics is a competitive power struggle among the political elite for the
electoral support of constituents. Posner's (2003) articulation of types one and two
democracy mirror the debates between the Federalists and Anti-federalists during the
founding of our country.
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The genius of our particular form of government is that it did not solve but
rather institutionalized the dilemma. We are foreordained to keep two diametrically
opposed points of view in our consciousness while we swing like a pendulum from
one side to the other. My own view is that when it came to choosing, we (our founding
fathers) chose Hamilton's (1961) view; but we, the people who do the living, have
been trying to inject Jefferson's (Ketcham, 1986) view ever since to varying degrees
of success. The point of this present discussion is that the existence of this emergent
citizen engagement, of the type demonstrated by my research, arisesfromthe desires
of citizens and public administrators to inject Jeffersonian activism into the
particularly Hamiltonian manifestation of constrained federalism—and it does so
wholly within the space of American Constitutional institutions of government. It is
not merely another liberal movement du jour harkening back to the progressive
movement.
Whether or not the emerging citizen engagement observed in this research is a
long-term structural change in federal governance or a continuing resonance of the
progressive movement datingfromthe late 1800s through the early 1900s will remain
to be seen. It however does share some things in common with the progressive
movement (R. C. Box et at, 2001; Link, 1959). The progressive movement of public
administration originated in the middle class with the twin purposes of creating
professional administration and community engagement. It is based on two ideas: (a)
efficient and effective government and (b) corporate America, harnessed through
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community-based democratic processes. The first idea of which fits with the emerging
governance described here. Thefeetthat many of the progressive movement values
existed in dynamic tension raises interesting questions about the present emerging
governance, including: (a) public administration vs. public service, (b) separation of
politics from administration, (c) altruism and capitalism, (d) science and applied
knowledge as the key to social problems, and (e) benefits of capitalism and
acknowledgement of exploitation of labor.
The emerging governance I describe here differs from the Progressive
Movement in that NPG is more carefully focused, constructed, and constrained. It also
has a yet-to-be-determined potential for continued growth. It is also different in that in
order for it to work, it takes a partnership of at least two— (a) citizens motivated by
their interests and (b) a federal public administrator being interested and willing to
lend the aegis of the federal government to particular partnership activities, and to
harness them to public purposes. Most importantly, it takes a federal official who is
willing to be held accountable to high standards for her actions.
Hypothesis III: Retain Benefits and Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism
Hypothesis III is constructed of three variables (a) BConf, the Benefits of
Constrained Federalism, (b) RDef, the Defects pf Constrained Federalism, and (c)
BLP, the body of administrative law as it pertains to partnerships. Variable BConF
aims at determining to what extent emergent forms retain the benefits of constrained
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federalism. The administrator's consideration of litigation and sense of duty for citizen
engagement is measured. Partnership agreements are evaluated to identify the extent
that the agreements: (a) make reference to administrative law and alignment with
agency mission; (b) provide evidence of clear accountability; (c) create procedural
burden (red tape); (d) create efficiency of autonomy for the partner's actions; and (e)
make provision for due process and professionalism in partnership activities.
Under variable BConf, Administrators reported that they sometimes (a) are
attuned to litigation issues as they contemplate partnerships, and (b) have a sense of
duty for citizen engagement in projects or service delivery and monitoring thereof. I
found that agreements almost always (a) made reference to alignment of partnership
activities with the agency mission, (b) made provision for due process, (c) had clear
accountability for results, and (d) gave partners autonomy to change coproduction to
match changed conditions. Agreementsfrequently(a) made reference to executive and
legislative authorities20, and (b) made provisions for professionalism embodied in
coproduction activities.
Variable RDef assesses the administrator's connection to the social fabric of the
community and his or her performance in providing opportunities for citizen

The determining factor for whether or not there was a recitation of legislative
authorities depended on requirements of the particular kind of agreement used—not
administrator discretion.
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engagement in project planning, decision-making, implementation, and monitoring.
Administrators also assess citizens' increased understanding of governance.
Agreements are examined for evidence of (a) dealing with ethical issues, (b) agency
serving the needs of the community, (c) agency connection to the social fabric of the
community, and (d) provision for civic engagement.
Administrators reported, with marginal reliability, that they (a) frequently
experience connection to the social fabric of the community as a public agency
administrator, (b) believe that partnershipsfrequentlyincrease partner's understanding
of how to best exert pressure in American federalism, (c) report their connections to
community social fabric border between sometimes andfrequently(as individuals, as
a local administrative unit, and as a local public agency), and they (d) believe
coproduction sometimes increases partner's understanding of checks and balances in
American federalism. Agreements sometimes exhibited evidence of (a) serving the
needs of the community, (b) connection to social fabric of the community, and (c)
provisions for civic engagement under the agreement21. Ethical issues were addressed
by 61 of 89 agreements reviewed, and then are only mentioned when the particular
form of agreement requires it. All ethical issues incorporated in agreements have an
exact and particular basis in law. Evidence of the agency serving the needs of the
community or connecting to the social fabric of the community is evident for 19 and
21

This is not an indicator of variable treatment of civic engagement in agreements, it
is only in agreements when civic engagement is part of the agreement's explicit purpose.
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18 of the agreements respectively. It is notable that the only time mention is made in
agreements about agency connection to communities is when that is the primary
purpose of the agreement. Provision of civic engagement is incorporated in eight
agreements, seven of which it is the primary purpose, and one of which the lead
agency conducted specified public involvement.
Variable BLP is the window into a highly constrained operating environment
for federal agency partnerships. The constituent items considered for this variable
show that external constraint comesfromCongress through the (a) Federal Grants and
Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977, (b) organic agency legislation and a host of
related agency-specific laws granting and delimiting authority, and (c) a modest body
of other laws that grant exact and particular partnership authorities to particular
agencies. External constraint also comesfromthe Executive Office of the President
through OMB's extensive regulatory standards and control of agencies. In addition,
agencies provide significant constraint through their own regulations, policies, internal
controls for oversight, certification systems, and training requirements. Taken all
together, the constituent items of this variable lead to rejection of the variable's null
hypothesis and thus affirm the Hypothesis III. Agency administrators do not have
considerable flexibility to form partnerships within the space of civil society at large.
Therefore, partnerships and their appurtenant evolution to citizen engagement in
governance takes place wholly within the space of the Constitutional institutions of
American federal governance.
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This present analysis affirms that partnerships and the associated emergence of
citizen engagement are highly constrained with the benefits of the broader constrained
federalism and more modestly endowed with remedies of its defects. One principle
shared in common by constrained federalism, conservative democracy, and the
progressive movement at the turn of the previous century is the separation of politics
and administration—elected or appointed public officials are responsible for setting
policy; administrators are responsible for following it.

Hypothesis IV: Factors that Influence Citizen Engagement
Hypothesis IV is constructed of two variables, Fos and Inh. Hypothesis IV
asserts that there is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit democratic citizen
engagement in governance. No predictive claims are made for the forms the factors
will take, however a predictive claim is made about whether or not such a set exists.
Given that the null hypotheses are rejected for both variables, the null hypothesis for
Hy. IV is therefore also rejected but with questionable reliability. Hy IV is supported:
There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit democratic citizen engagement
in governance, but further work needs to be done to describe factors that inhibit citizen
engagement.
Agency administrators reflected that shrinking budgets are almost always a
strong motivator in agency desire to seek partnerships. Administrators find that
coproduction frequently leads to civic engagement in governance. They report that
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they seek active community involvement on behalf of the agency somewhere between
rarely and sometimes. Administrators have well thought out ideas about what fosters
citizen engagement. Administrator responses reflected all of the main elements
shaping rational choice theory—motivations including, interests, information, beliefs,
and opportunities; as well as the power of actions. It is interesting that, while
administrators recognize many of the same factors for engagement in governance as
they did for engagement in coproduction, they also brought a wider world view to bear
on the question of governance. One administrator talked about an agency's
commitment to citizens and the agency's history of success in citizen engagement.
Another talked about long-term relationships and the role of outside threats. Another
talked about philosophies of governance, while another talked about people's sense of
place. Several public administrators reported increased public understanding of the
role of the environment and a challenge in the ability to sort out who is responsible for
what in increasingly complex partnership relationships. Lastly, one administrator
pointed out the importance of passion as a prime motivator.
The constituent items for variable Inh had problematic reliability due to the
erratic nature of the data, including small n = 8, and small number of items.
Administrators had many ideas about what inhibits citizen engagement, and similar to
factors that foster such engagement, they took a wide view when considering issues of
governance. Their broader view is that people are faced with the challenges of
modernity—distrust in government, guarded personal lives, too much information,
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two-income families, extreme partisanship, prejudices, pace of life, and competing
interests, as well as the more managerial foggy goals. Administrators experienced that
partnerships in coproduction are inhibited by a variety of things including lack of trust,
hidden agendas, polarity of interests, agency red tape, litigation, loss of agency
capacity, bad history of agency interactions, and lack of leadership openness. Citizen
engagement in governance experiences many of the same factors as coproduction, but
to them add lack of agency desire to cooperate, distrust in government, bureaucracy,
preciously limited free personal time on the part of citizens, and agency arrogance. To
this list, administrators added that people experience too much information flowing at
them, being tired and pressed for time as a two-income family struggles, and the
extreme partisanship that flows through politics at all levels. So while the conclusions
support the hypothesis that there is a set of factors that foster and inhibit citizen
engagement, more work needs to be done, particularly on factors that inhibit it
Conclusions about the Research Problem
Derthick (1990) outlines challenges bequeathed to administrators by the
American form of government with its various checks and balances—a context well
characterized here by discussions around variable BLP, Body of Law and Policy. She
summarizes by observing that it is not the President or cabinet officials who are held
accountable by courts or the Congress—it is the agencies and their administrators:
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The default of the president, who is the agencies' putative leader, combines
with the assertiveness of Congress and the courts to make administrative
agencies thefellguys of American government. As every institution's
subordinate, they are obliged to answer to each and are permitted to talk back
to none.
Public administrators are faced with internal barriers and constraints imposed by the
instrumental nature of policies arisingfromthe current process of governance. These
difficulties arisefrom(a) unresolved ideological contradictions embedded in new
policy as a result of attempts to respond to plural interests, and (b) overly detailed selfdefeating policy prescriptions formulated by new policy. In short, integrative public
administration is often legislatively precluded by provisions of highly instrumental
policy arisingfromcurrent governance.
Lakoff (1996) distinguishes the following three dimensions of democracy:
1. The normative dimension considers the justification of autonomy and the
role of the civic culture in promoting acceptance of democratic norms.
2. The institutional dimension is twofold, containing the forms of autonomy
that find expression in civil society, understood as the private sphere of
life, and those that apply to public government, or the sphere of the state.
Interest groups, political parties, and communications media link the two
spheres.
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3. The procedural dimension takes shape in electoral and judicial systems,
[italics in original] (p. x)
My research here poses an alternative conception to Derthick's view of the
public administrator's role in democracy by rising to a higher level of abstraction to
consider the view Lakoff offers. The affirmation of hypothesis III, which supports
Derthick's point, also directly addresses Lakoff s two aspects of the institutional
dimension of democracy. Lakoff identifies interest groups, political parties, and
communications media as links between the normative and institutional sphere. My
research places public administrators in exactly that same role as being a link—a
shock absorber if you will—between the normative and institutional dimensions of
democracy. Second, through my research, I have closely examined the boundary
between the normative and institutional dimensions of democracy, Figure 24, and
conclude that partnership agreements serve as an extension of an agency's and agency
administrator's authority under law. As a result, the actions of individuals or groups
that are normally conceived of as being plural interests operating in the terrain of civil
society are transformed. When citizens enter into a partnership agreement, they are
acting in the terrain of Constitutional governance. Discussions between individuals or
groups with members of Congress, or the Administration, regarding subjects
pertaining to the partnership are similarly transformed to the terrain of Constitutional
governance as shown in the area identified as emerging citizen engagement in Figure
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24. The agency administrator is often part of these discussions!—inserting,
interestingly, the potential for an element of upward political accountability.
Figure 24
Structure and Function ofNew Public Governance
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It is difficult to blame reduction of goods, services, or lack of responsiveness in
governance on hapless administrators when—in contradiction to Derthick's (1990)
notion, they actually become part of a three-way discussion. Partners, too, may know
better as the result of their first-hand experiences working with the agency. This
explains the often observed phenomenon that when agency administrators are part of
the discussion of problems, they no longer become politician's fall guys, and instead,
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the conversation moves to the problem itself—conflicts embedded in law and
exploring possibilities for the immediate problem itself rather than casting blame. This
phenomenon reframes political opportunism to interest-based problem solving. I also
notice,frompersonal experience, that in many cases politicians are as eager to work
with agency administrators, and claim credit for it, as they previously were to blame
the same official.
Lakoff notes that "federalism in its various forms gives citizens a greater
opportunity to scrutinize the workings of government in terms that are likely to be
most familiar, and even to become engaged themselves in local elections and local
issues" (p. 213). The phenomenon under discussion adds yet one more strand of
democratic DNA (in line with Keohane and Nye's notions of the enlightenment of
self-interest that accompanies complex interdependence) to American federalism. I
observe that partners' civic engagement around the subject matter of their partnership
leads to civic engagement in other issues and broader engagement in the political
process, thus better redeeming their responsibilities as citizens in a democracy. I will
now more closely examine how governance under this emerging phenomenon might
look in contrast to New Public Management's contract-based governance, which is
summarized in Figure 25, below.
Governance by partnership puts partnerships in the same intermediary role that
contractors serve under contract-based government. There is a difference, however.
Rather than shrinking democracy by decoupling goods and servicesfromtraditional
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Figure 25
Contract-Based Governance and Governance by Partnerships
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governance, democracy is expanded by the very people who were disenfranchised by
constrained federalism's/New Public Management's paucity of goods, services, and
governance. Looking a little closer, the relationship between government agent and
contractor under contract-based governance can be seenfromFigure 25 to be
mediated by contract law and federal acquisition regulations. Under governance by
partnerships, that same relationship (only this time between a government agent and a
partner) can be seen to be mediated by contract law and federal acquisition
regulations. But it is also mediated by authorizationfromparticular legislation that
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includes provisions for partnerships. In addition, it transforms a business relationship
between a customer and provider to a governance relationship between citizens and
their agents. The relationship between elected officials and government agents are
mediated in both cases by constrained federalism, otherwise known as KettPs theory
of New Public Management. Governance by partnerships is mediated additionally by
my yet to be posited Principal -Agent Theory for Public Administrators, and my
Theory of New Public Governance.
Synthesizing the foregoing, I speculate that two fundamental social processes
are taking place that explain emerging citizen engagement in their own governance.
The first process is that, in a very fundamental way, we Americans merely oscillate
between two different conceptions of government. I characterize one conception as
constrained federalism as served by the theoretical constructs of New Public
Management. And I characterize the other as liberal federalism served by the
theoretical constructs of Dahl's (1967) pluralism and Posner's (2003) Type I
Democracy where citizens come together to deliberate about and act on the greater
common good.
In a spirit reminiscent of the various progressive movements, citizens roll up
their sleeves and work to help make government better serve people's needs through
political action, volunteerism, and coproduction—a phenomena that I conceptualize as
New Public Governance, the theoretical basis of which I lay out in the various
constructs building up to, testing, affirming, and explaining my propositions. I suggest
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that we are at the beginning of a period of changefroma conservative narrow view of
government to a more hands-on liberal view of government.
The second social process that I hypothesize to be taking place is not an
oscillation, but a directional change of movingfromfierce American individualism to
a more community-centered sense of working for the greater common good, a
proposition championed by Bellah on many occasions, including in Habits of the
Heart (1985). Bang, Box, Hansen, and Neufeld (2000) capture the theoretical
dimensions of this directional change in their discussion of American individualism
versus Danish cornmunitarianism. The authors suggest, as noted earlier in this paper,
that Americans begin with a deeply rooted first language of individualism based on the
normative classic liberal view, but readily employ a second language of community
when confronted with ordinary problems where neighbors might be able to help. This
often leads to an interesting American dichotomy of a. professed ideology of
individualism contrasted to an enacted ideology of community. This social
phenomenon parallels the political phenomenon that D. Morgan, Shinn, and Green
(2008b) point out about the inherent parallel dilemma between the instrumental and
constitutive roles that public administrators necessarily play in our democratic system
of governance. They point out the difference between the currently espoused theory of
public administration under constrained federalism, and the theory in action of the
mixed instrumental and constitutive roles public administrators are actually compelled
to play.
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Theory of Agency for Public Administrators.
Constitutional federal governance is built upon a foundation of four pillars.
The first three are the main branches of government with their associated separation of
powers and checks and balances created in our federal system—the legislature, the
executive branch, and the courts. The fourth is fealty to rights granted citizens by the
Tenth amendment of the Constitution. It is then a small leap to transform these pillars
to principles in formulation of a theory of agency for public administration. I
formulate a principle-based set of motivations for public administrators thereby
forming a morefollyarticulated basis of action for administrators. The theory is
expressed as four dicta that federal public administrators are compelled by:

1. Legislative Directive: Charge to action and constraint created by the
mission of particular agencies as defined in organic or authorizing
legislation for the agency and further constrained by other appurtenant
laws, as well as yearly appropriations containing both operating funds and
direction;
2. Executive Directive: Charge to action and constraint by the President and
his or her administration, including the body of policy and federal
regulation;
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3. Judicial Directive: Charge to action and constraint by the federal courts in
their constitutional charge of interpreting Congressional mandates and the
constitutionality of laws and government actions;
4. Fealty to Citizens: (a) Duty to serve citizens as directed through agency
mission as modulated by laws, policy, regulation, and court decisions, (b)
to engage citizens in participation in decision making as outlined in various
laws, regulation, and policy, and (c) more broadly, to serve as an interface
between citizens and their government within the mission area of their
agency.
Theory of New Public Governance.
I believe that a new form of public administration is emergingfromcitizen and
public administrator responses to reductions in public services as a result of NPM
reforms—a form I suggest is well described by the term new public governance
(NPG). While federal agencies have been downsized, outsourced, and the scope of
their services reduced, I hypothesize that public administrators have increased
coproduction activities—citizen/agency collaborations!—to take the sting out of NPM,
particularly in the areas where citizens' interests related to reduced or eliminated
services or programs are most adversely effected. I outline New Public Governance as
an ideal type that adds New Public Management's contract-based governance to the
governance by partnership explored in my research study. Taken together, these two
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forms of governance add up to my conception of New Public Governance. My intent
is for it to keep the best of New Public Management and add on to it citizen
engagement around partnerships and broader citizen engagement in governance. The
broader engagement in governance is comprised of public discourse taking place in
the traditional space of civil society and of public discourse taking place within the
Constitutionally-sanctioned space where public administrators, citizens and elected
representatives join in discourse around topics of common interest.
I speculate that citizens are increasingly recognizing and acting on a growing
sense of community brought to the surface by the long-standing American reverence
for a sense of place. I also believe that public administrators have much potential to
catalyze change and foster a community spirit of working for the greater good through
facilitating community-based interest-based dialogues around places that people care
about. Taken together, my speculationsfromthe foregoing discussions are as follows:

1. The American view of ideal governance oscillates between two extremes
of a narrow conception of democracy characterized by the theoretical
constructs of New Public Management, and a liberal conception of
democracy informed by the theoretical constructs of pluralism and liberal
citizen engagement in democracy.
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2. Americans are engaged in an inexorable and unidirectional change in
fundamental valuesfromfierceAmerican individualism to a more
community-centered sense of working for the greater common good.
3. Americans are currently in the middle of a transitionfrompublic
administration emanatingfroma narrow view of government to public
administration conceived more in the progressive era of hands-on citizen
participation in the day-to-day business of government.
4. Americans increasingly find themselves engaged in problems situated in
the places where they live. In this situation, citizens are increasingly
recognizing and acting on a growing sense of community brought to the
surface by the long-standing American reverence for a sense of place and
rolling up their sleeves to help neighbors.
5. If these changes are beginning to take place, public administrators have
much opportunity to catalyze the changes by giving citizens opportunities
to engage in their own governance and stimulating their growing sense of
community by providing community- and interest-based opportunities to
work with neighbors (metaphorical and real) on problems situated in places
that people care about.

If my analysis is correct, we may be at the beginning of a Renaissance in
democratic governance marked by (a) citizens who take a more liberal view of
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democracy and the role of the federal government, (b) citizens who increasingly are
open to discussions of placing the greater community good before narrow self-interest,
(c) citizens who take a messier more hands-on approach to engagement with public
agencies, (d) citizens who have increasing concern with issues of community tied to
the places where they live, and lastly marked by (e) bureaucrats who are increasingly
willing to take on the constitutive responsibilities of public administrators. And even if
I'm wrong, these are still good goals toward which to aim. In the face of the old saw
that "the more things change, the more they stay the same," I believe that this research
has demonstrated that this homily is both true and false. Americans do oscillate back
and forth between liberal and conservative conceptions of government, but I also
believe we are tempering our fierce individualism and developing a more refined
sense of community.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The concept of New Public Governance demonstrates that when or if public
administrators engage in constitutive governance under the strictures of NPM, the
effect can be transformative to governance in a way that fosters democracy. Public
administrators under New Public Governance are thus given another choice besides
the OMB ultimatum to downsize or perish under NPM. The choice, located wholly
within the spirit, philosophy, and license of NPM, creates a pathway through citizen
coproduction that fosters liberal democratic process and balances and enriches NPM's
narrow conception of government with citizen engagement borne of plural self-interest
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and altruism. There is an added dimension to New Public Governance that citizens
will only voluntarily engage in coproduction when and to the extent that it aligns with
their self- or altruistic interests. In this sense, New Public Governance is self-limiting.
In addition, because of the voluntary nature of coproduction, when citizens are
adversely affected by downsizing or reducing governance to the provision of goods
and services, they can turn to coproduction as well as political activity or the courts to
serve theirfrustratedinterests. Under NPG, because of the loosening of relations
between citizens, agencies, and politicians, agencies can take up the cause of citizens
to the extent it fits their mission area.
I wonder if, in the largefieldof practice of public administration, land
management agencies have an early view and experience of a changing American tide
in governance and public administration. This view is of citizens recognizing and
acting on a growing sense of community brought to the surface by the long-standing
American reverence for a sense of place. In response to the lastframingquestion:
"What can public administrators do to catalyze change and foster the greater good," I
further hypothesize that this growing sense of community and place is stimulated
when public land management administrators facilitate community-based interestbased dialogues around places and things that people care about.

Chapter V, Conclusions 356
Implications for Theory
Democracy continues to evolve. Constrained federalism is well-defined by the
existing theory of New Public Management, however, there is currently no theory that
describes the role constrained federalism plays in spawning the intended outcome of
emergent citizen engagement—a liberal political outcome arisingfroma conservative
political thrust to constrain government and narrow (according to the constrained view
of federalism) its infringement on citizens made famous by President Reagan (1981)
in his first inaugural address: "In this present crisis, government is not the solution to
our problem; government is the problem" (para. 9). I have assembled and put together
the parts of a new theory that forms both a theoretical and empirical basis for
breathing new life in what some report as moribund American governance. The next
task at handfroma theoretical standpoint is to search for additional public
administrator constitutive actions that might fit within the concept of New Public
Governance.
Further Research
This study has been about constitutive actions taken by federal public
administrators to make governance better. I have explored partnerships in detail as one
such action. While further research attention certainly needs to be directed toward
exploring the bounds, practice, and standards for such constitutive public
administration, more fundamental work needs to be done. We are beginning the third
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century of our grand experiment in capitalism and democracy. We know something
about governance. We know something about public weal. We know something about
sustainability. We know something about the limits of power. It is time, in my
estimation, for scholars to focus on the basic questions of governance. What
constitutes good governance? By what standards do we measure it? And what about
citizens, what is their role, and what is government's role in creating conditions
favorable for good citizenship. Is it eradication of poverty? Is it universal education?
Or is it rebuilding the fabric of family and community that has become so strained?
These are our pressing questions as a society. Scholars can make great contributions to
these questions.
To close this study andframethe need for additional research on constitutive
actions of public administrators and partnerships in the terrain of Constitutional
governance, I compare New Public Governance to NPM by using the five strategic
goals of sustainable governance developed in the discussion on sustainability in the
Literature Review Chapter. For the sake of brevity, I subjectively assign the values
comparing the two as follows, Table 74 below. A match of"-" is assessed where the
value is antithetical to the strategic goal (score = -2), "~" where the value is neutral
with respect to the goal (score = 0),"(+)" where the value can include the strategic
goal (score =1), and "+" where the value inherently incorporates the goal (score = 2).
I do this to demonstrate how standards of governance can invigorate study of its
practice.

Chapter V, Conclusions 358
The response of NPM to the strategic goals of sustainable governance, averaging its
scores, is 0.36 (calculated by dividing total score of 9 by 25, the total number of
assessments). The average response of New Public Governance to the strategic goals
of sustainable governance is 0.84 (calculated by dividing the total score of 38 by 45,
the total number of assessments). Although it is not possible to test significance or
reliability in such a subjective rating, the scores show that in comparison to average
responsiveness, New Public Governance is approximately two times more responsive
than NPM. I take this gross measure to merely indicate a higher potential for New
Public Governance to respond to the strategic goals of sustainable governance. It is
worth noting that the average score of NPM is closer to zero and the average score of
New Public Governance is closer to one. I am surprised however, that New Public
Governance does not score better. Quick reference to the chart shows why—a
predominance of assessments (24 out of 38, which is equal to 63%) show that the
value of the goal can be, but is not necessarily, included in the value of NPG. From
this perspective, NPM is notferbehind (13 out of a total of 25 which is equal to 52%
). In the end, this last comparison emphasizes the point that both NPM and New Public
Governance serve the interests of its architects. NPM is driven by the hidden hand of
contested political choice, while New Public Governance tempers NPM by broadening
its basis through pluralism. This perspective further supports the notion that New
Public Governance has a greater potential for responding to the goals of sustainable
governance to the extent it is embraced by stakeholders.
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Table 74
Comparison ofNPMandNPG to Strategic Goals ofSustainable Governance
Strategic Goals of Sustainable Governance
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+
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Public discourse
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- Value is antithetical to strategic goal
~ Value is neutral toward strategic goal
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+ Value inherently incorporates strategic goal
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Table 75 displays the downside of NPM—the conflicts between the defects of
NPM and the strategic goals of sustainable governance. Recalling from the previous
analysis, NPM is deficient in the ethical arena because (a) devolvement results in no
one being responsible for the whole, so that ethical accountability evaporates; (b)
tracking ethics does not map well onto an outputs-based accountancy and metric; (c)
when governance is pushed down to street-level bureaucrats, lack of ethical
accountability and standards can cause unintended adverse results; (d) managers
become more privately and less civic minded; and (e) most importantly, as agencies
embrace NPM they become less connected to the social fabric of the very
communities they serve. Thus while they are more efficient in providing services,
broader normative and ethical questions go unanswered. As to citizen engagement, the
instrumentality of NPM tends to shrink opportunities for democratic participation.
Using the same scoring scheme, the average response of NPM to the strategic goals of
governance considering its defects is 0.57 based on a total score of 17 for 30
assessments. Ironically, NPM performs better with respect to strategic goals of
governance when considering its defects (score of 0.57) than when considering its
virtues (score of 0.36). A closer look reveals that 16 assessments are antithetical to the
strategic goals, one incorporates the strategic goal, and 13 can include the strategic
goal. Again, the architects of NPM have strong influence on its outcomes. In the case
of defects, however, the discretion is more on the side of street level bureaucrats or
administrators than on the political choices made. Performance of NPM, considering
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Table 75
Conflicts ofNPM Defects with Strategic Goals of Sustainable Governance
Strategic Goals of Sustainable Governance
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its defects, has considerably more potential for erratic performance because of the lack
of accountability for ethical behavior of its agents. Although New Public Governance
tempers NPM's defects, it suffers the same fate as NPM with respect to defects only to
a lesser degree due to the tempering effect of pluralism.
In summary, NPM as practiced in America with OMB as its main champion
represents the intersection of several strong currents of institutional power. The
strongest current permeating NPM is that of market-based solutions to solving
problems* Inherent in this view is the notion of the advisability of creating a marketlike invisible hand that inexorably guides public administration to create efficient
customer service for it constituents!—citizens of the government for which public
administrators work. A second strong current is that of NPM's vision of a smaller
more instrumental less intrusive government. Americans have distrusted big
government since the days of the republic's founding. A third is the managerialist
view aimed toward increasing efficiency in government and carefully segregating
policy formulation functions from public administration.
Considering the three main tenets of the human collective self-realization
project (i.e., expanding choice, mastery of the environment, and collective cooperation
as discussed earlier), NPM excels in the first two. While not critically accepted, the
notion that better government will solve economic and social ills has great popular
support. NPM's call for strict accountability is politically conservative; it has great
appeal as a problemframebecause even liberals cannot oppose accountability. There
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is also a structural feature of NPM that perhaps accounts for its persistence—politicians
like being able to blame bureaucrats because they are defenseless and because such
blame perpetuates the public's distrust of government. It is remarkable how politicians
escape being branded as part of government. Empirically, thefeetthat NPM has
endured as the dominant form of public administration since Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society is a testament to its persistence. New Public Governance may just be the
antidote.
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Appendix A
Hypotheses and Associated Research Concepts
Hypothesis

Research Concepts

I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a
Response to Constrained Federalism

In response to lack of agency capacity
In response to reduction in programs
Coproduction initiated by citizens
Form of engagement less than 25 years old
Structure and function of organizational forms
Dynamics evolve to democratic participation
Citizen motivation for civic engagement

II: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal
Democratic Citizen Engagement

Distribution of power
Hands-on governance aimed at consensus
Conflict resolution by interest-based processes
Public discourse for the greatest common good

III: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained
Federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage of Democracy

Positive Values of Constrained Federalism
Emphasis on customer service
Efficiency and cutting red tape
Capacity for learning and adaptive behavior
Checks and balances
Professionalism and managerial excellence
Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism
Devolvement to no one being responsible
Accountability for ethics
Adverse ethical effects
Administrators become less civic-minded
Administrators lose connection to community
Diminished citizen engagement
Lack of upward political accountability
Principal-Aaent Theory for Public Administration
Legislative Dictum
Executive Dictum
Judicial Dictum
Fealty to Citizens

IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster
and Inhibit Democratic Citizen Engagement

Reduction of services
Coproduction fosters citizen engagement
Lawsuits inhibit citizen engagement
Administrator wants community involvement
Administrator shares power
Administrator seeks greater common good
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Appendix B
Research Measurement Mode! Development from Conceptual Research Concepts
Evidence of Research Concept
Research Concept

Measurement Approach

Measurement Model

Level of Doubt
and Centrality to
overall Thesis

Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a Response to Constrained Federalism
Coproduction initiated in
Evidence of need for
response to lack of capacity to collaboration
meet demand

Capacity scaled back in
last 25 years.

Low
High

Coproduction initiated in
response to reduction in
programs

Evidence of need for
collaboration

Administrator initiated
coproduction

Moderate
Moderate

Coproduction initiated by
citizens

Evidence of genesis

Citizen initiated
coproduction

Moderate
Moderate

Form of engagement less than Date of authorities cited Changes in forms /level
25 years old
in agreement
of engagement last 25
years

Moderate
Moderate

Structure and function of
organizational forms

Mintzberg for structure
and Vector of change
model

Changes in forms /level
of engagement last 25
years

Dynamics evolve to
democratic participation

Evidence for activities

Coproduction evolving
to democratic
participation

High
High

Citizen motivation related to
desire for civic engagement

Evidence in provisions
of agreement

Citizens operating out of
plural interests

Low
High

Moderate
Moderate

Hypothesis II: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal Democratic Citizen Engagement
Positive Values of Liberal Democracy
Distribution of power
(citizens, agencies, and
political institutions)

Responsiveness to new
or conflicting actor's
interests

Acknowledgement of
other potential interests

High
High

Hands-on governance aimed
at consensus

Partners seek support
among differing
viewpoints

Partners seek to
broaden basis of
support

High
High

Conflict resolution by interest
based processes

Interest based Conflict
resolution addressed

Conflict resolution
mechanisms

High
High

Public discourse for the
greatest common public good

Provision for active
public involvement

Provision for public
involvement if
appropriate

High
High
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Level of Doubt
—~- and Centrality to
Measurement Model
overall Thesis

Evidence of Research Concept
Research Concept

Measurement Approach

Hypothesis III: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained Federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage
of Democracy
Positive Values of Constrained federalism
Emphasis on customer service

Provision of missionrelated public services

Coproduction tied to
mission-related services

Moderate
High

Efficiency and cutting red tape Low administrative
transaction cost

Coproduction set up for
efficiency

Moderate
High

Capacity for learning and
adaptive behavior

Room for adjustments

Agreement has room
for adjustments

Checks and balances

Administrative oversight Accountability built into
agreement

Moderate
High

Professionalism and
managerial excellence

Standards set for quality Quality standards
established

Moderate
High

High
High

Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism
Devolvement results in no
one being responsible

Accountability built in

Clear accountability for
results

Accountability for ethics

Explicitly deals with
ethical issues

Acknowledgement of
ethical dimension

Street level governance has
adverse ethical effects

Standards for ethical
Standards for ethical
behavior of participants behavior

Low
Low

Administrators become less
civic-minded

Collaboration aimed at
community purposes

Administrator serving
needs of community

High
High

Administrators lose
connection to community
social fabric

Evidence of connection
to communities

Administrator
connected to social
fabric of community

High
High

Diminished engagement for
democratic participation

Provision for citizen
engagement

Provision for citizen
engagement

High
High

Lack of political accountability Provision for citizen
with respect to agencies
engagement

Citizen awareness of
legislative
accountability

High
High

Low
Low
Moderate
Low

Principal-Agent Theory for Public Administration
Legislative Dictum

Reference to authorities Reference to authorities

Moderate
High

Executive Dictum

Consistency with
policies

Moderate
High

Consistency with
policies
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Evidence of Research Concept
Research Concept

Measurement Approach

Measurement Model

Level of Doubt
and Centrality to
overall Thesis

Judicial Dictum

Follows due process and Follows due process and
Admin. Procedures Act Admin. Procedures Act

Low
High

Fealty to Citizens

Acknowledges or
provides role for
citizens

High
High

Acknowledges or
provides for citizen
participation

Hypothesis IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster and Inhibit Democratic Citizen
Encasement
Reduction of services under
constrained federalism

Collaborations arise from agency reduction of
services

Coproduction fosters citizen
engagement in democracy

coproduction leads to broader citizen
participation in governance

Moderate
High

Lawsuits by narrow selfinterests inhibit emerging
citizen engagement

Legal system inhibits broader citizen
participation in governance (narrow self-interest
vs. common good

Moderate
Low

Administrator shares power

Administrator empowers stakeholder groups

Low
High

Administrator wants active
community involvement

Administrator seeks community involvement

Moderate
Moderate

Administrator motivated by
greater common good

Reference to greater
common good

Administrator appeals
to the greater common
good

Low
High

Low
High
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Appendix C
Measurement Questions by Method of Inquiry
Method of Inquiry
Research Concept

Affirmation in

Measurement Model

law or Policy

Survey Instruments*
Agreements

Administrators

Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a Response to Constrained Federalism
Variable: Reduced Public Service
Coproduction initiated in
response to lack of capacity
to meet demand

Ncte date of various
organizational forms
called for in law and
policy

Coproduction initiated in

Note any legislative,
policy, or legal
strictures

response to reduction in
programs

ID-1. Narrative
discussion
summarizing
agreements and
citizen coproduction
IA-1. Note genesis of
Co-production

IB-1. Assessment
of Administrator
intent
IB-2. Assessment
of citizens' intent

Coproduction initiated by

Same as above

Same as above

Same as above

Document legislativeand agency policycreated forms.

IA-2. Note details of
organizational forms

IB-3. Note any
refinements in
organizational forms

Same as above

Same as above

citizens
Form of engagement less
than 25 years old

Variable: Citizen Coproduction
Variable: Coproduction Evolves
Structure and function of

Same as above

organizational forms
Dynamics evolve to
democratic participation

Note any legislative
or policy provisions

IB-4. Administrate
r assessment, based
on criteria
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Method of Inquiry
Research Concept

Affirmation in

Measurement Model

Law or Policy

Survey Instruments*
Agreements

Citizen motivation related

Administrators
IB-5. Administrato
r assessment, based
on criteria

to desire for civic
engagement

Hypothesis II: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal Democratic Citizen Engagement
Positive Values of Liberal Democracy
Distribution of power
(citizens, agencies, and

IIA-l.Accommodation
of new interests?

political institutions)
Hands-on governance

IIB-1. Assess partner's
broadening of
support

aimed at consensus

Conflict resolution by
interest based processes
Public discourse for the
greatest common public

IIA-8. Provision for
conflict resolution

IIB-2. Assess conflict
resolution

IIA-9. Provision for
public involvement

IIB-3. Assess public
engagement

good
Hypothesis III: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained Federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage of Democracy
Positive Values of Constrained Federalism
Emphasis on customer
service
Efficiency and cutting red
tape
Capacity for learning and
adaptive behavior

IIA-2. Assess purpose
of coproduction
IIA-3.Assess efficiency
and red tape
IIA-4.Assess capacity
for adaptation
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Method of Inquiry
Research Concept

Affirmation in

Measurement Model

Law or Policy

Survey Instruments*
Agreements

Checks and balances

IIA-5.Assess
accountability

Professionalism and

IIA-6.Assess
professionalism

managerial excellence

Administrators

Remedy Defects of Constrained Federalism
Devolvement results in no

IIIA-1. Evidence of
clear responsibilities

one being responsible
Accountability for ethics

IIIA-2* Evidence of any
ethical dimensions

Street level governance has

Same as above

adverse ethical effects
Administrators become less
civic-minded

Administrators lose
connection to community
social fabric

IIIA-3. Evidence of
administrator serving
needs of community

IIIB-1. Evidence of
administrator serving
needs of community

IIIA-4. administrator
connection to social
fabric of community

IIIB-2. administrato
r connection to social
fabric of community

IHA-5. Evidence of

IIIB-3. Evidence of
provision for citizen
engagement

Diminished engagement for

Evidence of provision

democratic participation

for citizen engagement provision for citizen
engagement

Lack of political
accountability with respect
to agencies
Principal-Agent Theory for Public Administration

IIIB-4. Evidence of
fewer political cheap
shots against agency
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Method of Inquiry
Research Concept

Affirmation in

Measurement Model

Law Or Policy

Legislative Dictum

Reference to
authorities

Survey Instruments*
Agreements

Administrators

IIA-10. Existence of
documentation

Executive Dictum

Reference to policies

UA-11. Existence of
documentation

Judicial Dictum

Follows due process,
APA, and case law

| ) A . 1 2 . Assessment
of compliance

IIB-4. Assessment of
compliance

Fealty to Citizens

Acknowledges or

IIA-13. Assessment
of acknowledgement

IIB-5.Assessment of
acknowledgement

provides role for
citizens

Hypothesis IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster and Inhibit Democratic Citizen Engagement
Reduction of services under
constrained federalism
Coproduction fosters citizen
engagement in democracy
Lawsuits by narrow selfinterests inhibit emerging

IVB-1. Administrator
reports
IVB-2. Administrator
reports
IVB-3. Administrator
reports

citizen engagement
Administrator wants active
community involvement

IVB-4. Administrator
reports

Administrator shares power

IVB<-5. Administrator
reports

Administrator motivated by

IVB-6. Administrator
reports

greater common good

Note. The numbering scheme of measurement questions, e.g., IIA-2, reflects the hypothesis by Roman
numeral, instrument by capital letter, and the question number follows a dash and is listed by Arabic
numbers. Questions often have multiple elements in the instruments.
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Appendix D:
Measurement Instruments
Individual Agreements Instrument A
Agreement Name
Date of Investigation
Unique identifier
Investigator
Gary L Larsen
Project Name
Agreement Date
Agreement Form
Original Agreement
Name of Partner
Hypothesis I: New forms of citizen engagement emerge as a response to constrained federalism.
IA-4. What is the genesis of coproduction activities covered by the agreement?
a)
Administrator initiated
b)
Partner initiated
c)
d)
e)

Jointly Initiated
Other party:
No evidence

IA-5. Part a: Identify which functional elements of organizational form are identified in the agreement
and describe how characterized:22
a)
Existing external situation Y or N
_____
b)
Existing agency situation Y or N „
c)
Forming intent or strategic goals Y or N
d)
e)
f)

Tactical goals Y or N
Operational objectives Y or N
Operational processes Y or N

g)
h)
i)

Tactical output Y or N
strategic goal attainment Y or N
Desired new external situation Y or N _ _

,

j)
Operational feedback Y or N
,
k)
Tactical feedback Y or N
I)
Strategic feedback Y or N
„
,
Part b: Identify which structural elements of organizational form are identified in the
agreement and describe how characterized:23

_
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m)

Strategic Apex (top management) Y or N

n)
o)

Middle Line (middle management) Y or N
Operating Core (operations, operational processes) Y or N

p)
q)
r)

Technostructure (analysts that design systems, processes, etc) Y or N
Support Staff (support outside of operating workflow) Y or N
Ideology (halo of beliefs and traditions; norms, values, culture) Y or N

__

Part c: Describe any other elements of organizational form spelled out in the agreement:
s)

Individual Agreements Instrument A

Hypothesis II: Emergent forms of citizen engagement achieve benefits of liberal democracy.
HA-1. What is the purpose of coproduction activities covered by the agreement?
Part a: List of purposes

Part b: Is the purpose within the mission or authority of the agency
a. Yes, with citations
b. Yes, by assertion
c. Yes, by deduction
d. Questionably
e. Undetermined
IIA-2.Part a: What are the procedural transaction costs associated with planning, organizing, initiation,
conclusion, reporting, evaluation, or other follow-up coproduction activities from the partner's
perspective?
a.
b.
c.
d.

None—partner can act autonomously within the guidelines of the agreement.
Low—partner can act autonomously, but must report after the fact.
Moderate—partner must notify agency prior to engaging in coproduction activities.
High—partner must consult and obtain agreement with agency prior to engaging in
coproduction.
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Part b: What are the procedural transaction costs associated with planning, organizing,
initiation, conclusion, reporting, evaluation, or other follow-up with respect to coproduction
activities from the administrators perspective?
a. None—partner can act autonomously within the guidelines of the agreement.
b. Low—partner can act autonomously, but must report after the fact.
c. Moderate—partner must notify agency prior to engaging in coproduction activities.
d. High—partner must consult and obtain agreement with agency prior to engaging in
coproduction.
IIA-3.What amount of autonomy does the partner have to change activities to match changed
conditions?
a.

None—partner must consult with agency and obtain agency's agreement prior to
changing coproduction activities.
b. Low—partner must notify agency prior to changing coproduction activities.
c. Moderate—partner can change coproduction activities, but must report on changes after
the fact.
d. High—partner can change coproduction activities within broad agreement guidelines.
Individual Agreements Instrument A

IIA-4.What partner accountability for coproduction is built into the agreement?
a. None—no mechanism for accountability mentioned in agreement.
b.

Low—no accountability mechanism mentioned, but administrator oversight is provided.

c.

Moderate—partner reporting is provided for but there are no standards specified.

d. High—standards for performance and reporting are specified.
IIA-5.What degree of professionalism is incorporated into planning and delivery of coproduction
identified in agreement?24
a. None—traditional self-organized community planning and provision of services.
b. Low—traditional self-organized volunteer group activities modeled after "best practices".
c. Moderate—agency participates in planning or delivery of services.
d. High—professionally designed services delivered by partner alone or with agency, or
services delivered by professionally qualified partner.
IIA-6.T0 what degree is provision made in the agreement for acknowledging other potential interests?
a. None—no mention.
b.

Low—acknowledgement of other potential interests, but no provisions made for dealing
with them.
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c. Moderate—general provision.
d. High—detailed provision.
IIA-7. Is provision made in the agreement for resolution of conflicts between agency and partner?
a. None—no mention of conflict resolution
b. Low—mention of conflict resolution with no provisions
c.

Moderate—conflict resolution approach specified

d.

High—detailed provision is made for resolution of conflicts.

IIA-8. Is provision of public involvement made where appropriate for coproduction activity?
a. None—no mention of public involvement,
b. Low—mentioned, but no provision made for dealing with the public.
C. Moderate—mentioned, but only generic provisions made.
d. High—detailed provisions made for dealing with the public.
e. Not appropriate or not applicable
IIA-9. To what extent does agreement make reference to legislative authorities?
a. None
b. Low
c. Moderate
d. High
HA-10. To what extent does agreement make reference to executive policies?
a. None
b. Low
c. Moderate
d. High
Individual Agreements Instrument A
IIA-ll. Does agreement follow due process, Administrative Procedures Act standards?
a. None
b. Low
c. Moderate
d. High
IIA-12. To what extent does agreement acknowledge or provide a role for citizen participation?
a.

None

b. Low
c.

Moderate

d.

High

Hypothesis III: Emergent citizen engagement remedies defects of constrained federalism.
IIIA-1. To what extent is there clear accountability for results? Evidence?
a.

None
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b.

Low

:

c. Moderate
.
.
_ _ _ ^ _
:
d. High
IIIA-2. To what extent is there evidence that the agreement acknowledges ethical issues? Evidence?
a.

None

b.

Low

_ ,
;

c. Moderate
d. High
;
IIIA-3. To what extent is there evidence of the administrator serving the needs of the community?
a. None
b. Low
,
:
c. Moderate „
d. High
,
IIIA-4. To what extent is there evidence that the administrator is connected to the social fabric of the
community? Evidence?
a. None
b. Low
,
c. Moderate
d. High
;
.
IIIA-5. To what extent is there evidence that the administrator has made provision for civic
engagement?
a. None
b. Low
,
:
:
c.
d.

Moderate
High

,

,
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Individual Agreements Instrument A
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The functional aspects of organizations are assessed using Larsen's (in press) vector of
change typology as shown below:
Figure 1
Vector of Change Systems Model

Structural elements of organization are characterized after Mintzberg's (1983)
typology as shown below:
Figure 2
Five Basic Parts of Organizations after Min tzberg (1983}
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Individual Agreements Instrument A
Degree of professionalism is rated after Bovaird's (2005) typology as follows:
Figure 3
Assessment of Professionalism for Public Service Provider and User Relationships

Service Delivery
Professional

Professional
*

High

Traditional professional
service provision

Co-delivery

•» High
User co-delivery of
professionally designed
services

Users/Community
delivery

• * High
User/community delivery
of professionally planned
services

Planning and Design
Co-planning and
Design
•» High
Traditional
professional service
provision with
user/community
consultation on
planning and design
• * High
Full coproduction by
user/community and
professionals
•> Moderate
User/community
delivery of co-planned
or co-designed
services

User/Community
Design
• * N/A,or
• * High
(not applicable unless
partner is
professionally
qualified)
•¥ Moderate
Co-delivery of
user/community
planned services
•^ None
Traditional selforganized community
provision of services
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Administrators' Instrument B
Agency

Position Title

Organization Level

Investigator

Reference Number

Date of Investigation

Gary L. Larsen

Hypothesis I: New forms of citizen engagement emerge as a response to constrained federalism.
Please use this scale
to answer questions

Description Almost Always Frequently
>90%
90%- 50%
% of time

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

IA-6. Thinking about why you enter into coproduction agreements with your local unit's various
external partners, how often do each of the following factors influence your (your agency
administrators) decision to enter into such agreements?
>90%

a)

Reduced agency capacity to deliver services

b)

Public demand for services

c)

In response to partner request

d)

To build stakeholder knowledge or support

e)

To accomplish activities beyond scope of mission

f)

To accomplish activities beyond scope of expertise

g)

To accomplish activities beyond capacity of the unit

h)

To provide opportunity for civic engagement

0

To provide opportunity for voiunteerism
j)

90%50%

50%10%

<10%

Other or additional reasons:

IA-7. Thinking about why partners enter into coproduction agreements with your agency, how often
do you estimate that following factors influence partners' decisions to enter into agreements?
>90%

k)
I)

Reduced agency capacity to deliver services
To better meet partner's particular demand for
services

m)

In response to agency request

n)

To build partner knowledge or support

o)

To accomplish activities beyond local unit's mission

p)

To accomplish activities beyond local unit's expertise

q)

To accomplish activities beyond local unit's capacity

r)

To meet partner's desire for civic engagement

90%50%

50%10%

<10%
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s)

To meet partner's desire for volunteer opportunities I
t)

I

[

I

Other or additional reasons:
Administrators' Instrument B

IA-8. Thinking about the full range of partnership activities your local unit engages in, the following
three parts of this question explore different aspects of how you and your partners organize to
achieve the purposes of your various partnerships for coproduction.
Part a: Thinking about you and your partners and how you both structure your respective
organization's engagement under all your various agreements, what trends have you noticed
over the past ten years in how these various parts of your and your partner's organization get
involved in planning, organizing, implementing, or evaluating partnership activities?25
a)

Strategic Apex (top management)

b)

Middle Line (middle management)

c)

Operating Core (operations, operational processes)

d)

Technostructure (analysts that design systems, processes, etc)

e)

Support Staff (support outside of operating workflow)

f)

Ideology (halo of beliefs and traditions; norms, values, culture)

,

Part b: Thinking about the range of your agency's partnerships and changes over time, what
trends have you noticed over the past ten years that are relevant to how your agency and your
partners work together with respect to the following functional aspects?26
g)

Existing external situation

h)

Existing agency situation

i)

Forming intent or strategic goals

j)

Tactical goals

k)

Operational objectives ___

I)

Operational processes

m)

Tactical outputs

n)

Attainment of strategic goals

,
,
,
_____
,
,
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o)

Desired new external situation.

P)

Monitoring and evaluation,

Part c: Describe any other aspects of the trends in organizational forms for your agency's
various partnerships that you feel are relevant to this research

Administrators' Instrument B
IA-9. From your perspective, do you ever observe an evolution in how partners work from (a) first
being initially focused on just getting the job done to (b) later on, taking a broader focus on the
issues surrounding the partnership activities, to (c)eventually enter into discussions about
wherein lies the greater public interest?
Description:
Almost Always
Rarely
Frequently
Sometimes
90%-50%
50% -10%
>90%
<10%
% of time:
IA-10. From your perspective, how have partner's motives for engaging in coproduction
partnerships changed in the last ten years? Use the following definitions to make estimates for
ten years ago in comparison to today.
•
Narrow individual self-interest—conducting coproduction with no desire or interest in
benefits accruing to any other than the immediate individual partners.
•
Narrow group self-interest—conducting coproduction with no desire or interest in
benefits accruing to any other than the immediate partner's group or the group they
represent.
•
Enlightened self-interest—conducting coproduction with desire and interest that the
benefits from their activities accrue to others as well as themselves.
•
Community service—conducting coproduction with an interest in providing benefits that
accrue the local community.
•
Public service—conducting coproduction with an interest in providing benefits that
accrue to others.
Ten years ago
Today
Narrow individual self-interest:
%
a)
Narrow group self-interest:
%
b)
Enlightened self-interest:
%
c)
Service to the local community:
%
d)
Broader service to the Public:
%
e)
100 %
Total must add to:
100 %
JHypothesis II: Emergent fornw of citizen engagement achieve benefits of liberal democracy.
MA-13.TO what extent do partners seek to broaden the basis of public support for their coproduction
of services?
Description:
Almdst Always
Rarely
Frequently
Sometimes
>90%
90%-50%
50%-10%
<10%
% of time:
I
, I
I
,
I
IIA-14.To what extent do partners seek to use interest-based strategies for resolving conflicts rather
than position-based strategies:
Part a:
With respect to their own intergroup conflicts?
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Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% -50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

Administrators' Instrument B
With respect to conflicts that arise from others with regard to their coproduction
Partb:
activities?
Almost Always
Description:
Rarely
Frequently
Sometimes
>90%
90% - 50%
50%-10%
<10%
% of time:
Part c:
With respect to conflicts with the agency?
Description:
Almost Always
Frequently
>90%
90% - 50%
% of time:

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

IIA-15.To what extent do partners seek to enlist involvement from others in support of their
coproduction activities—ether in planning, delivery, or evaluation services—the notion of active
public involvement/engagement?
Description:
Frequently
Almost Always
Rarely
Sometimes
>90%
50% -10%
<10%
90%-50%
% of time:
IIA-16.As an administrator, how attuned are you to case law or potential difficulties in the face of
litigation as you plan and execute coproduction agreements and activities, e.g., due process,
Administrative Procedures Act, NEPA compliance, and tort claims?
Description:
Almost Always
Rarely
Frequently
Sometimes
>90%
90% - 50%
50% -10%
<10%
% of time:
IIA-17.As an administrator, to what extent do feel that it is the duty of public administrators to provide
opportunities for active citizen or public participation in agency activities:
Part a: With respect to planning and decision-making?
Description:
Rarely
Almost Always
Frequently
Sometimes
90%-50%
50%-10%
>90%
<10%
% of time:
Part b:
With respect to delivery of government services or implementing projects?
Description:
Almost Always
Frequently
Rarely
Sometimes
90%50%
50%
-10%
<10%
>90%
% of time:
Part c:
With respect to evaluation or monitoring of government services or projects?
Description:
Almost Always
Rarely
Frequently
Sometimes
% of time:
>90%
50% -10%
<10%
90%-50%
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Administrators' Instrument B
Hypothesis III: Emergent citizen engagement remediesdefects of constrained federalism.
IIIB-1.

To what extent are you motivated in your agency activities to serve the needs of the
local community?
Description:
% of time:

IIIB-2.

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

To what extent do you feel connected to the social fabric of your community:
Part a: As an individual?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

Frequently
90%-50%

Part b: As an agency public administrator?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%- 50%

Part c: As your local administrative unit?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Part d: As a local public agency?
Description:
% of time:
IIIB-3.

Almost Always
>90%

As an administrator, to what extent do you provide opportunities for active citizen or
public participation in agency activities:
Part a: With respect to planning and decision-making?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%-50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

Part b: With respect to delivery of government services or implementing projects?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

Part c: With respect to evaluation or monitoring of government services or projects?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%-50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%
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Administrators' Instrument B
IIIB-1. To what extent do you experience that citizen engagement in coproduction activities helps
citizens better understand the checks and balances built into American governance,
particularly:
Part a: The difference between legislative mandate, executive branch policy, agency policy,
case law, and local agency discretion?
Description:
Almost Always
Rarely
Frequently
Sometimes
50% -10%
>90%
90% - 50%
<10%
% of time:
Part b: Who is accountable for setting legislative mandates, executive branch policy, agency
policy/ case law, and local agency discretion?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%

Part c: Where and how to exert pressure at the right place to resolve issues or problems (e.g.,
Congress, the Administration, Agency policy makers, the legal system, and/or the local agency
administrator)?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

Hypothesis IV: There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit the emergence of citizen
engagement.
IVB-1. To what extent do you believe that reduction of budgets and associated reduction of agency
capacity or services is a positive causative factor in your agency seeking external partnerships
for coproduction of agency services?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%-50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

IVB-2. To what extent do you believe that citizen engagement in coproduction through partnership
agreements leads to a broader civic engagement in governance?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
96% - 50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

IVB-3. To what extent do you believe that the legal system inhibits broader citizen participation in
governance?

Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%-50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<10%
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Administrators' Instrument B
IVB-4. To what extent do you strive to secure active community involvement on behalf of the agency?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50% -10%

Rarely
<K>%

IVB-5. To what extent are you comfortable sharing power (agency authority and decisions) with
stakeholders?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90%-50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

IVB-6. To what extent are you motivated to seek the greater common good in your planning and
decision-making?
Description:
% of time:

Almost Always
>90%

Frequently
90% - 50%

Sometimes
50%-10%

Rarely
<10%

IVB-7. What other factors do you believe foster partnerships in coproduction?

IVB-8. What other factors do you believe inhibit partnerships in coproduction?

1VB-9. What other factors do you believe foster broader citizen engagement in governance regarding
your agency's mission area?

IVB-10. What other factors do you believe inhibit broader citizen engagement in governance
regarding your agency's mission area?
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Administrators' Instrument B
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Structural elements of organization are characterized after Mintzberg's (1983) typology as
Figure 2
Five Basic Parts of Organizations after Mintzberg (1983)
Top Management
Ideology is the
halo of beliefs,
traditions, norms,
values, and
culture in which
the organization is
embedded

Middle Management
Administrative Support
Technical Analysts
Operational Personnel
and Processes

The functional aspects of organizations are assessed using Larsen's (in press) vector of change
typology as shown below:
Figure 1
Vector of Change Systems Model
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Agreements Summary Instrument C
Agency

Position Title

Organization Level

Investigator

Reference Number

Date of Investigation

Gary L Larsen

Date
Unique

Kind of

Identifier

Agreement

Current

First

Purpose of Agreement Parties to Agreement Agreement Agreement
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Administrators Agreements Summary Instrument D

Agency

Position Title

Organization Level

Investigator

Reference Number

Date of Investigation

Gary L. Larsen

ID-7. What has been the trend with your agency's funding at your local unit level for the past 25
years?

ID-8. What has been the trend with your agency's funding at your local unit level for the past 10
years?

ID-9. Has this change in funding had an effect on your local unif s ability to meet its mission? If so,
how?

ID-10. Has this change in funding or organizational capacity have any effect on the coproduction
partnerships your agency forms? If so, what has been the effect?

ID-11. What patterns and trends have you noticed over the past years with respect to the kinds of
coproduction partnerships entered into by your agency?

ID-12. What patterns and trends have you noticed over the past years with respect to the number of
coproduction partnerships entered into by your agency?
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Appendix E
Structural Logic Model Variables and SPSS Variable Elements
SPSS Variable Elements
Agreements Instrument
Variable

Scaled

Narrative

Administrator's instruments
Scaled

Narrative

Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a Response to Constrained federalism
Reduced Public

IBlaARedCap

IBljAOther

Service

IBlbAPubDem

IB2tPOther

IBlcAPartReq

IDlRegFundTrend

IBleABeyMiss

ID2UnitFundTrend

IBlfABeyExp

ID3FundMiss

IBlgABeyCap
IBljAOScale
IB2kPRedCap
lB2lPPartDem
IB2mPAgReq
IB2oPBeyMiss
IB2pPBeyExp
IB2qPBeyCap
IB2tP0Scale
IDlRFTScale
ID2UFTScale
ID3FMScale

Citizen
Coproduction

lAldGenesisOther

IB3aaTTScale

IB3aaTrendTop

IA2aFunExSit

IA2aFunExSitN

IB3abTMScale

IB3abTrendMid

IA2bFunExAgency

IA2bFunExAgencyN IB3acTOScale

IB3acTrendOps

IA2cFunlntent

IA2cFunlntentN

IB3adTTScale

IB3adTrendTech

!A2dFunTactic

IA2dFunTacticN

IB3aeTSScale

IB3aeTrendSup

IA2eFunOpOb

IA2eFunOpObN

IB3afn Scale

IB3afTrendldeo

IA2fFunOpPro

IA2fFunOpProN

IB3cTOScale

IB3cTrendOther

IA2gFunTac0ut

IA2gFunTac0utN

lB3bgTSScale

IB3bgTrendSit

IA2hFunStratOut

IA2hFunStratOutN IB3bhTAScale

IB3bhTrendAg

IA2iFunNewExt

IA2iFunNewExtN

!B3biTSScale

|B3biTrendStrat

IA2jFunOpFeed

IA2jFunOpFeedN

IB3bjTTScale

IB3bjTrendTac

IA2kFunTacFeed

IA2kFunTacFeedN

IB3bkTOOScale

IB3bkTrendOpsObj

lAlGenesis
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SPSS Variable Elements
Agreements Instrument
Variable

Scaled

Narrative

Administrator's instruments
Scaled

Narrative

IA2IFunStratFeed

IA2IFunStratFeedN IB3blTOPScale

IB3blTrendOpsP

lA2mStrucTop

IA2mStrucTopN

IB3bmTTOScale

IB3bmTrendTacOut

IA2nStrucMid

IA2nStrucMidN

IB3bnTAScale

IB3bnTrendAttain

IA2oStrucOps

IA2oStrucOpsN

IB3boTNScale

IB3boTrendNew

IA2pStrucTech

IA2pStrucTechN

IB3bpTMScale

IB3bpTrendMon

IA2qStrucSupp

IA2qStrucSuppN

ID4FPScale

ID4FundPart

IA2rStrucldeo

IA2rStrucldeoN

ID5PKScale

IDSPartNumbers

IA2sStrucOther

ID6PNScale

IDSPartKinds

Coproduction

iBldAKnow

Evolves

IBlhACivEng
IBliAVolOpp
IB2nPKnow
IB2rPCivEng
IB2sPVolOpp
IB4EvolvCop
IB5alOPartSelf
IB5blOPartGrp
IBSclOPartEnl
IB5dlOPartCom
IB5elOPartPub
IB5alPartSelf
IB5blPartGrp
IBSclPartEnl
IB5dlPartCom
iBSelPartPub

Hypothesis II: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal Democratic Citizen Engagement
Benefits of Liberal

IIA60therPotlnt

IIBlPartBroad

Democracy

IIA7ConflictR

HB2aPartlnter

IIA8Publnvolve

HB2bPartOther

IIA12CitPart

IIB2cPartAgency
IIB3PartPublnv

Hypothesis III: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage of
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SPSS Variable Elements
Agreements Instrument
Variable

Scaled

Narrative

Administrator's instruments
Scaled

Narrative

Democracy
Benefits of

HAlbCopPurp

IIAlaCopPurp

Constrained

IIA2aPartTransCost

IIB5aAdmCitPln

federalism

IIA2bAdmTransCost

IIB5bAdmCitPrj

IIA3PartAuto

IIB5cAdmCitMon

IIB4AdmLit

IIA4PartAccount
IIASCopProf
IIA9LegAuth
IIAlOExecPol
IIAllDueProcess
Remedy Defects of

IIIAlAccount

lllAlAccountEvidence IIIBlAdmCSvc

Constrained

IIIA2Ethics

IIIA2EthicsEvidence

IHB2aAdmSocFI

federalism

IIIA3AdmComm

IIIA3AdmComEvid

IIIB2bAdmSocFAA

IIIA4AdmSocial

IIIA4AdmSocEvid

IIIB2cAdmSocFAU

IIIA5AdmCivicEng

IIIASAdmQvEngEvid IIIB2dAdmSocFPU
IIIB3aAdmDecOps
IIIB3bAdmDelOps
IIIB3cAdmMonOps
IIIB4aCopUCkBal
IIIB4bCopUAcct
IIIB4cCopUPress

Hypothesis IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster and Inhibit Democratic Citizen Engagement
Factors that Foster

IVBlShrnkCop

IVB7FostPart

Citizen

IVB2CopCiv

IVB9FosterGov

Engagement

IVB4AdmComln
IVB5AdmShare
IVB6AdmGCG
IVB7FPScale
IVB9FGScale

Factors that Inhibit

IVB3Leglnhib

IVBfflnhibPart

Citizen

IVB8IPScale

IVBlOlnhibGov

Engagement

IVBlOIGScale
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Appendix F
Qualitative Responses from Agency Administrators

Hypothesis I: Citizen Engagement EmergesfromConstrained Federalism
Variable RPS: Reduced Public Service
Table F-l
Administrators Responses to Questions Regarding Reduced Public Service
IA-11.
Thinking about why you enter into coproduction agreements with
your local unit's various external partners, how often do each of the following factors influence
your decision to enter into such agreements?
j) Other or additional reasons:
- partner's strategic goals, interests of Conservation District and Board
- opportunity for input into agency change, participation in management, nobility of managing
America's natural resources
- balancing mission-critical with broader conservation goals
- to be engaged, to know what other partners intend to do
- demonstrated agency benefit
IA-12. Thinking about why partners enter into coproduction agreements with your agency, how often
do you estimate that following factors influence partners' decisions to enter into agreements?
t) Other or additional reasons:
- money, economic development, jobs
- to use agency's expertise, gateway for tapping into other federal and state grant programs
- to obtain a "take permit" or federal $
- wanting to influence agency, leverage resources, meet their own interest or cause
- opportunities to influence agency, to improve quality of local community life
- the more we work with partners, the more we find we can meet their needs as well as our
own agency needs
- additional resources
ID-13. What has been the trend with your agency's funding at your local unit level for the past 25 years?
- agency funding flat after inflation, natural resource $ has increased dramatically, now
spending $180 M-$0 25 yrs ago
- federal support decreased, increased federal restrictions
- 15 years ago standard regulatory agency with flat budgets wired into regular permitting
programs
- decreasing with big decrease in late 80's when PNW public timber production is reduced
dramatically
- reduced every year since I've been in the agency
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- increasing up until 12 years ago
- roller coaster and long term downward trend
- down about 10% per year
ID-14. What has been the trend with vour agency's funding at your local unit level for the past 10 years?
- $ increased dramatically after biological opinion at end of Clinton Administration
- most decline in past 10 years, recent increase last four years
- upward funding trend in 90's due to citizens increased concerns with environmental issues,
flattened mid-late 90's
- budgets cut more than in half plus inflation costs
- even when flat, cost of doing business is increasing, dramatic reductions past ten years, forced
consolidations
- flat, which is a decrease due to inflation which overall reduced organization by 25%
- downward, forced agency focus on mission-critical functions
- gone up about 10% per year
ID-15. Has this change in funding had an effect on vour local unifs ability to meet its mission? If so, how?
- dramatic increase in $ has increased difficulty of efficacy and efficiency-down pressure on
internal staffing level
- as federal $ decreased, agency found other sources of $ for projects-local tax base, other
partners, state funding
- funding changes change staffing levels
- still meeting core mission, although a lot has fallen by the wayside, harder to meet basic
responsibilities under law
- agency cannot independently get our work done, but partnerships have let us accomplish a lot
of our work
- forced us to increase efficiency by pushing priority setting to the lowest level possible
- no longer have seed money for partnerships, increase in targeted grants
- easily meet its mission and do extra things too-environmental education with communities,
facilities for outdoor school
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Variable RPS: Citizen Coproduction
Table F-2
Administrators Responses to Questions Regarding Citizen Coproduction
IA-13. Part a: Thinking about you and your partners and how you both structure your respective
organization's engagement under all your various agreements, what trends have you noticed
over the past ten years in how these various parts of your and your partner's organization get
involved in planning, organizing, implementing, or evaluating partnership activities?

r) Top management involvement
- increasing involvement to express core agency interests
- no change
- increasing awareness of benefits of partnerships
- setting the tone, more open, support more initial investment for long-term payoff
- much more engaged than before
- a complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships
- more engaged in collaborative partnerships, less engaged in hierarchical partnerships
- increased interest in partnerships

s) middle management involvement
- increasing involvement due to complexity
- recent increase
- have become more active proponents because of benefits of partnerships
- desire for more engagement, but pressed because of downsizing
- much more engaged than before
- a complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships, moved from
ESA regulation to facilitation
- middle managers play more of an advisory role
- flat

t) operational involvement
- flat
- recent increase
- increasing desire for partnerships, but increasing tension of demand for core duties
- rely on partners more, spend more time on partnerships
- little change
- a complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships, moved from
ESA regulation to facilitation
- opportunity for engagement decreasing as S decrease
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- increased slightly

u) technical involvement
- increasing involvement due to complexity
- recent increase
- stable, but increasing unmet demand for services
- more important because of complexity, its what we offer, but partners do too increasingly
- now invited at the front end to use better technology
- many have no change
- opportunity for engagement decreasing as S decrease
- flat

v) support staff involvement
- slight increase
- recent increase
- unengaged
- burden of process has increased a lot, with tittle support help, burden shift to specialists
- increased dramatically
- none
- constant
- down (except for agreements staff)

w)Trends in ideology
- hardened due to political atmosphere and litigation
- more interest in urban issues, the environment
- more belief in benefits of partnerships, more support for local activism, more credibility,
support and acceptance
- fewer resources lead us to looking at partnerships In the light of what partners can bring and
mutual benefits
- none of us have resources to do it independently, a lot more possibilities arise from working
together-resources and expertise
• A complete paradigm shift to accomplishing conservation through partnerships
- desire for partnerships increasing of time, historical hierarchical walls are breaking down
- operating core has opened itself to collaboration with others-its the new norm
IA-6. Part b: Thinking about the range of your agency's partnerships and changes over time,
what trends have you noticed over the past ten years that are relevant to how your
agency and your partners work together with respect to the following functional aspects?

x) other aspects of organization forms for partnerships
- figuring out where agency's responsibility stops and other's starts, boundaries of partnerships
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- a lot of partnerships focus on particular land areas
- innovations, thinking outside the box, local creative initiatives and new ideas, professional
accountability for decisions
- more strategic, leverage limited resources, look hard for partner strategic alignment, partners
help retain capacity
- partners now demand time with us, insist on having a voice, more willing to share expertise,
agency has changed too
- more free-flowing partnerships, with decreasing $, partnerships more concentrated on
essential accountable core outcomes
- technology and data exchange have increased, partners are a different younger generation
than the agency

y) external situation
- world is far more complex, attempting larger scale restoration
- steady population increase and pressure on land resulting in increased interest in protecting
environment and restoration
- trying to be more strategic by embedding conservation biology principles
- changes to timber dependent communities, evolution from anger to willingness to work with
us and find common ground
- we no longer see ourselves as adversaries
- last year a huge shift to global climate change and "Last child in the woods"
- more free-flowing than in the past, more open communications
- more of an awareness that we're all in it together

z) agency situation
- restoration has become a core mission
- agency reduced direct service and increased incentives
- initially a regulatory bureaucracy, now evolving to more use of partnerships with state and
local entities
- increasing incentives to focus on where we can find agreement and be successful
- many experience agency as more inclusive and deliberately seeking common ground
- downward trends in $, necessity is the mother of invention
- more rigid operating environment in the past, now more open to opportunities
- agency direction toward collaboration

aa) forming intent or strategic goals
- political and legal complexity results in less control of our destiny
- changes reflect changed citizen interests
- recovery planning taking a larger role in strategic intent
- we use to decide, now we engage partners in forming strategic intent
- goals are more long term, less narrow, more aimed at common ground
- every 4 years we come up with a different way of doing it--we never get out of storming
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- increasingly consider agency strategic goals, striving to find common ground
- remained fairly constant

bb) tactical goals
- sharper, more clearly defined
- recently changed through new partners and sources of funds
- always driven by budget, staffing, and capacity
- sharpened to a results focus in a basin-wide setting
- goals go beyond administrative boundaries
- out of political initiatives we find new ways to count, but tactically we do the same things we
did before
- look at collective resources and figure out how to bring them together
- increasingly concerned with achieving sustainability, working with partners to develop tactics

cc) operational objectives
- more common, more efficient, less controversy
- no qualitative change but increase in number of objectives attained due to increased partners
- diversify portfolio of activities, encompassing use of personal skills
- sharpened to a results focus in a basin-wide setting
- out of political initiatives we find new ways to count, but operationally we do the same things
we did before
- more tailored to desired outcomes in a sharply defined scope
- constant

dd) operational processes
- smoother
- new services, new partner capabilities
- trend toward innovations, steering around bureaucratic and legal constraints
- trying to build more collaboration into it
- in the past, we have to lead, now a lot of partners bring serious expertise to the Table,
sometimes partners lead
- we work harder on meeting partner's objectives too
- more informal, flexible, more local long-standing relationships
- increased number and kind of projects, more involved in working them out together

ee) tactical outputs
- increasing back pressure foils tactical goal attainment
- increasing
- aiming toward health of the resource, having fish return increases society's awareness of
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importance
- more outputs because of landscape scale, broader support, and more $
- more comfortable with taking advantage of other's skills, expertise, and ideas
- no differences except for naming it differently
- more fluid partnerships produce more dynamic results
- increased in number

fi) attainment of strategic goals
- still no widely supported view of common strategic goals
- attaining more and increasing capacity through partnerships
- more accountability as an administrator from all entities
- partnerships increasingly help us achieve agency strategic goals
- partners help us consider longer term goals with all kinds of resources, $, people, expertise,
politics
- agency has matured into a results orientation
- strategic goals have stayed the same, but ability to meet them has increased
- more transparent discussion of strategic goals

gg) desired new external situation
- working towards mitigation aimed at sustainable restoration given climate change and the
scale of human development
- making a bigger and bigger difference
- less desire being regarded as rigid, more as bringing value-added
- partnerships have built community support for active public forest management, our awards
become community celebrations
- more concerned with building and maintaining long-term relationships instead of just outputs
- recognizing we need to give a little to get a little, partner's needs matter too
- now getting a better view of possibilities for greater change, more robust tools for greater
change
- meeting core mission has remained steady

hh) monitoring and evaluation
- we spend too much here because it creates jobs (but not fish)
- still not doing it well, but starting to focus more on performance monitoring
- continuing lack of agency $, recognition of importance of monitoring to adaptive
management, better data tech and sharing
- more joint monitoring and evaluation
- now credible partners increase our credibility which builds trust with other groups
- we still do it poorly
- little change

Appendix F: Qualitative Responses 422
- little change, our partner's awareness has increased
ID-16. Has this change in funding or organizational capacity have any effect on the coproduction
partnerships your agency forms? If so. what has been the effect?
- as program goes up so do number of partnerships-partnerships are our delivery mechanism
- developed new partners with $, improved relations with citizen groups, focus on local
partnerships
- Partnerships revolve around agency's regulatory mission, agency moved to providing
standards rather than tech assistance
- we've have to become more creative, take advantage of new authorities, external funding,
partnerships
- we're reaching out to non-traditional partners including urban groups and youth
- increasing interagency partnerships, also increase private lands partnerships with owners and
watershed associations
- reduces number of partnerships, core funding has gone away
- great affect, many more partnerships than ten years ago because we have more $ to pay for
partner's interests
10-17. What patterns and trends have you noticed over the past years with respect to the kinds of
coproduction partnerships entered into by your agency?
- no one common design, but the common denominator is trust
- more focused on specific projects in specific areas rather than larger scope, increased local
support
- political will to empower states, federal $ get to ground through states, a small national
community-based restoration program
- partnerships evolved to become much broader-based embracing multiple objectives, more
different kinds of partners involved
- from user-oriented to much broader non traditional groups
- partners for fish and wildlife grew out of 1985 Farm Bill and foreclosures of farms from FHA,
plus owners of targeted lands
- partnerships are more on an equal basis now with no one partner dominating, better
integration
- more habitat restoration
ID-18. What patterns and trends have you noticed over the past years with respect to the number of
coproduction partnerships entered into by your agency?
- number has increased with increased $
- informal partnerships have increased dramatically-interconnections
- dependent on the administration, partnerships not mission-critical, play increasing role in
mission esp. recovery plans
- increased slightly, includes environmental education, focuses on leveraging results on the
ground
- growth in numbers of partnerships has almost been exponential, particularly through growth
in networks
- opportunities are countless, the more we get out, the more we find

;
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- more partnerships, partnerships are the only way we can get work done in many areas
- much higher number

Variable CEv: Coproduction Evolves
Table F-3
Administrators' Assessments of Shifts in Partners' Interests Over Ten Years
Ten years ago
Partner's motives

Today

Mean%

Weight

score

Mean%

Weight

score

0

0.00

f)

Narrow individual selfinterest

26 25

°

0.00

14.00

g)

Narrow group self-interest

23125

*

23125

14125

1

14 13

h) Enlightened self-interest

24 375

2

48 7

- 5

2

000

2

40.00

i)

Service to the local
community

160

°

3

48

-°°

26 875

-

3

S 0 - 63

j)

Broader service to the
public

10 25

4

4100

25 00

4

100 00

-

-

-

100

160.88

-

100

-

-

234.76
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Hypothesis IV: There Are Common Factors that Affect Citizen Engagement
Variable Fost: Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement

1 Te n Ye ars Ago 8 Today

Narrow Self
Interest

Narrow Group Enlightened Self- Local Community Broader Public
Interest
Interest
Service
Service
Categories of Interests

Other factors that foster partnerships in coproduction
Other factors that foster broader citizen engagement in governance
Table F-4
Administrators' Assessments of Factors that Foster Citizen Engagement
IVB-9. What other factors do you believe foster partnerships in coproduction?
- trust
- recognition of common goals, utilizing each other's specialized skills, breadth of skills in
aggregate of partners
- personalities, personal orientation, administrator initiative, absence of legal mandates,
decreasing $~increased desire
- openness, leadership setting the right tone, partners dedication to joint interests, personal
relationships
- open dialogue, trust, constructive disagreement, trying to look through someone else's eyes,
trying for common objectives,
- outreach, developing a broader understanding of agency's mission, authorities, capabilities,
track record with partners
- common goals and interests, desire to resolve issues, desire for synergism
- common interests, willingness to accept each others' cultural differences to meet common
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interests
IVB-11. What other factors do you believe foster broader citizen engagement in governance
regarding your agency's mission area?
- agency's commitment to PNW citizens, awareness of agency's history of success in citizen
engagement
- community awareness, long-term relationships, outside threats
- distrust in federal government, people's desire for a facilitating government through
incentives rather than regulation
- opportunity for productive positive engagement, engagements tied to sense of place
- meeting citizens on their turf, actively listening hearing concerns, strive for including other's
ideas, talk in simple
- increased public understanding of the role of the environment-canary in the mine with
regard to ecological function
- agency support, greater resources,/grant opportunities, common goals, need
- clear understanding of who is responsible for what, knowing (accepting) decision space,
passion for particular project

Variable Inhib: Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement
Other factors that inhibit partnerships in coproduction
Other factors that inhibit broader citizen engagement in governance
Table F-5
Administrators' Assessments of Factors that Inhibit Citizen Engagement
IVB-10. What other factors do you believe inhibit partnerships in coproduction?
- lack of trust, hidden agendas, polarity of interests
- agency administrative procedures, lack of staff, too focused on narrow interests
- legal issues or liabilities, court orders, loss of $ and capacity reducing discretionary space,
decreased capacity
- lack of leadership openness, conflict between target accomplishment vs. partnerships, high
transaction cost, red tape
- self interest, functional barriers, history of negative interactions
- budget pressure leading to not being able to put people on the ground
- regulatory constructs, hidden agendas, trust time required, turf differences
- no common interests, administrative procedures, lack of clear benefit for both partners
IVB-12. What other factors do you believe inhibit broader citizen engagement in governance

regarding your agency's mission area?
- lack of trust, hidden agendas, lack of understanding, polarity
- lack of agency desire to collaborate, information overload, difficulty of word-of-mouth in an
urban environment
- distrust in federal government, people being guarded about personal lives
- agency bureaucracy, lack of knowing how to best engage, as a society everyone's time is

Appendix F: Qualitative Responses 426
more limited and precious
- arrogance that agency is always right, ignoring people's comments and concerns
- too much info flowing at people, 2-income families, extreme partisanship that flows through
politics at all levels
- agency inflexibility, rigid agendas, prejudices/difficult history, citizen time avail, competing
interests, pace of life
- foggy goals, lack of trust, failure to meet expectations
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Appendix G
Description of Research Project and Consent Form for Administrator Interviews
Description of Research Project on Federal Agency Citizen Partnerships
I am currently conducting research for my dissertation in pursuit of a PhD in Public Administration
from the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. The subject of my research is the
partnerships that federal agency administrators have formed with citizens and citizen groups over the
past 25 years as successive Presidential administrations have strived to harness the growth of the
federal government.
Background
Public administrators in the federal government today find themselves caught in cross-cutting
currents. On the one hand, the steady political tide toward constrained federalism since President
Johnson's Great Society has increased pressure to scale back size and scope of government. Successive
Presidents have worked to exert ever-stronger control over federal agencies through the Office of
Management and Budget to downsize, outsource, and become more accountable. On the other hand,
while it \i part of the American character to be opposed to big government, it is also part of our
character to demand a full suite of goods and services from government which is expressed through a
proliferation of special interests.
The scope of federal government is hotly contested by our founding fathers and the debate continues.
The general American consensus on limited government stays in permanent conflict with many
demands for better government programs and services. McKay27 observes the "fundamental dilemma
of attempting to reconcile raised public expectations with a deep suspicion of what government can
and should do is, therefore, likely to remain the identifying feature of the American system for many
years to come" (p. 391). This long-standing debate often becomes a passion play acted out on the
stage of public agencies with public administrators being frequent, albeit reluctant, actors as individual
scenes of the drama unfold.
The uniquely American answer to the question of size and scope of federal government involves a
balance between (a) a moderately strong federal government carefully circumscribed by limited
enumerated powers and a thorough system of checks and balances, (b) continued political calls for
better, more efficient government, (c) continuing high citizen demand for government services, and
(d) a political dynamic which ensures continuing unresolved debate about what government can and
should do.

Research
From the above described milieu, I hope through my research to: (a) reveal the underlying workings of
these dynamics, (b) explore partnerships as one possible response of public administrators to this

McKay, David. 2000. Essentials ofAmerican Government. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
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dilemma, and (c) explore the possibility of new emergent forms of citizen engagement that arise from
these partnerships. I further suggest that the resulting emergent forms of governance capture the best
of constrained federalism and also inject new energy into democratic citizen engagement. My
methodology is to examine a sampling of citizen partnership agreements and interview administrators
about their partnerships for a variety of federal agencies in the Pacific Northwest. I will survey both
the extent of such agreements for selected field offices and then evaluate a sample of the agreements
using an instrument I developed as part of my research, i will also use an instrument to conduct
interviews with administrators. From these instruments, I will conduct a statistical analysis of various
factors in hopes of developing a better understanding of the dynamics of pressures to downsize the
federal government in the face of citizen demand for more and better federal government services.
Hypotheses
As part of my research, I pose the following four hypotheses that is tested against the data
collected from the instruments use in examining partnership agreements and interviews with
public administrators:
1. Federal public administrators have increased the number and kinds of agency partnerships with
citizens and citizen groups as a response to the political pressure of the last 25 years to scale back
the size and scope of the federal government. These partnerships have resulted in emergent forms
of citizen engagement in governance.
2. The emergent forms of governance match theoretical constructs of a liberal view of democracy
while retaining many of the beneficial aspects of constrained federalism.
3. The emergent forms reduce the shrinkage of democracy reported to occur with constrained
federalism and also introduce elements of political accountability for politicians.
4. There is a common set of factors that foster and inhibit emergent forms of citizen engagement in
governance.
Concepts and Definitions
I make reference to two different concepts in the instrument for administrators that I
illustrate below. The first concept is differentiation of the parts of an organization according
to Mintzberg28:
Figure 1
Five Basic Parts of Organizations after Mintzberg (1983)
Top Management
Ideology is the
halo of beliefs,
traditions, norms,
values, and
culture in which "
~.J:he organization is ., ™'
embedded

Middle Management
Administrative Support
Technical Analysts
Operational Personnel
and Processes

od
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The second concept is that of the various functional aspects of organizations29:
Figure 2
Vector of Change Systems Model

Larsen, Gary L. in press. An Inquiry into the Theoretical Basis of Sustainability: Ten
Propositions. In Anthology of Social Sustainability: Routledge.
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Consent Form
Federal Agency Partnerships with Citizens and Citizen Groups
Dear Mr. or Mrs. or Ms.
My name is Gary Larsen and I am a PhD student at the Hatfield School of Government, Portland State
University. I am collecting data on Federal Agency partnerships with citizens and citizen groups to
study federal agency administrators' response to 25 years of pressure from Presidential
administrations to limit the size and scope of the federal government. I hope, as described in more
detail in the attached description of my research project, to: (a) reveal the underlying workings of the
associated dynamics, (b) explore partnerships as one possible response of federal public
administrators to this dilemma, and (c) explore the possibility of new emergent forms of citizen
engagement that arise from these partnerships.
I invite you to participate in this study. You are being asked to take part because, as an
agency administrator, your work has been conducted over the past years under the pressure
described above. As part of the study, I am interested in your opinions, attitudes, and experiences in
responding to these pressures. The information I collect will help to better understand the role of
public administrators and citizen participation in federal governance. If you decide to participate, you
is asked to take part in an interview conducted by Gary Larsen and provide limited access to your
agency's various partnership agreements so that summary information about the extent and scope of
these agreements can be described. In addition, Mr. Larsen will request to examine a sampling of the
agreements to conduct more detailed analysis. It should take less than two hours to conduct the
interview, and less than four hours for him to survey your partnership agreements and analyze a
sample of them.
As a result of this study, no information about you or your particular agency is disclosed. The
research will summarize partnership agreements and administrator responses in summary form only.
No attributions is made with regard to differences between agencies or administrators. You may not
receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study, but the study may help to increase knowledge
that may help others in the future.
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Any information obtained in connection with this study and that can be linked to you or your
agency is kept completely confidential. Subject identities is kept confidential by having no names
attached to any instrument. Participation is entirely voluntary. Your decision to participate or not will
not affect your relationship with the researcher, with Portland State University, or with the
researcher's agency in any way. If you decide to take part in the study, you may choose to withdraw at
any time without penalty. Please keep a copy of this letter for your records. If you have concerns or
problems about your participation in this study or your rights as a research subject, please contact the
Human Subjects Research Review Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 600 Unitus
Bldg., Portland State University, (503) 725-4288 /1-877-480-4400. If you have questions about the
study itself, contact Gary Larsen at 2938 SE Laura Ave., Gresham, Oregon, 97080, or at (503) 201-3707.

Sincerely,

Gary L. Larsen

Date

By signing this form, you agree to participate in the interview and allow the researcher to have limited
access to your agency's partnership agreements.

First and Last Name

Date
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Appendix H
Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 as Amended
TITLE 31-MONEY AND FINANCE
SUBTITLE V-GENERAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 63-USING PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS AND
GRANT AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
(Government Printing Office, Government Printing Office, 2008)
Sec. 6301. Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are to~
(1) promote a better understanding of United States Government expenditures and help eliminate
unnecessary administrative requirements on recipients of Government awards by
characterizing the relationship between executive agencies and contractors, States, local
governments, and other recipients in acquiring property and services and in providing United
States Government assistance;
(2) prescribe criteria for executive agencies in selecting appropriate legal instruments to achieve(A) uniformity in their use by executive agencies;
(B) a clear definition of the relationships they reflect; and
(C) a better understanding of the responsibilities of the parties to them; and
(3) promote increased discipline in selecting and using procurement contracts, grant agreements,
and cooperative agreements, maximize competition in making procurement contracts, and
encourage competition in making grants and cooperative agreements.
Sec. 6302. Definitions
In this chapter(1) "executive agency" does not include a mixed-ownership Government corporation.
(2) "grant agreement" and "cooperative agreement" do not include an agreement under which is
provided only(A) direct United States Government cash assistance to an individual;
(B) a subsidy;
(C) a loan;
(D) a loan guarantee; or
(E) insurance.
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(3) "local government" means a unit of government in a State, a local public authority, a special
district, an intrastate district, a council of governments, a sponsor group representative
organization, an interstate entity, or another instrumentality of a local government.
(4) "other recipient" means a person or recipient (except a State or local government) authorized
to receive United States Government assistance or procurement contracts and includes a
charitable or educational institution.
(5) '' State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, a territory or possession
of the United States, an agency or instrumentality of a State, and a multi-State, regional, or
interstate entity having governmental duties and powers.
Sec. 6303. Using procurement contracts
An executive agency shall use a procurement contract as the legal instrument reflecting a relationship
between the United States Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient when—
(1) the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquire (by purchase, lease, or barter) property or
services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government; or
(2) the agency decides in a specific instance that the use of a procurement contract is appropriate.
Sec. 6304. Using grant agreements
An executive agency shall use a grant agreement as the legal instrument reflecting a relationship
between the United States Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient when—
(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value totiheState or local
government or other recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation
authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter)
property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government; and
(2) substantial involvement is not expected between the executive agency and the State, local
government, or other recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.
Sec. 6305. Using cooperative agreements
An executive agency shall use a cooperative agreement as the legal instrument reflecting a relationship
between the United States Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient when—
(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to the State, local
government, or other recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation
authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter)
property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States Government; and
(2) substantial involvement is expected between the executive agency and the State, local
government, or other recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.
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Sec. 6306. Authority to vest title in tangible personal property for research
The head of an executive agency may vest title in tangible personal property in a nonprofit institution of
higher education or in a nonprofit organization whose primary purpose is conducting scientific
research(1) when the property is bought with amounts provided under a procurement contract, grant
agreement, or cooperative agreement with the institution or organization to conduct basic or
applied scientific research;
(2) when the head of the agency decides the vesting furthers the objectives of the agency;
(3) without further obligation to the United States Government; and
(4) under conditions the head of the agency considers appropriate.
Sec. 6307. Interpretative guidelines and exemptions
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget may(1) issue supplementary interpretative guidelines to promote consistent and efficient use of
procurement contracts, grant agreements, and cooperative agreements; and
(2) exempt a transaction or program of an executive agencyfromthis chapter.
Sec. 6308. Use of multiple relationships for different parts of jointlyfinancedprojects
This chapter does not require an executive agency to establish only one relationship between the
United States Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient on a jointly financed
project involving amountsfrommore than one program or appropriation when different relationships
would otherwise be appropriate for different parts of the project.
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Appendix I
USDA Forest Service Statutory Authorities
Relating to Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Other Agreements
1580.11 - Government-wide Use
1. The Economy Act of June 30,1932 (31 U.S.C. 1535. Pub. L. 97-258 and 98-216), Section 601 of this
Act authorizes one Federal agency to requisition work, services, supplies, materials, or
equipment from another Federal agency (FSM 1585.12).
2. The Act of August 27.1958 (23 U.S.C. 308(a). Pub. L 85-767). This Act authorizes the Federal
Highway Administration to perform by contract or otherwise, authorized engineering or other
services in connection with the survey, construction, maintenance, or improvement of
highways on behalf of other Government agencies (FSM 1585.13).
3. Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, as amended by the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
of September 13,1982 (31 U.S.C. 6501-6508, Pub. L 97-258). Title III of this Act authorizes
the Forest Service to provide special or technical services to States or subdivisions of States
(FSM 1584.15).
4. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (15 U.S.C. 3710a, Pub. L 96-480). This Act authorizes the
Forest Service to enter into cooperative research and development agreements for
technological transfer for commercial purposes (FSM 1587.14).
5. Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreements Act of 1977, as amended by the Using Procurement
Contracts and Grant and Cooperative Agreements Act of September 13,1982
(31 U.S.C. 6301-6308, Pub. L 97-258). as amended. Unless the relationship is otherwise
specified by statute, this Act requires that Federal agencies characterize the relationship
between a Federal and non-Federal party as one of a procurement contract or of Federal
financial assistance. (FSM 1580.6 and FSM 1582).
6. United States Information and Exchange Act (22 U.S.C. 1451 and 1479. Pub. I.
97-241). This Act authorizes the Forest Service to cooperate with a foreign government by
providing at its request Forest Service employees with specific technical or professional
qualifications (FSM 1584.16).

1580.12 - Service-wide Use
1. Cooperative Funds Act of June 30,1914 (16 U.S.C. 498 as amended by Pub. L
104-127). This Act authorizes the Forest Service to accept money received as contributions
toward cooperative work in forest investigations or protection, management and
improvement of the National Forest System (FSM 1584.11).
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2. Graneer-Thve Act of April 24,1950 (16 U.S.C. 572). Section 5 of this Act authorizes the Forest
Service to perform work to be done for the benefit of the depositor, for administration,
protection, improvement, reforestation, and such other kinds of work as the Forest Service is
authorized to do on lands of the United States: (a) on State, county, municipal, or private
land within or near National Forest land, or (b) for others who occupy or use National Forests
or other lands administered by the Forest Service (FSM 1584.12).
3. Acceptance of Gifts Act of October 10.1978 (7 U.S.C. 2269. Pub. L. 95-442). This Act authorizes
Forest Service acceptance of cash, as well as donations of real personal property (FSM
1584.13).
4. Cooperative Funds and Deposits Act of December 12.1975 (16 U.S.C 565al-a3. Pub. L 94-148). This
Act authorizes the Forest Service and cooperator(s) to perform work from which they would
accrue mutual non-monetary benefit (FSM 1587.11).
5. Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-154, (Challenge Cost-Share)).
This Act authorizes the Forest Service to cooperate with others in developing, planning, and
implementing mutually beneficial projects that enhance Forest Service activities, where the
cooperators provide matching funds or in-kind contributions. Cooperators may be public and
private agencies, organizations, institutions, and individuals (FSM 1587.12).
6. Title 7. United States Code, Section 2204a. This section provides for the exchange of personnel and
facilities in each field office of the Department of Agriculture to the extent necessary and
desirable to achieve the most efficient use of personnel and facilities and to provide the most
effective assistance in the development of rural areas in accordance with State rural
development plans (FSM 1585.11).
7. Federal Employees International Organization Service Act (5 U.S.C. 3343 and 3581-3584). as
amended. This Act authorizes the Forest Service to detail employees to an international
organization which requests services for a period not to exceed 5 years.
8. National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-113), as
amended by the Food Security Act of 1985 (7 U.S.C. 3318, and 3319, Pub. L. 99-198) and
further amended bv Public Law 105-198. This Act authorizes the Forest Service to:
a. Enter into joint venture agreements with any entity or individual to serve the mutual
interest of the parties in agricultural research, and teaching activities, whereby all
parties contribute resources to accomplish those objectives (7 U.S.C. 3318(b)).
b. Enter into cost reimbursable agreements with State cooperative institutions or other
colleges and universities without regard to any requirement for competition, for the
acquisition of goods or services, including personal services, to carry out agricultural
research or teaching activities of mutual interest (7 U.S.C. 3319(a), FSM 1587.13).
9. Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970 (16 U.S.C. 1701-1706,1723) as amended by the Title II,
Public Land Corps Act of 1993 (Pub. L. 91-378). This Act authorizes the Forest Service to utilize the
Corps or any qualified youth or conservation corps to carry out appropriate conservation projects
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on public lands, Indian lands, and Hawaiian homelands. Conservation projects may be carried out
on State, local, or private lands as part of disaster prevention or relief efforts in response to an
emergency or major disaster declared by the President (FSM 1581.25(a)).
1580.13 - Research
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research Act of 1978. as amended (16 U.S.C. 1641-1646.
Pub. L 95-307). This Act authorizes implementation of a program of forest and rangeland
renewable resources research, dissemination of the research findings, and the acceptance of
gifts, donations, and bequests and the investing thereof (FSM 1581.11 and FSM 1584.14).
1580.14 - State and Private Forestry
1. Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978. as amended (16 U.S.C. 2101-2114, Pub. L 95-313). This
Act authorizes the Forest Service to work through and in cooperation with State foresters or
equivalent agencies, and other countries in implementing technical programs affecting nonFederal forest lands (FSM 1581.13).
2. National Forest Dependent Rural Communities Economic Diversification Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. 6601
note. Pub. L. 101-624). Title XXIII, Subtitle G, Rural Revitalization Through Forestry, authorizes
Forest Service establishment and implementation of educational programs and technical
assistance to businesses, industries, and policy makers to create jobs, raise incomes, and
increase public revenues in ways that are consistent with environmental concerns (FSM
1581.15).
3. America the Beautiful (16 U.S.C. 2101. Subtitle C. Pub. L. 101-624). This law created the National
Tree Trust, a nonprofit foundation, to promote public awareness and solicit private sector
contributions to encourage tree planting projects, and allows the Forest Service to promote
principles of basic forest stewardship and provide increased assistance to others to plant and
maintain trees and improve forests in rural areas (FSM 1581.14).
1580.15 - International Programs
1. The International Forestry Cooperation Act of 1990 (16 U.S.C. 4501. Pub. L 101-513. as amended).
This Act authorizes Forest Service cooperation and assistance with domestic and international
organizations to further international programs, which support global environmental stability,
scientific exchange and educational opportunities, and technical and managerial expertise
(FSM 1581.12).
1580.16 - National Forest System
1. Cooperative Law Enforcement Act of August 10.1971 (16 U.S.C. 551a.
Pub. L 92-82). This Act authorizes Forest Service cooperation with State or political
subdivisions to enforce or supervise laws and ordinances of a State or political division on
National Forest Systems lands (FSM 1582).
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2. The Reciprocal Fire Act of Mav 27.1955 (42 U.S.C. 1856a. Pub. L 84-46).
This Act authorizes the Forest Service to enter into reciprocal agreements with any fire
organization maintaining fire protection facilities in the vicinity of national forest lands (FSM
1582).
3. National Forest Roads and Trails Act of October 13.1964 (16 U.S.C. 532-538.
Pub. L 88-657). This Act authorizes Forest Service financing and/or cooperation with other
public agencies, private agencies, or individuals for acquisition, construction, and
maintenance of forest development roads within or near national forests (FSM 1582).
4. National Trails System Act (16 U.S.C. 1246m). Pub. L 90-543). This Act authorizes Forest Service
cooperation with the States or their political subdivisions, landowners, private organizations,
or individuals to operate, develop, and maintain any portion of national trail system trails
either inside or outside a federally administered area (FSM 1581.21).
5. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (16 U.S.C. 1271 et sea.. Pub. L 90-542). This Act authorizes Forest Service
cooperation with States or their political subdivisions, landowners, private organizations, or
individuals to plan, protect, and manage river resources (FSM 1581.22).
6. Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-629.7 U.S.C. 2801 et sea.. Pub. L. 101-624). Title XIV,
Subtitle D - Other Conservation Measures, authorizes the Forest Service to issue cooperative
agreements to State agencies (or political subdivisions thereof responsible for the
administration or implementation of undesirable plant laws of a State) for establishment of
an undesirable plant management program and integrated management systems to control
or Contain undesirable plant species, and to issue specific cost-sharing cooperative
agreements with State and local agencies to manage noxious weeds in an area if a majority of
landowners in that area agree to participate in a noxious weed program (FSM 1581.23).
7. National and Community Service Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12501. Pub. L. 101-610). Subtitle C, National
Service Trust Program, establishes the Corporation for National Community Service, which
may enter into contracts or cooperative agreements with Federal agencies to support a
national service program carried out by the agency (FSM 1581.24).
8. Sikes Act of September 1.1960 (16 U.S.C. 67Qg-6701.670o. Pub. L 86-797. as amended). This Act
authorizes the Forest Service to cooperate with State wildlife agencies in conservation and
rehabilitation programs for fish, wildlife, and plants considered threatened or endangered
(FSM 1581.26)
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Appendix J
Variable and Element Frequency of Occurrence

^ ^

Frequency of Occurrence*
Almost Always Frequently Sometimes

Variable and Element

Mean

Rarely

>90%

90%-50%

50%-10%

<10%

Value = 3

Value = 2

Value = 1

Value = 0

Hypothesis I: New Forms of Citizen Engagement Arise as a Response to Constrained Federalism
Reduced Public Service
Administrator's instrument IB
Reduced Capacity

1.63

12.5

50.0

25.0

12.5

Increased Demand

1.63

25.0

25.0

37.5

12.5

Partner Request

2.13

37.5

37.5

25.0

Beyond Mission

1.88

25.0

37.5

37.5

Beyond Expertise

1.75

25.0

25.0

50.0

Beyond Capacity

2.0

37.5

25.0

37.5

Other Factors

3.0

100.0

Reduced Capacity

1.25

25.0

12.5

25.0

Increased Demand

2.25

37.5

50.0

12.5

Agency Request

1.88

25.0

50.0

12.5

12.5

Beyond Mission

1.75

37.5

12.5

37.5

12.5

Beyond Expertise

1.50

25.0

25.0

25.0

25.0

Beyond Capacity

1.63

37.5

12.5

25.0

25.0

Other Factors

3.0

100.0

25-Year Regional Funding

2.5

75.0

10-Year Local Unit Funding

1.5

37.5

Funding Impact to Mission

2.63

87.5

Partner's Perspective:

Citizen Coproduction
Administrator's instrument IB

37.5

25.0
12.5

12.5

37.5
12.5
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Frequency of Occurrence*
Almost Always Frequently Sometimes

Variable and Element

Mean

rtareiy

>90%

90%-50%

5096-10%

<1G%

Value = 3

Valuer 2

Value = 1

Value = 0

Structural Involvement Trends
Top management

2.63

87.5

12.5

Middle management

2.63

87.5

12.5

1.5

37.5

Technical staff

2.25

75.0

Support staff

1.38

25.0

Ideology

2.25

75.0

Other Aspects Organization

2.75

87.5

External agency environment

2.75

75.0

Internal agency environment

2.25

75.0

25.0

Strategic goals

1-5

50.0

50.0

Tactical goals

2.63

87.5

12.5

Operational objectives

2.57

85.7

14.3

Operational processes

3.0

100.0

Tactical outputs

2.25

75.0

Strategic goal attainment

2.13

62.5

Desired new external situation

1.88

62.5

Monitoring and evaluation

2.0

62.5

Impacts of agency funding

2.63

87.5

Kinds of partnerships formed

3.0

100.0

Number of partnerships formed

2.88

87.5

12.5

2.0

12.5

75.0

Operational staff

12.5

12.5

37.5
25.0

12.5

37.5

25.0
25.0

12.5

Functional Involvement Trends
25.0

25.0
12.5

25.0
37.5
12.5

25.0

Affects Partnership Trends
12.5

Coproduction Evolves
Administrator's instrument

Administrators Motivation
To build knowledge/support

12.5
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Frequency of Occurrence*
Almost Always Frequently sometimes
90%-50% 50%-10%
>90%
Variable and Element

Mean

To provide civic engagement

1.81

To provide for volunteerism

1.25

Value = 3

25.0

Value = 2

Value=1

12.5

50.0

12.5

25.0

62.5

37.5

Rarely
<10%
Value-0

37.5

Partner's Motivation
To build knowledge/support

1.63

Desire for civic engagement

1.5

25.0

12.5

50.0

12.5

Desire for volunteerism

1.0

12.5

25.0

12.5

50.0

Hypothesis II: Emergent Forms Include Elements of Liberal Democratic Citizen Engagement
Benefits of Liberal Democracy
Administrator's instrument
Partners Seeking
Broadened public support

2.13

12.5

87.5

lntergroup conflict resolution

1.88

12.5

75.0

12.5

Conflict resolution with others

1.13

12.5

75.0

12.5

Conflict resolution with agency

1.63

12.5

50.0

25.0

12.5

Active public engagement

2.5

50.0

50.0

Agreements Instrument
Partner transaction costs
Administrators transaction costs
Partner autonomy
Recognition other interests
Conflict resolution provision
Public involvement provision
Citizen participation
Hypothesis III: Emergent Forms Retain Benefits of Constrained Federalism and Reduce Its Shrinkage of Democracy
Benefits Constrained Federalism
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Administrator's instrument
Administrators View of Duty:
Potential of Litigation

1.5

12.5

50.0

12.5

Citizens' role in planning

2.13

37.5

37.5

25.0

Citizen role in coproduction

1.38

50.0

37.5

Citizen role in monitoring

1.13

12.5

87.5

25.0

12.5

Agreements Instrument
Within agency authority
Partner accountability
Professionalism
Reference to authorities
Reference to policy
Admin. Proc. Act Standards
Clear accountability
Defects Constrained federalism
Administrator's instrument
Administrators Motivation to
Serve local community needs

2.0

12.5

75.0

12.5

As an individual

1.88

37.5

25.0

25.0

As an agency administrator

2.0

25.0

50.0

25.0

As a local administrative unit

1.63

12.5

37.5

50.0

As a local public agency

1.63

25.0

37.5

12.5

25.0

Planning and Decision-making

1.5

37.5

12.5

12.5

37.5

Coproduction

1.38

50.0

37.5

12.5

Administrator Societal Connection
12.5

Provision of Citizen Role in:
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Monitoring and evaluation

.63

12.5

37.5

1.0

50.0

Federal accountability

1.13

25

62.5

Where to exert pressure

1.75

25.0

75.0

50.0

Increased Otizen Understanding
Federal checks and balances

50.0
12.5

Agreements Instrument
Acknowledges ethical issues
Serving community needs
Connection to social fabric
Civic engagement Provision
Hypothesis IV: There is a Common Set of Factors that Foster and Inhibit Democratic Citizen Engagement
Fosters Citizen Engagement
Administrator's instrument
Budget pressure

1.5
1.5

12.5
12.5

50.0
50.0

12.5
12.5

Coproduction evolves

2.38

37.5

62.5

Community involvement

1.75

12.5

50.0

37.5

Sharing power

1.5
1.5

37.5
37.5

12.5
12.5

12.5
12.5

Greater common good

2.63

62.5

37.5

Other coproduction factors

3.0

100.0

Other governance factors

2.5

75.0

25.0

37.5

25.0

Inhibits Citizen Engagement
Administrator's instrument
Legal constraints
Other coproduction factors
Other governance factors

.63

12.5
12.5

37.5
37.5

1.63

62.5

37.5

.88

87.5

50.0

12.5

Note. *Heading scale isfromInstruments and shows SPSS coding. Thefirstline of heading is
narrative description of frequency of occurrence. The second line describes categories by percent of
time subject element occurs. The third is SPSS coded value.
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Appendix K
SPSS Statistical Output

Descriptives of ordinal items for variable RPS:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Descriptive Statistics
N

Range

RPS item: Administrator's reason is reduced agency
capacity

8

3

0

3

.857

RPS item: Administrator's reason is public demand
for services

8

3

0

3

1.071

RPS item: Administrator's reason is partner request

8

2

1

3

.500

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work beyond
scope unit's mission

8

3

0

3

.857

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work beyond
scope unit's expertise

8

3

0

3

.839

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work beyond
unit's capacity

8

2

1

3

.857

RPS item: Partner's reason is reduced agency
capacity

8

3

0

3

1.839

RPS item: Partner's reason is to better meet
partner's demands

8

2

1

3

.500

RPS item: Partner's reason is in response to agency
request

8

3

0

3

.786

RPS item: Partner's reason is work beyond scope
unit's mission

8

3

0

3

1.411

RPS item: Partner's reason is work beyond scope
unit's expertise

8

3

0

3

1.268

RPS item: Partner's reason is work beyond unit's
capacity

8

3

0

3

1.643

5

0

3

3

.000

7

0

3

3

.000

RPS item: 25 year trend in agency regional funding-scaled

8

2

1

3

.500

RPS item: 10 year trend in funding at local unit
level-scaled

8

3

0

3

1.839

RPS item: Affect of funding on local unit ability to
meet its mission-scaled

8

3

0

3

1.125

Valid N (listwise)

4

RPS item: Administrator's reason is other-scaled
RPS item: Partner's reason is other-scaled

Minimum Maximum Variance
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T-Test of ordinal items for variable RPS:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

RPS item: Administrator's reason is reduced
agency capacity

8

1.50

.926

.327

RPS item: Administrator's reason is public
demand for services

8

1.75

1.035

.366

RPS item: Administrator's reason is partner
request

8

2.25

.707

.250

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond scope unit's mission

8

1.50

.926

.327

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond scope unit's expertise

8

1.38

.916

.324

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond unit's capacity

8

2.00

.926

.327

RPS item: Partner's reason is reduced
agency capacity

8

1.13

1.356

.479

RPS item: Partner's reason is to better meet
partner's demands

8

2.25

.707

.250

RPS item: Partner's reason is in response to
agency request

8

1.75

.886

.313

RPS item: Partner's reason is work beyond
scope unit's mission

8

1.38

1.188

.420

RPS item: Partner's reason is work beyond
scope unit's expertise

8

1.13

1.126

.398

RPS item: Partner's reason is work beyond
unit's capacity

8

1.25

1.282

.453

RPS item: Administrator's reason is otherscaled

5

3.00

.000(a)

.000

7

3.00

.000(a)

.000

RPS item: 25 year trend in agency regional
funding-scaled

8

2.75

.707

.250

RPS item: 10 year trend in funding at local
unit level-scaled

8

1.88

1.356

.479

RPS item: Affect of funding on local unit
ability to meet its mission-scaled

8

2.63

1.061

.375

RPS item: Partner's reason is other-scaled

a t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0.

Appendix K: SPSS Output 446
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
reduced agency capacity

4.583

7

.003

1.500

.73

2.27

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
public demand for services

4.782

7

.002

1.750

.88

2.62

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
partner request

9.000

7

.000

2.250

1.66

2.84

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
work beyond scope unit's mission

4.583

7

.003

1.500

.73

2.27

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
work beyond scope unit's expertise

4.245

7

.004

1.375

.61

2.14

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
work beyond unit's capacity

6.110

7

.000

2.000

1.23

2.77

RPS item: Partner's reason is
reduced agency capacity

2.346

7

.051

1.125

-.01

2.26

RPS item: Partner's reason is to
better meet partner's demands

9.000

7

.000

2.250

1.66

2.84

RPS item: Partner's reason is in
response to agency request

5.584

7

.001

1.750

1.01

2.49

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond scope unit's mission

3.274

7

.014

1.375

.38

2.37

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond scope unit's expertise

2.826

7

.026

1.125

.18

2.07

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond unit's capacity

2.758

7

.028

1.250

.18

2.32

11.000

7

.000

2.750

2.16

3.34

3.910

7

.006

1.875

.74

3.01

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

RPS item: 25 year trend in agency
regional funding-scaled
RPS item: 10 year trend in funding at
local unit level-scaled
RPS item: Affect of funding on local
unit ability to meet its missionscaled
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Reliability of ordinal items for variable RPS:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

N
%
8
100.0
0
.0
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Cases

Cronbach's
Alpha
.803

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

N of Items
12

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
reduced agency capacity

17.75

37.929

.727

.764

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
public demand for services

17.50

41.429

.343

.798

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
partner request

17.00

49.143

-.259

.833

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond scope unit's mission

17.75

38.786

.644

.772

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond scope unit's expertise

17.88

38.982

.634

.773

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond unit's capacity

17.25

41.071

.433

.790

RPS item: Partner's reason is reduced
agency capacity

18.13

39.839

.315

.808

RPS item: Partner's reason is to better
meet partner's demands

17.00

45.429

.120

.811

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond scope unit's mission

17.88

38.982

.450

.789

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond scope unit's expertise

18.13

34.982

.812

.749

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond unit's capacity

18.00

33.429

.810

.745

RPS item: Partner's reason is in
response to agency request

17.50

43.143

.270

.803
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Maximal reliability of ordinal items for variable RPS:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
Valid
8
100.0
Excluded(a)
0
.0
Total
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.897

N of Items
5

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
reduced agency capacity

5.25

13.929

.662

.892

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond scope unit's mission

5.25

13.929

.662

.892

RPS item: Administrator's reason is work
beyond scope unifs expertise

5.38

13.411

.761

.874

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond scope unit's expertise

5.63

11.125

.927

.830

RPS item: Partner's reason is work
beyond unit's capacity

5.50

11.143

.768

.876
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Reliability of scaled items for variable RPS:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Warnings
Scale has zero variance items.
Case Processing Summary
N
%
4
50.0
4
50.0
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.000

N of Items
5

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

RPS item: Administrator's reason is
other-scaled

11.75

.250

.000

.000

RPS item: Partner's reason is otherscaled

11.75

.250

.000

.000

RPS item: 25 year trend in agency
regional funding-scaled

11.75

.250

.000

.000

RPS item: 10 year trend in funding at
local unit level-scaled

12.00

.000

.000

Nan(a)

RPS item: Affect of funding on local unit
ability to meet its mission-scaled

11.75

.250

.000

.000

i

-

a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
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Descriptives of scaled items for variable CCop:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Descriptive Statistics

CCop item: Trends in top management
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in middle
management involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in technical
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in support staff
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in ideology (beliefs,
traditions, norms, values, culture)-scaled
CCop item: Trends in any other aspects
of organizational forms for partnershipsscaled
CCop item: Trends in agency situationscaled
CCop item: Trends in forming intent or
strategic goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical goalsscaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
objectives-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
processes-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical outputsscaled
CCop item: Trends in attainment of
strategic goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in desired new
external situation-scaled
CCop item: Affect of change in funding or
organizational capacity on partnershipsscaled
CCop item: Patterns and trends in kinds
of j»artnerships—scaled

CCop item: Patterns and trends in
number of partnerships-scaled
CCop item: Trends in external situationscaled
CCop item: Trends in monitoring and
evaluation-scaled
Valid N (listwise)

N

Range

Minimum

Maxim u
m

Variance

8

3

0

3

1.125

8

3

0

3

1.125

8

3

0

3

1.839

8

3

0

3

2.411

8

3

0

3

1.643

8

3

0

3

1.125

7

2

1

3

.571

8

3

0

3

1.125

8

3

0

3

1.125

8

0

3

3

.000

7

3

0

3

2.143

8

0

3

3

.000

8

3

0

3

1.929

8

3

0

3

1125

8

3

0

3

1.929

8

3

0

3

1.125

8

1

2

3

.125

8

1

2

3

.125

8

1

2

3

.125

8

3

0

3

1.839

6

.
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T-Test of scaled items for variable CCop:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics
N
CCop item: Trends in top management
8
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in middle management
8
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
8
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in technical involvement8
scaled
CCop item: Trends in support staff
8
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in ideology (beliefs,
8
traditions, norms, values, culture)-scaled
CCop item: Trends in any other aspects of
7
organizational forms for partnerships-scaled
CCop item: Trends in external situation8
scaled
CCop item: Trends in agency situation8
scaled
CCop item: Trends in forming intent or
8
strategic goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical goals-scaled
8
CCop item: Trends in operational objectives7
scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational processes8
scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical outputs-scaled
8
CCop item: Trends in attainment of strategic
8
goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in desired new external
8
situation-scaled
CCop item: Trends in monitoring and
8
evaluation-scaled
CCop item: Affect of change in funding or
organizational capacity on partnerships8
scaled
CCop item: Patterns and trends in kinds of
8
partnerships-scaled
CCop item: Patterns and trends in number of
8
1 partnerships-scaled
a t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0.

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

2.63

1.061

.375

2.63

1.061

.375

1.88

1.356

.479

1.88

1.553

.549

1.25

1.282

.453

2.63

1.061

.375

2.71

.756

.286

2.88

.354

.125

2.63

1.061

.375

2.63

1.061

.375

3.00

.000(a)

.000

2.14

1.464

.553

3.00

.000(a)

.000

2.25

1.389

.491

2.63

1.061

.375

2.25

1.389

.491

1.88

1.356

.479

2.63

1.061

.375

2.88

.354

.125

2.88

.354

.125
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One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0
t

CCop item: Trends in top management
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in middle management
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
involvement-scaled

df

Mean
Sig. (2tailed) Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower

Upper

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

3.910

7

.006

1.875

.74

3.01

3.416

7

.011

1.875

.58

3.17

2.758

7

.028

1.250

.18

2.32

7.000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

9.500

6

.000

2.714

2.02

3.41

7

.000

2.875

2.58

3.17

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

6

.008

2.143

.79

3.50

7

.003

2.250

1.09

3.41

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

7

.003

2.250

1.09

3.41

7

.006

1.875

.74

3.01

7,000

7

.000

2.625

1.74

3.51

23.000

7

.000

2.875

2.58

3.17

CCop item: Patterns and trends in number of
partnerships-scaled
23.000

7

.000

2.875

2.58

3.17

CCop item: Trends in technical involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in support staff
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in ideology (beliefs,
traditions, norms, values, culture)-scaled
CCop item: Trends in any other aspects of
organizational forms for partnerships-scaled

CCop item: Trends in external situation23.000
scaled
CCop item: Trends in agency situation7.000
scaled
CCop item: Trends in forming intent or
7.000
strategic goals-scaled
CCop Kern: Trends in operational objectives3.873
-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical outputs4.583
scaled
CCop item: Trends in attainment of strategic
7.000
goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in desired new external
4.583
situation-scaled
CCop item: Trends in monitoring and
3.910
evaluation-scaled
CCop item: Affect of change in funding or
organizational capacity on partnershipsscaled
CCop item: Patterns and trends in kinds of
partnerships-scaled
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Reliability of scaled items for variable CCop:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Reliability Statistics
Case Processing Summary
N
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

6
2
8

%
75.0
25.0
100.0

Cronbach's
Alpha
.687

N of Items
20

a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if Scale Variance Corrected Item Cronbach's Alpha
Item Deleted if Item Deleted Total Correlation if item Deleted
CCop item: Trends in top mgrnt
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in middle mgrnt
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tech
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in Support staff
involvement-scaled
CCop item: Trends in ideology
(beliefs, traditions, norms, values,
culture)-scaled
CCop item: Trends in any other
aspects of organizational forms for
sartnerships-scaled
CCop item: Trends in external
situation-scaled
CCop item: Trends in forming intent
or strategic goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical
goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
objectives-scaled
CCop item: Trends in operational
processes-scaled
CCop item: Trends in tactical
outputs-scaled
CCop item: Trends in attainment of
strategic goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in desired new
external situation-scaled
jCCop item: Trends in monitoring

46.50

75.100

-.367

.741

46.50

59.500

.413

.659

47.00

52.800

.783

.610

47.00

59.200

.302

.673

47.83

66.567

.045

.699

46.50

58.300

.481

.651

46.33

62.267

.455

.662

46.17

64.967

.557

.670

46.50

59.500

.413

.659

46.00

68.800

.000

.689

46.50

59.500

.413

.659

46.00

68.800

.000

.689

46.50

58.300

.481

.651

46.50

58.300

.481

.651

47.00

48.400

.835

.587

47.00

74.800

-.347

.741
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Scale Mean if Scale Variance Corrected Item Cronbach's Alpha
Item Deleted if Item Deleted Total Correlation if Item Deleted
and evaluation-scaled
CCop item: Patterns and trends in
kinds of partnerships-scaled
CCop item: Patterns and trends in
number of partnerships-scaled
CCop item: Trends in agency
situation-scaled
CCop item: Affect of change in
Funding or organizational capacity
on partnerships-scaled

46.00

68.800

.000

.689

46.17

70.967

-.339

.703

46.50

58.300

.481

.651

46.50

69.100

-.088

.714

Maximal reliability of scaled items for variable CCop:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
Valid
100.0
8
Excluded(
.0
0
a)
Total
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
1.000

N of Items
3
Item-Total Statistics
Corrected
Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Scale Variance Item-Total
Alpha if Item
Item Deleted if Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted

CCop item: Trends in ideology (beliefs,
traditions, norms, values, culture)-scaled
CCop item: Trends in attainment of
strategic goals-scaled
CCop item: Trends in agency situationscaled

5.25

4.500

1.000

1.000

5.25

4.500

1.000

1.000

5.25

4.500

1.000

1.000
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Descriptives of ordinal items for variable CEv:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Descriptive Statistics
N Range Minimum Maximum Variance
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to build
stakeholder knowledge or support
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to provide civic
engagement
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to provide
opportunity for volunteerism
CEv item: Partner's reason is to build knowledge or
support
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for civic
engagement
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for volunteer
opportunities
CEv item: Evolution of coproduction to democratic
citizen engagement
Valid N (listwise)

8

3

0

3

.786

8

3

o

3

1 210

8

3

0

3

1.643

8

2

1

3

500

8

3

0

3

1.357

R

3

0

3

1.696

8

3

o

3

1 125

8

T-Test of ordinal items for variable CEv:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\D±ssertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics

CEv item: Administrator's reason is to build
stakeholder knowledge or support
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to provide
civic engagement
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to provide
opportunity for volunteerism
CEv item: Partner's reason is to build
knowledge or support
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for civic
engagement
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
volunteer opportunities
CEv item: Evolution of coproduction to
democratic citizen engagement

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

8

1.75

.886

.313

8

1.69

1.100

.389

8

1.25

1.282

.453

8

1.75

.707

.250

8

1.75

1.165

.412

8

1.38

1.302

.460

8

1.63

1.061

.375
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One-Sample Test

CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
build stakeholder knowledge or support
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
provide civic engagement
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
provide opportunity for volunteerism
CEv item: Partner's reason is to build
knowledge or support
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
civic engagement
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
volunteer opportunities
CEv item: Evolution of coproduction to
democratic citizen engagement

Test Value = 0
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Mean
Sig. (2Upper
tailed) Difference Lower

t

df

5.584

7

.001

1.750

1.01

2.49

4.339

7

.003

1.688

.77

2.61

2.758

7

.028

1.250

.18

2.32

7.000

7

.000

1.750

1.16

2.34

4.249

7

.004

1.750

.78

2.72

2.986

7

.020

1.375

.29

2.46

4.333

7

.003

1.625

.74

2.51

Reliability of ordinal items for variable CEv:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N
%
Valid
Cases
8
100.0
Excluded(a)
0
.0
Total
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Cronbach's
Alpha
.428

N of Items
7
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Item-Total Statistics
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
build stakeholder knowledge or support
CEv item: reason is to provide civic
engagement
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
provide opportunity for volunteerism
CEv item: Partner's reason is to build
knowledge or support
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
civic engagement
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
volunteer opportunities
CEv item: Evolution of coproduction to
democratic citizen engagement

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

9.44

11.531

.136

.416

9.50

11.429

.067

.454

9.94

9.317

.278

.340

9.44

15.246

-.472

.585

9.44

7.388

.694

.070

9.81

6.853

.673

.041

9.56

12.246

-.031

.495

Maximal reliability of ordinal items for variable CEv:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics

N
%
Cases
Valid
8
100.0
Excluded(a)
0
.0
Total
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.

Cronbach's
Alpha
.692

N of Items

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected Item Cronbach's
if Item
Variance if
Total
Alpha if Item
Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
build stakeholder knowledge or support
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
provide civic engagement
CEv item: Administrator's reason is to
provide opportunity for volunteerism
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
civic engagement
CEv item: Partner's reason is desire for
volunteer opportunities

6.06

11.888

.380

.671

6.13

10.982

.385

.668

6.56

8.674

.620

.557

6.06

10.603

.400

.662

6.44

9.531

.469

.635
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Descriptives of scaled items for variable CEv:
Administrators instrument
[DataSet3] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Thesis (C)\SPSS\Partner Motives Ten Years
ago and Today.sav
Descriptive Statistics

Partners Ten Years Ago
Partners Today
Valid N (listwise)

N

Minimum

100
100
100

0
0

Mean

Maximum
4
4

1.61

Std. Deviation
1.262

2.39

1.333

T-Test of partner's motivations ten years ago vs
today for variable CEv: Administrators instrument
[DataSet3] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Thesis (C)\SPSS\Partner Motives Ten Years
ago and Today.sav
One-Sample Statistics

Partners Ten Years Ago
Partners Today

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

100
100

1.61
2.39

1.262
1.333

Std. Error
Mean
.126
.133

One-Sample Test

Test Value * 0
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

Partners Ten Years
Ago
Partners Today

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

12.753

99

.000

1.610

1.36

1.86

17.936

99

.000

2.390

2.13

2.65
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Reliability of partner's motivations ten years ago vs
today for variable CEv: Administrators instrument
[DataSet3] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Thesis (C)\SPSS\Partner Motives Ten Years
ago and Today.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
100
100.0
0
.0
100
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.954

N of Items
2
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Descriptives of ordinal items for variable BLDem:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransfornied.sav
Descriptive Statistics

BLDem item: Extent of partner's
seeking to broaden basis of public
support
BLDem item: Extent of partner's
use of interest-based intergroup
conflict resolution
BLDem item: Extent of partner's
use of interest-based conflict
resolution with others
BLDem item: Extent of partner's
use of interest-based conflict
resolution with the agency
BLDem item: Extent of partners
seeking active public involvement
Valid N (listwise)

N

Minimum

Maxim u
m

Mean

Std.
Deviation

8

1

3

2.00

.535

8

0

3

1.75

.886

8

0

3

1.13

.835

8

0

3

1.75

.886

8

0

3

2.25

1.035

8

T-Test of ordinal items for variable BLDem:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

BLDem item: Extent of partner's seeking to broaden
basis of public support

8

2.00

.535

.189

BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of interest-based
intergroup conflict resolution

8

1.75

.886

.313

8

1.13

.835

.295

8

1.75

.886

.313

8

2.25

1.035

.366

BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of interest-based
conflict resolution with others
BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of interest-based
conflict resolution with the agency
BLDem item: Extent of partners seeking active public
involvement
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One-Sample Test

BLDem item: Extent of partner's seeking
to broaden basis of public support
BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of
interest-based intergroup conflict
resolution
BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of
interest-based conflict resolution with
others
BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of
interest-based conflict resolution with
the agency
BLDem item: Extent of partners seeking
active public involvement

Test Value = 0
Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Sig. (2tailed) Difference
of the Difference
Lower
Upper

t

df

10.583

7

.000

2.000

1.55

2.45

5.584

7

.001

1.750

1.01

2.49

3.813

7

.007

1.125

.43

1.82

5.584

7

.001

1.750

1.01

2.49

6.148

7

.000

2.250

1.38

3.12

Reliability of ordinal items for variable BLDem:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

N
%
100.0
8
.0
0
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.729

N of Items
5

Item-Total Statistics
Scale
Corrected Cronbach's
Scale Mean if Variance if Item-Total Alpha if Item
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
BLDem item: Extent of partner's seeking to
broaden basis of public support
BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of

6.88

8.982

-.178

.838

interest-based intergroup conflict resolution

7.13

4.696

.837

.527

BLDem item: Extent of partner's use of
interest-based conflict resolution with others

7.75

5.357

.684

.604

7.13

5.554

.564

.652

6.63

5.125

.533

.669

BLDem item: Extent of partner's use
interest-based conflict resolution with the
agency
BLDem item: Extent of partners seeking
active public involvement
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Maximal reliability of ordinal items for variable BLDem:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

N
%
8
100.0
0
.0
8
100.0
,
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.931

N of Items
3

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

BLDem item: Extent of
partner's use of interestbased intergroup conflict
resolution

2.88

2.696

.859

.901

BLDem item: Extent of
partner's use of interestbased conflict resolution
with others

3.50

2.857

.861

.900

BLDem item: Extent of
partner's use of interestbased conflict resolution
with the agency

2.88

2.696

.859

.901
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Descriptives of scaled items for variable BLDem:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Docuirients\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Descriptive Statistics

BLDem item: Provision for
acknowledgement of potential
interests of others
BLDem item: Provision for conflict
resolution between agency and
partner
BLDem item: Provision for public
involvement in coproduction activities
BLDem Acknowledgement or
provision of role for citizen
participation
Valid N (listwise)

N

Minimum

Maxim u
m

Mean

Std.
Deviation

88

0

3

.47

.946

89

0

3

.31

.717

86

0

3

57

1 O ^

89

0

3

.44

.891

85

T-Test of scaled items for variable BLDem:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
One-Sample Statistics

BLDem item: Provision for
acknowledgement of potential
interests of others
BLDem item: Provision for
conflict resolution between
agency and partner
BLDem item: Provision for
public involvement in
coproduction activities
BLDem Acknowledgement or
provision of role for citizen
participation

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

88

.47

.946

.101

89

.31

.717

.076

86

.57

1.035

.112

89

.44

.891

.094
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One-Sample Test

BLDem item: Provision for
acknowledgement of potential
interests of others
BLDem item: Provision for conflict
resolution between agency and
partner
BLDem item: Provision for public
involvement in coproduction
activities
BLDem Acknowledgement or
provision of role for citizen
participation

Test Value = 0
Mean
Differenc
Sig. (2tailed)
e

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Upper
Lower

t

df

4.619

87

.000

.466

.27

.67

4.142

88

.000

.315

.16

.47

5.104

85

.000

.570

.35

.79

4.638

88

.000

.438

.25

.63

Reliability of scaled items for variable BLDem:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA. sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N
%
95.5
85
4
4.5
89
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.935

N of Items

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
if Item
Variance if
Deleted Item Deleted
BLDetn item: Provision for acknowledge of
potential interests of others
BLDem item: Provision for conflict
resolution between agency and partner
BLDem item: Provision for public
involvement in coproduction activities
BLDem Acknowledgement or provision of
role for citizen participation

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if item
Deleted

1.36

5.925

.939

.883

1.52

7.824

.702

.959

1.27

5.890

.844

.921

1.39

6.169

.940

.884
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Maximal reliability of scaled items for variable BLDem:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documertts and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav

Case Processing Summary
N
%
88
98.9
1
1.1
100.0
89
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Exciuded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.972

N of Items
2

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

.44

.801

.948

•(a)

.47

.895

.948

(a)

BLDem item: Provision
for acknowledgement
of potential interests of
others
BLDem
Acknowledgement or
provision of role for
citizen participation
• II i

ii

ii i

)

i

i

i

i

t i i

i

i

a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
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Descriptives of ordinal items for variable BConF:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Descriptive Statistics

N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std.
Deviation

BConF item: Extent of Administrator's
consideration of litigation issues regarding
coproduction

8

0

3

1.63

1.188

BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in planning & decisionmaking

8

1

3

2.13

.835

BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in projects or service
delivery

8

0

2

1.38

.744

BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in monitoring of projects or
service

8

1

3

1.38

.744

Valid N (listwise)

8

T-Test of ordinal items for variable BConf:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

BConF item: Extent of Administrator's consideration of
litigation issues regarding coproduction

8

1.63

1.188

.420

BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for citizen
engagement in planning & decision-making

8

2.13

.835

.295

BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for citizen
engagement in projects or service delivery

8

1.38

.744

.263

BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for citizen
engagement in monitoring of projects or service

8

1.38

.744

.263
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One-Sample Test

BCohF item: Extent of Administrator's
consideration of litigation regarding
coproduction
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty
for citizen engagement in planning &
decision-making
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty
For citizen engagement in projects or
service delivery
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty
for citizen engagement in monitoring of
projects or service

Test Value =0
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Sig. (2- Mean
Upper
tailed) Difference Lower

t

df

3.870

7

.006

1.625

.63

2.62

7.202

7

.000

2.125

1.43

2.82

5.227

7

.001

1.375

.75

2.00

5.227

7

.001

1.375

.75

2.00

Reliability of ordinal items for variable BConF:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Docuraents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N

O
CO

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

CO

%
100.0
.0
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Cronbach's
Alpha
.583

N of Items
4

Item-Total Statistics
Corrected Cronbach's
Scale Mean
Scale
if Item
Variance if Item-Total Alpha if Item
Deleted Item Deleted Correlation
Deleted
BConF item: Extent of Administrator's
consideration of litigation issues regarding
coproduction
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in planning & decisionmaking
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in projects or service
delivery
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in monitoring of projects
or service

4.88

2.982

.322

.593

4.38

4.268

.218

.615

5.13

3.839

.453

.460

5.13

3.554

.573

.377
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Reliability
[DataSetl] C:\DoQuments and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

N
%
8
100.0
0
.0
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.615

N of Items
3

Item-Total Statistics

BConF item: Extent of Administrator's
consideration of litigation issues regarding
coproduction
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in projects or service
delivery
BConF item: Administrator's sense of duty for
citizen engagement in monitoring of projects
or service

Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if Item-Total
Deleted Item Deleted Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

2.75

1.357

.542

.368

3.00

2.857

.341

.625

3.00

2.571

.479

.472
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Maximal reliability of ordinal items for variable BConF:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
100.0
8
0
.0
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Exctuded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.625

N of Items
2
Item-Total Statistics
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlatiort

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

BConF item: Extent of Administrator's
consideration of litigation issues
1.38
.554
.505
•(a)
regarding coproduction
BConF item: Administrator's sense of
duty for citizen engagement in
.(a)
1.411
.505
1.63
monitoring of projects or service
a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
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Descriptives of scaled items for variable BConF:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

BConf item: Strength of
reference to alignment with
agency mission

89

1

3

2.84

.474

BConf item: Partner's
procedural transaction costs of
coproduction

79

0

3

.86

1.163

BConf item: Agency's
procedural transaction costs
associated with partner's
coproduction

79

0

3

.86

1.163

BConf item: Partner's autonomy
to change coproduction to
match changed conditions

79

0

3

2.67

.729

BConf item: Partner's
accountability for coproduction

79

0

3

2.71

.663

BConf item: Degree of
professionalism embodied in
coproduction activities

89

1

3

2.37

.509

BConf item: Reference to
legislative authorities

89

0

3

2.48

.881

BConf item: Reference to
executive branch policies

89

0

3

1.93

1.250

BConf item: Provision for due
process or Administrative
Procedures Act standards

89

2

3

2.74

.440

BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results

83

1

3

2.70

.619

Valid N (listwise)

79
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T-Test of scaled items for variable BConF:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
One-Sample Statistics

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

BConf item: Strength of reference to
alignment with agency mission

89

2.84

.474

.050

BConf item: Partner's procedural
transaction costs of coproduction

79

.86

1.163

.131

BConf item: Agency's procedural
transaction costs associated with
partner's coproduction

79

.86

1.163

.131

BConf item: Partner's autonomy to
change coproduction to match
changed conditions

79

2.67

.729

.082

BConf item: Partner's accountability
for coproduction

79

2.71

.663

.075

BConf item: Degree of
professionalism embodied in
coproduction activities

89

2.37

.509

.054

BConf item: Reference to legislative
authorities

89

2.48

.881

.093

BConf item: Reference to executive
branch policies

89

1.93

1.250

.133

BConf item: Provision for due
process or Administrative Procedures
Act standards

89

2.74

.440

.047

BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results

83

2.70

.619

.068
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One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0

Mean
Sig. (2-tailed) Difference

t

df

56.540

88

.000

6.579

78

6.579

BConf item: Partner's autonomy
to change coproduction to match
changed conditions

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower

Upper

2.843

2.74

2.94

.000

.861

.60

1.12

78

.000

.861

.60

1.12

32,568

78

.000

2.671

2.51

2.83

BConf item: Partner's
accountability for coproduction

36.306

78

.000

2.709

2.56

2.86

BConf item: Degree of
professionalism embodied in
coproduction activities

43.975

88

.000

2.371

2.26

2.48

BConf item: Reference to
legislative authorities

26.605

88

.000

2.483

2.30

2.67

BConf item: Reference to
executive branch policies

14.581

88

.000

1.933

1.67

2.20

BConf item: Provision for due
process or Administrative
Procedures Act standards

58.748

88

.000

2.742

2.65

2.83

BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results

39.689

82

.000

2.699

2.56

2.83

BConf item: Strength of
reference to alignment with
agency mission
BConf item: Partner's procedural
transaction costs of
coproduction
BConf item: Agency's procedural
transaction costs associated
with partner's coproduction
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Reliability of scaled items for variable BConF:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N
%
79
88.8
10
11.2
89
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.230

N of Items
10

Item-Total Statistics

(

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale Variance
if Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

BConf item: Strength of
reference to alignment with
19.73
6.993
.516
.067
agency mission
BConf item: Partner's
procedural transaction costs
21.70
9.317
-.290
.464
of coproduction
BConf item: Agency's
procedural transaction costs
21.70
9.317
-.290
.464
associated with partner's
coproduction
BConf item: Partner's
autonomy to change
19.89
.063
.219
7.820
coproduction to match
changed conditions
BConf item: Partner's
accountability for
19.85
.293
.117
7.130
coproduction
BConf item: Degree of
professionalism embodied in
20.18
8.660
-.104
.272
coproduction activities
BConf item: Reference to
20.01
5.731
.464
-.051(a)
legislative authorities
BConf item: Reference to
20.39
6.600
.128
.177
executive branch policies
BConf item: Provision for
due process or
19.73
7.172
.626
.077
Administrative Procedures
Act standards
BConf item: Extent Of clear
19.84
6.960
.388
.083
accountability for results
a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
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Reliability
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary

79

%
88.8

10

11.2

N
Cases

Valid
Excluded(
a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
..
Cronbach's
Alpha
N of Items
.464
9

100.0
89
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Item-Total Statistics
Scale
Mean if
Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

BConf item: Strength of reference to
alignment with agency mission
BConf item: Agency's procedural
transaction costs associated with
partner's coproduction

18.87

7.291

.657

.324

20.84

12.729

-.574

.773

BConf item: Partner's autonomy to
Change coproduction to match changed
conditions

19.03

8.563

.052

.483

BConf item: Partner's accountability for
coproduction

18.99

6.961

.547

.316

19.32

9.988

-.288

.546

BConf item: Reference to legislative
authorities

19.15

5.464

.703

.173

BConf item: Reference to executive
branch policies

19.53

5.406

.505

.253

18.87

7.445

.822

.325

18.97

6.846

.645

.292

BConf item: Degree of professionalism
embodied in coproduction activities

BConf item: Provision for due process or
Administrative Procedures Act standards
BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results
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Reliability
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N
%
Valid
Cases
79
88.8
Excluded(a)
10
11.2
Total
89
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Cronbach's
Alpha
.773

N of Items
8

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

BConf item: Strength of reference
to alignment with agency mission

18,01

10.295

.680

.728

BConf item: Partner's autonomy
to change coproduction to match
changed conditions

18.16

12.011

.037

.818

BConf item: Partner's
accountability for coproduction

18.13

9.497

.683

.714

BConf item: Degree of
professionalism embodied in
coproduction activities

18.46

14.020

-.404

.845

BConf item: Reference to
legislative authorities

18-29

7.901

.773

.682

BConf item: Reference to
executive branch policies

18.67

6.916

.768

.685

BConf item: Provision for due
process or Administrative
Procedures Act standards

18.01

10.423

.870

.722

BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results

18.11

9.436

.766

.704
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Reliability
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSO\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
79
88.8
10
11.2
89
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.845

N of Items
7

Item-Total Statistics

BConf item: Strength of reference to
alignment with agency mission
BConf item: Partner's autonomy to
change coproduction to match
changed conditions
BConf item: Partner's accountability
for coproduction
BConf item: Reference to legislative
authorities
BConf item: Reference to executive
branch policies
BConf item: Provision for due
process or Administrative
Procedures Act standards
BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results

Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

15.63

11.440

.688

.821

15.78

13.017

.090

.893

15.75

10.807

.636

.820

15.91

8.902

.782

.793

16.29

7.542

.843

.787

15.63

11.646

.849

.817

15.73

10,608

.752

.807
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Maximal reliability of scaled items for variable BConF:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
79
88.8
10
11.2
89
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.893

N of Items
6

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

BConf item: Strength of
reference to alignment with
agency mission

12.96

10.370

.744

.879

BConf item: Partner's
accountability for
coproduction

13.08

9.815

.665

.882

BConf item: Reference to
legislative authorities

13.24

8.108

.779

.866

BConf item: Reference to
executive branch policies

13.62

6.931

.813

.878

12.96

10.652

.884

.877

13.06

9.522

.815

.863

BConf item: Provision for
due process or
Administrative Procedures
Act standards
BConf item: Extent of clear
accountability for results
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Descriptives of ordinal items for variable RDef:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Descriptive Statistics

N

Minimum

Maximu
m

Mean

Std.
Deviation

RDef item: Administrator's motivation to
serve needs of the local community

8

1

3

2.00

.535

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an individual

8

0

3

1.50

1.195

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an agency
administrator

8

1

3

1.81

.753

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local
administrative unit

8

1

3

1.50

.756

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local public
agency

8

0

3

1.50

1.195

RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
planning & decision-making

8

0

3

1.50

1.414

RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
delivery of services or projects

8

0

2

1.25

.707

RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
monitoring or evaluation

8

0

2

.63

.744

RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of checks
and balances in American federalism

8

0

3

1.38

1.188

RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of
accountability in American federalism

8

0

3

1.38

.916

RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of how to
best exert pressure in American federalism

8

1

2

1.63

.518

Valid N (listwise)

8
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T-Test of ordinal items for variable RDef:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

8

2.00

.535

.189

8

1.50

1.195

.423

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an agency
administrator

8

1.81

.753

.266

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local
administrative unit

8

1.50

.756

.267

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local public
agency

8

1.50

1.195

.423

RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
planning & decision-making

8

1.50

1.414

.500

RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
delivery of services or projects

8

1.25

.707

.250

RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
monitoring or evaluation

8

.63

.744

.263

RDef item: (^production's role in
increasing citizen understanding of checks
and balances in American federalism

8

1.38

1.188

.420

RDef item: reproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of
accountability in American federalism

8

1.38

.916

.324

8

1.63

.518

.183

RDef item: Administrator's motivation to
serve needs of the local community
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an individual

RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of how to
best exert pressure in American

federalism
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One-Sample Test

RDef item: Administrator's motivation to
serve needs of the local community
RDef item: Administrator's connection
to community social fabric as an
individual
RDef item: Administrator's connection
to community social fabric as an agency
administrator
RDef item: Administrator's connection
to community social fabric as a local
administrative unit
RDef item: Administrator's connection
to community social fabric as a local
public agency
RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
planning & decision-making
RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
delivery of services or projects
RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
monitoring or evaluation
RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of
checks and balances in American
federalism
RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of
accountability in American federalism

RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of how
to best exert pressure in American
federalism

Test Value = 0
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Sig. (2- Mean
tailed) Difference
Lower
Upper

t

df

10.583

7

.000

2.000

1.55

2.45

3.550

7

.009

1.500

.50

2.50

6.808

7

.000

1.813

1.18

2.44

5.612

7

.001

1.500

.87

2.13

3.550

7

.009

1.500

.50

2.50

3.000

7

.020

1.500

.32

2.68

5.000

7

.002

1.250

.66

1.84

2.376

7

.049

.625

.00

1.25

3.274

7

.014

1.375

.38

2.37

4.245

7

.004

1.375

.61

2.14

8.881

7

.000

1.625

1.19

2.06
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Reliability of ordinal items for variable RDef:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

N
%
8
100.0
0
.0
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the
procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha(a)
N of Items
11
-.139
a The value is negative due to a negative
average covariance among items. This violates
reliability model assumptions. You may want to
check item codings.

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
Corrected
if Item
Variance if Item-Total
Deleted Item Deleted Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

RDef item: Administrator's motivation to serve
.036
14.06
9.888
-.425
needs of the local community
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
14.56
.034
-.207(a)
7.103
community social fabric as an individual
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an agency
14.25
9.357
-.256
.008
administrator
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local administrative
14.56
6.817
.344
-.402(a)
unit
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
-.955(a)
14.56
.547
4.531
community social fabric as a local public agency
RDef item: Administrator-provided opportunities
for citizen engagement in planning & decision14.56
7.531
-.101
-.047(a)
making
RDef item: Administrator-provided opportunities
for citizen engagement in delivery of services or
14.81
6.138
.601
-.582(a)
projects
RDef item: Administrator-provided opportunities
for citizen engagement in monitoring or
15.44
10.103
-.404
.088
evaluation
RDef item: Coproduction's role in increasing
citizen understanding of accountability in
14.69
8.924
-.186
-.011(a)
American federalism
RDef item: Coproduction's role in increasing
citizen understanding of how to best exert
14.44
8.103
.127
-.203(a)
pressure in American federalism
RDef item: Coproduction's role in increasing
citizen understanding of checks and balances in
14.69
10.067
-.362
.179
American federalism
a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
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Reliability of Group One ordinal items for variable RDef:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTr'ansformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

%
N
8
100.0
0
.0
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Cronbach's
Alpha
.671

N of Items
3

Item-Total Statistics

RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of
accountability in American federalism
RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of how
to best exert pressure in American
federalism
RDef item: Coproduction's role in
increasing citizen understanding of
checks and balances in American
federalism

Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

3.00

2.000

.662

.321

2.75

3.929

.174

.855

3.00

1.143

.788

.063

Reliability of Group Two ordinal items for variable RDef:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
%
100.0
.0
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

00 O 00

N

Cases

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.554

N of Items
3
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Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
Scale
if Item
Variance if
Deleted Item Deleted
RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
delivery of services or projects
RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
monitoring or evaluation
RDef item: Administrator-provided
opportunities for citizen engagement in
planning & decision-making

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

2.13

2.696

.707

.106

2.75

3.929

.121

.727

1.88

1.268

.493

.338

Reliability of Group Three ordinal items for variable RDef:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin I n s t
A p r i l 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
8
100.0
.0
0
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.623

N of Items
4
Item-Total Statistics

RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an individual
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as an agency
administrator
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local
administrative unit
RDef item: Administrator's connection to
community social fabric as a local public
agency

Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

4.81

4.424

.327

.630

4.50

6.000

.252

.643

4.81

4.424

.786

.339

4.81

4.138

.397

.570
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Descriptives of scaled items for variable RDef:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
DoGuments\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

RDef item: Extent of
evidence for dealing with
ethical issues

89

0

3

1.67

1.338

RDef item: Extent of
evidence of agency
serving the needs of the
community

89

0

3

.46

.942

RDef item: Extent of
evidence of agency
connection to social fabric
of the community

89

0

2

.38

.776

RDef item: Extent of
evidence of provision for
civic engagement

80

0

3

.26

.807

Valid N (listwise)

80

T-Test of scaled items for variable RDef:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
One-Sample Statistics

RDef item: Extent of evidence for dealing with ethical
issues
RDef item: Extent of evidence of agency serving the
needs of the community
RDef item: Extent of evidence of agency connection to
social fabric of the community
RDef item: Extent of evidence of provision for civic
engagement

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

89

1.67

1.338

.142

89

.46

.942

.100

89

.38

.776

.082

80

.26

.807

.090
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One-Sample Test

RDef item: Extent of evidence for
dealing with ethical issues
RDef item: Extent of evidence of
agency serving the needs of the
community
RDef item: Extent of evidence of
agency connection to social fabric
of the community
RDef item: Extent of evidence of
provision for civic engagement

Test Value = 0
95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Sig. (2Mean
tailed) Difference
Lower
Upper

t

df

11.804

88

.000

1.674

1.39

1.96

4.613

88

.000

.461

.26

.66

4.643

88

.000

.382

.22

.55

2.908

79

.005

.263

.08

.44

Reliability of scaled items for variable RDef:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

80
9
89

%
89.9
10.1
100.0

a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha

N of Items

.195
Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
RDef item: Extent of evidence for
dealing with ethical issues
RDef item: Extent of evidence of
agency serving the needs of the
community
RDef item: Extent of evidence of
agency connection to social

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

.98

4.632

-.336

.868

2.21

2.650

.296

-.157(a)

2.53

3.113

.537

-.211(a)
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fabric of the community
RDef item: Exteiit of evidence of
2.46
2.606
.498
-.364(a)
provision for civic engagement
a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.

Reliability
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
%
80
89.9
9
10.1
100.0
89
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Exciuded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.868

N of Items
3

Item-Total Statistics
Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

RDef item: Extent of evidence of
agency serving the needs of the
community

.46

1.796

.713

.896

RDef iterri: Extent of evidence of
agency connection to social fabric of
the community

.78

2.734

.810

.819

RDef item: Extent of evidence of
provision for civic engagement

.71

2.056

.832

.734
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Maximal reliability of scaled items for variable RDef:
Agreements instrument
[DataSet2] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Agreements
Instrument IA.sav
Case Processing Summary
%
N
89.9
80
9
10.1
89
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.896

N of Items
2
Item-Total Statistics

•

Scale
Mean if
Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

RDef item: Extent of evidence of agency
connection to social fabric of the
.26
.652
.856
(a)
community
RDef item: Extent of evidence of
.339
.20
.856
•(a)
provision for civic engagement
a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
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Descriptives of ordinal and scaled items for variable Fos:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Fost item: Shrinkage of agency budgets is a
causative factor in agency desire for
coproduction partnerships

8

0

3

1.50

1.069

Fost item: Coproduction leads to civic
engagement in governance

8

2

3

2.38

.518

Fost item: Extent that administrator seeks
active community involvement on behalf of
agency

8

0

3

1.50

.926

Fost item: Extent that administrator is
comfortable sharing power

8

0

3

1.25

1.282

Fost item: Extent that administrator is
motivated by seeking the greater common
good in planning and decisions

8

2

3

2.63

.518

Fost item: Other factors that foster
partnerships in coproduction-scaled

8

3

3

3.00

.000

Fost item: Other factors that foster broader
citizen engagement in governance-scaled

8

1

3

2.50

.926

Valid N (listwise)

8
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T-Test of ordinal and scaled items for variable Fos:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
One-Sample Statistics

Fost item: Shrinkage of agency budgets is a
causative factor in agency desire for
coproduction partnerships
Fost item: Coproduction leads to civic
engagement in governance
Fost item: Extent that administrator seeks
active community involvement on behalf of
agency
Fost item: Extent that administrator is
comfortable sharing power
Fost item: Extent that administrator is motivated
by seeking the greater common good in
planning and decisions
Fost item: Other factors that foster partnerships
in coproduction-scaled
Fost item: Other factors that foster broader
citizen engagement in governance-scaled

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

8

1.50

1.069

.378

8

2.38

.518

.183

8

1.50

.926

.327

8

1.25

1.282

.453

8

2.63

.518

.183

8

3.00

.000(a)

.000

8

2.50

.926

.327

a t cannot be computed because the standard deviation is 0.
One-Sample Test

t
Fost item: Shrinkage of agency budgets
is a causative factor in agency desire for
coproduction partnerships
Fost item: Coproduction leads to civic
engagement in governance
Fost item: Extent that administrator
seeks active community involvement on
behalf of agency
Fost item: Extent that administrator is
comfortable sharing power
Fost item: Extent that administrator is
motivated by seeking the greater
common good in planning and decisions
Fost item: Other factors that foster
broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

Test Value * 0
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Sig. (2- Mean
df tailed) Difference
Lower
Upper

3.969

7

.005

1.500

.61

2.39

12.979

7

.000

2.375

1.94

2.81

4.583

7

.003

1.500

.73

2.27

2.758

7

.028

1.250

.18

2.32

14.346

7

.000

2.625

2.19

3.06

7.638

7

.000

2.500

1.73

3.27

Appendix K: SPSS Output 490

Reliability of ordinal and scaled items for variable Fos:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst;
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N
%
Cases
Valid
100.0
8
Excluded(a)
.0
0
Total
100.0
8
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Cronbach's
Alpha
.591

N of Items
7

Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

Fost item: Shrinkage of agency budgets
is a causative factor in agency desire for
coproduction partnerships

13.25

9.357

-.044

.701

Fost item: Coproduction leads to civic
engagement in governance

12.38

9.411

.169

.592

13.25

6.500

.605

.429

13.50

4.571

.730

.309

Fost item: Extent that administrator is
motivated by seeking the greater
common good in planning and decisions

12.13

8.696

.410

.542

Fost item: Other factors that foster
partnerships in coproduction-scaled

11.75

10.214

.000

.608

Fost item: Extent that administrator
seeks active community involvement on
behalf of agency
Fost item: Extent that administrator is
comfortable sharing power

Fost item: Other factors that foster
broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

12.25

7.357

.398

.518

Appendix K: SPSS Output 491
Reliability
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
N
CD

Valid
ExCluded(
.0
a)
100.0
Total
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Cronbach's
Alpha
.701

00

O

Cases

Reliability Statistics

%
100.0

N of Items
6

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Fost item: Coproduction
leads to civic engagement in
governance
Fost item: Extent that
administrator seeks active
community involvement on
behalf of agency
Fost item: Extent that
administrator is comfortable
sharing power
Fost item: Extent that
administrator is motivated by
seeking the greater common
good in planning and
decisions
Fost item: Other factors that
foster partnerships in
coproduction-scaled
Fost item: Other factors that
foster broader citizen
engagement in governancescaled

Scale Variance
if item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

10.88

8.125

.327

.692

11.75

5.929

.570

.610

12.00

3.714

.810

.493

10.63

7.696

.485

.661

10.25

9.357

.000

.730

10.75

6.500

.424

.666
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Reliability
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary
Reliability Statistics
N

%
100.0
.0
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Cronbach's
Alpha
.730

00

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

00 O

Cases

N of Items
5

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Fost item: Coproduction
leads to civic engagement in
governance
Fost item: Extent that
administrator seeks active
community involvement on
behalf of agency
Fost item: Extent that
administrator is comfortable
sharing power
Fost item: Extent that
administrator is motivated by
seeking the greater common
good in planning and
decisions
Fost item: Other factors that
foster broader citizen
engagement in governancescaled

Scale Variance
if Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

7.88

8.125

.327

.738

8.75

5.929

.570

.651

9.00

3.714

.810

.526

7.63

7.696

.485

.705

7.75

6.500

.424

.711
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Reliability
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
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Case Processing Summary
N
%
Valid
100.0
Excluded(
.0
a)
Total
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
CO

Cases

O
00

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.738

N of Items
4

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Fost item: Extent that
administrator seeks active
community involvement on
behalf of agency

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

6.38

5.125

.511

.690

6.63

2.839

.843

.453

Fost item: Extent that
administrator is motivated
by seeking the greater
common good in planning
and decisions

5.25

6.786

.397

.758

Fost item: Other factors
that foster broader citizen
engagement in
governance-scaled

5.38

5.125

.511

.690

Fost item: Extent that
administrator is comfortable
sharing power
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Maximal reliability of ordinal and scaled items for variable Fos:
Administrators instrument
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Case Processing Summary
N
%
8
100.0
0
.0
8
100.0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Cases

Valid
Exciuded(a)
Total

Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's
Alpha
.758

N of Items
3

Item-Total Statistics

Scale
Scale Mean if Variance if
Item Deleted Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

Fost item: Extent that administrator
seeks active community involvement
on behalf of agency
3.75

3.929

.545

.727

4.00

2.286

.737

.500

2.75

3.929

.545

.727

Fost item: Extent that administrator is
comfortable sharing power

Fost item: Other factors that foster
broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled
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Descriptives of ordinal and scaled items for variable Inn:
Administrators instrument
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Descriptive Statistics
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Inhib item: Legal system
inhibits broader civic
engagement in governance

8

0

2

.63

.744

Inhib item: Other factors
that inhibit partnerships in
coproduction-scaled

8

1

3

1.75

.707

Inhib item: Other factors
that inhibit broader citizen
engagement in
governance-scaled

8

0

1

.75

.463

Valid N (listwise)

8

T-Test of ordinal and scaled items for variable Inn:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
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One-Sample Statistics

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

Inhib item: Legal system
inhibits broader civic
engagement in governance

8

.63

.744

.263

Inhib item: Other factors
that inhibit partnerships in
coproduction-scaled

8

1.75

.707

.250

8

.75

.463

.164

Inhib item: Other factors
that inhibit broader citizen
engagement in
governance-scaled
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One-Sample Test

Inhib item: Legal system inhibits
broader civic engagement in
governance
Inhib item: Other factors that inhibit
partnerships in coproduction-scaled
Inhib item: Other factors that inhibit
broader citizen engagement in
governance-scaled

Test Value = 0
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
Sig. (2Mean
taiied) Difference
Lower
Upper

t

df

2.376

7

.049

.625

.00

1.25

7.000

7

.000

1.750

1.16

2.34

4.583

7

.003

.750

.36

1.14

Reliability of ordinal and scaled items for variable Inh:
Administrators instrument
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\Gary\My
Documents\PSU\Dissertation\Methods and Data\Data\SPSS\Admin Inst
April 2 Orig Data ReTransformed.sav
Case Processing Summary

Reliability Statistics

N
Cronbach's
Alpha(a)
N of Items
8
100.0
-13.714
0
.0
a The value is negative due to a negative average
8
100.0
variables in'the ^ v 3 " 3 1 1 0 6 among items. This violates reliability model
a Listwise deletion based on all
assumptions. You may want to check item codings.
procedure.
Cases

Valid
Excluded(a)
Total

Item-Total Statistics

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted
Inhib item: Legal system
inhibits broader civic
engagement in governance
Inhib item: Other factors
that inhibit partnerships in
coproduction-scaled

Scale
Variance if
Item Deleted

Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation

Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted

2.50

.571

-.889

-.500(a)

1.38

.554

-.882

-.774(a)

Inhib item: Other factors
that inhibit broader citizen
.268
2.38
-.745
-5.867(a)
engagement in
governance-scaled
a The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability
model assumptions. You may want to check item codings.

